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Social L im its  to  E co n o m ic  T h eo ry  
Jon M ulberg
Summary
THIS DISSERTATION effects a complete re-orientation o f econom ic theory. It shows how the economic 
cannot be analysed separately from the political and the social, and lays the foundation for an inte­
grated political economy.
The work examines the philosophical difficulties faced by economists, and re-draws the history of 
economic thought as a response to methodological dilemmas.
The traditional History of Economics textbooks re-write the history in terms of the contemporary 
paradigm. This dissertation, by contrast, shows how the philosophical debates have shaped the tra­
jectory o f economics, and how the orientations of the schools undergo major changes so as to attempt 
to deal with the fundamental dilemmas o f a 'policy science’. It brings out the 'hidden history’ of eco­
nomics, and shows both how laissez-faire can only be defended by dropping any notion o f economic 
'science', and how  economic theory has an implied political theory. It then considers the debate over 
political economic theory and the consequences for econom ic organisation and for environmental 
disruption.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
... Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in the tempestuous seasons they can only 
tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again. | J.M.KeynesI
I. POSITIVE SCIENCE
TO BEGIN w ith  the facts. For m any years now. a  great num ber o f p eo p le  have been 
dying through  poverty. T his question  o f poverty appears to be an  econom ic 
phenom enon. Let us therefore look  to  the econom ic textbooks for the so lu tion , or at 
least for som e sort o f explanation. O n m y shelf. I find Laidler [1982]. w hose book 
begins w ith  the explanation that ''E c o n o m ics  is about scarcity”  w hich looks prom is­
ing. especially  when Laidler continues: "T h e  word ‘scarcity’ is used h ere  in a  special 
sense: it re fers to  a state o f affairs in w hich, given the wants o f  a society a t any partic­
ular m om ent, the m eans available to  satisfy them are not sufficient” .
T his is obv iously  the very state o f  affa irs we are concerned with! W e ea g erly  read on:
If all desires cannot be totally satisfied, then choices have to be made as to which of them are going to 
be satisfied, and to what extent. To say that economics is about scarcity then is also to say that it is 
about choice lop.cit p.l 1.
Surely there is some confusion here?  W e have before us the ultim ate ca se  o f scarcity 
—  starvation  —  and the econom ic scien tist is talking about choices. O u r  confusion is 
soon com pounded when later w e read  “ The objects o f  the consum ers  choice are 
goods and services [ibid p .10].”
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But the problem  is precisely that there are no goods o r  services! C learly  this approach 
will not be o f  u se. and indeed a reading o f the next 3 00  pages would confirm  this. Yet 
we w ould turn in vain to o ther econom ics texts fo r o u r  answ er, since they all adopt 
this ‘ch o ice ' definition o f  econom ics (w hich as w e shall see. was introduced by R ob­
bins in 1932), an d  this is inadequate for the problem . T h is  is a strange position for a 
leading social science to be in. It appears to be unable even  to contem plate one o f  the 
main problem  areas o f the contem porary  world. 1
T he them e o f  our investigation in the pages below  is that there is a  central 
dilem m a in econom ics. This d ilem m a is betw een the w ish  to em ploy the m ethods o f  
positive science, and the contrad ictory  desire to  m ake contributions to  policy ques­
tions. W e w ill show  that this predeliction for a positive  ‘policy sc ience’ cannot be 
achieved, and  we will show how  the developm ent o f  th e  discipline can  be view ed as 
an attem pt to  respond to this dilem m a.
O ur poin t o f  departure is the argum ent that a positive  policy science o f  econom ­
ics cannot be sustained. In this introductory chapter w e  will consider the argum ents in 
favour o f  such a positive science, and  we will w itness the tendency for the m ethodo­
logical positions to  m ove aw ay from  positivism  tow ards instrumental and evo lu tion ­
ary approaches. T he tw o chapters follow ing will show  the inability to  put a positive 
econom ics into operation.
An alternative approach is required, and chap ters four and five w ill look a t nor­
mative approaches to econom ic theory. The thrust o f  o u r  argum ent will be that it is 
not possible to develop  an econom ic theory o f any substance without also  including 
the political and social. E conom ic theory, w e will m ain tain , must a lso  contain social 
and political theory  if  it is to be o f  any consequence. W e will reject the idea that there 
^an be a positive science o f  econom ics that is som ehow  ‘neutral’, and  w ill suggest 
that all econom ic theory —  and the consequent po lic ies  derived from  it —  contain 
implicit political and social value-judgem ents. It is  fo r this reason that a norm ative 1
1 An explanation of why economics is unable to consider the question of poverty is contained 
in Mulberg [19871
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theory o f  po litical econom y is needed —  a  theory th a t explicitly  includes social 
norm s and  the political structure as well as the questions o f  production and  exchange 
which are usually  regarded as constitu tive o f  econom ic science. T o develop  su ch  a 
theory w ould  be a  tall order indeed, but in the last tw o chapters we will give an  o u t­
line o f  som e o f  the possible constituents o f  such a theory.
It m ay be w ell to  begin by defining ou r term s. T he term  'm ethodo logy ' is o ften  used 
as a grandiose synonym  for 'techn ique '. T h is  is not the sense in w hich we are u sin g  it 
here. W e shall be em ploying it in its o rig inal m eaning: the study o f the principles and 
procedures o f  an  organised discipline .2 T he  practise o f  m ethodological enqu iry  is 
therefore connected  with epistem ology an d  ontology, an d  w ith the philosophy o f  s c i­
ence in general. W e will not be overly concerned  with these areas how ever, since our 
case is based upon application o f  know ledge rather than its acquisition. N onetheless, 
a b rief sum m ary  o f  the main positions o f  the philosophy o f  science will be usefu l, 
especially  since w e are investigating the claim s o f 'p o s itiv e ' econom ics. W e will 
therefore g ive special attention to the philosophy o f positivism .
W e can  begin this task by em ploying  K eat and U rry ’s tripartite classification of 
the conceptions o f  natural science. T his classification will com e under strain later, but 
will serve o u r purposes for now. T he au thors outline three positions —  positiv ism , 
realism  and  conventionalism  [1975 p .4 |. Positivism  they  classify as the belief that 
science consists o f  the attem pt to obtain "p red ic tiv e  and  explanatory know ledge”  o f 
the w orld as  it ex ists. T his is achieved by theorising the existence o f  regularities, 
which enab le prediction and explanation. These theories are objectively tested  by 
observations and  experim ents [ibid p.4].
R ealists a lso  believe in science as em pirica l and objec tive , but posit a  d ifference 
betw een explanation  and prediction, the form er being prim ary. T his involves go ing  
'b ey o n d ' regu la rities to the causal m echanism s involved, w hich m ay well necessitate  
positing "u n o b serv a b le  en tities”  [ibid p .5].
2 From the Greek: meihodos ‘method' and logos ‘study of.
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C onventionalists  reject science as  em pirical and  objective [ibid]. A s a  result, the 
goals o f  science becom e a m atter o f  debate, and conventionalists  tend  not to share 
com m on v iew s on w hat scientific k n o w led g e consists of.
W e can  see that a  belief in ob jec tiv ity  in science is therefore insufficien t to d is­
tinguish positive science. In addition, th e  positivist w ill put forw ard c la im s about the 
content o f  explanation  and its re la tio n  to  prediction, the process o f  observation  and 
the role o f  theory . Fay cites four essen tia l features o f  m odem  positivism : the lim ited 
account o f  explanation, the foundation  o f  know ledge in  the language o f  neutral obser­
vation, the ideal o f  value-free sc ien c e , and the assertion  o f  m ethodological un ity  
[1975 p. 13]. O ur interest for the first part o f  th is chap ter w ill be on  the first tw o o f  
these features.
A lthough m uch o f the w ork on  th e  philosophy o f  science has focused  upon this 
las t notion o f  the methodological u n ity  o f  the sciences, w e w ill no t be directly  con­
cerned  w ith  the problem  o f m onism , b u t w ill instead be looking a t th e  possibility  o f 
positive social science.
Before w e do  so, it  m ight be as  w e ll to enquire a s  to the sta tus o f  the philoso­
phies o f sc ience  them selves. P ositiv is ts  suggest th a t science consists o f, am ongst 
o ther th ings, explanatory and p red ic tive know ledge o f  the world. Is  th issu g g e s tio n  
itse lf explanatory  and predictive? It w ou ld  not appear to  be possib le to  g ive a  posi­
tiv ist account o f  w hat is actually a  c rite rion  fo r sc ience  —  to attem pt to  do so is  to  
fa ll into an  infinite regress. M odem  positivism  has m oved aw ay fro m  a  theory o f  
scientific m eaning  tow ards w hat K olakow ski ca lls  a “ norm ative attitude”  to 
know ledge, tow ards the postulation o f  crite ria  fo r the dem arcation o f  science from 
non-science. B ut if  the positivist p h ilo sophy  consists in fac t Qf no rm ative criteria, 
these crite ria  have to be justified no rm atively . W hy have positive science a t all? W hat 
does science achieve that —  say —  re lig io n  does not?
Science is  often justified in te rm s o f  instrum entality  —  science is  valuable as an 
instrum ent fo r problem -solving .3 P o sitiv e  science is  ‘a  good th ing ’ because it  g ives
3 The term 'instrumental' is used in many different senses throughout the literature. We will try 
to distinguish these as necessary.
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us know ledge w h ic h  enables us  to  im prove our l o t  T h is is  the po in t o f  the exercise. 
Fay believes th a t  i t  w ould be the cla im  o f  m any social scien tists  that
... just as the natural sciences have provided men with a certain kind of knowledge by which they can 
control their natural environment, thereby making it more hospitable and productive, so also the 
knowledge gained from social science will enable men to control their social environment, thereby 
making it more harmonious and congruent with the needs and wants of its members [Fay 1975 p-14J.
Social science is there fo re  required in o rd er to obtain instrum ents fo r social im prove­
m e n t T he p o s itiv is ts ’ claim  is th a t tw o elem ents w ith in  positive science m ake it 
uniquely p laced  to  provide these instrum ents. F irstly , they  cla im  that the value- 
neutrality o f  po sitiv ism  m eans tha t on ly  positive science can  provide objective 
knowledge o f  so c ie ty , and that this is superior to  sub jective view points. T hey  also 
claim  that th e  a b ility  to  predict g ives us instrum ental know ledge w hich w ould other­
w ise be lack ing  [F a y  1975 p.21].
T he n o rm ativ e  justification fo r the dem arcation o f  science from  non-science 
along positive l in e s  is  that it  g ives us  control over o u r en v iro n m e n t It is  ab le to  do 
this because it  g iv e s  us both the ab ility  to predict th e  fu tu re and  to  understand the 
present in an  o b je c tiv e  manner.
W e w ill h a v e  m ore to  say  on  the em phasis on objec tiv ity  la ter in fh e  chapter. 
O ur interest h e re  w ill be in  the idea  o f  ‘know ledge’. W e suggest th a t the positivist 
insistence on  k n o w led g e  as being exclusively  based on  observation  p laces severe res­
trictions on th e  ab ility  to  understand and  consequently  to  predict. T he justification for 
positivism  in  in stru m en ta l term s (in  term s o f instrum ents fo r contro l) tended to  sug­
gest that th e  sc ie n c e  w ould in  som e m anner enhance o u r pred ic tive ability  beyond 
that o f m ere c h a n c e ; w hich w ould usually  be taken to  m ean  tha t science cou ld  offer 
us causal k n o w led g e . W e w ould ju stify  a prediction by  exp la in ing  the causes o f  the 
phenom ena u n d e r  investigation.
T his re q u ire m e n t o f  causal explanation creates considerable friction w ithin the 
positivist p h ilo so p h y , given the insistence on a limited accoun t o f  explanation and o f 
observation b e in g  th e  foundation o f  know ledge. A lthough the idea  o f  causality  is now
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accepted as im plied by e x p la n a tio n  [H em pel 1966 p .52-53], m any o f w hat w e  would 
usually regard as explanations in v o lv e  non-observational en tities —  v iruses, m agne­
tism , electrical resistance, fr ic tio n  o r  even (from  econom ics) satisfaction. T h a t is to 
say, w e require theories an d  th eo re tic a l term s to  develop  causal analysis. O f  course, 
the introduction o f  theories m ark s  a  significant w eakening o f  the positiv ist position, 
and it is far from  clear how  th ey  sh o u ld  be treated. M ach believed that positive  sci­
ence should have no in terest in  th eo ry  —  these m ay be a  useful heuristic d ev ic e  for 
the practising scientist, bu t a re  o f  n o  consequence fo r the science itse lf [C aldw ell 
1982 p.23]. T hat is, w e sh o u ld  re s tr ic t ourselves to  the discovery  o f regu la rities. This 
appears to m ake non-trivial sc ien c e  next-to-im possible though, since w e w o u ld  have 
no method o f  deciding w h ich  em p irica l regularities to  consider, and w h ich  experi­
m ents to perform . W e also  n e e d  to  b e  able to  interpret o u r observations; th e  regu la ri­
ties w e observe will require th e o rie s  to  explain them  [H em pel 1966 p.70].
The m odem  positivists u su a lly  accept the centrality  o f  explanation: “ T o  explain 
the phenom ena o f  the ph y sica l w o r ld  is  one o f  the prim ary  objectives o f  th e  natural 
sciences”  [H em pel 1966 p .4 7 ]. In  fact, one o f  the central cla im s o f  positiv ists  is  the 
sym metry betw een exp lanation  a n d  prediction [K eat and  U rry 1975 p . l l ,  Caldw ell 
1982 p.29]. T h is is because o f  th e  fo rm  o f  explanation  now  adopted, k n o w n  as the 
‘covering law ’ m odel. C o v erin g  la w s  arc conditional statem ents; given the an tecedent 
condition, w e can conclude th e  explanandum . T he explanandum  can be predic ted  
given know ledge o f  the ex is ten c e  o f  the antecedent conditions, and the co v e rin g  law 
can be used as an  a  posteriori ex p lan atio n  o f  the explanandum  [Keat an d  U rry  1975 
p .l 1]. The explanations ca n  th e re fo re  be tested by th e ir predictions. H em pel refers to 
this form o f  explanation a s  deductive-nomological [B enton 1977 p .55; F ay  1975 
p.32]. N onetheless, som e fo rm  o f  theoretical analysis is  still required to  e n a b le  con­
sideration o f  the covering law s , s in c e  we have to  d istinguish  our causal explanations 
from  accidental g enera lisa tions .4 . T o  do  this w e w ould require in  particu lar
4 e g-
“ all the coins in my pocket are shillings
This coin is in my pocket
Therefore it is a shilling”  [Hempel 1966 p.56, cf. Benton 1977 p.10]
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counterfactual conditionals [Hempel 1966 p .5 6 ].5 . B ut counterfactual conditionals 
can seldom  be observed w ithout controlled ex p e rim en t, w hich is not usually  possible 
in social science.
Perhaps we can get round the problem  o f  cond itional statem ents by placing less 
em phasis on deductive explanation. T he o th e r m o d e  o f  explanation frequently  d is­
cussed Hempel calls Inductive-Statistical. W e  ca n  perhaps explain an  event induc­
tively by reference to its frequency o f  past o cc u rre n ce s. W e m ight exp la in , fo r exam ­
ple, the fact that inflation rose as unem ploym ent fe ll by  the fact that th is has occurred 
in, say, 90%  o f  all past cases.
It is important to note that this m ode o f  e x p la n a tio n  is  not a  logical probability, 
w hich is a question of the confirm ation o f  an  h y p o th esis , but is a  statistical probabil­
ity, a  “ quantitative relation between repeatab le kinds o f  events: a  certain  kind  o f  out­
com e ... and a certain kind o f  random  p ro cess ...”  [p .63].
G iven this definition, w e may question w h e th e r a  statistical ‘explanation ’ is pos­
sible [K eat and  Urry 1975 p.13]. The process is  desc ribed  as random . A  poker hand 
w hich I deal to m yself is no t “ expla ined”  by  its p ro b a b ility ; if  I dea l four aces I 
w ould not norm ally be inclined to “ ex p la in ”  th is  ev e n t to  the o ther players. I was 
lucky, that is all there is to  i t  In this sense, e x p la n a tio n  is precluded. 6 W hat can 
perhaps be explained is the pattern o f  repeatab le  ev e n ts. 7 O f  course, a s  the analysis 
becom es exhaustive, the hypotheses becom e m o re  like  a  covering law  model: the 
overall probabilities tend to  unity, and  the tw o  ty p e s  o f  probability  outlined  by H em ­
pel tend to  merge.
The inductive model ca n n o t then, o ffer ex p la n a tio n s  o f  events. It can enable us 
to  m ake predictions on the basis o f regularities tho u g h . T his would therefore appear 
to  g ive tw o choices: to either break w ith the re q u irem en t o f  explanation o r to  adopt a
3 i.e.: If not A then not B
6 Fay disagrees with this analysis (1975 p.37].
7 Fay jflso argues that statistical explanations of mass events are as much explanatory as deduc­
tive models, and that this would maintain the symmetry of explanation and prediction. (1975 
p.37b ff.]. Although we do not have space to discuss this question here, we would suggest that this 
form of 'explanation' is somewhat empty.
Mulberg: Social Limits to Economic Theory
w eak version o f  deductive explanation involving theory . T heories are usually  
regarded by positivists as containing two types o f principles: th e ir ow n internal tau to ­
logies and ‘bridge princip les’ [som etim es called ‘correspondence ru les’]. T he bridge 
principles link the theoretical term s to observable entities. It is th is  that g ives a  theory 
its “ explanatory pow er”  and its testability [H em pel 1966 p .74 ]. T his is a  fairly 
significant departure from the concept o f testability therefore: th e  theory as a  w hole is 
never tested. T he only test is o f  the im plications o f  the th eo ry  in term s already 
(antecendently) available. T his m akes testing problem atic, s in ce  we m ust assum e the 
correctness o f  the correspondence rules. The explanation as a  w hole is never tested 
against observation.
It w ould appear that the positivist philosophy as a  w ho le  cannot be sustained. 
W e m ust e ith er accept theoretical concepts w hich v io la te  the princip le o f 
observation-based knowledge or abandon the congruency o f  explanation  and  p red ic­
tion.
W e have already m entioned the idea o f  inductive/statistica l reasoning that does 
not offer explanation. In fact we can go e ither way —  p red ic tio n s  that do  not expla in  
or explanations that do not predict. O f the latter, the m ost com m on  form  are those 
know n as ‘functional’ explanations, which broadly consist o f  expla in ing  processes in 
term s o f  the function played in achieving an  end-state. W e shall see how  there is a 
tendency fo r social explanation to adopt this form. The m ain  question  in an  exam ina­
tion o f  functional explanations is the dom ain o f  the theory . A s  special theories these 
form s o f  explanation m ay have some legitimacy, but as general theories, and  as 
social theories, counterfactual conditionals cannot be supported , and functional 
explanations o f  this level tend towards bland assertions o f  the inevitability  o f  the 
status quo. T he whole idea o f control, w hich was one o f  the reasons for our in terest in 
positivism , is lost when one adopts evolutionary/functional ana lysis —  indeed there 
is a strong tendency tow ards determ inistic theories. W e w ill co m e across this m ode o f 
reasoning later, in the w orks o f V eblen and o f  the A ustrians.
T he alternative route is to  view theories as sim ply instrum ents to  ob tain  predic-
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dons: w e are no  longer concerned w ith explanation  a t all. Theories could be com ­
pletely false; a s  long  as they generate accurate predictions they will continue to be 
em ployed . T h is m ethodological instrum entalism  8 was m ooted by Friedm an —  we 
will consider it  in  g reater detail la ter in the chapter. W e w ould note in passing that 
both these v iew s d o  no t fit in w ell w ith  the tripartite classification that w e mentioned 
earlier. It is  unclear w hether m ethodological instrum entalism  is a form o f  positivism  
o r conven tionalism , w hereas functionalism  appears to  straddle the positivist/realist 
boundary. 9 A s w e  shall see, this often  m akes these argum ents difficult to  perceive, 
w hile on  the o th e r hand  those w ho present these m ethodological viewpoints m ay end 
up con trad icting  th e  philosophical trad ition  they purport to  uphold.
W e have seen  how  the observation  that the stipulations o f  positive science can­
not them selves be justified positivistically  has opened  up cracks that have spread 
throughout the en tire  structure. A  positive philosophy o f  science has to be justified 
norm atively in te rm s o f  control, y e t such contro l requires causal explanations which 
contrad ict the ten e ts  o f  positivism . W e are  e ither forced to  adm it theoretical concepts 
and m ove tow ards realism , or to  m ove aw ay from  positivism  e ither in the direction o f 
conventionalist instrum ental theories o r  tow ards determ inist evolutionary theory.
W e will n o w  turn our attention to  econom ic theory, and  look a t the effect o f 
these problem s upon econom ics. C hap ter tw o  will trace how  the m ethodological 
problem s ou tlined  here have determ ined  the trajectory  o f  econom ic theory from the 
utilitarians to  m o d em  theory. T he next sec tion  o f  the present chapter will look at the 
m ethodological deba tes a s  applied to  econom ic science, o r to  use Fey’s term , the
* It is important to note that the term ‘instrumentalism’ has a different meaning here to that we 
used in our discussion of Fay’s work. The term can have many different meanings — instruments 
have different functions. What is meant here is methodological instrumentalism, that theories are 
instruments in generating predictions. This should be distinguished from policy instrumentalism, 
which concerns the use of science to generate policies. The two views ate, however, linked [Keat 
and Urry 1975 p.63J.
9 Keat and Urry consider instrumentalism as a form of conventionalism, but they note that it 
has many similarities with extreme views of positivism, and it is easy to move from one to the oth­
er. Moreover, they lead to similar forms of activity [1975 p.64]. Hollis and Nell (in their discus­
sion of Friedman) seem to place instrumentalism in a similar position, but they also maintain that 
pragmatism is a form of positivism [1975 p.4]: they seem to have little space for conventionalism 
at all. In this, they follow Kolakowski [1972 p.181]. Possibly the more empathetic analysis is Ben­
ton [1977 p.68], who suggests that there are different forms of the instrumentalist methodology.
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econom ic “ m etatheory” . The final sec tio n  o f  this chapter will show how the 
m etatheory adopted by econom ists in troduces unwarranted lim itations on the method 
and  scope o f the substantive econom ic ana lysis.
II. PO SITIV E E C O N O M ICS
T he problem s of positive explanations in social science are com pounded by the fact 
that the causes are often m otivational in natu re . A positivist social explanation would 
therefore often be teleological —  it w ou ld  expla in  action in term s o f  its final ob jec­
tive. T his form o f  explanation was in troduced  by J.S . M ill in the guise o f his 
m eans/end  dichotom y, w hich co rresponded w ith the distinction between fact and 
value. T he scientist could consider the b e s t m eans for a  given end, but could make no 
judgem en ts upon the ends them selves. A t the same tim e, this m ethod o f analysis 
introduced  the requisite teleological exp lanation  [M yrdal 1933 p.206].
M yrdal points out a  problem  fo r econom ists  adopting this line. If we do adopt 
the end/m eans form ulation, “ we arrive, n o t at the laissez-faire inherent in the philo­
sophy o f natural law, but at som e kind o f  ‘econom ic p lanning’ The consequence 
is a  need  for justification o f  laissez-faire:
This does not mean that non-intervention may not be looked upon as a more appropriate policy to pro­
mote a given end than any alternative. But it is never a foregone conclusion. It can be seen to be the 
case only after the consequences of all possible courses have been explored. Modem economic liberals 
attempt to prove the desirability of non-intervention in this manner. By acknowledging that this kind of 
proof is required, they accept the end-means scheme, and the element of planning inherent in it. 11933 
p.207]
T he later classics and  the m arginalist econom ists w ere therefore set two tasks to 
ju s tify  laissez-faire: to  show that their conclusion  is em pirically-based, and also to 
show  that no non-m arket knowledge o f  po licy  instrum ents is possible. To complete 
both  these tasks sim ultaneously was to  p ro v e  impossible.
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Myrdal notes that th is dichotom y o f m eans and ends w a s required  as an out­
g row th  o f  the philosophy o f  natural law. U nder this ph ilo sophy  th e  propelling cause 
w as identified with the final cause 10 —  there w as a direct co n n e ctio n  between is and 
ought. W hat ‘is ’ existed because it ought to. T he end and m ea n s w ere both known a 
priori. The early classics w ould  therefore have no need fo r th e  m eans/end dicho­
tom y. This only occurred w h e n  propelling cause and final ca u se  w ere distinguished 
[ibid.], which aw aited the developm ent of the utilitarian p h ilo so p h y , and the d istinc­
tion w as explicit in M ill. H e distinguishes betw een the art o f  e c o n o m ic s  —  the pro­
duction  o f effects, and the science o f  econom ics —  the classification  o f  causes [1836 
p. 151 ]. The utilitarianism  o f  M ill was therefore not yet a  full b lo w n  positivism , but 
contained some rem nants o f  th e  natural law philosophy. M o reover. “ It was then still 
be lieved”  according to M yrdal
that ends can be established scientifically, the only difference being that proof of those ends was 
required: proof was no longer seen to lie in 'the nature of things'. As before, ends were thought to be a 
proper subject of research, requiring, however, special methods for their discovery (ibid p.208).
In spite o f  the fact/value dichotom y, the identification o f  h edon ism  with positiv­
ism cam e after Mill; M ill’s  m ethod was a prioristic. He b e liev e d  tha t the entire sci­
ence o f  Political Econom y “ reasons from assumed prem ises —  from  premises which 
m igh t be totally w ithout foundation  in fact, and  w hich are not p re te n d ed  to be univer­
sally  in accordance with i t” . T h is  has the consequence that the conc lusions “ are only 
true ... in the abstract”  [ibid p .144  original em phasis]. W e m u st a llow . M ill explains, 
for possible deviations w hen considering actual cases [ibid p . 150]. T he procedure is 
one o f  deduction from ab strac t premises w ith  assum ptions tha t ceteris rem ain 
paribus. Indeed, this a priori m ode o f investigation is the on ly  m o d e for the “ moral 
sciences” , o f  which Political Econom y is one. A posteriori investigations are only 
useful as an aid to deduction  in that they enab le us to verify  tru th  [ibid p. 153]. It is
10 Streeten's 1958 translation uses '•cause” for propelling cause and “ teleology" for final 
cause (German final). This seems to be an error, although 1 am happy to be conected on this 
matter.
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also  required  to put the science into practice, since abstractions do not hold [p .IS S ]. 
H ow ever, as B laug puts it, “ M ill cannot bring  h im self to equate a  failure to  verify  a  
p red ic tion  with a  refu tation  o f  the underlying theory . . ."  [B laug 1980 p .65], th e  
d iscrepancy  may be because ceteris are not paribus [M ill 1836 p.154].
U tilitarian political econom y is therefore saved from the possibility  o f  hav ing  to  
test its ac tions by being  im bued with a know ledge o f  ultim ate causes. T his line w a s 
con tinued  by C aim es [1875], who re-asserted  the position taken by M ill. T h e  
econom ist begins w ith  a know ledge o f  u ltim ate causes, but C aim es insists that these  
p rem ises are real [1875 p .87]. Political Econom y is therefore deductive, and  is 
hypothetica l because it  is conditional. V erification is aim ed only  at establishing the 
ex istence  o f  an tecedent conditions, not a t the testing  o f  theories.
T he first edition o f  C aim es was published  before Jev o n s’ Theory o f  Political 
Economy, and C aim es only  m akes a  few d isparaging  com m ents on the Theory in th e  
preface to  the second ed ition . Caim es had very  little time fo r the m athem atics o f  
Jevons. o r  at least fo r his view  that econom ic know ledge w ould be advanced in th is  
way. B y the time o f  John  N eville K eynes essay  on m ethodology [K eynes 1890], 
m athem atics was estab lished  as  an appropriate technique for the analysis o f ec o n o m ­
ics. Furtherm ore, the philosophy of utilitarianism  was proving an  em barrassm ent fo r 
reasons w e shall see in the next chapter, and  by the time o f  M arshall was v irtually  
abandoned. Neville K eynes' Scope and M ethod  w as contem porary w ith the w ork  o f  
M arshall —  they w ere colleagues at C am bridge —  and can therefore be said  to  
represent the end o f  the 'c la ss ic a l' m ethodology, and is a transition from the classical 
m ethodology to the new  m arginalism .
T h e  inability to  operationalise utilitarianism  created a need for m ethodological 
ad justm ent to m aintain the positivist philosophy o f  science. T he changes that K ey n es 
m ade w ere subtle but notable. Firstly, it w as no  longer possible to avoid em pirica l 
input. Induction w as now  to  be used both in the testing o f theories and in their d e r iv a ­
tion. Political E conom y “ m ust both begin w ith  observation and  end w ith o b se rv a­
tio n ”  [1890  p.227]. T he m atter o f  ceteris not being  paribus w as sim ply another p ro b ­
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lem  o f  th is particular d iscip line [ibid p .233].
T here were m any o th e r subtleties assoc ia ted  with the gradual abandonm ent o f 
utilitarianism . K eynes ou tlines the Senior-M ill-C aim es trad ition  o f  separating the 
positive science from the norm ative a r t o f  econom y, but qualifies th is  with the notion 
that the norm ative art is  social [ibid p .75]. T h e  science o f  po litical econom y was con­
cerned w ith  individuals w ith in  society, an d  since m orals w ere n o  longer regarded as
scientific. Political Econom y w as a  social ra the r than a  m oral science [ibid p .88].
rem ained .
E conom ic hum an repfaina-an abstraction, b u t one which was close  to  reality [p.124].
T his last w as fairly illustra tive o f  th e  nature o f  K eynes’ m ethodology. In line 
w ith the m ove aw ay from  utilitarianism , w e no longer have know ledge o f  ultimate 
causes it la Mill o r C aim es, bu t an  assertion  that econom ic m o tiv e s  are predominant, 
but w ith —  as B laug notes —  only “ casual em piricism ”  offered  as  evidence [Blaug 
1980 p .55]. T he problem  stem s from  th e  fac t that ends are n o  longer regarded as 
know n, but m ust be derived . F o r M ill the abstraction  o f econom ic behaviour from  all 
o ther aspects o f  behaviour w as an irre levance —  all w ere scien tific . Since both ends 
and  m eans are still know n, the definition o f  econom ic science is  arb itrary , and indeed 
M ill readily  adm its that h is definition o f  econom ic hum an is arb itrary  [M ill 1836 
p .144]. For K eynes th is is  n o t the case. S ince ends are not k n o w n , any abstraction 
m ay d ivorce econom ics from  reality . T h is  is  w hy (follow ing M arshall) he is hesitant 
about the application o f  th e  conclusions o f  Political Econom y —  ceteris m ay not be 
paribus.
T he central problem  w a s how to  o b ta in  a  social ethic from  a  positive m ethodo­
logical individualism . T h is w ill inevitab ly  break  som e o f  th e  p ositiv ist tenets. The 
u tilitarian philosophy —  w hich  w e c o n sid e r in more detail in  th e  next chapter —  
cla im ed that th is cou ld  b e  accom plished  because eth ics co u ld  be m easured 
scientifically. A s it becam e obvious that th is  cou ld  not be ac h iev ed , the only m ethod 
o f  m aintaining positivist ana lysis and m ain ta in  a  value-free sc ience  w as to avoid  con­
sidering ethics. W e shall see in the n ex t chapter that the so cia l ethic cannot be 
obtained. In m etatheoretical term s, the d ilem m a w as betw een th e  positivist crite ria  o f
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observation  an d  o f  lim ited explanation, and  th e  norm ative justification  in term s o f  
environm ental contro l, because the latter p laces  a lim it on  the m inim um  scope o f  
positive science: w e m ust be ab le to derive p o licy  instrum ents from  o u r social science 
in o rd er to ju s tify  the p ractise. T he positivist d ilem m a w hich em erged  w ith the fall o f  
utilitarianism  w as p recisely  how to deal w ith th e  ethical behaviour w hich the utilitari­
an s  tried to m ake scientific.
A s the positiv ist m ethodology cam e to  b e  estab lished  in B ritain  and m uch o f  
E urope and the U .S ., the m ethodological problem s associa ted  w ith positivism  
rem ained  stubbornly  resistan t to  attack. T he m ethodological deba tes which occured 
could  be view ed as  squabbles over w hich defensive strategy to  adop t to  try to  protect 
the positivist position . T h e  first innovation w a s influenced by the Austrians, w ho 
ac tually  never adopted  positivism . R obbins’s  Nature and Significance o f  Economic 
Science [1935 (1932)] attem pted  to deal w ith  th e  problem  o f  abstraction by positing 
scientific behaviour as  a  necessary condition o f  econom ic ac tion . Econom ic ac tion  is 
instrum ental in nature, and  consists o f  adop ting  m eans fo r a  given  end. How ever, 
there is a  further requirem ent fo r sufficiency —  there m ust be a  m ultiplicity o f ends 
and  a scarcity o f  m eans. T his scarcity will th e n  involve behaviour in the form  o f  
choosing  betw een m eans [1935 p l4 ] . In  keeping  w ith the positiv ist prescription, R ob­
bins suggests tha t E conom ics is neutral betw een en d s [ib id  p24].
T he identification o f  econom ics w ith  scientific teleo logy  is drawn from 
R obb ins’s con tac t w ith  the A ustrian school [C aldw ell 1982 pp .103 ff.]. H ow ever 
R obbins appears re luc tan t to  keep  the A ustrians com pany along  their entire m ethodo­
logical path [ibid].11 H e does no t em brace p raxeology (he cla im s never to have been 
ab le to  understand M ises position [1981 p .x iv ]) o r em brace o ther a  prioristic 
ep istem ological positions, bu t ra ther attem pts to  rem ain w ithin the positivist fram e­
w ork —  indeed h e  accep ts Popperian fa lsification  [ibid]. S ince a prioristic know ledge 
o f  hum an behaviour is rejected, w e m ust conceive o f  explanation  in observational
11 For a review of Austrian methodology see Hutchison [1981]. The discrepancies between the 
Austrians and Robbins also carried over into the substantive theoretical concepts: see chapter 3 
below.
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term s. As Hicks notes, valuation is not itse lf observable [1935 p.87]. W hat is required 
is a  m ethod o f transform ing this theoretical term  into observational term s w hich can 
e ith e r be observed o r —  for Hicks —  are intuitively obvious. T his is, o f  course, the 
essence o f  the positivist concept o f  correspondence rules
But the praxeology o f  the A ustrians w as a  prioristic, not positiv istic . 12 It is far 
from  clear w hat the status o f R obbins’ rationality  postulate is. R obbins h im se lf 
be lieves that his sense o f  rationality is “ sim ply  one o f  a  num ber o f  assum ptions o f  a 
psychological nature w hich are introduced into econom ic analysis o f  various stages 
o f  approxim ation to  reality”  and that “ E conom ic m an ”  is sim ply an  “ expository 
d e v ic e "  w hich can  be used to gain know ledge w hich can then be applied  to  real, 
m ore  com plex situations [1935 p.94J.
T his is not the case though. The assum ption  o f  rational hum ans is  not sim ply a 
heuristic device that can be relaxed w hen app ly ing  the theoretical ana lysis to  ‘re a l’ 
hum ans. " I t  is w orth em phasising that the assum ption  o f rationality  is  not sim ply 
ano ther ceteris paribus condition. Even if all ou tside influences w ere elim inated  and 
all observed values o f  variables ad justed  to  fit the theory, irrational behaviour ... 
w ould  render prediction im possible”  [H ollis and  Nell p.53J. T he orig inal m eans/end 
d ichotom y o f M ill, it w ill be recalled, w as to  distinguish betw een science and art. 
Follow ing  this, R obbins’s rationality ‘assum ption ’ was also used as a  definition o f  
econom ic science. Any behaviour outside o f  th is assum ption w ould b e  beyond the 
purv iew  o f econom ics also. “ W e m ay pu t th is new  qualification by  saying that 
econom ics is the study o f rational econom ic m a n "  [ibidj. W e canno t consider an  
abstract ‘rational’ econom ic hum an, and  then com pare w ith a real ‘irrational’ 
econom ic hum an, because econom ic ac tion  has been defined as ra tional action. A ny 
irrational behaviour w ould therefore be regarded as non-econom ic, and  ignored.
T he utilitarians tried to  deal with m orality  by reducing it to  scien tific  m easure­
m ent. W hat R obbins appears to  do is sim ply ignore this m oral elem ent, thereby
12 Note in particular Von Mises: “ The starting point of praxeology is a self-evident truth, the 
cognition of action, that is, the cognition of the fact that there is such a thing as consciously aim­
ing at ends”  [1962 pp.5-6)
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rendering w hat is left ‘scien tific’, but also vacuous: it canno t be applied to  or 
observed in any concrete situation. By identifying the subject-m atter w ith  an abstrac­
tion. Robbins has m ade the analysis analytic.
This w ould, o f  course , mean that Robbins w ould not be ab le  to  draw  policy con­
clusions from his theories. C uriously enough he seem s perfectly  happy to  adm it this 
—  possibly because he is unaw are o f  the analytic nature o f  h is theories. A lthough in 
1935 he believed that “ w ithout econom ic analysis it is not possib le rationally  to 
choose betw een alternative system s o f  society”  [1935 p.155 orig inal em phasis], by 
1981 he believed “ that all recom m endations o f  policy involve judgem en ts o f value”  
and that “ in the applica tion  o f  Econom ic Science to  problem s o f  policy, 1 urge that 
w e m ust acknow ledge the introduction o f  assum ptions o f value essentia lly  incapable 
o f  scientific p roof”  [1981 p . xxxi). It was the vacuous nature o f  th is approxim ation 
to reality ’ w hich p rom pted  H u tchison’s critique. H utchison does no t believe that the 
game is being played accord ing  to the positivist m ethodological rules. T he legitimate 
use o f  theory to  help  tes t definitions was rendered inoperative by tautologous 
definitions and  unspecified ceteris paribus assum ptions. H utchison  com plained that 
the Robbins definition effec tive ly  excludes all facts. He c la im s tha t since Robbins 
excludes the choice o f  ends, and technical and  social considerations from the 
subject-m atter o f  econom ics, “ All facts, that is, are excluded , fo r technical, social, 
and psychological facts presum ably com prise that entire possib le factual material for 
the social scien tis t”  [1938 p54]. Furtherm ore, the ‘hypothetical m ethod’ o f econom ­
ics resulted in analytic propositions [p.36]. U nspecified ceteris paribus assum ptions 
achieved the sam e resu lt, because they rendered the theory untestab le [p.40 ff.]. 
Indeed, H utchison believes that this sort o f qualification should be reserved  for induc­
tive theories [p.46].
W hat H utchison is a f te r is —  following Popper —  econom ic propositions that 
are falsifiable. He cla im s that scientific propositions w ould ‘fo rb id ’ the occurrence o f 
som e events. T his econom ics does not do. Follow ing from th is, prediction was not 
possible.
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There is Anally the view to which the fullest and most penetrating discussion of Economic Prognosis 
led up: that all prognosis of economic events is impossible. It was clearly seen that the prognosoc con­
tent of propositions of pure theory was nil. but owing to the misconceived notions of exactness and 
necessity ... all prognoses based on empirical regularities were objected to as in principle inexact and 
liable at any moment to be falsiAed. If all prognosis was really impossible, then ... Economics would 
be ... an idle science but a true one |p.64).
Econom ics, according to  H utchison, depends on the discovery o f  regularities. He 
regards it as an em pirical science [p .164], but thought that curren t practise lim ited the 
science to tautologies. Furtherm ore, policy initiatives w ould necessarily go  beyond 
econom ics: “ No one, statesm an o r ind iv idual, can act on purely econom ic advice. All 
state economic policy involves politics ... on ly  advice and policy  w hich is based on  an 
estim ate of the political, sociological, and econom ic effects together o f  a  policy o r 
m easure can be sensibly acted o n ”  [p. 165].
O f course, the en tire  problem  w ith  the discovery o f  regularities is the need fo r 
theoretical constructs fo r their understanding . W hile H utchison is correct about the 
em ptiness of Robbins' schem e, he o ffers nothing to put it in its place. W hich regu la ri­
ties are non-trivial? O n w hat basis d o  w e judge the social and  political effects o f  p o l­
icy recom m endations? T he answ ers are not apparent, and  H utchison does not 
enlighten us.
O ur argument in the first part o f  th is chapter was that the sort o f  em pirical-based 
science that H utchison appears to be advocating could no t be sustained. W e a lso  
noted at the beginning o f  this sec tion  how  the positivist form ulation leads not to  
laissez-faire but ra ther to econom ic planning . This appears to  be the consequence o f  
the Hutchison m ethodology, and w as the very antithesis o f  the orthodox program m e. 
C learly  the charges laid  by H utchison  m ust be refuted. W hile K night's bellicose 
review  o f H utchison 's book reasserted  the Robbins definition o f  econom ics along  
w ith Austrian praxeology [Knight 1940 p .154], the orthodox response was a m ove 
tow ards m ethodological instrum entalism . T his line is taken by Friedm an [1953] and 
M achlup [1955]. W e shall break sligh tly  w ith the historical o rder and begin w ith  the 
latter work, since it d irec tly  responds to  H utchison.
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W e m entioned th e  possibility o f  slid ing  into in strum en ta lism  earlier during our 
review  o f  positivism . Instrum enta lists abandon the idea o f  explanation , and are con­
cerned  only with p red ic tio n . M achlup believes in theo ries, b u t these have no particu­
lar significance —  th ey  are, to  use Popper’s  term , co n jec tu res: “ N o fixed lines can be 
draw n betw een theo ries , hypotheses and m ere hunches . . .”  [M achlup 1955 p.3]. 
S ince all conjectures h a v e  equivalent s tanding , M achlup  b eliev e s  that identifying one 
as a “ fundam ental”  p o stu la te  is an arb itrary  process [p.4J. T h is  is especially  the case 
since M achlup does n o t propose to test any  o f  the h y po theses . Rather, w e are to  draw  
em pirica l conclusions fro m  these hypotheses o r hunches, an d  then  to “ confront these 
conclusions”  with em p irica l data. T hat is, w e are to  use th e  principle o f  correspon­
dence ru les [ibid]. W e are then to  test w he ther an  assu m ed  change leads to the 
predicted change u n d er ce rtain  conditions o r  not. I f  so , w e  ca n  regard the test as a 
confirm ation. H ow ever w e  only test the occurrence o f  th e  assum ed  change, and the 
correc t conclusions. W e  need  no t test fo r the ex istence o f  th e  conditions: “ Regarding 
them , a  casual, perh ap s even  im pressionistic , em piricism  w ill d o ”  [ibid]. T hat is, 
g iven  a  theory ‘If A , th e n  ceteris paribus B \  w e can te s t ‘I f  A  then  B ’. I f  th is occurs, 
w e assum e ceteris w ere probab ly  paribus [pp.13-14].
H ow ever M ach lup  appears to  have gone a  stage b ey o n d  positivism . He is no 
longer simply transla ting  theoretical term s into o bservational term s, w hich is w hat 
bridge principles are a b o u t. H e is m issing o u t a  part o f  th e  theo ry , w hich is whether 
the conditions under w h ich  the theoretical law s apply  ac tu ally  held during  the test. 
T he tw ist in the arg u m e n t [to  use w hat later becam e a  c lic h e ] is  that these conditions 
are actually  held to  b e  irrelevant: indeed, they m ay e v e n  b e  know ingly unrealistic. 
“ W hen a  sim pler h y po thesis , though obviously  un realistic , g iv es  consistendy satis­
factory resu lts”  M ac h lu p  contends “ one need  not b o th e r w ith  more com plicated, 
m ore realistic h y p o th eses”  [p l6 9 , em phasis added]. T h at is, th e  real test o f  the theory 
is the generation o f  “ satisfactory”  resu lts , w hatever th is  m eans. A gain, in the 
Rejoinder M achlup s tates:
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We can, to repeat, test empirically whether the outcome of peoples actions is most of the time reason­
ably close to what one would expect if  people always acted as they are unrealistically assumed to act. 
Again, the 'indirect verification’ or justification of the postulate lies in the fact that it gives fairly good 
results in many applications of the theory [1956 p.488]
Lf these results are no t forthcom ing, presum ably  any ad hoc m odifications to  the 
“ hunches”  could be m ade. M ach lup  v iew s theory as a  “ m achine”  w h ich  is “ a  co n ­
struction o f  ou r m ind” , and  that “ S o m eth in g  goes in ... and  som ething com es o u t”  
[p l2 ] . T he ‘m ental m achine’ as it w e re , can  be altered  to  su it o u r purpose . S ince the 
theory is on ly  a m achine to  g en e ra te  deductions, w e w ould only  s to p  using  the 
m achine w hen a  replacem ent a rriv es . A  theory will only be rejected w hen  a  better 
theory is available [p .l 1 ]. T he p o s itio n  corresponds to  that o f  m ethodological instru­
mentalism .
There is, however, one group  o f  fundam ental assum ptions w hich  acco rd ing  to 
M achlup cannot be verified [1956, p .4 3 7 ]. T hese are the “ ideal ty p es”  o f  ac tion  and 
(c iting  W eber and Schütz) M ach lup  m ain tains these postulates o f  hum an  ac tion , o f 
w hich the fundam ental assum ptions o f  econom ic theory are one, “ are no t su b jec t to  a 
requirem ent o f  independent em p irica l verification, but instead to  a  req u irem en t o f 
understandability  in the sense in w h ic h  m an can understand the ac tions o f  fellow - 
m e n "  [1955 p .1 7 ] '3
T his v iew  M achlup opposes to  w hat he term s “ U ltra-em piricism ” , o f  w hich 
H utchison is  cited  as a  practitioner. A n  u ltra-em piricist requires the d irec t tes tin g  o f 
a ll assum ptions [p.7]. M achlup b eliev e s  he has show n th is is  u nnecessary  and 
undesirable —  o r even im possible.
H utchison’s m ost telling rep ly  is  tha t the only  ‘fundam ental assu m p tio n ’ o f  any 
note is  that o f  rationality  [1956 p .4 7 9 ]. B eyond this the tw o protagonists ap p e ar to  be 
talking past each  other, w ith  the d eb a te  over “ u ltra-em piricism ”  bein g  largely 
sem antic: fo r H utchison th is is  p o ssib ly  som ething like the logical positiv is ts , for 
M achlup it represents Popperian p o sitiv ism . W e have already no ted  th e  particu lar 13
13 Machlup criticises Friedman on this point [1955 p.17]
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difficulties associated w ith the m eans/end definition o f  ra tio n a lity . This autom atically  
excludes ’non-scientific’ behaviour from  the analysis. N a tu ra lly , it follow s that we 
can analyse this behaviour but our propositions are ana ly tic .
T he o ther response o f  H utchison’s  w e could note is th e  observation that succes­
sive generations of econom ists have attem pted to re fo rm u la te  value theory in testable 
form . T his suggests an unw illingness o f  econom ists to  accep t a priori postulates 
[p .482].14 W e will turn to  this trajectory o f  value theory in  th e  next chapter.
M achlup, then, adopts a sort o f  ’lim ited’ m ethodological instrum entalism. 
T heories are simply m ental machines to  deduce change, a n d  are really no  better than 
hunches. W e should proceed “ as i f ’ they were true [1 9 5 6  p.487]. H ow ever there is 
also  a fundamental postulate o f rationality  which is no t su b jec t to verification [1955 
p. 16].15 Friedm an also  believes in m ethodological q ualifica tions, and uses “ as if”  
form ulations o f  theories, but appears to go further than  M achlup . It will be recalled 
that F riedm an’s essay antedates M achlup’s by tw o years. F riedm an is still concerned 
to refute both the “ em pty econom ic boxes”  charge o f  C lapham , and the charge o f 
tautology by H utchison and others. H is response is to  a d o p t an extrem e version o f 
m ethodological instrum entalism. /
Friedm an m aintains that a theory contains tw o e le m e n ts . T he first elem ent is that 
o f language, and this Friedm an accepts is indeed a  set o f  tau to logies. Its function is to 
serve as a  “ filing system ”  [1953 p.7]. Friedm an also a c c e p ts  that “ econom ic theory 
m ust be m ore than a structure o f  tautologies if  it is to  b e  able to predict and not 
m erely describe the consequences o f  action; if  it is to  b e  som ething different from 
disguised m athem atics”  [p. 11]. T he second elem ent o f  th e o ry  is therefore as “ a  body 
o f substantive hypothesis” , the validity  o f  w hich is ju d g e d  by its predictive power 
[p.8]. For Friedm an, th is exhausts the possibilities. T h e  o n ly  relevant em pirical test
14 The response of Machlup was to suggest that ordinal utility was part of the Austrian heritage 
(1956 p.491 ]. We will see the inadequacy of this reply in our survey of value theory.
15 Although in the rejoinder Machlup seems to place this rationality postulate alongside all the 
other instrumental theories. If a suitable alternative model comes up “ then the Assumption will 
have outlived its usefulness and will be sent to the limbo of 'disconfirmed propositions’” [1956 
p.489]. This seems to take Machlup closer to Friedman.
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is that o f  the im plications o f  the theory. H ypotheses do not. Friedm an suggests, have 
assum ptions as such [p. 14] —  the so-called assum ptions m ay indeed be w id ely  inac­
curate an d  yet form  the basis o f  useful substantive hypotheses [p .20].16 T h e  only 
re levant point is “ w hether the theory w o rk s" , w hich for Friedm an "m ean s  w h e th e r it 
y ields sufficiently accurate p red ic tions"  [p.15]. This com pletes the task o f  e c o n o m ­
ics, w hich  is  “ to provide a system  o f  generalizations that can be used to m ake co rrec t 
p red ic tions about the consequences o f  any change in c ircum stances" [p.4].
T h is appears straightforw ard. N onetheless, Friedm an attem pts to  ju s tify  his 
position. T he reason for the lack o f  relationship between the realism  o f  ‘assu m p tio n s ' 
and the significance o f the hypothesis, he explains, is that an  hypothesis abstrac ts  
" th e  com m on and crucial e le m e n ts"  o f phenom ena, and is therefore "d esc rip tiv e ly  
fa ls e "  in its assum ptions [p. 14). W e therefore are to proceed “ as i f ’ the h y p o th esis  
w ere true  [p.16 ff.J.
S hould  the hypothesis fail to yield true, m eaningful predictions, it  should  
presum ably  be replaced. The construction o f  hypotheses is, fo r Friedm an, ex o genous. 
T his is a  creative act w hich cannot be form alised [p.43]. H e m ight also ad d  th a t the 
derivation  o f  hypotheses is, as fo r Popper, an irrelevance. I f  it works it is o f  u se, no 
m atter w here the hypotheses cam e from.
It m ay well have been F riedm an 's  justification o f the instrum entalist position  
w hich caused  so m uch confusion in the secondary literature. V iew ed in te rm s  o f 
orthodox positivism , the position is untenable. M usgrave points out that F riedm an  
fails to  distinguish between three different types o f  assum ption. The m ain sen se  in 
w hich Friedm an is using the term  is what M usgrave calls "negligibility a ssu m p ­
tio n s" . T hat is to  say, a theory ignores som e aspects o f a  group o f p h enom ena 
because these aspects have little effec t on the conclusions. W e may act as i f  they 
w ere not there [1981 p.373]. W e cannot say from  this that the assum ptions are  unreal-
16 This appears to be what Friedman is trying to say, especially in the light of the correspond­
ing footnote, where he adds the rider that unrealistic assumptions do not guarantee a useful theory.
His phrasing of the point is a bit clumsy though — he almost appears to regard unrealism as a vir­
tue. This was later caricatured by Samuelson.
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istic , though. W e are not a ssum ing  that these aspects are not ex isten t —  w hich w ould 
be, a s  Friedm an put it, “ desc rip tive ly  fa lse” . W e are sim ply saying that their p res­
ence is irrelevant [p .379-80, cf . M elitz 1965 p.40J.
T h is difference is sign ifican t because o f  the o ther forms o f assum ptions which 
can be m ade. W e m ay a lso  assu m e a  domain for the applicability  o f  a theory. The 
realism  o f  dom ain assum ptions is significant, because it specifies when the theory 
will “ w o rk ” , and when it w ill n o t [p.351]. W e will see this clearer later on, when we 
d iscuss  the difference betw een testing  and prediction. W e m ay particularly note that 
it is possib le to delim it the d om ain  in such a  w ay as to m ake the theory untestable —  
w hich  is the opposite effec t to  that posited by Friedm an [M usgrave 1981 p.382, cf. 
N agel 1963 p .215]17
Indeed , we can use a  theo ry  w hose assum ptions are known never to  hold. M us- 
grave ca lls  these “ heuristic assu m p tio n s”  and they are used in em ploying a m ethod 
w hich  M usgrave calls “ a  m eth o d  o f  successive approxim ation”  [M usgrave 1981 
p .383]. N agel seem s to co n sid e r ‘ideal types ' in this set [1963 p .215].18 Only in this 
sense could  the use o f  assu m p tio n s be regarded as ‘descriptively fa lse '. Yet Friedm an 
has stated  that the derivation  o f  hypotheses —  including presum ably heuristic devices 
—  is no t a m atter o f  concern  fo r positive science. B oth Nagel and  M usgrave believe 
that F riedm an com m its an  e r ro r  by not distinguishing betw een these various senses of 
‘u n re alis tic ’ assum ptions. It is no t particularly legitim ate to claim  that the truth of 
assum ptions is irrelevant because  assum ptions abstract from reality. M ason points out 
that an  abstraction is d iffe ren t to  a  false  statem ent [1980 p.242]. F riedm an’s 
justification  for ignoring the assum ptions o f  a theory cannot be sustained.
W hat is not clear is ex a ctly  w hy this justification was thought necessary in the 
first place. Nagel believes that
...the essay is marked by an ambiguity that perhaps reflects an unresolved tension in his views on the
17 This of course throws some light on the Hutchison/Machlup debate.
18 The three senses of unrealistic assumption outlined by Nagel seem to correspond to that of 
Musgrave [Nagel 1963 pp.214-lSj.
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status of economic uieory. Is he defending the legitimacy of unrealistic theoretical assumptions 
because he thinks theories are at best only useful instruments, valuable for predicting observable 
events but not to be viewed as genuine statements whose truth or falsity may be significantly investi­
gated? But if this is the way he conceives theories (and much in his argument suggests that it is), the 
distinction between realistic and unrealistic theoretical assumptions is at best irrelevant, and no 
defense of theories lacking in realism is needed. Or is he undertaking that defense in order to show that 
unrealistic theories cannot only be invaluable tools for making predicnons but that they may also be 
reasonably satisfactory explanahons of various phenomena ... But if this is his aim (and parts of his 
discussion are compatible with the supposition that it is), a theory cannot be viewed ... as a "simple 
summary" of some vaguely delimited set of empirical generalisations with distinctly specified ranges 
of application INagel 1963 p.218. cf. McLachlan and Swales 1982 p.22|.
If w e fo rgo  the possibility  o f  offering explanation  for econom ic phenom ena, and 
focus so lely  on prediction, then F riedm an 's p o s itio n  can be salvaged [Coddington 
1972 p .4]. T his is the position  o f  Boland [1979]. H e suggests that F riedm an 's posi­
tion is indeed one o f  instrum entalism . F urtherm ore , he claim s that instrum entalism  
cannot be logically assa iled , it “ is its ow n d efen se  and its only defense”  [1979 
p.522], a  position accepted  by Rotw ein [1980 p . 1553]. Rotwein does not accept that 
F riedm an does indeed take an instrum entalist stance, however. He points out 
F ried m an 's  concern w ith  science, whereas we co u ld  classify the instrum entalist posi­
tion as a  sort o f  “ eng in eerin g ”  approach. H irsch  and  DeM archi also believe that 
B o la n d 's  categorisation “ certainly carries it too  far. He ... makes it appear as if  sci­
ence is no  concern w hatsoever to Friedm an. T h is  is not true. It seem s rather that 
F riedm an passionately w anted  to contribute to  ec o n o m ic  science, because he felt, as 
D ew ey d id , that to be usefu l, econom ics had to  be sc ien tific”  [1984 p.783 fn.6].
It is clear that F riedm an did not want to go  com plete ly  down the instrum entalist 
path. T h is  creates the tension  and am biguity tha t N agel perceived. A fter all, he did 
title h is essay  'T he M ethodology o f Positive E co n o m ics ', in a volume called ‘Essays 
in Positive Econom ics’. T h is suggests an unw illingness to  accept the conventionalist 
e lem ents im plied w ithin instrum entalism: w hat C aldw ell terms a  “ m ethodological 
in strum entalism ” . T his position is ostensibly taken  to  avoid the problem  o f  theoreti­
cal en tities . However, it does not solve the p ro b lem  o f  theory-laden observation. 
Friedm an seem s to regard  em pirical data as unproblem atic , whereas we have seen 
that the opposite  is the ca se  [cf. Coddington 1972 p .9].
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In addition the inductive problem  is n o t avoided; a problem  w h ich  the pragm a­
tist philosophy o f  John D ew ey did attack. H oover no tes an  am biguity  in  th is respect. 
H e cites B oland’s  argum ent th a t “ For F riedm an, an instrum entalist, hypo theses are 
chosen  because they are successful in yielding true pred ic tions”  [B o lan d  1979 p.511, 
em phasis in H oover 1984]. Indeed , F riedm an h im se lf states that “ th e  o n ly  relevant 
t e s t ... o f  a hypothesis is  com parison  o f  its p red ic tions w ith experience”  [1953 p.8]. 
T h is im plies that a preconceived theory is confirm ed only because it  has been suc­
cessfu l [H oover 1984 p .790]. B u t Friedm an also  states that “ the g o a l o f  a positive 
sc ience”  is  to  predict phenom ena “ not y e t observed”  [1953 p.7], th a t is , predictions 
th a t will be successful [H oover ibid]. W e canno t attem pt both to p re d ic t the future 
and  test the accuracy o f  the pred ic tion  at the sam e tim e [M cLachlan a n d  Sw ales 1982 
p .21]. The H um ean problem  o f  induction w as precisely the inability  to  extrapolate 
p ast regularities into the fu ture . T he past pred ic tive success o f  a th eo ry  does not 
guarantee fu ture success.
Y et th is successful p red ic tion  o f  the fu tu re is  clearly  w hat F ried m an  had in 
m ind , since norm ative questions and policy conclusions are dependent u pon  positive 
econom ics [1953 p.5]. O ne no tes  in  th is re sp ect the d ifference in th e  u s e  o f  theories 
betw een Friedm an and M achlup . M achlup appears to  adopt a  ‘tw o -s tag e’ technique 
o f  testing follow ed by application. “ O nce w e have confidence in th e  w h o le  theoreti­
ca l system ”  then, he states
we are willing to apply it to concrete cases even where only one of the two ‘changes’, in the ‘cause* or 
the ‘effect’, is identifiable in practice, rather than both.
T h is  is no t the case w hile w e are  testing, how ever
For purposes of verification of the entire theory, however, we shall have to identify both the 
phenomena represented by the Assumed Change and the Deduced Change (1955 p.14].
M achlup here seem s to  have som ew hat abandoned science in  fav o u r o f  an
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“ engineering”  ty p e  approach. H e is no t, it  w ould seem, concerned  with universal 
conditionals ‘and  all th a t’, but sim ply w ith  finding tools th a t will probably w ork  in 
the future. B oland  and  Frazer suggest th a t m ethodological instrum entalism  is th ere­
fore applicable fo r “ short-run or m ost prac tica l problem s”  [1980  p.1556]. Y et it  is 
unclear exactly  w hich  “ practical p ro b lem s”  w e are supposed  to  solve: w e d o  no t 
have m uch in the w ay o f  exam ples to  fo llow . The snag w ith  an engineering-type 
approach is tha t w hile  it m ay be able to  d ea l w ell w ith “ neg lig ib ility”  assum ptions, it  
is particularly susceptib le to  dom ain prob lem s. Recall th a t  the R obbins ‘ra tional 
econom ic m an ’ w as only an  “ expository  d ev ice”  —  an  heuristic  assum ption. W e 
noted that R obbins ac tually  denied the leg itim acy  o f  policy applica tions. O f course, it  
w as R obbins’ ra tionality  postulate (w hich  H utchison  calls “ T h e  A ssum ption” ) w h ich  
M achlup in particu la r w as at such pains to  defend . T o  use a n  assum ption in an  in a p ­
plicable dom ain w ill, o f  course, lead to  fa lse  predictions. A n d  to  use an ideal ty p e  —  
an  assum ption w hich  has no applicable d o m ain  —  as a neg lig ib ility  assum ption is an  
invitation to  theo rists  to  g e t up to  all so rts o f  chicanery. T h e  Friedm an m ethodology 
leads to  m ythology [M ason 1980 p.242].
Indeed, it w ill be recalled that the m a in  m ethodological dilem m a for the o rth o ­
dox econom ists w a s to  derive a  positive sc ience  —  w hich  w ou ld  inevitably lead  to  
the developm ent o f  policy instrum ents —  a n d  a t the sam e tim e  show that these to o ls  
should not be used  fo r planning. M ach lup  a n d  (especially) F ried m an ’s m ethodology 
appears to  lead d irec tly  to  th is p lanning conclusion . T he R o b b in s  rationality assum p­
tion was designed  to  avoid the conc lusion  tha t planning is  desirab le, and to  ju s tify  
laissez-faire. In  sp ite  o f  their p ro fessed  indifference to  theories, F riedm an a n d  
M achlup are ac tually  closely  tied  to  th e  ra tionality  postu la te an d  the m odels d e riv e d  
from  it as a m eans o f  escape from  the leg itim acy  o f  p lanning . T his is what o ccurs  in  
Friedm an’s essay , according to  M ason:
The Chicago assumption of ‘perfect competition' has the advantage of permitting rigorous — though 
unrealistic — analysis [Mason 1980 p.242]
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and has the e f fec t o f
introducing ideological bias through the back door and avoiding the moral problems of unequal 
economic power [Jones 1977 p.358, cited Mason ibid].
T he use o f ra tiona lity  therefore b reaks th e  conditions o f  objectivity:
in short, the scope of positive economics is drawn so as to be a normative defense of neo-classical 
analysis, and the concept of a testable theory is confused with the untestable agglomeration of neoclas­
sical doctrine [Mason 1980, p.242].
Actually i f  ‘T h e  A ssum ption’ o f  ra tiona lity  is dropped, one could  be forgiven fo r 
wondering w h a t is  left. As w e m en tioned  in  section one, the point about causal 
know ledge is precisely  that it  helps u s  to  increase the accuracy  o f our predictions 
beyond that o f  m ere guessw ork, and indeed  in the sam e y ea r tha t Friedm an’s essay  
w as published, Schoeffler’s influential boo k  The Failures o f  Economics pointed ou t 
that, in fact, econom ists were n o t ac tually  very good a t pred ic ting . Sim ilar conc lu ­
sions had been  draw n by M itchell ea rlie r . 19
C ertainly all w as not w ell, y e t it  is  unclear w hich  w ay orthodox econom ics 
could now  tu rn . T he use o f  co rrespondence  ru les to  transform  theoretical term s 
appears to h av e  serious failings, and  th e  conventionalist consequences o f instrum en­
talism  w ere unacceptable, yet a  pure ly  m ethodological instrum entalism  was not valid . 
N or did a re trea t into a pragm atic ‘eng ineering ’ m ethodology help. Sam uelson’s 
answ er w as to  tu rn  to em piricism .
T he debate began  with Sam uelson’s  critique  o f  F riedm an. Sam uelson m aintains an 
essentially positiv ist critique .20 T he  n e t re su lt is  sim ilar to  H utchison’s position, tha t 
Friedm an “ is fundam entally w rong in  th inking  that no realism  in the sense o f factual 
inaccuracy e v e n  to  a tolerable degree o f  approxim ation  is  anyth ing  but a  dem erit fo r  a
19 See later analysis
20 Samuelson’s methodological naivity is noted by Caldwell [1982], Certainly he has not un­
derstood the instrumentalist methodology.
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theory o r hypo thesis”  [Sam uelson 1963 p.233].
M ach lup  responded to Sam uelson in m uch the sam e w ay as he responded to 
H utchison , claim ing that Sam uelson “ rejects all theory”  [M achlup 1964 p.733 o rig i­
nal em phasis]. For M achlup the poin t is “ w e never deduce a  consequence from  a 
theory a lone . W e alw ays com bine the postulated rela tionships (w hich  constitute the 
theory) w ith  an assum ption o f  som e change o r event and then w e deduce the conse­
quence o f  the conjunction o f  the theoretical rela tionships and  the assum ed 
occurrence”  [ibid p.733 original emphasis].
S am uelson  does not w ish to  accept the ‘rational cho ice’ theory o f  Robbins, since 
his ow n ‘revealed  preference’ approach did no t re ly  on a priori ax iom s .21 How ever, 
ra ther th an  follow ing H utchison, Sam uelson decides to adopt an ex trem e em piricist 
approach.
Scientists never 'explain' any behaviour, by theory or by any other hook. Every description that is 
superseded by a ‘deeper explanation' turns out upon careful examination to have been replaced by still 
another description, albeit possibly a more useful description that covers and illuminates a wider area. 
[1964 p.73]
T hat is to  say  that “ A n explanation  ... is  a  better kind o f  descrip tion , and no t som e­
thing tha t g o es  ultim ately beyond description” .
C a ld w ell view s this position as an  error [1982 p .194], an d  certainly an 
anachronistic em piricist position cannot be sustained. T heories canno t, as Sarauelson 
claim s, b e  reduced  to “ basic sen tences” .22 O bservational term s are  no t neutral but 
are theo ry  laden  [W ong 1973].
In add ition , the whole justification  fo r positive social science w as that it could  
deliver p o licy  prescriptions. C learly  a  science based on  S am uelson’s  m etatheory 
w ould n o t be able to do this. In fact, such a  science o f  descrip tion  w ou ld  be pointless.
21 Although the differences between the theories turn out to be largely semantical.
22 This claim is made by Samuelson after a rather weak attempt at refuting Hempel's contrary 
position (Samuelson 1965 p.l 167). For a refutation of the empiricist position Samuelson identifies 
with, see Benton [1977 p.50] and citations therein: "No number of observation statements can 
ever be equivalent to the statement 'The sparrow is cleaning itself.”  [Ibid]
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The philosophy o f  econom ics has therefore run  aground on the sam e rocks as the 
positivist philosophy it tried  to take on board. T he idea o f  a  m ethodological unity o f  
the sciences runs into the im m ediate problem  that m uch social science is m otiva­
tional. and will therefore require teleological explanation. T his teleo logica l explana­
tion could not be squared  w ith the requirem ent o f  observation and the need  for causal 
explanation to ju stify  the positivist position, leading e ither to  analy tic theory w hich 
cannot be observed, o r to  a  sort o f  ‘m ethodological’ instrum entalism  w hich  is unsus­
tainable —  particularly  if  laissez- taire is to  be m aintained.
in. POSITIVE SOCIAL THEORY
In fact the need for a  justification  o f the positiv ist m etatheory is som ething o f an 
achilles heel for the philosophy, for it leads to  a  w eakness in the co n cep t o f  value- 
neutrality, w hich w as the cornerstone o f the entire program m e. T ow ards the end  o f 
the previous section w e looked at m ethodological instrum entalism . T his position 
could  be arrived at th rough an  extension o f  the Popperian critique. K arl P opper's  ph i­
losophy, based on the refutation o f theories, w as bom  out o f  a d issatisfac tion  with the 
philosophy o f  logical positivism , in particular with the responses to  the Hum ean 
problem  o f  induction. P opper believes that theories do not obtain m eaning  "in them ­
selv es '. but obtain m eaning  a posteriori th rough the failure to  re fu te them. T his 
m eans that the w ay theories are constructed is  im m aterial —  they co u ld  indeed, be 
conjectures. Popper believed  the method o f construction o f  a  theory ‘‘is irrelevant to 
the logical analysis o f  scientific m ethod.”  [1934 p.31] U nlike Friedm an how ever. 
Popper did not regard theories as an irrelevance, but thought them  a  vital part o f 
scientific explanation .“-* It w as only  the m ethod o f  construction he w as unconcerned 
w ith. Popper was exp lic itly  critical o f  instrum entalism , as he believed that “ ordinary 23
23 Although Boland and Frazer do argue for an 'alignment' of Friedman's methodology with 
Popper’s philosophy [Boland and Frazer 1983].
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language is full o f  theo ries”  and  that “ observation  is alw ays observation in the light 
o f  theories” [1959 p .59 n .l  original em phasis].
In sp ite  o f  F riedm an’s invocation o f  falsification [p.23] the positions o f  F ried­
m an and P opper are different. Popper does no t m aintain tha t theories are irrelevant, 
bu t on ly  that the m ethod by w hich  the scien tis t arrives a t the theory  is  irrelevant. 
T heories them selves are o f  great im portance to  science. T he reason  fo r Popper’s 
em phasis on  theory is fundam ental, and rests on  the norm ative attitude to  know ledge 
w e m entioned  at the start o f  the chapter. P opper believed that the positiv ist philoso­
p hy  should not be regarded as a criterion o f  meaning but as  a  crite rion  o f  demarcation 
betw een science and  non-science. A s w e no ted  earlier, the positiv ist prescription can ­
no t itse lf be positive.
Positivists usually interpret the problem of demarcation is a naturalistic way; they interpret it as if it 
were a problem of natural science. Instead of taking it as their task to propose a suitable convention, 
they believe they have to discover a difference, existing in the nature of things, as it were, between 
empirical science on the one hand and metaphysics on the other [op.cit p.35 original emphasis].
P opper’s  m etatheory w as explicitly  conventionalist;
My criterion of demarcation will accordingly have to be regarded as a proposal for an agreement or 
convention. As to the suitability of any such convention opinions may differ, and a reasonable discus­
sion of these questions is only possible between parties having some purpose in common. The choice 
of that purpose must, of course, be ultimately a matter of decision, going beyond rational argument 
(op.cit. p.37 original emphasis].
T h is conventionalist aspect o f Popper’s position is often overlooked, b u t the conven­
tionalist attitude to  m etatheory cannot be avo ided  by the philosophers o f  econom ics 
either. A s M cLachlan and  Sw ales poin t ou t, a ll the m ethodological prescrip tions o f  
th e  econom ists are them selves norm ative. It is therefore apparent tha t w e require a 
no rm ative d iscussion on m etatheory before any  science can take place. Y et, once we 
a llow  th is, it is  no longer clear w hy this no rm ative discussion should no t form  a  part 
o f  the substan tive theories
Mulberg: Social Limits to Economic Theory 30
Suppose that we were to accept that normative statements cannot be rationally discussed. How should 
we consider a claim such as that positive economics should be judged by its predictive success or that 
economists should make positive statements, or that if. as economists, we do not try to test our theories 
empirically, we should cease right now giving policy advice' (Lipsey 1975 p. xx|? We would have to 
say that these claims cannot be rationally discussed and are rationally no better or no worse than the 
claims that positive economics should not be judged by its predictive success, and that economists 
should not make positive statements, and that whether or not we try to test our theories, we should not 
cease giving policy advice. To be consistent, we would have to say that any pronouncements we made 
about the methodology of economics were either descriptions of how economists do or might actually 
proceed or else not intended to be considered as rational claims at all but simply as expressions of per­
sonal whim. If this is the case, much methodological discussion seems to us to be pointless, and any. 
even implicit, methodological prescription not prefaced by a clear statement that such prescnpdons 
cannot be rationally defended is misleading. [McLachlan and Swales 1978 p.15-16)
Y et it w ould seem  strange to suggest that no dialogue on m ethodology is possible
We can see no reason a priori for discounting the possibility that normative statements can be 
rationally discussed in the sense that reasons for and against their acceptance can be offered, lop.cit. 
P-16)
But this suggests that we should attem pt to  incorporate analysis o f  the norm ative into 
our theory. " I f  norm ative statem ents can be rationally discussed , the failure to 
develop a norm ative econom ics is regrettab le”  [op.cit. pp. 17-18].
O ur claim  here is  that a norm ative m etatheoretical position  m ust contain an 
implicit norm ative theoretical position. If, in the case o f  positiv ism , w e are to con­
sider a convention fo r the dem arcation o f  science, the convention  adopted will be 
justified according to  a  norm ative evaluation o f  the •science’ it w ould  yield. We 
w ould adopt the positivist criteria for science only if  we value the con ten ts o f  the sci­
ence which w ould result. T hat is to say, the discussion is no longer w hat is ‘correct’ 
o r •incorrect’ science, but w hat is useful science.
The problem  for a  positivist form ulation is, o f course, that it c la im s to  be value- 
free. W e have already seen how  the norm ative justification o f  contro l o f  the social 
environm ent created insuperable problem s for the observational and  lim ited explana­
tion aspects o f  positivism . O ur criticism  here is that in addition the need  for a norm a­
tive m etatheory m ust result in a positive science contradicting its o w n  criterion o f 
value-neutrality, and that ’’with regard to  social science, there is ... an  im plied politi­
Mulberg: Social Limits to Economic Theory 31
cal th e o ry  as  an  elem ent in its account o f  w hat it m eans to understand  social life”  
[Fay 1 975  p.15]
T h e  po litical theory o f  positivism  F ay  ca lls  the concept o f  “ policy sc ien c e” , 
w hich c o n s is ts  o f  a “ se t o f  procedures w h ich  enab le one to determ ine the technically  
best c o u rs e  o f  action to  adopt in o rd e r to  im p lem en t a decision  o r  achieve a  g o a l” . 
H ow ever, the policy scientist is m ore than  an  adviser.
Here the policy scientist doesn't merely clarify the possible outcomes of certain courses of action, he 
actually chooses the most efficient course of action in terms of the available scientific information. In 
this regard, the policy scientist really is a type of social engineer who makes instrumental decisions on 
the basis o f  the various laws of science — in this instance, social science — which are relevant to the 
problem at hand [op.cit. p. 14 original emphasis].
T his v ie w  o f  policy science obviously h as  considerable im plications fo r political 
practise, fo r  to  the extent that policy can  be analysed im personally  and objectively 
w ithout su b jec tiv e  argum ent, political d eb a te  w ould be rem oved from  these areas. 
F u rth e rm o re , Fay argues, participation in the political process w ould be lim ited  to 
those w ith  requisite technical com petence, and  also  the accountability  o f  the policy- 
sc ien tist i s  internal to the peer group.
F ay  a lso  outlines the inevitable d irec tio n  tha t politics w ould  take. T he em ploy­
m ent o f  th e  policy  scientists w ould crea te  a  m ovem ent tow ards centralised  g overn ­
m ent c o n c e rn e d  with the planning o f  the so cia l and  the political [op.cit. p .26-27].24 
T he sum  to ta l  o f  these changes is, fo r F ay , “ the sublim ation o f  po litic s ... an attem pt 
to  e lim in a te  politics as we know  it”  [op .c it p .27 ]. It would be rep laced  by a  “ social 
en g in e erin g  v iew  of politics, w hich is  tha t there is  a  correct w ay  o f  proceeding in 
hum an a f fa irs  and that it is  the responsib ility  o f  the decision- m aker to d iscover w hat 
this w ay  i s . ”  [op.cit. p.28]
T h is  re su lt, Fay m aintains, is  caused  by positive social science because o f  the 
com bined  e f fe c t o f the presum ed value -neu tra lity  and the connection  betw een the
24 For an  explanation of how this squares with arguments for laissez-faire see the analysis 
below.
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concept o f  explanation and  prediction. It w ill be recalled that the positiv ist concep­
tion o f explanation  was in te rm s  o f regularities, and that th is w as regarded as the 
sam e as a  possible p red ic tion . That is, understanding an event consists o f  know ing 
w hat produces or can p re v en t it, but this is exactly  w hat is required  fo r control. Posi­
tive science “ constitutes, [ th e ]  world from the view point o f how  one can  gain control 
over it”  [op.cit p.40]. N o th in g  else apart from  control is to be regarded  as  scientific. 
It is  not so m uch that sc ien tific  knowledge enables social m anipulation , but that only 
th is is regarded as scientific . “ Technical control is a defining elem en t in the scientific 
enterprise itse lf”  [op.cit p .4 1 ] . It is not a question o f  how science is to be applied. 
G iven the form  that k n o w led g e  takes, there is no o ther way it can be usefully  applied 
[op.cit. p.39].
T he orthodox e c o n o m ic s  scheme is s im ilar in its view o f  the exclusion  o f the 
political, bu t has in add ition  to  justify  laissez-faire. It was this add itional burden that 
lead to the analytic an a ly sis  o f  rational ‘econom ic hum an’. W e shall return to this 
shortly.
T he political theory im p lie d  by the positivist analysis could be described  as an 
end state conception, the o n ly  concern is the efficacy o f the m eans a t obtaining the 
independently  derived en d s . U nder this schem e, we make no o ther judgem en t as to 
which m eans should be used . M yrdal m aintains this is an error. H e believes that “ In 
any hum an valuation”  m ea n s  have independent values as well a s  instrum ental values 
[1935 p.49] and that “ m e a n s  are not ethically neutral” . T he a lternative courses are 
com pared through value ju d g em en ts . But th is causes the co llapse o f  the w hole con­
struction —  w e now  have to  hypothesise each stage in the argum ent, not merely the 
final stage [1933 p.211]. T h e  means/end construction w as supposed  to  allow  the 
objective derivation o f  po licy .
But as soon as we admit that value can be attached to means independently, every single link in the 
chain of the argument is opened. It follows, first, that the problem can no longer be solved unequivo­
cally even if the end is given.
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In addition, w e no longer have any gu id ing  p rincip le for elim inating  any possi­
ble alternative from consideration. W e cannot l im it  o u r field o f enquiry [op.cit p.212]. 
Generalising becom es complex and difficult [1 9 5 3  p .50], because “ the value premise 
which has to be introduced in order to  allow p o lic y  conclusions from factual analysis 
has therefore to be a valuation o f  m eans as well a s  e n d s .”  [1955 p.49]
The ‘eng ineering’ approach o f  m atching m ea n s to ends m ust therefore be 
rejected, because the m eans m ust them selves be eva luated . That is  to say in place o f 
the N ew tonian conception o f policy science, w e sh o u ld  consider policy in Einsteinian 
relativist term s as it  were. Ends and  m eans are  n o t  fixed, but are relative. W hat we 
regard as a m eans is  also an end w hich is to be ac h iev ed  by a  prev ious m eans [Fay 
1975 p .5 1 ]. S im ilarly  the end w e are striving f o r  can  itse lf be a m eans to a  further 
end. T his im plies th a t “ any given course o f a c tio n  m ay be either a m eans o r an end 
depending upon the poin t o f view w hich one a d o p ts ”  [Fay ibid].
So the various m eans we have a t our d isp o sa l w ill them selves have been arrived 
at as norm ative ends. “ And, upon reflection”  F a y  believes
this seems an obvious point. For all political decisions, even those which are seen as means to an end, 
are social policies, and as such they embody a notion of wbat people ought to be required or permitted 
to do to others. No social policy's worth can be solely instrumental because any such policy will 
require that people interact with one another in certain definite ways, and for this reason it must have a 
moral value in itself'
Fay believes this can  be easily show n through ca rica tu re  of purely technical policy 
recom m endations.
What if it were concluded that the most efficient (i.e. the cheapest fastest, most simple etc.) way to 
deal with the population problem were simply to exterminate large numbers of some special class of 
people? The point is that such a proposal could be objected to not simply on the grounds of technical 
efficiently, but also on the basis on an antipathy to the moral values inherent in it" [op.cit p.52].
Fay concludes that all political p roposals —  even  th o se  o f  which m eans to  adop t fo r a 
given end  —  are m oral is nature [ibid].
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Because we are unable to separate out objective m eans from  su b jec tiv e  ends, we 
are unable to abstract 'econom ic hum an ' from ‘social hum an'. S in c e  w e cannot limit 
our field o f  enquiry, in this respect the act o f abstraction is in p o in t o f  fact, normative 
[S treeten 1958 p. xx]. O ur choice o f  question determ ines the a n sw ers  [p . xxi], Myrdal 
outlines one method o f  abstraction which is som etim es p roposed  by econom ists. 
W hile adm itting  the subjectivity o f  valuations, the problem  is sp lit in  tw o . O ne p an  is 
political, and  is taken as exogeneous, the other is econom ic, and  is endogeneous and 
value free . “ T he division usually runs along the old classical lin e  draw n between 
incom e distribution and production. They say, fo r exam ple, tha t th e y  disregard the 
effects on  income distribution, o r that they presum e a  just d is tr ib u tio n , e tc .”  He adds 
that " s u c h  a separation o f  a political problem into a political an d  a  pu re ly  econom ic 
section is, however, im possible”  [1933 p.218].
In particular, we shall see that the distributional crite ria  ca n n o t sim ply be 
'im p o rted ' into the theory as an  exogeneous variable, because th e  price theories 
them selves have distributional im plications. This means that a t b e s t  the theory can 
only be static, since the distributional pattern can  change w ith e a c h  time period. In 
addition, we will see that the developm ent o f a value theory as  o p p o se d  to  simply a 
price theory  will necessarily involve dealing with distributional is su e s .
T he neoclassical scheme w as different from  the classics tho u g h , in that it 
required a m ethod o f  deriving social value. Its value theory c o u ld  n o t be identified 
w ith a  p rice theory: their congruence had to be show n. And b ec au se  un d er positivism  
the abstraction o f ‘homo oeconomicus' was non-arbitrary, the sep a ra tio n  o f  distribu­
tion from  value could not be achieved. These questions will be c o n s id e re d  in chapter 
tw o, w here we look at the attem pt to  put the positivist ph ilosophy in to  operation: the 
chapter will focus on the orthodox laissez-faire econom ic th eo rie s . H ow ever, as we 
saw, the positivist philosophy actually  tends tow ards a process o f  e c o n o m ic  planning. 
C hapter three will outline the m arket socialist approach to p o s itiv is t  econom ic plan­
ning, an d  will show that the positiv ist approach to social sc ie n c e  cannot be m ain­
tained.
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If  the p o sitiv is t m eans/end schem e is abandoned, then both the co n c ep tio n  o f  
‘rational ec o n o m ic  hum an’ and the abstraction o f econom ic from social and  po litica l 
ac tion  m ust a lso  be abandoned. C hapter four will look at the A m eric an  
Institu tiona lis t’s  critique o f  orthodox econom ics, and their attem pts to  in c lu d e  
psycho log ica l and  social elem ents in their econom ic theories.
T o  ex p la in  the contex ts o f chapter five it will be necessary to return b rief ly  to 
o u r an a ly sis  o f  positivism . If the political theory im plied by the positivist a n a ly s is  is 
an end-sta te  concep tion  o f politics, the alternative could  be described as a  process 
concep tion  o f  p o litics. W e should concern ourselves not solely with the en d  p ro d u c t 
o f the dec isio n -m ak in g  process, but with the organisation o f the process itse lf. S ince 
we re ject th e  idea  o f  policy being decided by the policy-scientist, we m ust h o ld  a  c o n ­
ception  o f  a  partic ipa tory  process, and  given that we cannot separate out th e  v ario u s  
e lem ents o f  hu m an  action, we m ust also consider a theory o f  political a s  w e ll as 
econom ic hum an
... according to this theory 'politics' refers to men's deliberate efforts to order, direct, and control their 
collective affairs and activities, to establish ends for their society, and to implement and evaluate these 
ends. From this perspective, what is fundamental about politics is the interacuon and participation of 
men according to mutually defined and accepted rules as they engage in this process of creating and 
administering the laws of their community, which is to say that what is most significant is the involve­
ment of the citizens in the process of determining their own collective identity (Fay 1975 p.54].
It is  th is  p rocess  o f  determ ining a  collective identity that will be the s u b je c t  o f  
C h ap te r Five.
O u r ta sk  then  is to  show  that a positivist conception o f econom ic sc ien ce  ca n n o t 
d e liver on  its  p rom ise o f  value-free control over the environm ent. W e w ill b e g in  this 
task  by sh o w in g  how  the orthodox econom ists from the 19th century to th e  p re sen t 
day w ere unab le  to  put the philosophy into practice
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CHAPTER 2
From Utility to Welfare:
The Trajectory of Orthodox Economics
w e  SAW in the previous ch a p te r  that the achilles heel o f  the positivist approach to 
social science was the need  fo r a  justification for the m etatheory. The only cogent 
ju stification  lay in the claim  th a t  positive science leads to an ab ility  to  understand and 
thereby  control our social env ironm en t. This, though, necessarily  involved a causal 
explanation  o f  the social w orld , and  explanations solely in term s o f  observable regu­
larities w ere insufficient fo r th is . C ausal explanations invariably involved recourse to 
theories.
Positive econom ics faced  ex tra  difficulties, particularly  in justifying laissez- 
faire. T he idea o f a  positive econom ics would seem to lead to som e notion of 
econom ic planning. L aissez -fa ire therefore has to be justified  by show ing both why 
social planning cannot su cceed , and how individuals acting in ignorance o f  an 
unknow n social optim um  nevertheless can collectively obtain  the best social out­
com e.
T his left the positivists tw o  tasks in order to justify  laissez-faire. The first task is 
to expla in  activity in term s o f  individual actions. They then had to show how  the 
aggregate o f these actions n o t on ly  arrived at but actually revealed the optimum  
social outcom e. T hat is to  say , the theory must be based on individuals, m ust be capa­
ble o f  aggregating the ind iv idua l actions, and m ust show  that only then can the best 
social outcom e be found. W h a t w e will see in this chapter is that it is im possible for 
the positivists to keep all th ree  sk ittles in the air at once.
In order to put the p o s itiv is t philosophy into operation the econom ic theory 
w ould require three e lem ents. It w ould  require a psychology so that causal explana­
tion  can be derived in o rd er to  explain why actions occurred. T o  aggregate these 
ac tions a  second elem ent —  th e  theory o f price —  is needed. B ut to show that this 
aggregate is optimal a  th ird  e lem en t —  a value theory —  is also  required, and  it is
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th is last that causes the tension  in w hat is su p p o sed  to be a value-free positive sci­
ence. because in order to support laissez-faire the v alu es  m ust be subjective, whereas 
positivism  stresses objectivity. 1
This chapter will trace th e  trajectory o f  o rth o d o x  econom ics as  it tries out dif­
feren t w ays o f dealing w ith  the d ilem m a o f  a ttem p tin g  to obtain objective results 
from  subjective analysis. F irst we will look a t th e  utilitarian m arginalists. who 
cla im ed to be able to reconcile value and p rice th ro u g h  their know ledge o f ‘ultimate 
causes’. W e will see that the hedonist psychology w h ich  this involved cannot be sus­
tained. and the philosophy canno t be put into opera tio n . The utilitarian philosophy 
gave way to a more orthodox conception o f  p o sitiv ism , and in econom ics the margi- 
na list school was succeeded by the neo-classics. T h e  neo-classics used an objective 
value theory, but could no t then  defend laissez-faire. at least not w ithout incorporat­
ing unsubstantiated psychological assum ptions. The later ord inalist theories 
attem pted to dispense w ith psychology, but in so  do ing  had a lso  to  dispense with 
value theory, which m eant tha t they could not sh o w  how the best social outcom e can 
be arrived at. But w ithout th is ability to arrive a t  policy conclusions the positive 
approach seems pointless, and  w e shall see that o rthodox econom ics arrives at an 
essentia lly  vacuous theory.
I. U TILITA R IA N ISM
B en th am
O ne m ethod o f deriving an objective social sc ien c e  from a subjective theory is to 
m oo t a theoretical approach based  on hum an p sycho logy . This then  m akes it seem 
possib le to draw  policy recom m endations from  ‘ev id e n c e ’ because the ultim ate facts
1 This is not to say that planning cannot be critisised, or that laissez-faire cannot be defended, 
but simply that this would require a non-posidvist approach. We will consider one such approach 
in the next chapter.
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o f behavior are (claim ed to be) know n. T his is the approach o f  B en tham ist Utilitari­
anism . w hich H ollis and Nell refer to  as “ the trium ph o f  p o s itiv ism ’’ [1975 p.48]. 
The avow ed aim  o f  the utilitarian philosophy o f  the eigh teen th  a n d  nineteenth cen ­
tury was precisely to  extend the principles o f  rational c a lcu la tio n  to  all aspects o f 
hum an activity. M orality could be calculated in the sam e m an n e r a s  the quantities o f  
physical sciences. U tility w as a  guide both to  w hat is and  w hat o u g h t to  be. A ccord­
ing to  Bentham
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is 
for them alone to point out what we ought to do. as well as what we shall do. On the one hand the stan­
dard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects are fastened to their throne (Bent-
ham 1789 p. 11).
There is therefore no  distinction betw een ethical and technical considerations. Left 
alone, w hat w e w ant to  do  is w hat we w ill do. and this is indeed  w h a t w e ought to  do. 
E thics are therefore objective.
The consistency  o f the utilitarian moral philosophy w ill n o t  be d iscussed here. 
O ur interest is in the operationalisation o f  utilitarianism  —  the tran sitio n  from social 
theory to  social science. The ability  to operationalise the ph ilo so p h y  is o f  vital im por­
tance to utilitarianism  because o f  the claim  for objective m orality  and  m easurem ent. 
Unless the philosophy can be put into operation, it will not be a b le  to  “ point out what 
we ought to  d o " .  T o  show that m orality  is objective, it is  im p o rtan t to  show how  it 
can be d iscovered. T he technical cannot be separated from the e th ica l.
Follow ing on  from our analysis o f  positivism  in the p re v io u s chap ter, we can see 
that the key e lem ent in w hat we could term  the utilitarian m ethodo logy  is the p er­
ceived dem arcation  betw een that w hich is scientific and the non-sc ien tific . W e saw  
that J .S .M ill d istinguished m eans from ends, and that this d is tin c tio n  was used later 
by Robbins as a defining feature o f econom ic science. M ill’s u sa g e  d iffered  from that 
o f  Robbins, though. For the utilitarians there was no distinc tion  b etw een  the scientific 
and the non-scientific. “ The quintessence o f  utilitarian m oral ph ilosophy, which at 
that tim e constitu ted  the basis o f econom ic thought”  M yrdal m ain tains “ was the
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conviction that th e  will both can and should be rational even  w ith  respect to  the end  
tow ards w hich it is d irec ted”  [1953 p .8].
T he question fo r the utilitarians was not how hum an values could be exam ined  
scientifically, since  all values w ere scientific. Because o f  the identification o f  science 
and m orality, the problem  appeared to be technical: how  to arrive at a  social ‘m ax ­
im um ' o f m orality . B entham ’s desire was to become “  the N ew ton o f  the M oral 
W orld” , and he hoped to develop a  m ethod for calculating m orals, a  “ felicific ca l­
cu lu s”  [M itchell 1918 p. 170]. H ow ever the problem  is not straightforw ard. T he ca l­
culation o f  a  social m axim um  o f utility  w ould require the sum m ation o f  the net utility  
o f each individual [p.171]. This im plies an universal cardinal m easure o f  u tility . It is 
far from clear how  such a m easurem ent could be derived. Even though Bentham  did 
not appear to  v iew  the principle o f  m easurem ent as problem atic, in practice he cou ld  
only  m easure on  a  nom inal scale [p.173].
Bentham  ac tually  began to m ove tow ards the notion o f  pecuniary m easurem ent 
o f utility and tow ards the concept o f  indifference analysis to find his way ou t o f  th is 
difficulty:
If of two pleasures a man. knowing what they are. would as lief enjoy the one as the other, they must 
be reputed equal ... If of two pains a man had as lief escape the one as the other, such two pains must 
be reputed equal. If of two sensations, a pain and a pleasure, a man had lief enjoy the pleasure and 
suffer the pain, as not enjoy the first and not suffer the pain must be reputed equal, or. as we may say 
in this case, equivalent
T his equality  then  suggests the use o f  pecuniary measure:
If then between two pleasures the one produced by the possession of money, the other not. a man had 
as lief enjoy the one as the other, such pleasures are to be reputed equal. But the pleasure produced by 
the possession of money, is as the quantity of money that produces it: money is therefore the measure 
of this pleasure ...
If then, speaking o f the respective quantities o f various pains and pleasures ... we would understand 
one another, we m ust make use of some common measure. The only common measure the nature o f 
things affords is money ... Money is the instrument for measuring the quantity of pain or pleasure. 
Those who are not satisfied with the accuracy o f this instrument must find out some other that shall be 
more accurate or bid adieu to Politics and Morals [Bentham, in Halevy 1901 p.410-14 cited Mitchell 
1918].
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It can be seen how in attem pting  to derive a m ethod o f  m easurem ent for utility 
Bentham began to m ove aw ay from  his original idea o f  the calculation o f m orality, 
for by utilising m oney as a  m easurem ent we im mediately begin to  place a boundary 
around those hum an activities w hich are to  be deem ed capable o f  ‘scientific ' exam i­
nation. B ut the w hole point o f  utilitarianism  was precisely to  get round  this problem 
o f dem arcation. In the utilitarian political econom y there w as no  real sense in w hich 
one could separate non-econom ic ends from  econom ic m eans: both w ere governed by 
utility:
In other words, the distincuon was not one of principle. It was dictated entirely by expediency. That 
this was the sole motivation was, indeed, sometimes explicitly stated.
It was thus regarded as both natural and desirable that political economists should venture beyond the 
frontier line [Myrdal 1953 p.8).
Indeed the la ter classics had little op tion  but to  deal w ith utilitarianism  in this w ay, 
because they sim ply did not have the tools to deal with m oney m easurem ents of u til­
ity. Myrdal believed that “  the hedonistic trim mings o f classical theory show m erely 
a desire to conform  to the utilitarian philosophy”  [1953 p.80J. T he actual analysis o f  
the later classics remained m uch as before. “ N ot until later d id  utilitarianism  exert its  
full influence upon econom ic th eo ry ”  [Ibid].
Jevons
W hat the c lassics lacked in their attem pt to obtain m oney m easures o f  utility was the 
m athem atical tools o f the differential calculus. It was only  w ith  the w ork o f the m ar- 
ginalists in the late nineteenth century that the method o f  ‘m easu ring ' utility w as 
fully developed. Jevons’ Theory o f  Political Economy w as an  exp licit attempt to  
create the felicific calculus o f  Bentham  [1957 p.xxvi].
The m arginalists linked p rice2 w ith utility by distinguish ing  betw een the total
2 More accurately exchange value: see below
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utility o f  the entire quantity o f  a com m odity consum ed and the ‘final degree’ o f  u til­
ity: roughly  speaking the increm ent in total utility caused  by consum ption o f  th e  last 
un it.3 B ut in o rd e r to provide th e  connection with price a further concept w as needed: 
the notion o f  dim inishing m arginal utility. T his enabled the construction o f  the 
felicific ca lcu lus; the m arket w ould  adjust until the m arginal utilities o f all goods are 
equal. I f  the marginal utility o f  one com m odity w as h igher than that o f another, then 
the individual would switch consum ption to the first good. O f  course, the m ore o f  this 
com m odity  tha t is consum ed, the low er the utility yielded by each  increm ental unit. 
Sw itching consum ption to g oods with a higher m arginal utility therefore low ers the 
m arginal utility . Eventually a  position will be reached w here all m arginal u tilities are 
equal, and there is no incentive to  sw itch consum ption. T his is an  equilibrium  posi­
tion: there is  no  pressure for change.
T h is treatm ent of the M arginalists m ade it appear possible to  find a social 
optim um . H ow ever the new  approach to U tilitarianism  w as m ore than  ju s t  an 
im provem ent in technique —  Jevons’ professional pique against M ill w as in  this 
respect som ew hat misplaced. T here had been earlier critiques o f the labour theory  o f 
value, and  several anticipators o f  the m arginal utility technique used by Jevons. It 
w ould  seem  th at the reason that the time for this idea cam e in the late n ineteenth cen ­
tury  w as m ore as a response to  the advent o f socialist political econom y than  any 
notion  o f  scientific progress [D asgupta 1985 p.95]. B laug does poin t out that M arx ’s 
w ork w as probably unknown to  Jevons and the o th e r m arginalists [1962 p .282], but 
he also w rites that the utility theory itse lf was not accepted fo r m any years. It could  
be suggested  tha t the acceptance o f m arginal utility  a t the turn o f  the cen tu ry  —  
ra the r than  earlie r when it w as first m ooted —  w as due to  the ideological conten t 
[G ram m  1988 p.232]. Recall tha t the utilitarian philosophy w as itse lf a response to 
the natura l-law  philosophy o f  Adam  Smith. T hat the utility theory should p rovide a 
philosophical challenge to labour value theory should  com e as no surprise, bu t the
3 For an explanation of the differences between various formulations of the differential ap­
proach to utility see Mitchell [1969 p.55].
Mulberg: Social Limits to Economic Theory 42
treatm ent o f  utility  theory itse lf show s clearly a  conservative bias. W e w ill be tracing 
these developm ents in due course.
T he u tilitarian theory o f  hum an nature focused  theory on individual behavior. 
The problem  that B entham  was struggling to  solve was in essence to deriv e  from  this 
an operational social theory. T he significance o f  m arginalism  w as th a t it m ade the 
calculation o f  this u tilitarian social theory appear possible. The resu ltan t theory 
enabled the m arginalists to arrive a t the sam e laissez-faire conclusions as  the classics, 
but w ithout em ploying  any no tion  o f  objective value. Utility w as sub jective —  it w as 
located w ith in  the individual ac tor: “ T he u tility  theory o f  value is  prim arily  an 
attem pt to expla in  price determ ination  in psychological term s”  [V iner 1925 p . 123]. 
How ever, there is a  difference in this approach, reflecting the p roblem s o f  positive 
social science. The psychological ‘explanation ’ rem ains an hypothesis —  unlike p ro ­
duction, utility  cannot be o b jec tive ly  know n: “ O ne does not p roceed  from  a 
know ledge o f  relative utility to  p rices  o f com m odities. T he procedure seem s to  be the 
other w ay about; when one know s relative prices, one hypothesises that they 
represent the relative m arginal u tilities o f  com m oditie s”  [D asgupta 1985 p.85].
If  the m ethodological im pact o f  utility theory w as the m ovem ent tow ards indivi­
dualism , the theoretical effec t w as to  sw itch the focus o f  econom ics from  production 
to dem and [G ram m  1988 p .232]. T he problem  is how  to m ove from  a  (subjective) 
utility to  an (objective) m arket dem and. Som e o f  the m arginalists (includ ing  Jevons) 
tended to  m ove directly from  u tility  to dem and: the form er w as expressed  in m oney 
terms, thereby  identifying it w ith  the later [V iner 1925 p. 125]. A ctually , Jevons never 
really arrived  at a fully fledged p rice theory. He does equate pu rchasing  pow er w ith 
the ratio o f  exchange [1957 p .81], but he tends to  m ove directly  to  th is from price 
without show ing how the ra tio  o f  exchange has been derived. In fact, all Je v o n s’ 
exam ples involve barter [cf. M itchell 1969 p.61 ff.]. P rice theory p ro p e r w as only 
developed after Jevons. Furtherm ore , his trea tm ent o f  the derivation  o f  m axim um  
aggregate utility  is incom plete in o ther respects also. H is analysis has no  tim e factor 
present at a ll [H utchison 1953 p .44]. A lso, because Jevons lim its h is  exam ples to
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barter, he is necessarily restricted to  a  two-person, tw o-com m odity analysis, and it is 
unclear w h e th e r this can be generalised. Jevons therefore developed h is ra ther am bi­
guous co n c ep t o f  the 'T rading B ody’. This was defined  simply as “ any body e ither of 
buyers o r s e lle r s "  [1957 p.88J. Jevons did not d istinguish  between individual traders 
and  groups o f  traders: “ The trading body may be a  sing le individual in one case: it 
m ay be the w ho le inhabitants o f a continent in another: it m ay be the individuals o f a 
trade d iffu se d  throughout a  country in a th ird .” [p.88]. T he actual size o f  the trading 
bodies w as n o t a relevant factor in the theory, since " th e  principles o f  exchange are 
the sam e in  nature , however wide o r narrow  m ay be th e  m arket considered .” [p.89J.
J e v o n s ’ use o f  the concept o f the Trading Body is significant for the operational­
isation o f  utilitarianism  in tw o respects. U tilitarianism  involved the derivation o f  a 
social m ax im um  from the m axim isation o f individual utility. Later analysis showed 
that this so cia l maximum would not necessarily o cc u r when just tw o traders were 
involved; to  ensure this m aximum there is a  m inim um  requirem ent o f  a large num ber 
o f  traders, notw ithstanding the o ther requisites o f  perfec t com petition. G am e Theory 
analysis w a s  later to show that the m axim um  aggregate utility is o ften  not arrived at 
in bilateral negotiation .4 Jevons m entioned som e o f  th e  conditions o f  com petition in 
his ‘law  o f  ind ifference’ (w hich gives a simplistic explanation  o f why a  single price 
accrues fo r  each commodity in a  m arket), but d ism isses these as " ex tra n eo u s cir­
cu m stan c es” , and  also applies them  to  his tw o-trader m odels, w here they are not 
sufficient.
In a d d itio n , the concept o f the Trading Body ten d s to beg the en tire  question o f 
aggregation . Jevons admits that explanations based on  an aggregate Trading  Body 
m ust be d e r iv e d  from individuals [1957 p.89]. He a lso  adm its that the differen tial ca l­
cu lus is d ifficu lt to  apply to  individual behavior, since the functions are not continu­
ous [p.15]. T he calculus is only applicable to averages o f large groups: these show 
con tinuous functions, and the effec t o f  small p rice  changes is negligible [Ibid]. 
Jevons te rm s  this average the “ F ictitious M ean": th e  average does not correspond to
4 The original text was Morgenstem and von Neumann 11944).
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any individual. Y et Jevons d o e s  not show us how  this aggregate func tion  is derived. 
A gain, he sw itches from utility  to  dem and in a  ra ther disconcerting fash ion . If w e are 
only concerned with dem and func tions then the use o f  an aggregate function m ay 
have some legitim acy, but J e v o n s  w as concerned w ith utilities. In o rd e r to  be able to 
derive an aggregate utility fu n c tio n , we have to  assum e that utility is com parable 
betw een people. Yet this J e v o n s  denied [M yrdal 1953 p.101, cf. op.cit p .87, S tigler 
p.72]. He states that
The reader will find, again, that there is never, in any single instance, an attempt made to compare the 
amount of feeling in one mind with that in another. I see no means by which such comparison can be 
accomplished ... Every mind is thus inscrutable to every other mind, and no common denominator of 
feeling seems to be possible (1957 p. 14).
This problem  actually h as  its roots in the positiv ist/ policy d ilem m a we have 
already encountered. The d ile m m a  is that the adm ission o f  interpersonal com parisons 
leads straight back to the sort o f  egalitarian conclusions that the labour theory o f 
value led to. T he problem is th a t  the concept o f  dim inishing m arginal utility could 
also  be applied to  m oney, in co m e o r wealth. T his would suggest th a t m aximum 
aggregate utility would be ach iev ed  when these w ere equal, w hich im plies a re­
distribution o f w ealth along eg a lita rian  lines.
This points to egalitarian principles, justifies trade unions, progressive taxation, and the welfare state, 
if not more radical means to interfere with an economic system that allows so much of the good juice 
of utility to evaporate out of commodities by distnbuting them unequally.
But on the other hand the whole point of utility was to justify laisser faire (Robinson 1962 p.53).
Again, the d ilem m a o f price a n d  value em erges. If Jevons is to  arrive a t  a  theory o f 
price, based on the hedonist p sycho logy , and to  m ove from utility to  dem and , he has 
to accept the interpersonal com parison  o f utility. This interpersonal com parison 
w ould, o f course, result in an  eg a lita rian  value theory.
By denying that utility c a n  be com pared betw een different peop le , Jevons 
appears to have avoided this co n c lu sio n , but a t a  cost. A s M yrdal po in ts ou t: “  the
Mulberg: Social Limits to Economic Theory 45
c o n c e p ts  o f  utility and disu tility  w hich the m a rg in a lis ts  took over from the utilitarians 
w e re  in tended  for interpersonal co m p a riso n s”  [1953 p.90]. T he abandonm ent o f  
in terpe rsonal com parisons necessarily in v o lv es  abandoning  “ u tilitarian com parisons 
and  th e  social calculus. A t this point ec o n o m ic  theory parts com pany w ith u tilitarian 
p h ilo so p h y . It aim s a t a  positive psycho log ica l analysis, and does not as such intend 
to  b e  a  rationalistic political m etaphysics.”  [op.cit. p.87]. T he price o f  denying 
in terp e rso n al com parisons is the failure to  o pera tionalise  utilitarianism . W e can no 
lo n g e r equa te ‘w hat w e shall d o ’ with ‘w h a t w e  ought to d o ’, because we cannot 
c o m p a re  the results o f  o u r actions betw een  peo p le . T he social op tim um  becom es 
indeterm ina te .
In  fact the question o f  distribution sh o w s u p  well the lim its that Jevons put upon 
h is e x p o sitio n  o f  B en tham 's theory. If  w e are  n o t to  have interpersonal com parisons 
o f  u tility , along  with the consequent eg a lita rian  distribution, w e m ay ask w hat d istri­
b u tio n  theory  Jevons has to offer in its p la c e . H ere we find the lim itation o f  the 
th e o ry . Jev o n s ' calculus was only really  c o n c e rn e d  with com m odities and  exchange 
[see M itchell 1967 p.43). B entham  w as c o n c e rn e d  with the en tire  range o f  hum an 
ac tiv itie s , especially w ith penal legislation a n d  the legal system  [W am ock 1962 
p. 12]. O f  course, as we saw. the whole p ro b lem  w ith the Bentham  schem e w as the 
m ea su rem en t o f  utility. Jevons appears to h av e  som ew hat abandoned this general e th ­
ical ca lcu lus , and lim its his analysis to  m a rk e t exchange. He evokes the notion o f  a 
h ie ra rc h y  o f pleasures to separate the h ig h e r  (m oral) pleasures from the low er 
(e co n o m ic) feelings, an d  suggested that “ It is the low est rank  o f  feelings w hich w e 
h ere  trea t. T he calculus o f  utility aim s a t su p p ly in g  the ordinary w ants o f  m an a t the 
lea st c o s t  o f  labour”  [Jevons 1957 p.27]. Y e t Je v o n s appears to believe in the m oral 
c a lc u lu s , and seem ed to  believe that d is tr ib u tio n  w as a  part o f  it:
Each labourer, in the absence of other motives, is supposed to devote his energy to the accumulation of 
wealth. A higher calculus of moral right and wrong would be needed to show how he may best employ 
that wealth for the good of others as well as himself. But when that higher calculus gives no prohibi­
tion. we need the lower calculus to gain us the utmost good in matters of moral indifference. [1957 
P-27]
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B asically Jev o n s  is passing the buck. He is simply asserting  tha t somehow distri­
bution and  eth ics ca n  be calculated, but that this is not his concern .
G iven that no  ind ica tion  is provided as to how  a ‘higher c a lc u lu s ' o f morals is to 
work, w e are left w ith  som ething o f a vacuum . T he w hole p o in t o f  utilitarianism  was 
that all hum an ac tiv ity  w as determ inate. Jevons is now saying  th a t only part o f this 
activity is d e te rm ina te , and  also that this part cannot be m easu red  inte rpers on ally 
while the rest can. s in c e  if w e cannot m ake interpersonal com parisons o f utility even 
in the m oral ca lcu lus  it is hard  to see how any utilitarian po licy  conclusions can be 
arrived at at all. J e v o n s  needs to m aintain tw o different no tions o f  utility: the ethical 
one w hich is co m p a rab le  betw een people, and  the political econom y/exchange utility 
w hich is not. Jev o n s m akes no attem pt to distinguish betw een these: we have no 
boundary line b etw een  the one and the other. W e are asked to  distinguish between 
'political ec onom y ' a n d  'e th ica l ' aspects o f behavior w ithout b e in g  given any distin­
guishing feature.
W ithout any d is tin c tio n  between the political econom y an d  ethics, it w ould 
seem to  be im possible to  derive any policy prescriptions along Jevon ian  lines. In fact, 
Jevons h im self o rig in ally  expressed doubts as to the usefulness o f  his theory [1871 
p.25], but in later e d itio n s  o f  the Theory o f  Political Economy he expunged these pas­
sages. But separated from  its utilitarian roots the theory had very  little to  offer in the 
way o f  practical ad v ic e , and a return to the utilitarian philosophy involved accepting 
interpersonal com parisons, along with the distributional consequences. This was the 
path chosen by E dgew orth .
E d g ew o rth
Edgew orth was in so m e w ays far more utilitarian than even  Jev o n s  [M itchell 1969 
p.95]. H is book New and Old Methods o f  Ethics was part o f  h is  attem pt to derive a 
clear m athem atical concep tion  o f exact utilitarianism  [H utchison  1953 p.109]. He 
believed that this w a s  im plied in the greatest happiness princ ip le  [Edgeworth 1953
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p.109), and he thought that the “ E conom ical C a lc u lu s"  as he term ed it, was an  
extension o f  this. H is 1881 essay Mathematical Psychics w as subtitled ‘An Essay on  
the A pplication o f  M athem atics to  th e  M oral S ciences ', and  was an attem pt to form u­
late this econom ical calculus. T he m ain  title o f  the essay  is o f  significance. E dge- 
worth believed that hedonism  rep resen ted  an accurate psychological analysis. Furth­
ermore, the m ethods o f both physical science and “ m oral science”  w ere identical: 
“ T he central conception o f D y n a m ic s“  according to  Edgew orth “ is other-sidedly 
identical with the central conception  o f  E th ics“ , and  he believed that
Mechamque social«' may one day take her place along with mecharuque celeste', throned each upon 
the double-sided height of one maximum principle, the supreme pinnacle of moral as of physical sci­
ence. | Edgeworth 1881 p. 12]
For Edgew orth utility was a  m easurable, observable fact. It w as, to use S am ueison 's 
phrase, ‘as real as his m orning ja m '.  L ik e  Jevons. E dgew orth ’s felicific calculus w as 
divided between the econom ic an d  the eth ica l calculus, but Edgew orth’s arrangem ent 
w as not hierarchical. T he ethical ca lcu lu s  was in no  sense a 'h ig h er' calculus, as it 
was for Jevons, but is parallel w ith econom ics, and it is  through the ethical ca lcu lus 
that Edgew orth derives his social va lue  solution. “ T he Econom ical C alcu lus”  was to  
explain
the equilibrium of a system of hedonic forces each tending to maximum individual utility 
w hereas the Utilitarian C alculus considered
the equilibrium of a system in which each and all tend to maximum universal utility, [op.cit. p.15]
T he question o f  social value and d is tribu tion  was therefore part o f the m oral calculus, 
but this calculus Edgew orth believed to  be fully capable o f  operationalisation. Putting 
the moral calculus into operation d id , how ever, require the use o f inter-personal com -
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parisons o f  utility, according to Edgew orth:
For moral calculations, a further dimension is required: to compare the happiness of one person with 
the happiness of another, and generally the happiness of groups of different members and different 
average happiness.
Such comparison can no longer be shirked, if there is to be any systematic morality at all. It is postu­
lated by distributive justice. It is postulated by the population quesuon ... [op.cit. p. 18]
Boundary questions w ere not o f  the sam e im p o rtan ce  fo r Edgew orth as for Jevons, 
since the dual calculus were 'o ther-sidedly id e n tic a l'. It w ill be recalled  though, that 
the need fo r a m oral calculus in Jevons' theory a ro se  o u t o f  distributional considera­
tions. W e m ay ask if  Edgew orth, w ho claim s to  be a b le  to  consider the m oral ques­
tion o f distribution, accepts the egalitarian co n c lu sio n  im plied by dim inishing m arg i­
nal utility. Edgew orth avoids this conclusion by p o s itin g  differing “ ca p ac itie s"  for 
the enjoym ent o f pleasure: the savage societies, th e  labouring classes and w om en 
may well, according to  Edgew orth, have “ inferior ca p ac itie s“  for p leasure [op.cit. 
P-77 ff.j.
This artificial and arbitrary supposition o f  E d g e w o rth  shows up  well the prob­
lems the m arginalists had in squaring the radical e le m e n t o f  utilitarianism  w ith the 
conservatism  inherited from the natural law p h ilo so p h y  o f  the early classics. W e will 
see this reconciliation em erge in the works o f  M a rsh a ll, which w e will exam ine 
shortly, but there w ere several developm ents in E d g e w o rth ’s works w hich oversha­
dowed later developm ents. One o f  the problem s w e o b se rv ed  w ith the Jevonian  trea t­
ment was that his exam ples o f bilateral trading w e re  no t sufficient to  derive a  social 
m axim um ,5 and that h is device o f the trading body in v o lv ed  an inadm issible additive 
utility function. Edgew orth dealt w ith the form er p ro b le m  by attem pting to  specify 
the requirem ents fo r perfect com petition .6 He a lso  m o v ed  from an  additive utility
s “ He saw. that is. how closely dependent micro-economic maximisation theorems are on the 
'perfect competition' postulate. He even went so far as to argue that in a regime of general mono­
poly (and. presumably of oligopoly) 'abstract economists would be deprived of their occupation, 
the investigation of the conditions which determine value. There would survive only the empirical 
school, flourishing in a chaos ...*’ [ Papers, vol. 1 pp. 138-39, cited Hutchison 1953 p. 112]
6 Edgeworth's formulation involved the ability to recontract: this would ensure an unique 
equilibrium price (1881 p. 18].
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function  to  w hat S tigler term s a  'generalized  utility ' function [S tig le r  1950 p.77]. For 
Jevons the utility o f  a com m odity was independent o f other co m m o d itie s . For Edge- 
w orth, the utilities were linked [H utchison 1953 p.114]. It w as in  this way that he 
could  address the problem  o f  bilateral trading, w hich he did th ro u g h  the now familiar 
device o f  indifference curve analysis7 (he was attem pting to  sh o w  the indeterminacy 
o f  th is trade , and derived his w ell-know n contract-curve). As H u tc h iso n  rem arked, it 
w as iron ica l that the m ost utilitarian o f the m arginalists should  h a v e  developed the 
concep ts tha t led to  the eventual exclusion o f utilitarianism  from  e c o n o m ic  thought.
E dgew orth ’s form ulation was dependent upon the m oral c a lc u lu s  being opera­
tive: it w as form ulated directly  upon hedonism . L ater in his life h e  began  to doubt the 
hedonist psychology in the light o f  advances in psychology a n d  o ther sciences 
[M itchell 1969 p.94]. H edonism  was no longer in keeping w ith  th e  sp irit o f positiv­
ism.
From the period of the later classics onwards, economic theory has been out o f  step with the general 
advance of ideas. Marginal utility theory attempted to give a hedonistic interpretation of value at a 
time when psychologists were abandoning hedonism in favour of a more realistic analysis. (Myrdal 
1953 p.811
T he early  m arginalists accepted utility analysis as a  fa c t o f  com m on sense 
[Jevons 1957 p.52, Edgew orth 1877 p.35]. They attem pted to o p era tio n a lise  utilitari­
anism  by narrow ing  the focus o f  political econom y from that o f  t h e  la ter classics, but 
w ere never really  able to derive a distributional theory that w as s e p a ra te  from an  ino­
perative m oral calculus. They also never properly developed a th e o ry  o f  social value, 
bo th  o f  w hich  w ere essential elem ents o f  the c lassic ists ' theories.
7 These may well have been based on Marshall’s in the latter’s P u re  T h e o r y  o f  D om estic  
V alues a n d  o f  F o re ig n  Trade  (Hutchison 1953 p .l 14).
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U. N EO -CLASSICS
M arsh all
It was w ith M arshall th a t the reconciliation o f  the classics and  the m arginal ap p ro ach  
was established, and  it is  M arshall’s work that m arks the beginning o f ‘n eo -c lass ica l’ 
econom ics proper. T h is  coincided with the fall o f  utilitarianism  as a  moral sc ien c e . It 
is notable how  the m o st m athem atically-inclined o f  the econom ists (E d g e w o rth ’s 
background w as in L aw  and  English) was also the m ost sceptical o f  the usefu ln ess  o f 
m athem atical analysis.
Though a skilled mathematician, he [Marshall| used mathematics sparingly. He saw that excessive 
reliance on this instrument might lead us astray in pursuit of intellectual toys, imaginary problems not 
conforming to the conditions of real life: and. further, might distort our sense of proportion by causing 
us to neglect factors that could not easily be worked up in the mathematical machine. (Pigou 1925. 
cued Coase 1975 p.30]
A lthough he w a s perfectly able to use m athem atical reasoning if  and  w h e n  
desired. M arshall w as very sensitive to the lim its o f  M athem atics. For M arsh all, 
m athem atics w as sim p ly  a useful language: he advised one o f  his students to
(1) Use m athem atics as a shorthand language, ra ther than as an  e n g in e  of 
enquiry
(2) K eep to  th em  till you are done
(3) T ransla te in to  English
(4) T hen  illu s tra te  by exam ples that are im portant in real life
(5) B um  the m athem atics
(6 ) If you ca n n o t succeed in (4). bum  (3). T his last I d id  often, [ibid.]
It was im portant to M arshall that econom ics should be reflected in practical e x a m p le s  
o f  everyday living. H e w as not concerned w ith developing ethical system s o f  in te re st
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m ainly to initiates —  although his w ork  d id  have ethical m otivation. For M arshall the 
idea o f  m easuring ethics, o r indeed any  social phenom enon, was simply nonsensical. 
O ne o f  his m arginal notes in the Principles reads " E v e n  com m on pleasures and 
pains can be com pared only through th e  strength o f  the incentives which they supply 
to a c tio n "  [M arshall 1890 (1920) p .1 5 ]8 —  a clear indication o f  M arshall's break 
with U tilitarianism . M arshall was not concerned  with B en th am 's  'springs o f  ac tion ', 
he w as concerned with effect not cause. " I t  is essential to  n o te "  M arshall writes 
" th a t  the econom ist does not claim  to  m easu re  any affection o f  the m ind in itself, or 
directly , but only through its e ffec t."  [Ib id ). He is also  explicit in his rejection o f util­
itarianism  [op.cit p.17 fn 1). Typically , th e  reason for M arshall’s rejection o f  the u tili­
tarian eth ic stem m ed not so much fro m  abstract m ethodological considerations as 
from sim ple practicalities: u tilitarian ism  did not w ork. There was no w ay that 
M arshall could see o f  reconciling w hat is w ith what ought to be:
Lastly it is sometimes erroneously supposed that normal action in economics is that which is right 
morally. But that is to be understood only when the context implies that the action is being judged 
from the ethical point of view. When we are considering the facts of the world, as they are. and not as 
they ought to be. we shall have to regard as "norm al" to the circumstance in view, much action which 
we should use our utmost effort to stop.
One o f  the main problem s o f  u tilitarian ism  for M arshall was the undesirable side- 
effects o f  the laissez-faire policy latent in the orthodox im plem entation o f  utilitarian­
ism. He continues:
For instance, the normal condition of many of the very poorest inhabitants of a large town is to be 
devoid of enterprise, and unwilling to avail themselves of the opportunities that may offer for a 
healthier and less squalid life elsewhere: they have not the strength, physical, mental and moral, 
required for working their way out of their miserable surroundings. The existence of a considerable 
supply of labour ready to make match-boxes at a very low rate is normal in the same way that a con­
tortion of the limbs is a normal result of taking strychnine, (op.cit. p.35|
8 References to the 8th. edition (1920) are taken from the Variorium edition, London. Macmil­
lan 1961.
Mulberg: Social Limits to Economic Theory 52
T he sim ple description o f  social events was no t th e  p o in t o f  M arshall’s  w ork. He 
ju stified  econom ic science in  the m anner tha t w e d iscussed  earlier —  it w as to 
im prove ou r lo t in life. M arshall refused to accep t th a t  th e  squalor o f the p o o r in  V ic­
to rian  Britain could be squared  with the notion th a t laissez-faire led to the best possi­
ble social outcom e. O ne o f  h is  m ajor concerns in th e  Principles and e lsew here w as 
the ab ject poverty which the Industrial R evolu tion  le f t in  its wake:
Thus free competition, or rather, freedom of industry and en terprise, was set loose to run, like a  huge 
untrained monster, its wayward course. The abuse o f their new pow er by able but uncultured business 
men led to evils on every side; it unfitted mothers for their du ties,9 it weighed down children with 
overwork and d isease...
Furtherm ore the econom ists w ere also to blame:
And yet the time at which free enterprise was showing itself in an unnaturally harsh form, was the very 
time in which economists were most lavish in their praises o f  i t  [op.cit. p.9]
W hat M arshall seem ed  to  find o b jec tionab le  w as not e th ics, but eth ics 
m asquerading as science. H e also seem ed to d isreg ard  th e  idea o f a purely descriptive 
so cia l science. M arshall’s  aim  w as to  study h o w  to  im prove the lo t o f  hum ankind , 
and th is could  be best done, he believed, by im p ro v in g  hum ans them selves. He 
believed  that econom ic science could  show  w a y s in  w hich  hum an natu re cou ld  be 
m odified  fo r the better [op.cit. p.35]. T his w as p a r t  o f  M arshall’s  concern  fo r the 
p lig h t o f  the poor. 10
It was fo r this reason  tha t M arshall w a s u n concerned  with deriv ing  exact 
theories o f  transcendental econom ic ‘law s’ based  o n  th eo ries  o f  hum an nature: “ Sci­
9 This is (he first indication of the move away from an individual unit of analysis to that of a 
group unit. Note that this means that individual utility can no longer be said to be maximised.
10 In particular, Marshall held a vague notion of human capital. The improvement of the condi­
tions of the working class would help the material wealth of the country [1920 p.562]. Marshall 
believed that “ The most valuable of all capital is that invested in human beings”  [1920 p.564]. 
The improvement of the effectiveness of the labour force — especially through education [1920 
p.212, 562 ff.) — was one of the keys to growth. Indeed, Marshall believed that investment in hu­
man capital may itself end class distinctions [Dasgupta 1985 p .l 18].
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ence m ay  suggest a m oral or practical precept to  m odify that nature a n d  thus modify 
the ac tio n  o f the law s o f  n a tu re .'’ [1920 p.36] Theory was therefore o f  little value in 
itself, bu t had constantly to show  application, indeed M arshall on ce  w rote that “ in 
econom ics there is ‘no theo ry ’ to speak o f ’ [Coase 1975 p.28]. L a te r  he wrote to 
Edgew orth
In my view Theory' is essential. No one gets any real grip of economic problems unless he will work 
on it. But I conceive no more calamitous nouon than that abstract, or general, or theoretical' econom­
ics was economics proper. It seems to me a very small part of economics proper: and by itself even — 
well, not a very good occupation of time ... general reasoning is essential, but a wide and thorough 
study of facts is equally essential ... a combination of the two sides of the work is alone economics 
proper. Economic theory is, in my opinion, as mischievous an imposter when it claims to be econom­
ics proper as is mere cmde unanalysed history, (cited Coase 1975 p.29. Hutchison p.711
M arshall was unconcerned with questions o f  pure theory and  w ith  philosophical 
and  m ethodological disputes. H e regarded h im se lf as "m id w ay  b e tw e en  Keynes + 
S idgw ick  + C aim es and Schm oller + A shley’’ [cited Coase 1975 p .2 8 ]. He simply 
had no  appetite for the debate. He w anted to "o b ta in  guidance in th e  practical con­
duct o f  l ife " , and he required  econom ics to generate pragm atic co u n c il as to  the best 
po licy .
F or Marshall, the notion o f  m easuring the effects o f  utility, an d  h is  approach to 
s tudy ing  mental states through their m anifestations [Principles 8 p .1 4 ], w as as much a 
m atter o f  com m on-sense as utility was for the early  m arginalists: he uses such 
ph rases as " in  ordinary l ife "  and "o rd inary  u sage" several tim e s  in his early 
chap ters . It did not, for him , require extensive justification. N e ith e r, Marshall 
be lieved , did the definition o f  econom ics, although he did m ove aw ay  from the 
’w e a lth ' definition o f  the classics. In the earlier Economics o f  Industry  he had been 
happy to  include the idea o f wealth:
Those portions of human conduct which are directed towards the acquirement of material wealth, and 
those conditions of human well-being which directly depend on material wealth, are called Economic. 
The science of Economics collects, examines, arranges and reasons about the facts which are con­
nected with the economic habits and conditions of well-being in various countries at various times. 
[1879 p.5]
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Later on he placed m ore em p h asis  on the notion o f ac tion , and less on  w ealth . He also 
em phasised the 'com m on sen se ' elem ent m ore. He began the first th ree editions o f  
the Principles by writing
Political economy or Economics, is a study of man 's actions in the ordinary business of life: it inquires 
how he gets his income and how he uses it
But by the fourth edition M arshall’s concern  with the idea o f social w elfare caused 
him to  revise this definition. B y then econom ics was
.a  study of mankind in the ordinary business of life: it examines that part of individual and social 
actions which is most clearly connected with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing.
M arshall's interest was no t in  m aterial w ealth  per se. but w ith the m aterial aspects o f  
'w e llbe ing ' —  it was only  fo r this reason that wealth w as o f  im portance, and it was 
this im plicit ethic o f the 'w e llb e in g ' o f society that w as at the back o f  M arshall’s 
endeavors.
The study o f "m ate ria l requisites o f w e llb e in g "  required, for M arshall, a fusion 
o f both the psychological approach  o f  the early  m arginalists and the w ealth delinea­
tion o f the classics. He b elieved  econom ics " i s  on the one side a  study o f  wealth; and  
on the other, and more im portan t side, a  part o f  the study  o f m an .”  [1920 p .l)  W hat 
was needed was the a n a ly sis  o f  both subjective and objective elem ents. W riting to  
N .G.Pierson. M arshall says “ T he book [Principles] w as written to express one idea 
& one idea only. That idea is that w hereas R icardo &  co . m aintain that value is de te r­
m ined by cost o f  production , & Jevons & (in  a  m easure) the A ustrians that it is deter­
mined by utility, each w as righ t in w hat he affirm ed but w rong in w hat he den ied .”  
[D asgupta 1985 p.104]
W e will consider M arsh a ll’s value theory in m ore detail shortly. W hat is also 
striking about M arshall’s defin ition , com pared to that o f  the earlier m arginalists is the 
lack o f abstraction. W e are  not dealing w ith an abstract homo oeconomicus w hich
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la te r  econom ists w ere to  use. nor are we sp litting  hum an action  into ethical and 
ec o n o m ic  dim ensions. W e deal “ w ith m an as he is: not w ith an  abstract or 
’e c o n o m ic ' man: but a m an o f  flesh and b lo o d .”  [1920 pp.26-27] F or M arshall, the 
p o in t  was that it is econom ic forces w hich m o u ld  the character o f  hum ans. “ For 
M a n ’s character has been m oulded by his ev e ry d ay  w ork, and  the m aterial resources 
w h ic h  he thereby procures, more than any o th e r influence unless it be that o f his re li­
g io u s  ideals”  [op.cit. p . l ] .  It was not that h u m an s are naturally  rational, but that in 
re g a rd  to business conduct hum ans are at th e ir m ost rational [op.cit. p.20]. Habits 
a n d  custom s are follow ed, but have th em selv es  arisen from  calcu lation  [ibid.].11 
H o w e v er the only generalisable m easure o f  m o tiv es , M arshall m aintained, was that 
a ffo rd e d  by m oney, hence this “ is the c e n tre  around w hich econom ic science 
c lu s te r s .” [p.22] M itchell m aintains that for M arshall m oney m easures the “ force o f 
m o tiv e s  that control hum an behavior” , and suggests  that m odem  society “ is organ­
ise d  about the process o f m aking and sp end ing  m oney in co m es" , a  process w hich 
“ m o u ld s  the minds o f people”  and
makes them as economic characters substantially different from the denziens of another type of econ­
omy. If the theorist could take away the effect of the money economy from the modem civilised 
nations, he would find that their inhabitants would be very different creatures from what they are. 
[Mitchell 1969 p. 158)1 2
M arshall’s theory is therefore objective in  the sense that he is concerned w ith an 
o b jec tiv e  element: that o f  the material a sp e cts  o f  w ellbeing. Furtherm ore, these 
m ateria l aspects have com e to  centre around m o n ey . A lthough he uses the differential 
ca lcu lu s , he is not attem pting to  m easure the sam e  things as his m arginalist predeces­
so rs . In addition, M arshall is far more cautious ab o u t the use o f  m oney m easures than 
h is  predecessors: it is on ly  w ith “ careful p re cau tio n s”  that m oney can  be used as a
11 Marshall's marginal notes are misleading here.
12 This should be compared with the institutionalist critique of the economic assumptions con­
cerning human action which began to emerge in America about the time of the sixth edition of the 
Principles, with the work of Veblen and Mitchell. We will look at the institutionalist school in 
chapter four.
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m easure o f  the “ m ov ing  forces”  o f hum an lives. W e will see  here that M arshall 
only provides sca n t exposition o f the “ precautions”  we m ust take when using m oney 
m easures o f b eh a v io ra l forces, and provides next-to-no institutional analysis o f  the 
predom inance o f  m on ey  as the focus fo r m odem  behavior. T he reason for this is  that 
M arshall was n o t a s  concerned with market equilibrium  as the orthodox econom ists 
have tended to  b e , e ith e r before M arshall o r since. ^  Part o f  M arshall’s  synthesis of 
the m arginal an d  class ica l approach was that he drew  no distinction between value 
and grow th [L oasby  1978 p .l]. He w anted to incorporate the elem en t o f time that was 
so central to the c la ss ic s. It was this that led him to insist upon the use o f  costs a s  well 
as dem and in v a lu e  theory: hence his fam ous dictum about the scissors. M arshall 
added the concep t o f  diminishing returns to that o f dim inishing m arginal utility  to 
explain how  m ark e t price was derived. An increase in one fac to r o f production would 
yield a  p rogressively  sm aller increase in product. Each ex tra  hour that the labour 
force w orked w o u ld  resu lt in a sm aller and sm aller increase in  output, the o ther fac­
tors o f  production (especially  plant) being fixed. This m eant th a t while dem and price 
fell with quantity , supply costs rose. A t one particular p rice supply would equal 
demand: the m ark e t w ould clear.
H ow ever th is  is  no t the com plete story. C osts were, fo r M arshall, determ ined 
differently from  dem and: the central elem ent in the analysis o f supply w as time. 
There were three tim e-periods, which represented different positions in the variability 
o f  output. He o u tlin e s  the period o f "tem porary equilibrium ", w here there is  a fixed 
stock o f a  com m o d ity  for sale. This is M arshall’s “ day” . T he equilibrium  price will 
be determ ined by  th e  “ higgling and bargaining”  o f the m arket, and will represent a 
m arket clearing p rice  —  assuming that sellers and buyers are equally  m atched [1920 
p.333].
M arshall’s m a in  concern though was not with this m arket equilibrium , but rather 
w here output co u ld  vary: supply as a flow  [cf. Dasgupta 1985 p.104]. O ne o f his mar- 13
13 With the possible exception of Pigou (we are concerned, of course, only with microeconom­
ics).
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g inal notes reads " In  a  stationery s tate  the doctnne o f  value w ould be s im p le "  [1 9 2 0  
p .367]. It was the effect o f  changes o v e r  time that interested M arshall. H is an a ly sis  
can  be divided into tw o such tim e-periods w here supply can be treated as a flow: the 
short period and the long period. D u rin g  the short period a  change in dem and w ill 
cau se  a corresponding ad justm ent in supply  and a change in price: an increase in 
dem and  will cause price to  rise and  supp ly  to increase [1920 book V sec.5]. H ow ever 
th is need not be an  equilibrium  p rice . M arshall did not subscribe to  any notion  o f  
‘perfec t com petition ' —  as Loasby  p o in ts  out, the w ord does not appear in his index  
[Loasby 1978 p.5]. M arshall does suppose  " fre e  p la y "  o f the forces o f  supply an d  
dem and, m eaning an absence o f com bination , and he also supposed " fre e  co m p e ti­
t io n "  am ong buyers and also  am o n g  sellers [1920 p.342]. A lthough M arshall 
envisaged  a large num ber o f  buyers a n d  sellers, he d id  not rule out som e im p erfec­
tio n s  in the m arket. He realised th a t firm s have regular custom ers and regular s u p ­
p liers  and m ight not react to short-run  changes in m arket price. M arshall uses an  ‘o li­
go p o listic - inform ation system  [L oasby  1978 p.6]. It is this w hich brings ab o u t a 
com petitive solution —  but one w h ich  is neither perfectly com petitive nor o lig o p o lis­
tic. M arshall believed that the rea litie s o f  the industrial world w ould them selves lead  
to  price m aintenance. H e believed  th a t depressions w ere caused by a  lack o f  
confidence [1920 pp .710-11].
M arshall's analysis o f  the sho rt run  tried to show  that the “ h igg ling" o f  the 
m arke t should not affect " n o rm a l"  p rice greatly. It was his long run analysis tha t 
form ed the link with the classics, fo r in  the long-run it was costs w hich w ere the m ain  
variable: firms could adjust their p la n t to alter output. For M arshall the im portant 
elem en t in this adjustm ent was the no tio n  o f  returns to scale. A lthough d im inish ing  
re turns held for the short run because  size o f  plant was constant, in the long run  
increasing returns could  accrue. F o r M arshall, this was w hat led to  econom ic grow th : 
technical changes and also  changes in  industrial organisation caused by increasing  
sca le . It was this prevalence o f  in creasin g  long-run returns that M arshall believed w as 
the m ain justification for con tem porary  industrial organisation.
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T h is  is  further underlined  by M arshall’s  trea tm en t o f  o lig o p o ly . M arshall’s  con­
ception  o f  the effect o f  increasing  returns upon industrial o rg an isa tio n  is that o f  the 
industrial ‘life cycle’. In the long run  many firms p resen tly  trad in g  w ould go  ou t o f 
business: on ly  a few su rv ive  to dom inate the m arket. H o w e v er, these firms w ill in 
their tu rn  stagnate to be rep laced  by new er ‘y o unger’ u n dertak ings. By the 1910’s 
M arshall acknow ledged th is life-cycle analogy w as lo o k in g  som ew hat dated, but he 
did not develop an o ligopolistic  theory. There is  no  p lac e  fo r m arket pow er in 
M arshall’s  analysis once poverty is rem oved.
In the long-run, the industry w ill therefore be in eq u ilib riu m . It is worth stress­
ing tha t th is is  an equilibrium  o f  the industry: the firm s th em se lv es  could com e and 
go: there w as no sense in w hich  one could discuss the lo n g  ru n  equilibrium  position 
o f  the firm. Again, th is is  m uch m ore like the c la ss ic s  th a t  a  purely m arginalist 
analysis.
M arshall’s  treatm ent o f  value and grow th is  o f  sig n if ican ce  to  our thesis for 
several reasons. M ethodologically , the need fo r co n s id e ra tio n  o f  long-run effec ts 
m itigated against the partial equilibrium  approach. Ceteris w e re  n o t likely to rem ain 
paribus in  the long run. T h is is possibly why M arshall b e liev e d  h is analysis to  be 
realistic: th is w as not an  abstraction , bu t ‘flesh and b lo o d ’.
W e w ill recall the o th e r aspect o f  M arshall’s  w ork , w h ich  w as his concern  to 
study real hum ans rather th an  abstract ‘econom ic h u m an ’. T h is  enab led  M arshall to 
ju stify  m oving  directly from  utility to  m oney. All h is e x a m p le s  in  the Principles are 
o f  m arket dem and schedules, and he frequently u ses  th e  co n c e p ts  interchangeably 
[e.g. 1920 p.92-94]. T here is  now here an equation o f  u tilitie s  in  term s o f price. W e 
therefore require an explanation  o f  how  m axim um  so cia l v a lu e  is  coincidental with 
equilibrium  in  cash term s. M arshall u ses the device o f  th e  surplus
Since marginal u tility  o f  a com m odity d im in ished  w ith  quan tity , the dem and 
price fo r a ll un its except the last w ill exceed the e q u ilib riu m  price . M arket price , o f  
course, d o es  not vary —  the sam e price is charged fo r th e  firs t u n it as fo r the last. 
M arshall therefore m aintained that consum ers gained  a  surplus  by  trade: they  paid
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less fo r the first units o f  a com m odity than  they  were prepared to pay . 14 15By the sam e 
token , producers also gained a  surplus: they w ould  have been prepared to  su p p ly  the 
first few  units at a low er price than the equ ilib rium  price, since the supplier is sub jec t 
to d im inish ing  returns. T he total surplus is m axim ised when supply surp lus equa ls 
dem and  surplus —  at the equilibrium  price. N ote that this m easure has currency  a s  its 
un it- it is a  direct m oney m easure o f  satisfac tion  obtained through trade. A lso  note 
that, as such, it im plies both interpersonal com parisons and a cardinal m easurem ent 
o f u tility . O f course, as soon  as we allow  for cardinal utility, w e run into the d im in ­
ish ing  m arginal utility o f  m oney, and all the egalitarian im plications that th is holds. 
By contrast, the m easurem ent o f  consum er surplus adopted by M arshall is  only 
unam biguous if  the m arginal utility o f m oney is constant [D asgupta 1985 p .l  13], but 
M arshall m aintained that it w as only in ex trem e cases that the m arginal u tility  o f 
m oney  was not constant. T h is may exp la in  w hy M arshall had m isgivings about 
alw ays using the com petitive equilibrium  position  as an  optim um  [ibid.].13
The exceptions (to a constant marginal utility o f money | are rare and unimportant in markets for com­
modities: but in markets for labour they are frequent and important.
When a workman is in fear o f hunger, his need o f money (its marginal utility to him» is very great ... 
and he may go on selling his labour at a low rate ... (op.cit. p.335|
M arsh all’s social value theory depended  fo r the most part on an unrealistic p sy ch o ­
log ical assertion concerning the m arginal utility  o f  m oney. This assum ption  enab led  
him  to  avoid  the distributional im plications o f  m arginalism .
M arshall did. though, suggest a technical reason for particularly requ iring  the 
am elio ra tion  o f poverty. He fully realised th a t the vast inequalities o f  w ealth w ou ld
14 Marshall defined the consumers surplus as “ the excess of the price which [the consumer) 
would be willing to pay rather than go without the thing, over that which he actually does p ay ”  
[1920 p. 124). This amount will be less the more units are actually consumed, and will be zero at 
the m arket clearing price, since the marginal utility diminishes with each additional unit. If it w ere 
possible to sell the consumer units at a higher pnce than the subsequent units, then the producer 
could take some of this surplus (in a competitive market this is not possible —  the consumer 
would buy elsewhere, at the lower equilibrium price).
15 Hicks also believes this is a  requisite for an industry demand curve [1939 p.26).
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m ean th a t  it w ould be m o s t unlikely that the m arginal utility  o f  m oney w ould rem ain 
equal. F urtherm ore, the m athem atical train ing  o f  M arshall did no t allow  him  to 
ignore th e  problem s cau sed  by the use o f  the differen tial ca lculus. T he concept of 
d im in ish in g  marginal u tility  and dim inishing m arginal p roduct rested  upon a  notion 
o f  a  s m a ll  increm ental change. It was th is tha t enabled the derivative to  be obtained: 
i f  the c h a n g es w ere large, th e  m argin becom es indeterm inate. M arshall realised that 
one m a rk e t w here changes arc likely to  be fa r from  increm ental w as the labour 
m arket. C hanges in p rices here m ay w ell have large effec ts on ‘w ellbeing’. The 
labour m ark e t is  fo r th is reaso n  exceptional, and  d isadvantages in bargaining tend to 
be cum ulative .
I t  w a s  fo r these reasons (as well as the com m on-sense observation  o f  distribu­
tional prob lem s), that led  M arshall to question  the m arginal productiv ity  theory of 
d is tr ib u tio n  proposed by J.B .C lark  and la ter by W icksteed. T h is w as in  fact the for­
m al c lo su re  o f the system : w ages w ere determ ined  by the value o f  the m arginal pro­
duct m a d e  by the labourer. M arshall never fu lly 16 accepted  the M arginal Produc­
tiv ity  T h e o ry . O ne o f the essen tia l elem ents is that it  on ly  holds fo r constan t returns 
to sca le , w hereas the en tire  thrust o f M arshall’s  w ork  stressed  increasing returns. 
B oth  C la rk  and W icksteed’s  analysis w ere essentia lly  static —  they d id  no t consider 
long ru n  supply  costs as d id  Marshall. Indeed , W icksteed believed tha t the supply 
sch ed u le  w as sim ply an  in v erte d  dem and schedule:
But what about the “ supply curve”  that usually figures as a  determinant o f price co-ordinate with the 
demand curve? I say it boldly and baldly: there is no such thing. W hat usually figures as such is 
merely a  disguised and therefore unrecognisable portion o f the ‘demand curve’ ... [Wicksteed 1913
P-261]
O f c o u rse , this w as far fro m  the case fo r M arshall: the w hole poin t w as that costs 
w ere th e  dom inant feature in  the long run. T h is  also  exp la ins w hy h is advocacy of 
red is tribu tion  did not ex te n d  beyond the am eliora tion  o f  ex trem e poverty. T he essen­
16 His reaction is ambiguous [cf. Hutchison 1953 p.84 ff.J.
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tial principle for M arsh all was that although  the analysis o f  value m ay show  up 
im perfections, it lea d s  to  grow th in production  in the long  run . Even m onopolies 
could  be justified in  th is  w ay (D asgupta 198S p .l 19]. B y increasing  the quantity  o f 
production —  w ith th e  w orst evils o f  poverty  elim inated —  th e  com petitive econom y 
could  create a post hoc  m axim um  solu tion , even  though th e re  m ay be ex ante ine­
qualities.
M arshall's g ro w th  theory was therefore an essential e lem en t o f distribu tion  also. 
It was grow th tha t ju s tified  inequality ( i f  not extrem e poverty). U nfortunately. 
M arshall’s em phasis o n  long-run grow th im pales him on th e  o ther horn o f  the posi­
tivist dilem m a, bec au se  as we m entioned a t the outset o f  th is  chapter a laissez-faire 
value theory m ust be subjective. The u tilitarian  theory was subjective, bu t on ly  at the 
expense o f  a realistic  psychology. M arshall has rejected the psychology o f  hedonism , 
but his em phasis on  g ro w th  involved, as w ith  the classics, a  corresponding  em phasis 
on costs. Costs, th o u g h , are objective, an d  since they are ob jec tive  it is no t clear why 
production cannot b e  planned. If M arsh a ll’s analysis revo lves around increasing 
returns to scale, and  i f  furtherm ore he on ly  considers the equilibrium  o f  the industry, 
then there appears to  be little justification fo r laissez-faire: increasing  re turns to the 
industry could be e a s ily  served by large state enterprises. M arshall w as forced to 
resort to casual psycho log ica l assertions to  back up his position , claim ing that plan­
ning underm ined “ se lf-re lian t and inventive faculties’’ and  so  on.
In addition, w e  can  see that M arshall o ften  resorts to  unsubstan tiated  claim s, 
m ost notably for th e  g ro w th  elem ent o f  h is theory. He does n o t explain exactly  how 
the possibility o f  re tu rn s  to  scale will affec t technical and industrial change, and con­
versely why only th e  m arket m echanism  ca n  achieve this. W e are not to ld  why o li­
gopolistic m arkets w o u ld  maintain price , and  not lead to  dep ressions . 17 W e are not 
told exactly why th e re  should be a ro tating  elite o f dom inan t firm s, o r  even  why 
M arshall’s lim ited c o n c ep t o f free com petition  should hold —  o r  w hat w ould  happen 
when it does not. N e ith e r  is there any bu t the m ost casual institutional analysis o f  our
17 or as Mitchell was shortly to suggest, business cycles.
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“ men o f  flesh and blood”  - and n o  analysis o f any o th e r forces not m easured  by 
m oney. Furthermore, if  “ M an’s c h a ra c te r”  is m alleable, a s  M arshall m ade out, then 
it can be m anipulated, and utility a n d  m arket dem and are no  longer guides to  material 
well-being.
By the time o f  M arshall’s d e a th  the son  o f psychologica l assenions he invoked 
would no longer w ash as science. Furtherm ore. M arshall’s lack o f  oligopolistic 
theory w as beginning to show as a  m a jo r  weakness in h is theory, as the ‘life  cy c le’ 
analogy was called into question b y  dynasties o f jo in t-s to ck  com panies. H is concept 
o f increasing returns was com ing u n d e r  fire from w ithin the profession. A nd in  A m er­
ica his casual institutional analysis w a s  being challenged by the Institutional school.
Pigou
The M arshallian analysis there fo re  foundered on the sam e problem s th a t w e con­
sidered in a m ethodological gu ise in  the last chapter. I f  w e attem pt an  objective, 
refutable analysis á  la H utchison , then we m ust e ith e r  accept the viab ility  o f 
econom ic planning or provide p ro o f  as  to why pieinning is no t viable. In his attem pt 
to m ove from static value analysis to  dynam ic grow th —  in order to escape the d istri­
butional consequencies o f  the su rp lu s  —  Marshall n ecessarily  invokes the objective 
cost analysis o f  the classics, and is  therefore not ab le  to sustain the political theory 
im plied in his position. M arshall i s  unable to escape the value im plications o f  his 
price theory.
T he critiques o f  the M arshallian  approach had very  little immediate im pact upon 
orthodox econom ics. Indeed. M a rsh a ll’s successor at C am bridge —  his pupil A rthur 
Pigou —  was to continue em ploy ing  the same value theory as his teacher. P igou was 
not as concerned with individual b e h a v io r  as M arshall w as how ever. H is a im  w as to 
exam ine the aggregate results o f  m arg in a l analysis. A ggregate individual utilities 
w ere known as welfare, and the a n a ly s is  o f this Pigou ca lled  W elfare Econom ics.
O ne o f M arshall’s early d e fin itio n s  o f  Econom ics, it w ill be recalled, concerned
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how  m an "gets his income and how  he spends i t ."  P ig o u 's  concern is the N ational 
Incom e, or as he term s it. the "N ational D iv idend” . L ike M arshall. Pigou only c o n ­
siders " th a t part o f social welfare that can be brought d ire c tly  o r indirectly into re la ­
tion  with the m easuiing-rod o f  m oney" [1920 p. 11 ]. U n lik e  M arshall though, P igou  
d o es  not defend this choice o f boundary by institutional a n a ly sis , however casual. H e 
sim ply states that "T h e  one obvious instrum ent o f m ea su rem en t available in social 
life  is m oney" [ibid.], and then proceeds without fu rth e r a d o . T his lack o f  caution  
w as to  create problem s for the analysis. In fact, e v e n  Pigou admits that th is  
'E conom ic W elfare' cannot be separated " in  any rigid w a y  from  other p a r ts " , and  
tha t "T h e  outline o f  our territory is. therefore, necessarily  v a g u e " ,  but he still asserts 
tha t " th e  test o f accessibility to a m oney m easure serves  w ell enough to  set up a 
rough  distinction ." [ibid.]. Indeed, Pigou believed that e f fe c ts  on  econom ic w elfare 
w ere " probably equivalent in direction ... to the effect on  to ta l w e lfare"  and that " in  
a ll circum stances the burden o f proof lies upon those w h o  h o ld  that the presum ption 
should  be overru led ." [p.20]
Although Pigou adopted the M arshallian value a n a ly sis , he did not adopt the 
concept o f consum ers surplus. Instead he went d irec tly  to  a  margined approach  
[B lackhouse 1985 p.166]. The m arginal analysis itse lf is fa ir ly  standard once the in i­
tial concepts are established . 18 Pigou takes the c o n c e p t o f  marginal p roduct 
developed  by M arshall and J.B .Clark: this he refers to a s  m arg ina l private product. 
T he contribution to the aggregate whole o f  a m arginal ac t o f  production is the m arg i­
nal social product. In a com petitive econom y, the n a tio n a l d ividend is m axim ised 
w hen these two products are equal.
T he aim o f policy would therefore be to ensure that th i s  is  the case. There w ere 
several reasons for divergence, one o f  the m ost im portant o f  w hich were increasing 
re turns to scale. It will be recalled that these formed a  m a jo r  plank o f M arshall’s 
value theory. M arshall suggested that a  subsidy to in d u s tr ie s  subject to increasing
18 "My conclusions ... are identical with those established thirty years ago by Dr.Marshall" 
[Pigou 1924p.30|.
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returns m ay o p tim ise  w elfare. Pigou believed that this should form  part o f  policy. 
H ow ever, this n o tio n  cam e in for sharp  critisism , m ost notably from C la p h a m ’s jibe 
that the concep ts o f  constant, increasing and dim inishing returns w ere “ em pty 
econom ic boxes” . C lapham  did no t believe that the concepts w ere capab le  o f  being 
operationalised: h e  m aintained that it  w as im possible to tell w hich in d u s tr ie s  were 
subject to fa lling  c o s ts  and which w ere no t [Clapham  1922]. Indeed, fo r the pu rposes 
o f  fiscal po licy  w h ich  Pigou and M arshall proposed, it appears to  be n ec essa ry  to 
m ake an  alm ost en trepreneurial ex ante judgem ent as to long terra costs.
Indeed, the w h o le  M arshallian value/grow th theory, w hich Pigou also  b a se d  his 
w ork  upon, w as n o w  being questioned. Unfortunately, it  w ill be recalled  th a t  the 
prospect o f  g ro w th  w as used to ju stify  inequalities. O nce the idea  o f  g ro w th  is 
rem oved, in eg a lita r ia n  laissez-faire policies lose their justification. A n d  su ch  a 
justification w as in d ee d  necessary under the neo-classical schem e, because  o f  the 
egalitarian im p lica tio n s  o f dim inishing m arginal utility o f m oney. P igou’s  trea tm e n t 
is slightly  m ore fo rth rig h t than M arshall’s:
The old 'law  o f d im inishing utility' thus leads securely to the proposition: Any cause which increases 
the absolute share o f rea l income in the hands o f the poor, pro v id ed  th a t it  d o es  n o t le a d  to  a  co n tra c ­
tio n  in  th e  size  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  d iv idend  fr o m  a n y  p o in t o f  view, will, in general, increase econom ic wel­
fare. [Pigou 1920 p.91 em phasis added]
There is  even le ss  an a ly sis  o f  the lim itations o f redistribution and in te rv e n tio n  here 
than in  M arshall’s  w ork how ever: presum ably we are to take M a rsh a ll’s 
qualifications and  c a su a l psychology en bloc. It was through assertions c o n c ern in g  
psychology and tec h n ic a l progress tha t M arshall defended laissez-faire, a n d  these 
problem s have been  im ported straight in to  the Pigouvian scheme.
T he o ther p ro b lem  both M arshall and Pigou fail to deal with concern  aspects  19
19 Pigou suggests that free loading could also occur when durable capital is leased rather than 
owned. The tenants m ay not receive adequate compensation for investment [p.176], in particular 
this could apply to tenant-farmers [p. 177]. He believes that a  case could be made for com pensa­
tion to be paid for investm ent in capital made by tenants (He notes that penalties are often levied 
for damage to capital) [p. 179], but also that all such compensation schemes have shortcomings.
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o f m ateria l well-being w hich c a n n o t be judged  by the m easuring-rod o f m oney. 
M arshall devotes considerable sp a c e  to  discussing external econom ies to scale o f  the 
industry, but he has no m ention o f  general external econom ies and diseconom ies, 
especially  as concern the ind iv idual. T he problem  o f  w hat econom ists now call ex ter­
nalities —  w here the supplier o f  g o o d s  o r services renders a cost o r benefit to  o ther 
(third) parties, who do not, o r c a n n o t, receive com pensation for lo ss or subm it pay ­
m ent fo r  benefit —  w as m ore c ru c ia l fo r  P igou, w ho w as directly concerned w ith  the 
d ivergence between individual an d  so cia l m axim a. I f  the costs o f  production are not 
in ternalised , but ra the r passed on to  the com m unity, then the private product w ill be 
h igher than the social product, s im ila r ly , i f  it  is no t possible to  co llec t paym ents for 
goods w hich  give universal benefit, these  goods m ay not be provided: the m arginal 
social p roduct is  h igher than  th e  p rivate  p ro d u c t In these instances the m arginal 
social p roduct will obviously v a ry  from  the m arginal private p ro d u c t S idgw ick’s 
exam ple o f  the latter is  that o f  a  lig h th o u se : this w ould bring substantial benefits to 
sh ipp ing , bu t it  is  not possible in  m a n y  cases  to  co llec t paym ent from  them [Pigou 
1920 p . 186]. Pigou g ives various o th e r  exam ples, such  as  pollution and  loss o f am en­
ity.
T h e  problem  w ith  ex te rn alitie s  is tha t often i t  is  far from cle a r that these are 
m easurable by m oney —  in  fac t P ig o u  h im se lf observes that few  real-life exam ples 
are capab le  o f  m onetary m easu rem en t:
If we w ere to be pedantically loyal to the definition o f the national dividend ... it would be necessary to 
distinguish further between industries in  w hich the uncompensated benefit or burden respectively is 
and is n o t one that can be readily brought in to  relation with the measuring rod o f money. This distinc­
tion, however, would be o f formal ra ther than real importance, and would obscure rather than 
illuminate the main issues. I shall therefore, in the examples I am about to give, deliberately pass it 
over. [Pigou 1920 p. 185]
P ig o u ’s  position is  som ew hat u n c le a r: i f  there is a problem  here he should attem pt to 
deal w ith  i t  His tone ( “ pedan tically  loyal ...’ ’) seem s to  suggest that he regards the 
non-pecuniary  externalities as e i th e r  excep tional o r unim portant. H e believed that, in 
spite o f  the non-pecuniary nature o f  m an y  externalities, fiscal m easures should prove
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sufficient to deal w ith the problem. It was not u n til much later that the possibility that 
the “ measuring rod o f  m oney" m ay be faulty  becam e widely debated. Hutchison 
rem arked that the acceptance o f externalities p u t the concept o f  marginal social net 
product in a  rather dub ious position:
Any summanon even o f the more strictly economic 'products ' into the single ‘social product’ o f an 
economic act is bound to be more or less arbitrary, but w ould have nothing 'illegitimate' about it if  the 
result emerging from this use o f ‘the measuring rod of m oney’ was significant for a particular purpose. 
But under the one relevant heading where a wider range o f  clear practical examples is given, the intro­
duction of the "measuring rod of money”  ... is held to  obscure rather than illuminate the main 
issues. [Hutchison 1953 p.293]
A t any event, th e  im position o f  taxes o r  subsidies on ‘externalities’ itself has 
distributional im plications: fiscal policy itself p resum es a net equitable level o f distri­
bution. Pigou d isregards these distributional im plications because he seem s to regard 
the m atter as trivial, b u t subsequent events hav e  suggested this is far from  being the 
case, and it has becom e a m atter o f im portance where the incidence o f taxation or 
subsidy for ex ternalities should lie. A gain, the distributional aspects o f  value theory 
cannot be ignored, a s  indeed the lim itations o f  th e  neo-classical value theory cannot.
It had become c le a r that it w ould not be possib le to separate out the marginal 
utility from its distribu tional im plications. Jev o n s  and Edgeworth tried to  do  so, but 
w ere forced to rely on  an  unoperational ‘sc ien tific ’ utilitarianism . M arshall and Pigou 
tried to  deflect concern  with distribution by incorporating grow th into their value 
theory, but this w as n o  more operational than before, and was looking less and less 
plausible as the 1930’s approached. T he 30 ’s w e re  to  herald a m ovem ent aw ay from 
the analysis o f m aterial well-being tow ards a p u re ly  subjective analysis, and  the com ­
plete separation o f  distribution from value. T h e  price of these changes w as to propel 
econom ic theory fu rthe r and further into an an a ly tic  shell.
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IU. O R D IN A LISM
P a re to
The m ovem ent towards this state o f  affairs ac tually  began  contem porary with 
M arshall in the w orks o f  Vilfredo Pare to . Pareto d iscarded  th e  utilitarian philosophy 
in favour o f positivism . He also re fused  to adopt the m arg ina lis t partial equilibrium  
approach, preferring instead W alrasian general equilibrium . H e  says o f M arshall that 
"M arsha ll has not yet m anaged to grasp  the idea o f  econom ic equilibrium  ... H e adds 
nothing rem arkable to our know ledge”  [cited C irillo  1979 p .1 5 ]. He believed that the 
study o f  econom ic units in isolation from  each o ther cau sed  the im putation o f 
incorrect causal relationships. O ne had  to  consider equ ilib rium  in term s o f the econ­
om y as a whole [Tarascio 1966 p .109]. W e noted earlier how  Edgew orth  was m oving 
tow ards the notion o f interdependent u tilities. Pareto, fo llow ing  W alras, extends this 
into a concept o f  equilibrium  sim ultaneous throughout a ll exchanges. Pareto also 
used Edgew orth’s device o f ind ifference analysis. H ow ever the indifference curves 
had a  com pletely different m eaning fo r the tw o theorists. E dgew orth, it will be 
recalled, believed very strongly in the utilitarian philosophy  and cardinal utility. 
Pareto, on the other hand, rejected all notions o f  utility. T he indifference curves for 
him w ere factual data [M itchell 1967 p .412]. Pareto believed  tha t it was necessary to 
go beyond hedonism :
Subsequently it seemed to me that one could go one step further. I was worried about that p leasure  
and that pa in  which had to be measured, because in reality, nobody is capable of measuring pleasure, 
[cited Tarascio 1966 p.410 original emphasis)
A lthough Pareto still had som e notion o f utility in h is  Cours [1896], in the 
Manuel the use o f  indifference ana lysis enabled him  to b reak  aw ay from utility alto­
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gether [C irillo  1979 p.21]. In fact, by the turn o f  the century  P are to  had b roken  w ith 
the idea o f  value en tire ly . The w hole notion o f  value, he believed , was m etaphysi-
ca l:20
... there are people w ho think that the new economic theories have been produced to explain value. Far 
from it! I am looking for something very different from the metaphysical reason of value (1901. cited 
Tarascio 1972 p.410]
P are to 's  th eo ry  w as one of price, not value —  it w as objec tive and positive : “ I 
look for a  theo ry  w h ich  m ay include and present econom ic fa c ts”  [ibid.]. F o r Pareto, 
the econom ist shou ld  focus only on the objective data o f  choice [Tarascio 1972 p .4 1 1
ff.]
T his w ould  appear to be naive em piricism , but P are to  is not a ttem pting  to 
explain these facts. H is concern is lim ited to  pure econom ic theory . His ob jec tive  is
only to search for the uniformities that phenomena present, that is to say their laws, without having any 
direct practical usefulness in mind, without concerning himself in any way with giving recipes or pre­
cepts. without seeking the happiness, the benefit or the well-being o f humanity or o f any p a n  o f it. 
1 Pareto 1909 p. 2]
W e have seen  th a t Pareto has eschew ed both utility and  value, and that h e  is not
concerned to  investiga te  ‘w ellbeing’. H is sole stated concern  is  with un iform ities.
W e m ay there fo re  w onder if  he has any  tim e for questions o f  distribution. W ithou t a
notion o f  value it w ou ld  not seem possible to  consider d istribu tion , and indeed  P are to
excludes d is tribu tion  from his econom ic analysis. He believes that d is tribu tion  is  a
question o f  social e th ics  [Cirillo 1979 p.43]. T he ‘ophelim ities’ o f  tw o people cannot
be com pared: th ey  consist o f heterogeneous quantities [Pareto  1916 sec .2130]. T his
has the coro llary  th a t it is not realistic to  talk o f  a  unique optim um  for a  com m odity .
Pareto d istingu ishes betw een a m axim um  o f  the com m unity and  a  m axim um  fo r  the
com m unity [op .c it. sec.2129]. There m ay be m any such m axim a: we cannot com pare
20 And also, of course, dispensable: cf. Robinson [1962]. who also believes that ‘value’ is 
metaphysical, but believes that metaphysics is a necessary complement to science.
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one w ith  another w ithout considering d istribu tion .
In fact, there is  a  severe re s tr ic tio n  on the m ovem ents to  general equilibrium  
w hich  can be considered. Since th e  econom ist cannot consider distribution o r  re­
d istribu tion , only m ovem ents that a re  n o t to the detrim ent o f  any individual are p er­
m issib le; even if  the social gain o v era ll is  positive, a  lo ss to any individual w ould 
invo lve a  re-distribution. This c o n d itio n  leads to w hat is  now  called a  ‘P are to  
o p tim u m ’ position. T he originator o f  th e  condition did no t view  the ensuing optim um  
w ith  anything like the contem porary en thusiasm  though. F o r Pareto, this condition  
sim ply  represented the boundary b e tw e e n  econom ics and sociology:
Movements o f a first type, P, are such that, beneficial to certain individuals, they are necessarily harm ­
ful to others. Movements o f a  second type, Q , are such that they are to the advantage, or to the detri­
ment, o f all individuals without exception ...
Consideration o f the two types o f points, P and  Q, is o f great importance in political economy. W hen 
the community stands at a point, Q, that it can  leave with resulting benefits to all individuals, procuring 
greater enjoyments for all o f them, it is obvious that from the economic standpoint it is advisable ... to 
move on from it as far as the movement aw ay from it is advantageous to all. When, then, the point P, 
where that is no longer possible, is reached, it is  necessary, as regards the advisability of stopping there 
or going on, to resort to other considerations foreign to economics —  to decide on grounds o f ethics, 
social utility, o r something else, which individuals it is advisable to benefit, which to sacrifice. From 
the strictly economic standpoint, as soon as the community has reached a  point P  it has to stop. [Pareto 
1916 vol.4 sec 2129]
T h e  condition  fo r ‘Pareto optim um ’ is  therefore in no w ise an  exclusive decision-rule 
fo r a  society , and it is  not really u sed  in  this m anner. It is  sim ply a statem ent o f  the 
lim itations o f pure econom ic theo ry , g iv en  the conditions w hich Pareto p laced  on 
econom ic theory.
W e m ight hold that this lim ita tio n  p laces extraordinary restrictions on policy  
fo rm ation . It would be nigh im p o ssib le  to  only  prom ote policies which affec ted  
nobo d y  fo r the worse. O f course, a s  w e  saw , Pareto was not concerned with econom ic 
policy . Pareto’s  exclusive concern a s  an  econom ist w as w ith pure econom ics, p re­
c ise ly  w hat M arshall believed w as a  w aste  o f  time. T he point was that in P are to ’s 
v iew  the econom ist, qua econom ist, co u ld  no t give “ guidance in the practical co n ­
d u ct o f  life” , to use M arshall’s ph rase . T he practical conduct o f  life involved so cio ­
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logical elem ents as w ell as econom ic, and concerned  non-iogical as well as logical 
actions. T he econom ist only considered logical ac tio n s  (and  also all logical actions 
w ere econom ic in nature), and view ed non-logical a c tio n s  as beyond her brief [Par­
sons 1937 p.185 ff.]. In  order to derive a realistic p o lic y  science, the non-rational 
m ust also  be analysed. In fact, Pareto m akes exp licit th e  analytic nature o f  'rational 
econom ic hum an’. E conom ics, he m aintained, ab stra c ted  from real ‘flesh and blood ' 
hum ans entirely , so th a t “ the individual may d isap p ea r, w e do not need him any 
longer to  determ ine econom ic equilibrium .“  [T arasc io  1972 p.415] U nlike the later 
w elfare econom ists, w ho ironically m ade such ex tensive u se  o f the concept o f ‘Pareto 
op tim um ’, Pareto h im se lf “ rem oved the facade to  e x p o se  so-called ‘econom ic m an ’ 
for w hat he was —  neither econom ic nor m an”  [Ib id ]. W hat Pareto w anted was a 
com plete social science: a science o f  all hum an b eh a v io r. He therefore attem pted to 
construct a  sociological supplem ent to  his pure ec o n o m ic  theory [Tarascio 1967 
p.670, cf. Sam uels 1974 p .8].
This sociology w as to consider the non-logical a sp e cts  o f  action w hich Pareto 
believed pervaded hum an life. He realised that the e c o n o m y  as well as the polity is 
affected by system s o f  pow er [Sam uels 1974 p .88], E conom ic  policy analysis there­
fore had to go beyond the market [op.cit p. 198]. M ark e t choice was only part o f 
econom ic policy [op. c it p. 185], W hat Pareto hoped to  d o  w as to put sociology on the 
sam e footing as econom ics, and thereby derive a co m p le te  policy science.
U nfortunately P are to ’s positive sociology never re a lly  gets o ff the ground. He 
attem pts to  use the sam e notion o f m axim isation and  equilib rium  simply transported 
into the social sphere, w here they are not operative .21 In  retrospect, P are to’s work 
can be seen as another attem pt to square the circle o f  o b jec tiv e  social value, based on 
a notion o f  transcendental hum an nature. For the ea rly  marginalists, this theory of 
hum an nature could  be found by a science o f ‘u tility ’. F o r Pareto, an invariable posi­
tive science o f society is posited. N either can be pu t in to  practice.
21 For an outline of Pareto’s sociology see Aron (1970). Pareto’s sociology actually appears to 
be more an exercise in political theory, in which case a positivist philosophy is an inappropriate 
guide. We shall be considering our own approach to political philosophy in chapter five.
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In spite o f  P are to ’s strictures o f  the need for a  sociological supplem ent to 
econom ic theory, the use o f  indifference analysis and the Paretian cond itions for 
equilibrium  w ere eagerly taken  up by the later 'w elfare econom ists ' o f  th e  inter-w ar 
period, as was the idea that d istribu tion  is an  ethical, not an econom ic, consideration. 
However, as w e have seen throughout, ethical elem ents are essential in  a  value 
theory, and th is theory cannot be separated from  its distributional im p lications. The 
effect o f replacing the neo-classical value theory was to  m ove tow ards a  behavioral- 
and therefore analy tic- definition.
R obbins
T his m ovem ent tow ards behavioralism  began w ith  the new  definition o f  econom ics 
developed by Lionel R obbins [R obbins 1935 (1932)]. T his change in definition, 
w hich has becom e com m on currency throughout the d iscip line since the 1 930’s, was 
couched in positiv ist term s. All traces o f  the d iscip line’s utilitarian p a s t  w ere d is­
carded: legitim acy now  lay in the cla im  to  ‘scientific’ truth in po s itiv is t terms. 
Econom ics w as no longer to look a t w ealth , as the classical econom ists  did, o r 
material w elfare, as did the neo-classics. R obbins ' definition concerned  itse lf with 
behavior, w ith ‘rational ch o ic e '. In fact, Robbins considers no t M arshall’s  “ men o f 
flesh and b lo o d ’’, but ra ther an abstract, ‘ra tional’ hum an. All that is necessary  for a 
science o f behavior. R obbins asserts, is  for actors to be able to  choose betw een  given 
alternatives. A s long as these choices are transitive (and  it w ould be s tran g e  for an 
individual to  hold intransitive preferences), then it is possib le to  show  (b y  the same 
indifference analysis as used by Pareto) that an equilibrium  can occur a t  w h ich  each 
indiv idual's u tility  is m axim ised. R obbins replaced a cardinally  m easu rab le utility 
w ith an ordinal utility, based on the idea o f rational choice.
R obb ins 's  definition (and, as w e shall see, m uch o f  his substan tive analysis) 
reflects his A ustrian  background, and  is a  curious m ixture o f  positivism  a n d  A ustrian 
praxeology. A lthough his theory is couched  in behavioral term s, R obb ins explicitly
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denies that econom ic theory can be based solely on observational concepts [1935 
p.87]. H e believes that
After all. our business is to explain certain aspects o f conduct. And it is very questionable whether this 
can be done in terms which involve no psychical element. It is quite certain that whether it be pleasing 
or no to the desire for the maximum austerity, we do in fact u n d e rs ta n d  terms such as choice, indiffer­
ence. preference and the like in terms o f inner experience. [ibid.|
R obbins also specifically denied interpersonal com parisons o f  utility. Again, this 
affec ted  the discip line boundary, in that it effec tive ly  excluded  statem ents concerning 
re-distribution [Cooter and R appoport 1984 p.521]. T he m ove to  ordinalism  therefore 
appears to neatly  sidestep the distributional conclusions o f  the dim inishing marginal 
utility o f  m oney. H ow ever the cost o f  this m ove w as high.
O rdinal utility  theory gives the appearance o f  allow ing  us to reach similar con­
clusions to M arshall, but w ithout the distributional im plications attached to the 
theory .22 It a lso  laid the foundation for a  positivist, behavioral econom ics
Robbins assembled the elements of a new conceptual framework by joining together the scarcity 
definition oi economics, die positivist conception of method, and the ordinalist view of utility. The 
only piece missing from the modem view was a behaviorist interpretation of ordinal utility, and that 
was supplied by others. (Cooler and Rappoport 1984 p.523)
Hicks
Hicks and  A llen  [1934] attem pted to  redefine M arshall in term s o f  ordinal utility and 
behavioral concepts. Hicks denied the legitimacy o f  any notion  o f  quantitative utility 
[H icks 1939 (1946) p.42, cf. H icks 1975 p.220]. A lthough accepting the notion o f 
utility, he denied  this is a  m easurable phenom enon in the sense o f cardinal m easure­
m ent. H icks believed that ‘‘the facts o f  observable conduct m ake a  scale o f prefer­
22 Although, as we shall see later, ordinal utility and indifference analysis tend towards static 
theories.
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ences capable o f  theoretical construction  ... but they do  no t enable us to proceed from 
the scale o f preferences to  a  particu lar utility fu nc tion .”  [H icks and Allen 1934 p .6 
em phasis added]
H icks claim s that ordinal utility can be derived  from  observed behavior, 
w hereas cardinal utility cannot. H icks therefore proposes to  "undertake a purge, 
rejecting all concepts w hich are tainted by quantitative utility , and  replacing them  ... 
by concepts w hich have no  such im plication”  [1946 p.19]. M arginal utility  was 
therefore replaced with m arginal ra te  o f substitution (betw een tw o  goods), dim inish­
ing m arginal utility by d im inish ing  marginal rate o f  substitu tion  and so on . Note 
though that the justification for the m ove to rational choice w as not the sam e for 
Hicks as fo r Robbins. For R obbins, choice was ju stified  by appeal to introspection. 
For H icks the justification is that the ordinal ranking can be observed  in behavior.
T he Hicksian m ethodology can  be viewed as  a  m ove tow ards a m ore positivist 
justification o f  econom ic ’sc ien c e ', and away from  the psychologism  o f  earlier 
schools.2-* But, as we saw  in chap ter one, the appeal to introspection w as not an 
optional ex tra . The use o f  an abstraction as a  definition autom atica lly  precluded any 
em pirical input into the science. T he Hicksian form ulation is no more observational 
than the o ld  cardinal theory w as, since observation is  precluded  alm ost by definition. 
Sam uelson believed that the concepts could not be ju stified  without recourse to 
psychologism : the law o f  dim inish ing  substitution, for exam ple , is not an  observa­
tional term  [Sam uelson 1938, cited  W ong 1978 p.49]. ‘Indifference ' is not an  obser­
vational term  either. T he sw itch  to ordinalism cannot be justified on positivist 
grounds and  indeed, as W ong observes, Hicks ra ther changes tack in later w ritings:
In Hicks (1939) the rationale for revising Marshall's theory is changed. The revision is not defended 
on the grounds that an ordinal utility rather than a cardinal utility function can be constructed from the 
facts o f observable conduct, but on the grounds that only an ordinal concept o f utility is necessary for 23
23 cf. Cooler and Rappoport: "John Hicks and R.O.D. Allen ... supplied the technical basis for 
a behaviorist account o f consumer theory. Their article reconstructed consumer theory by isolating 
and developing those parts that did not not rely on cardinality ... A  concept that described mental 
impulses (marginal utility) was replaced by a behaviorist concept (marginal rate of substitution)."
[1984 p.523]
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the explanation o f consumer behavior:
and he cites Hicks:
Pareto’s discovery only opens a door, which we can enter o r  not as we feel inclined. But from the 
technical economic viewpoint there are strong reasons for supposing we ought to enter it. The quanti­
tative concept o f utility is n o t ne c e s sa ry  in order to explain market phenomena. Therefore, on the prin­
ciple o f Occam's razor, it is better to  do without it. [Hicks 1939 p.18 cited Wong 1978 p.34. emphasis 
in Wong]
Hicks has therefore ch an g ed  the justification fo r replacing cardinal w ith ordinal 
utility from his original c la im  that it provided a  m ore  realistic , observable concept to 
the w eaker (and som ew hat triv ia l) claim  that it p rovides a scientifically neater theory.
Sam uelson
T he cudgels for observability  w ere taken up by Sam uelson . S am uelson 's aim was to 
devise a new  theory o f consum er behavior w hich  succeeds in "d ro p p in g  o ff the last 
vestiges o f utility analysis”  [Sam uelson 1938 p .62 ]. He believes that the ordinal u til­
ity theory does not go far enough  in severing all links w ith the concep t o f utility. 
Samuelson w ishes to  m ove tow ards a stronger positivistic econom ics —  he believes 
that the theory m ust be based  on purely observational concepts. Sam uelson therefore 
proposes to em ploy the b ehav io r o f  consum ers as  data. He purported to  show  how  
the same conclusions as in  the ordinal utility approach  could be reached by observa­
tion o f the choices m ade by  individuals. G iven a  price and  a budget constraint, we 
could simply observe the ch o ices  made by individuals. Sam uelson m aintains that 
rational individuals given th e  sam e axiom s o f  cho ice as in the ord inalist construction, 
can be observed as " re v e a lin g ”  their preferences in their choices. G iven  relative 
prices and a  budget constra in t, w e could sim ply observe that the consum er has a 
preference for those cho ices m ade over all o ther viable choices. N o recourse to  utility
need be m ade.
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D oes this new  construction solve the p roblem  o f  a po licy  science? Firstly we 
w o u ld  observe that prices and distribution are g iven . T o  derive policy these would, it 
see m s, have already to have been settled. O ne presum es tha t p rice would be 
ex p la in e d  in a m anner sim ilar to  the M arshallian short run analysis, w ith the curves 
d ra w n  from  observation. D istribution, how ever, is no t clear.
Indeed it is not clear that Sam uelson is prov id ing  a  new theory, since in order to 
d e r iv e  the theory w e still are required  to  ac ce p t both transitivity o ver tim e (otherwise 
w e h av e a trivial answ er —  the consum er c h o se  w hat s/he preferred) and the other 
a sp e c ts  o f  rationality  [W ong 1978 p.58]. A s S en  observes, these ax iom s are in fact 
iden tica l w ith those o f  ordinal utility
Faith in the axioms o f revealed preference arises, therefore, not from empirical verification but from 
the intuitive reasonableness of these axioms interpreted precisely in terms o f preference ... if the theory 
o f revealed preference makes sense it does so not because no psychological assumptions are used but 
because the psychological assumptions used are sensibly chosen [ 1973 pp.3-4, cited W ong 1978 p.59]
In fa c t, as W ong notes
... Samuelson seems to move towards a non-observational ordinal utility in his derivation of indiffer­
ence curves. Being indifferent is the opposite to holding a preference. Indifference curve analysis 
therefore involves assumptions o f individual preferences and a limitation of the means to obtaining 
these preferences. This is already presumed by the ordinal utility approach —  Samuelson s  theory does 
not differ substantially [Wong p.73].
Sam uelson was correct in his be lief that ordinal utility contained non- 
observational concepts, but w rong in his jud g em en t that these cou ld  be avoided. 
M oreover, the notion o f  scientific explanation tha t Sam uelson seem s to  be adopting is 
v e ry  m uch the strong, Hum ean conception o f  regularities. C erta in ly  Samuelson 
ex c lu d es  any possibility o f causal explanation . It is “ not an explanation  in the sense 
th a t it explains why one bundle [of goods] w e re  bought and all o ther bundles were 
n o t”  [W ong 1978 p.61]. T his is in accord w ith  the stated m ethodological position 
h e ld  by Sam uelson, that explanation is constitu ted  by descriptions [Sam uelson 1964 
passim ].
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Sam uelson d o es  n o t provide a descrip tion  though. Follow ing th e  ordinal utility 
theorists, he ac tually  p rov ides  a corollary o f  an abstraction from  h u m an  behavior. The 
concept o f ra tiona lity  is  never defined in operational term s. Inconsisten t behavior is 
re-defined in term s o f  changing  tastes, the w ish for variety  o r so m e such . In addition, 
as Sen show ed in  h is  w ell-know n 1976 article, by redefining th e  boundaries o f 
egoism , any ind iv idual ca n  be made to  appear self-seeking [Sen 1976 passim].
T his leads on to  a  m ajor criticism  o f  the ordinalist school, w h ich  is  show n up 
well in the S am uelson  form ulation. T he w hole point o f  utility th eo ry  w as to  derive a 
theory o f  value. M eek  suggests that the elim ination o f  card inality  in  favour o f  ordi- 
nality also elim inates v a lu e  theory [M eek 1956, cited G ram m  1988 p .238]. W hat we 
are given instead is  a  price  theory. Preferences are ju s t p re ferences w hich we can 
neither judge n o r com p a re . The ra tionality assum ptions have re m oved  any vestige o f 
a  maxim and. It is  no  lo n g er clear w hat the objective o f ordinal u tility  is. M yrdal had 
earlier critisised F ish e r o n  the same point:
When hedonism is abandoned, utility, subjective value, satisfaction, pleasure and  pain, etc., must be 
defined in terms o f observable choice (W ah lhandeln ). This is done by Irving F isbcr. But he, unlike, 
for example, Cournot and Cassel, does not try to give up the subjective theory o f  value. He abstains 
from psychology and yet retains a  purely formal, behavionst utility and value theory.
But why retain psychological concepts without psychological content? W hat is  the purpose of an 
analysis which is intended to  prop up the theory o f price and which, apart from sm all improvements 
and terminological changes, is identical with the old theory? Marginal utility theory proper had at least 
an objective; it purported to  be a psychological explanation o f price formation. But what is the point o f 
the new theory o f choice w hich claims to be non-psychological?
M yrdal m aintains th a t econom ic explanations m ust o f  necessity  in v o lv e  a  psychologi­
cal formulation:
The comprehensive m odem  non-bedonistic value analysis seems tci have been constructed in order to 
replace marginal utility theory. The latter was intended to provide a  psychological explanation o f price 
formation. When hedonism becam e discredited psychological explanation generally suffered a  loss o f 
reputation. But the flaw in the marginal utility theory was not that it endeavored to  explain economic 
phenomena psychologically, but that hedonism could not explain them. The new school tries to sal­
vage the hedonistic model by stripping it o f its psychological content Its concepts are formal and 
‘purely economic'. But its theoretical model is not likely to provide a  very happy formulation of the 
specifically psychological problems of economics, for in so far as it formulates them  at all, it does so 
hedonislically. [Myrdal 1929 p.99]
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T he ordinalists use o f rationality  ac tu ally  abstracts any  psychological conten t from 
econom ics: "R ationa l econom ic m a n  is not an actual m an. He is. rather, any actual 
m an who conform s to the m odel to  b e  te s ted ."  [H ollis and  N ell 1975 p.55]
Welfare Economics
T he positive econom ic science has com e to the im passe that we d iscussed in the 
Introduction. If  positivists are to  b ase  their theories on conditional observational 
statem ents, then we m ust be ab le to  te s t when the conditions have held. T he o rd inal­
ists —  and especially Sam uelson —  cannot do this. T he concept o f  rationality is 
being used both as what M usgrave ea rlie r referred to  as a  heuristic assum ption and 
also as a dom ain assum ption. All th e  behavioral e lem ents have been assum ed aw ay in 
the strictures o f rationality. Indeed th e  professed belief in the justification o f  theories 
through observation was com plete ly  a t odds with the w elfare econom ics m ovem ent 
post-1930. T his —  as H utchison com plained  - saw  a  veritab le plethora o f abstractions 
and unrealistic assum ptions.
T hese becom e com pounded w h e n  we try to m ove from  the individual to  the 
social utility. T he essential m ethodological problem  o f  orthodox econom ics, it will be 
recalled, was to derive a  social th eo ry  from an ind iv idualist basis, if it is to  develop 
an  alternative to planning. M arshall attem pted this by the concept o f  consum ers’ 
surplus, m easured in m onetary u n its .24 Since this w as a  cardinal m easure, the social 
‘w ell-being ' could be derived by sim ply  aggregating the surpluses. O bviously by 
definition ordinal utility could no t b e  aggregated in th is w ay. By the late 1930’s m ost 
w elfare econom ists were m oving tow ards Pare to 's schem e o f  general equilibrium , 
using the Pareto crite rion’ o f  op tim ality , but em ploying  indifference analysis a s  a 
derivation o f  ordinal utility .25 W e lfa re  econom ics becam e a study o f the conditions
24 Hicks attempted to reconstruct the theory of consumer’s surplus in his article. For a  critique 
see Samuelson (1947).
25 Recall that Pareto took his indifference curves simply as data. “ As we have seen, by the 
time he wrote the M anuel, Pareto had adopted Edgeworth’s indifference curve techniques. How­
ever unlike Edgeworth he did not derive the curves from an existent cardinal utility function. On 
the contrary, he worked his way from indifference maps to the preference function. In this manner
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u n d er w hich a  Pareto-efficient allocation is  possib le .
W hat w as originally  m ooted by Pareto as  an  exam ple o f the limitations o f  pure 
econom ics w as now  to be used as an objective o f  econom ic theory . T he en tire  thrust 
o f  Pare to ’s thought w as based on the idea tha t so c ia l po licy  could  not be derived  from 
pure ly  econom ic analysis —  Pareto believed a  socio log ical supplem ent w as required. 
I t  w ill be recalled  that Pareto’s  econom ics w as lim ited  to the presentation  o f  “ unifor­
m itie s” . H e explicitly  eschewed explanation o r  p ractical usefulness —  it was a 
pu re ly  synthetic exercise. Yet the ordinalists are em bracing  P are to ’s exposition  o f  the 
lim it as a m ajo r tool fo r positive econom ics. T h e  discipline consequen tly  became 
m ore and m ore abstract and unrealistic.
T h is can  be im m ediately seen in the co n c lu sio n s concern ing  social u tility  which 
w ere arrived a t  Social utility is only m axim ised u n d er conditions o f  w h a t w ere called 
‘perfec t com petition ’. T his concept w as consid erab ly  d ifferen t to  M arshall’s ‘free 
com petition ’ in  th a t the axiom s w ere im possib ly  strong . Perfect com petition  involved 
first and fo rem ost a  very large num ber o f  buyers an d  sellers in the m arke t, such that 
no o n e  se ller o r buyer can influence price. A ll eco n o m ic  agents are there fo re  price- 
takers. F urther to  th is, there m ust be free en try  to  th e  m arket fo r suppliers and  perfect 
know ledge o f  a ll present and future m arket co nd itions . All com m oditie s  m ust be 
d iv isib le, and the product o f  the m arket hom ogeneous. Furtherm ore , governm ent 
in terference w ith  the m arket (tariffs, subsid ies an d  so on) are  presum ed  not to 
o ccu r.26
C learly , these assum ptions do no t ho ld  in  an y  real-w orld  m arket. T h e  theory is 
synthetic  and vacuous and unlike the M arshallian  an a ly sis  totally  static in  nature:
The analysis is about a stationary economy in which everything exactly repeats itself from one period 
to another. In such a  society all decisions are made only once; oncrf made they are relevant for all time 
because the things ... decided upon ... remain constant for all time. Everything is assumed to take 
place a t a  point in time —  no time elapses between one event and  another, hence there is no future to 
be uncertain abou t In such a timeless world, though there is no uncertainty about the future, there
be did away with the need o f considering any measurability o f  utility and interpersonal comparis­
ons o f  utility as well.”  [Cirillo 1979 p.100]
26 For a full list o f the conditions for Pareto-efficiency see Nath ( 1969 p.28]
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might yet be imperfect knowledge about one another's actions at the present tim e; but this, too, is 
assumed away by supposing there is perfect knowledge [Nath 1969 p .l 1J.
Furtherm ore, unlike the partial equilibrium  approach o f  M arsh all, the general 
equilibrium  approach o f W alras is no t only static but instantaneous. T he optimum 
conditions m ust obtain sim ultaneously fo r all m arkets. It is  n o t th e  case that the 
optim al conditions are a goal tow ards w hich we m ay strive: the an a ly sis  o f Lipsey 
and Lancaster show ed that it  is ‘all o r no th ing’ as it  were. I f  there is  a  departure from 
the optim al conditions in  one part o f  the econom y, the next best ( “ second-best” ) 
situation m ay involve further departures elsew here. For exam ple, i f  w e have a large 
m onopoly in one industry, it  would no t be possible to  attain a Pareto-optim um : it is 
possible to m ake everyone better off. T he second-best situation m a y  involve even 
further im perfections —  say  fo r the sake o f  argum ent a m onopsonist trad e  union. The 
second-best situation is  not attained by conditions as close as possib le to  the ideal:
... there is no a  p r io r i  way to judge as between various situations in which som e o f the Paretian 
optimum conditions are fulfilled while others are n o t Specifically, it is n o t true that a situation in 
which more, but not all, o f the optimum conditions are fulfilled is necessarily, o r even likely to be, 
superior to a situation in which fewer are fulfilled. [Lipsey and Lancaster 1956 p.144]
B ut even  i f  wc suspend disbelief, and accept the assum ptions o f  perfect com ­
petition, it is  still not clear that w e can  derive social value con c lu sio n s from this 
analysis. Recall that the ordinalists are attem pting to  obtain a  m ax im um  social utility 
from individual utilities. Since these individual utilities are h e ld  to be non­
com parable, and since distribution is  not considered, the b est th a t  the ordinal 
econom ists can achieve is  to  consider situations where unanim ity occurs : where any 
change in the econom y lessens som eone’s  w elfare. This is clearly  a  maxim um : the 
position is clear-cut. It w as soon realised that it  would be im possib ly  restrictive to 
lim it econom ic analysis to these cases —  indeed as w e have seen, th e  conditions were 
never m eant to be applied. Kaldor’s  solution fo r extending the scope o f  what became 
known as the ‘N ew  W elfare Econom ics’, w as based around the id e a  that it would
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alw ays be possible for the gainers to overcom pensate the losers in any situ a tio n  
w here to ta l welfare is increased [K aldor 1939]. G iven this possibility o f co m p e n sa­
tion. the econom ist need not be lim ited to changes w here no-one is worse off. K a ld o r 
did not believe it to be the task o f  the econom ist to  suggest that com pensation sh o u ld  
ac tually  take  place. This is a question  o f distribution, which econom ists were fo rb id ­
den to  answ er. As long as com pensation could  be paid, an im provem ent co u ld  be 
said to  ex is t. The question o f  w ho should actually  obtain the fruits o f this im p ro v e­
m ent is. it  seem s, to be left hanging in the air.
L et u s briefly recap the argum ent, before show ing how  the position w e h av e  
arrived  a t leads to a com plete im passe. The use o f ordinal utility, originally m o o ted  
as an im provem ent in 'scien tific ' m ethod, was in actuality no m ore scientific tha t th e  
old ca rd in al utility theory, although it was considerably m ore restrictive. The need  fo r 
perfect com petition  to obtain m axim um  social welfare m eant that econom ists co u ld  
not incorporate any form o f m arket power or state intervention into their schem e. T h e  
ideologica l backdrop to the adoption  o f ordinalism  was the need to avoid q uestions o f  
ob jec tive ‘w ell-being ' and o f  distribution. Y et as we have seen, the com pensation  
princip le upon which the new  w elfare econom ics relied could  not entirely  d is tance  
itse lf from  the question o f distribution. T his anom aly was soon to  be picked up  by 
Scitovsky , although it appears, a s  usual, in a technical guise.
Scitovsky  critisises the com pensation principle for containing an im plied d is tr i­
bu tional b ias  in favour o f  the status quo  [1941 p.393]. All that is being proposed  by 
K aldor, Scitovsky  points out, is that the redistributive effects o f  a change should  be 
co rrec ted . Scitovsky then show s that this leads to a  paradox. C onsider a  change (sa y  
in the re la tiv e  prices of various com m odities) w hich leads to an  im provem ent in so m e 
p eo p le ’s w elfare but leaves o thers w orse off. Let us call the old position A and  th e  
new  o n e  B . The com pensation principle states that a change from  A to B is o n ly  a 
social im provem ent if it is possible for gainers to  com pensate the losers and still g a in . 
L et us a ssu m e this is the case. B is therefore better than A , in K aldor's  sense. S o  fa r 
so good.
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Now, Scitovsky argues, consider reversing this change, m oving from  B back to 
A . If  it is possible for the o rig in al losers to  give com pensation back to the original 
gainers to com pensate them  fo r 'lo s s ' they are now  incurring —  so that we arrive 
back at the original starting poin t —  then, follow ing K aldor, A  is better than B! W e 
have a contradictory result, because we cannot choose any “ starting p o in t” . Moving 
from A to B is an im provem ent, and  m oving back from B to  A is also  an  im prove­
m ent, since we cannot m ake any  judgem ent about the respective d istribu tions .27 W e 
cannot say which way com pensa tion  should go —  com pensation  to  the losers from 
change or bribes to the w ou ld -be  gainers to m aintain the status quo  —  and recall that 
w e are still on ly  considering th e  possibility o f  com pensation!
Scitovsky suggests th a t th e  econom ist m ust abandon the idea o f  deriv ing  policy 
conclusions without considerations o f social ju stice [op.cit p .393]. T his appears also 
to  be L ittle’s position. N e ith e r appears to be able to  bring them selves to  suggest the 
abandonm ent o f the schem e. Scitovsky decides to  sim ply add  one m ore qualification 
to  the already long list to  o b ta in  a  social optim um  from the m arket mechanism: we 
can  only m ake welfare ju d g em en ts  if tw o-w ay com pensation is im possible. Quite 
how  this is to be operationalised  is unclear.
G iven the problem s o f  th is  analysis another m ethod o f  proceeding was advo­
cated. It was suggested by S am uelson  and others that w e should posit directly  a social 
w elfare function, w hich w o u ld  include a  variety o f  ethical judgem ents from  outside 
econom ics [Sam uelson 1950]. It is for this reason that he is apparently  happy to forgo 
any notion o f  welfare in h is  econom ics —  this notion is to be ‘im ported’ into 
econom ics, as it were.
In a sense we have co m e full circle, for w e began by looking at the idea o f  
m easuring ethics, and o f  deriv in g  social policy from them , and  w e have traced tw o 
centuries’ worth of efforts to  p u t this into effect. W e should not therefore be surprised 
to find that the ethical ju d g em en ts  w hich can be so im ported are, as it turns out,
27 This was. of course, the distinctive element in the Pigouvian analysis. Pigou was happy to 
consider distribution, up to a point.
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rem arkably restric tive —  in fact, they m ust am o u n t to  a d ictatorship over econom ic 
choice in order fo r the social function to  be construc ted . Arrow [1950] show ed that 
even  if  individual preferences are defined as tran sitiv e  by definition o f  rationality, the 
resultant social preferences need not be - un less, o f  course these 'p re ferences ' are 
im posed. T he social utility function cannot be d eriv ed .
Sen suggests that it is the "in fo rm ational re s tr ic tio n s"  o f  w elfare econom ics 
that cause the im possibility o f transivity. Sen a rg u es  that this “ can be seen as resu lt­
ing from com bining a  version o f w elfarism  ruling o u t  the use o f  non-utility inform a­
tion w ith m aking the utility inform ation rem arkab ly  poor (particularly  in ruling out 
interpersonal utility  functions)”  [Sen 1979 p.539].
W e have seen, then, that the m ove to o rd in a l econom ics, even though it is 
unjustified and resu lts in a  synthetic theory, fa ils  because it cannot derive a social 
value theory w h ich  is independent o f  social d is tribu tion . The gam e is simply not 
w orth the candle. W e have no theory o f  social w e lfa re  or even any realistic theory of 
individual value. W e have lost any idea o f 'w e ll-b e in g '. In fact, as Sen points out, it 
is im possible w ith in  the framework o f  welfare econom ics  to even distinguish a  rich 
person from a poor one!
Can we identify the nch  through the observanon that they have more utility than the poor? Not in the 
Arrow framework, since interpersonal comparisons are not admitted. Perhaps as those with a lower 
marginal utility of income? No. of course not, since that will go against bo th  noncomparability and 
ordinalism. Can we then distinguish the rich as those who happen to have more income, or more con­
sumer goods (nothing about utility need be said), and bring this recognition to bear in social judge­
ment? No. not that either, since this will go against welfarism ... since this discrimination has to be 
based on non-utility information.
Sen believes that th is is connected w ith the A rrow  im possib ility  theorum
‘Social utility', in Leontiefs characterisation, as 'a  function o f  utility levels', without interpersonal 
comparisons robs us o f our ability to 'te ll ' effectively the rich from the poor. It is this peculiarity of 
traditional welfare economics in insisting on both that social judgements be based on utility informa­
tion a n d  that the utility information be used in a particularly poor form, that can be seen as paving the 
way to inconsistency or incompleteness — and thus to impossibilities. (Sen 1979 p.544|
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The m ove to ordinal utility and  'ra tional econom ic hum an' re su lts  in  an  abstract 
theory devoid  o f practical application. T his m ilitates against the very p u rp o se  o f  posi­
tive social science. W e argued in chap ter one that a  policy science is ju s tif ie d  by the 
possibility tha t it will yield instrum ental know ledge. C ontem porary o rd in a l econom ­
ics precludes precisely this know ledge.
The fundam ental problem  o f  orthodox econom ics has not been so lved . In order 
to arrive a t a positivist social policy either we m ust show som e psychological 
knowledge o f  hum an desires, w hich  w as the aim  o f  the utilitarians, o r w e  m ust inves­
tigate objec tive , em pirical activity , as w ith the neo-classics. The fo rm e r w as simply 
unoperational, but the latter led to  the social policy o f planning that is inheren t in the 
positivist approach. Since the positiv ist approach is pointless unless so cia l policy can 
be derived, it appears that we m ust e ither surrender the policy o f  laissez-faire and 
em brace positivist planning, o r d itch  positivism  if laissez-faire is to  be m aintained. 
We will consider both options in the nex t chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
1930’s Market Socialism
THE INABILITY to obtain a positiv ist subjective econom ic theory leaves us w ith tw o 
choices. W e can either rem ain true to  the positiv ist philosophy and accept the possi­
bility o f  econom ic planning, o r w e can m aintain a subjective theory a t the cost o f 
abandoning o u r claim  to  positiv ist science. In th is chapter we will look at the 
‘English d eb a te ’ on M arket Socialism  w hich , although  the protagonists did no t 
always re a lise  it at the tim e, w as direc tly  concerned  w ith  this question. T he 1930’s 
m arket socia lists  attem pted to  base a socialist theo ry  on the m odels o f  w elfare 
econom ics w e outlined in the last chapter. 1 T h is position  w as criticised  by the A us­
trian school, w ho dismissed n o t on ly  the socialist m odels, but also  their positivist, 
orthodox basis. W hile their c ritique appears cogen t, th e  m ove from  positivist to  nor­
m ative th eo ry  carries with it  the condition  that an accoun t be m ade o f  the political 
elem ents in  th e  theory, and the attem pts o f  the A ustrians to  abstract from  political and 
econom ic p ow er renders their substan tive theory  no  m ore plausible than the orthodox 
econom ists’.
L M A R K E T  SO C IA LISM
It will be recalled  that the argum ent o f  the p rev ious chapter w as th a t the abstraction 
o f distribu tion  was a response to  the d istribu tional im plications o f  the early  raarginal- 
ist and the neo-classical analysis. O f course the resu lt o f  arguing  fo r the rem oval o f  
distribu tional questions from  econom ics is  tha t econom ists cannot evaluate the dif­
ferent d istribu tional schemes pu t forw ard  by d iffe ren t political persuasions. Further­
m ore, w e lfare econom ists appear to  be re lian t upon the polity  to derive such a 
schem e, since  they have no distribu tional theory o f  th e ir own. T his abstraction o f 1
1 Although the early maiket socialists w ere also influenced by Marshall.
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d is tribu tion  —  w hich w e suggested was behind  the m ove to  ordinalism  —  also led to 
the problem  o f deriving a m axim um  social w elfare from individual ordinal functions. 
W e saw  several authors —  notably Sam uelson and B ergson —  suggesting that we 
c o n sid e r directly a  social w elfare function. A gain , if we are dealing w ith  this function 
d irec tly , and it is not derived  from individual behavior, it is not clear w hy a  m arket 
p ro cess  is required for production and distribution. In principle, it w ould  be possible 
to d irec tly  meet the requirem ents o f  the social function. Even if  we concede the mar- 
em a ils t school may have estab lished  that a  social m axim um  can be derived  from indi­
v idual actions in the m arket, this does not in itse lf show that a  sim ilar feat cannot be 
ach ieved  through planning. T h is dem onstration was attem pted by P ierson at the turn 
o f  th e  century. The m ain poin t o f his 1902 artic le  was that a planned econom y would 
still require a m onetary valuation o f goods and  services. O nly if the state can supply 
every th ing  in plenty will this need disappear.
As long as the communist state can supply each person with what he wants, no trading will arise but 
w hen this is no longer the case trading is inevitable 11902 p.751.
T rad in g  will inevitably involve m arkets and pecuniary evaluation —  P ie rson 's 'P ro b ­
lem  o f  V alue '. He also  m aintains that an incom e distnbution  which is independent o f 
lab o u r productivity is inconsistent with free choice o f labour. " I f  the state is to p ro­
v id e  us with all our needs, then it m ust d ispose o f  all labour a t its own discretion, o th ­
e rw ise  its task will be im possible. It m ust be in a position to  place us w here our work 
is required  and it m ust not be so far influenced by our w ishes that they interfere with 
its p la n s”  [p.48].
If, however, we are to d istribute incom e according to  productivity, then m one­
tary  calculation is, P ierson believed essential [p .80  ff.J.
T his analysis was reinforced in the orthodox literature by Barone.“ Barone was a 
fo llo w er o f  Pareto, and  his 1908 article was an  investigation, on general equilibrium  2
2 Pareto also made some contributions to this question, although as we have seen his work is 
equivocal.
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lines, o f the possibility o f  calculating the various coefficients o f production  in a  co l­
lectivist state. Barone concludes that such a  valuation  would be im possibly difficult, 
and  would involve solving a  vast num ber o f sim ultaneous equations [qv. H off 1938
p.2 22 ].
Both these articles rem ained  relatively obscure until H ayek’s reproduction o f 
them  in 1935. The au thor w hose w ork did succeed  in provoking a  response w as Von 
M ises. not least because o f  his polem ical and m ocking style:
When Marxism solemnly forbids its adherents to concern themselves with economic problems beyond 
the expropriation of the expropriators, it adopts no new principle, since the Utopians throughout their 
descnpnons have also neglected all economic considerauons. and concentrated attenuon solely upon 
painting lund pictures of existing conditions and glowing pictures of that golden age which is the 
natural consequence of the New Dispensation 11920 p.88].
W e will deal more fully w ith  the w ork o f  V on M ises shortly. M ises critique o f  ‘phy­
sical unit' o r non-pecuniary planning, and his criticism  o f the lack o f  econom ic 
analysis in M arxism, led socialists to attem pt to  rectify this. The 'E nglish  debate ' 
centred around the possib ility  o f  retaining pecuniary  measurem ent o f  goods and the 
use o f  m oney and m arket w ithin a  socialist state: the im possibility o f  non- market 
socialism  was conceded. Indeed, even  L ange 's  ironic praise o f  M ises (“ a statue o f 
Professor M ises ought to occupy an honourable place in the great hall o f  the ministry 
o f  socialization .. ." )  did contain the adm ission that “ it was his pow erful challenge 
that forced the socialists to  recognise the im portance o f  an adequate system  of 
econom ic accounting to  gu ide the allocation o f  resources in a socialist econom y”  
[1938 p.57].
Lange believes that the M arxist theory is insufficient by itself, although it 
rem ains a necessary com ponent o f  political econom y
The Marxists claim to superiority for his economics is that ‘bourgeois’ economics has utterly failed to 
explain the fundamental tendencies of the development of the capitalist system
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which are the increase in the scale o f  production leading to  m onopolies, intervention 
and econom ic im perialism , econom ic instability and  a revolt against the econom ic 
system , and so  on  [1934 p. 190]. However L an g e believed the M arxian theory  was 
insufficient
But this superiority o f Marxian economics is only a  partial one. There are some problems before which 
Marxian economics is quite powerless, while "bourgeois" economics solves them easily. What can 
Marxian economics say about monopoly prices? What has it to say on the fundamental problems of 
monetary and credit theory? ... And (irony o f fate!) what can Marxian economics contribute to the 
problem o f the optimum distribuuon o f productive resources in a  socialist economy
T he point for Lange is that the tw o theories are operative in com plim entary ‘spheres':
Clearly the relative merits o f Marxian economics and of "bourgeois"  economic theory belong to dif­
ferent ranges.' Marxian economics can work the economic evolution of capitalist society into a con­
sistent theory from which its necessity is deduced, while bourgeois' economists get no  further than 
mere historical descriptions. On the other hand, 'bourgeois' economics is able to grasp the phenomena 
of the everyday life o f a capitalist economy in a  manner far superior to anything the Marxists can pro­
duce (ibid. p. 191 ).
The tw o sciences are valid for different dom ains. M arxian theory provides an 
historical explanation  o f  the developm ent o f  th e  political econom y, w hereas  ‘bour­
geo is ' econom ics provides a useful tool for everyday  econom ic adm inistration. 
There is, Lange suggests, a functional difference betw een the tw o theories:
This difference is connected, of course, with the respective social functions o f 'bourgeois’ and Marx­
ian economics. The first has to provide a scientific basis for rational measures to be taken in the current 
administration of the capitalist economy ...the social function of the latter has been to provide a 
scientific basis for long range anticipations guiding the rational activity of a  revolutionary movement 
against the very institutional foundation of the capitalist system.
Lange believed tha t the concepts o f neo-classical theory w ould be o f  grea t use in the 
socialist econom y
But in providing a scientific basis for the current administration of the capitalist economy ‘bourgeois’ 
economics has developed a theory of equilibrium which can also serve as a basis for the current 
administration of a  socialist economy. It is obvious that Marshallian economics offers more for the
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current administration o f the economic system o f Soviet Russia than Marxian econom ics does, though 
the latter is surely the more effective basis for anticipating the future o f capitalism.
and in th is respect
Modem economic theory, in spite o f its undoubted ‘bourgeois’ origin, has a universal significance 
IP.191J
T he response to  the critique o f  M ises w as to attem pt to  d ev e lo p  m arket-based 
socialist m odels along  neo- c lassical/w elfare econom ics lines .3 Indeed , one o f  the 
first contributions to  the debate o ver m arket socialism  —  F red  T a y lo r’s  A m erican 
Econom ic A ssociation presidential speech [Taylor 1929] —  w as concerned  pri­
m arily  w ith a justification o f  con su m er’s sovereignty. Follow ing the m ethodological 
stance o f  the m arginalists, T aylor abstracts the question o f  d istribu tion  from  the 
dom ain o f  the econom ic. Taylor believes that distribution u nder p riva te  enterprise is 
entirely  an  institutional m atter.
First, on the basis o f  a vast complex o f institutions, customs and laws, the citizen adopts a  line o f con­
duct which provides him with a  money income o f greater o r lesser volume [1929 p.42].
T he incom e is then used to  dem and g oods from  the producers, w h o  “ p rom ptly  sub­
m it to  the dictation o f  the citizen in th is  m atter”  [ibid.].
T aylor proposes to  m irror this system  in a  socialist state. H e beg in s  w ith  the 
assum ption that
the authorities of such a state would have honestly and earnestly endeavored to fix incomes so that 
they represent that distribution ... which is called for in the interest o f citizens generally and o f the 
group as an organic whole.
3 Bradley [1981 p.23] and Vaughn [1980 p.S42] both note what Bradley terms a “ retreat from 
a pure advocacy of Marxist socialism to a compromise watered down with ‘competitive’ infu­
sions” . In fact this was an explicit admission by Lange.
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current administration o f the economic system of Soviet Russia than Marxian economics does, though 
the latter is surely the more effective basis for anticipating the future o f capitalism.
and in  th is respect
Modem economic theory, in spite of its undoubted 'bourgeois' origin, has a universal significance 
Ip 1911
T h e  response to the critique o f M ises w as to  attem pt to  develop m arket-based 
socia lis t m odels along neo- classical/w elfare econom ics lines.3 Indeed, one o f  the 
first con tribu tions to  the debate over m arket socialism  —  Fred T aylor 's  A m erican 
E conom ic  Associations presidential speech [Taylor 1929] —  was concerned pri­
m arily  w ith  a justification o f  consum er's  sovereignty. Follow ing the m ethodological 
s tan ce  o f  the m arginalists. Taylor abstracts the question o f  distribution from  the 
d o m ain  o f  the economic. T aylor believes that d istribution under private enterprise is 
en tire ly  an  institutional matter.
First, on  the basis o f a vast complex of institutions, customs and laws, the citizen adopts a line of con­
duct w hich provides him with a  money income o f greater or lesser volume (1929 p.42].
T he incom e is then used to dem and goods from the producers, who "p ro m p tly  sub­
m it to  the dictation o f the citizen in th is m a tte r"  [ibid.].
T ay lo r proposes to m irror this system  in a socialist state. He begins w ith the 
assum ption  that
the authorities of such a state would have honestly and earnestly endeavored to fix incomes so that 
they represent that distribution ... which is called for in the interest o f citizens generally and of the 
group as an organic whole.
3 Bradley 11981 p.231 and Vaughn [ 1980 p.542| both note what Bradley terms a "retreat from 
a pure advocacy of Marxist socialism to a compromise watered down with ‘competitive’ infu­
sions". In fact this was an explicit admission by Lange.
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This being the case, th e  state should subm it to their cla im s in the m arket:
This socially correct system  of incomes being assumed, it necessarily follows that the judgements 
reached by citizens with respect to the relative importance of different commodities would be virtually 
social judgements, and the resulting commodity prices would be prices which expressed the social 
importances o f commodities (p.44J.
Taylor then goes on  to  establish the optim al pricing level. Recall that the state is 
required to follow  c o n su m e r’s sovereignty. T aylor therefore suggests that “ A  single 
consideration is d ec isiv e . T hat p rice w hich equals resource-cost is the only  price 
which would be co n sis ten t with the incom e system supposed to  have been already 
decided u p o n "  [p.49].
The key factor is  therefore to  determ ine the cost o f  resources. This invo lves a 
m easurem ent o f the value  ‘im puted’ to factors. T aylor believed that this co u ld  be 
achieved by construc ting  factor-valuation tables based on initial estim ates. T h e  key 
point is the feedback m echanism  offered  by m arket pricing. If  the estim ate is in error, 
either surpluses or sho rtages o f the factor will result [p.52-54].
T ay lo r’s artic le  w a s  to form the basis o f m any o f  the m odels o f  the early  m arket 
socialists.4 D ick in so n 's  1933 schem e was sim ilar in m any respects. He also accepted  
that consum er goods w ou ld  be priced  on free m arkets, and proposed the use o f  m ark­
eting boards to d is tr ib u te  goods through m arkets. B ut D ickinson additionally  m ain­
tained that it w ould b e  possible to derive the various pricing and output coefficients 
directly
...once the system has got going it will probably be unnecessary to create in this way within the frame­
work of the socialist community a  son o f working model of capitalist productions. It would be possible 
to deal with the problems mathematically, on the basis o f the full statistical information that would be 
at the disposal of the suprem e Economic council [1933 p.242].
The p lausibility  o f  this scheme w as bolstered by D ickinson’s belief that " u n d e r
4 Useful summaries o f  the early market socialist models can be found in Vaughn (1980) and 
Vaughn (1981).
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capitalism , dem and schedules are apt to  e x is t in the realm  o f  fa ith ”  [p.240]. It is pos­
sibly fo r th is reason that Dickinson w a s  con ten t to  a ttem pt the sam e problem  that 
B arone despaired of. H e did have sec o n d  thoughts on  th is m athem atica l solution 
though, and abandoned the idea in h is  1939 book The Economics o f  Socialism. By 
then the debate had reverted to the ‘tr ia l  and erro r’ m ethod outlined  by T ay lo r.5 
T ay lo r’s m ethod was adopted by L an g e w hen he re -jo ined  the debate in  1936, in 
rep ly  to  H ayek’s  intervention [H ayek 1935a and  1935b].
L ange believed that the trial and e r ro r  m ethod overcam e the problem s o f  com ­
putation o f  equations raised by H ayek [1 935b] and also by  R obbins [1933].6
Neither would the Central Planning Board have to solve ... m illions ... o f  equations. The only ‘equa­
tions' which would have to be ‘solved’ would b e  those o f the consumers and the managers of produc­
tion. These are exactly the same ‘equations' w hich  are ‘solved’ in the present economic system and the 
persons who do the ‘solving’ are the same also. Consumers ‘solve’ them by spending their income so 
as to get out o f it the maximum total utility; and  the managers o f production ‘solve’ them by a  method 
o f trial and error, making (or imagining) small variations a t  th e  m a rg in , as Marshall used to say, and 
watching w hat effect those variations have either on the total utility or on the cost o f production.
...there is not the slightest reason why a trial and  error procedure, similar to that in a competitive 
market, could n o t work in a socialist economy to  determine the accounting prices o f capital goods and 
o f the productive resources in public ownership.
L ange m aintained that the feedback m echan ism  w as su ffic ien t to  enable equilibrium  
prices to  be determ ined.
Any mistake m ade by the Central Planning B oard in fixing prices would announce itself in a  very 
objective way —  by a  physical shortage or surplus o f the quantity of the commodity or resources in 
question and would have to be corrected in o rder to keep production running smoothly. As there is 
generally only one set o f prices which satisfies the objective equilibrium condition, both the prices of 
products and costs are uniquely determined (1938 p.82].
Furtherm ore, Lange asserted that price d id  n o t need a frde m arket to be operative. All 
that w as required w as ‘‘term s on w hich  alternatives are o ffered” . G iven  a  preference
5 Although the similarity o f the two schemes was pointed out by Hayek [1935b], Dickinson ac­
tually mentioned the problem of ‘linked’ prices requiring a general equilibrium approach himself, 
but did not draw out the corollaries o f this [D ickinson 1933 p.240].
6 Although this was something o f a red herring, as we shall see presently.
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scale and a  quantity o f resources, the econom ic p roblem  o f choice w as soluble. 
Lange also  believed that this trial and error m ethod is  analogous to the functioning of 
the m arket under capitalism , that "T h e  Central P lan n in g  Board perform s the func­
tions o f the m arket"  [ibid.] and even claim ed that th e  m ethod is the sam e as that out­
lined by W alras [Lange 1938 p.70].
Lange attem pted to construct a w orking m odel o f  pure com petition by instigat­
ing m anagerial rules fo r productive plants. The first instruction  was fo r the m anagers 
to produce at low est average cost. The second w as to  alter output so  that marginal 
cost equals price. T h is last rule also applied to the industry  as a w hole [1938 p.76]. 
This is only desirable, though, i f  the m anagers a c t  a s  price- takers —  in Lange 's  
terms the "param etric  function o f prices”  m ust be re ta ined . Only if  p rices  are given 
would the m anagenal rules be sufficient, because o n ly  then would the perfec tly  com ­
petitive market results be imitated [p.80-81 ].
Lange noted that producing a t lowest average c o s t  leads to the m arginal produc­
tivity o f factors —  measured in m oney —  being eq u a l. O n this basis Durbin sug­
gested an  alternative set o f rules based on what he c la im ed  was a  b lend o f  M arshal­
lian and Pigovian analysis. He believed that the so lu tio n  to production coefficients 
should be found by equating the marginal p roducts o f  all factors [1938 p.141-62]. 
Durbin w as not satisfied with the exclusive use o f  th is  rule though, since the marginal 
productivities would only be estim ates [p. 143]. H e therefore includes a  m anagerial 
rule based on M arshallian analysis —  that at the p o in t o f  equilibrium , the average 
cost will be at its minimum. A t this point m arg in a l costs equal average costs. 
D urbin’s rules were to  equate m arginal productivity  and  also m inim al average cost 
with price [p. 144 ff.].
D urbin’s analysis was designed to provide a  m o re  realistic set o f  policy propo­
sals than the equation-solving system o f  D ickerson [p. 140]. However, the entire idea 
o f providing m anagerial rules was questioned by L em e r, perhaps because o f  his fam i­
liarity with Austrian theory [Bradley 1981 p.26]. L em e r views it a s  a  m istake to 
attem pt to recreate perfect competition, but be lieves that instead we should  provide
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an ana lysis o f  how to achieve the sam e results. H e begins his 1937 a rtic le  by stating
This article is in the main a protest against the developing tradition, in approaching the problems of 
socialist economics, o f starting from the consideration of competitive equilibrium, instead of going 
direct to the more fundamental principle of marginal opportunity cost This approach is not only sub­
jec t to methodological criticism as indirect and cumbersome, but it is a  fertile source o f actual error 
deriving from unrealised implications o f the static nature o f competitive equilibrium [ 1937 p.253].
T h at is  to say , we can arrive at a  sim ple conclusion:
Price m ust be equal to marginal cost. This is the contribution that pure economic theory has to make to 
the building up o f a  socialist economy [1937, p.270].
T he significance o f L em er’s intervention is to attem pt to include th e  no tion  o f oppor­
tun ity  costs  into the socialist m odels —  the m arginal costs w ere m arg in a l opportunity 
co sts  [p .254]. T he concept o f  opportunity  co st is designed to in troduce a  dynam ic ele­
m ent in to  the static model: h is costs ru le  includes long-term  costs. L e m e r criticised 
the so lu tions o f  Lange and D urbin fo r focusing on short-term  costs.
II. AUSTRIAN CRITIQUE
A lthough these concepts o f  opportunity  co st and dynam ics are cru cia l fo r  the debate, 
the fac t is  that these have d ifferen t m eanings for the various pro tagon ists. T he Aus­
trian  T heory  w as radically differen t to the neo-classical fram ew ork w ith in  w hich the 
m arke t socialists  w ere w orking, and the A ustrian critique was aim ed as  m uch at neo­
classical theory  as at the m arket socialist use o f  this theory. T he d iffe ren c e  in the two 
approaches was not grasped by the socialists and the tw o sides talked  p as t each other, 
so  to  speak , a s  a  result. *
T h e  confusion  was no t helped by som e rather loose term inology on the part o f 
the A ustrians, in particular M ises’ cla im  th at “ as soon as  one g iv es  u p  th e  conception 
o f  a  freely  established m onetary price fo r goods o f a higher order, ra tio n a l production
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becom es com plete ly  im p o ssib le ."  [M ises 1920 p.104] M ises' point was no t tha t p ro ­
duction w ould be im possib le under socialism , but ra ther that such production w o u ld  
not be —  in M ises’ term inology —  rational. N onetheless. Lange and others be lieved  
that they —  and  a lso  the solutions o f  Pareto and  Barone —  had successfully re fu te d  
M ises’ claim , an d  th a t H ayek’s subsequent defense o f  M ises' argument s ig n a lled  a 
" re tr e a t"  from  the cla im  that allocation under socialism  is impossible to  a  p o s itio n  
that such a llocation  is  impractical [Lange 1938 p.62]. B ut the whole poin t o f  the 
Austrian critique w a s that the G eneral Equilibrium  m odels o f  Pareto and the n e o ­
classical works o f  M arshall and Pigou —  w hile they  may be logically valid  —  w e re  
an irrelevance to  real-w orld  econom ic activity. T he m arket socialists w ere c r itic ise d  
for using an ab strac t m odel as a  blueprint fo r an  actual w orking econom y [V aughn  
1980 p.543].
In order to  understand  the Austrian critique o f  neo- classical and general e q u il i­
brium  theory, it m ay  be helpful to exam ine the differences in the use o f  ec o n o m ic  
concepts. It w ill be recalled from the last chapter that it was Lionel R o b b in s , 
described by V aughn as " a t  least partially in the A ustrian trad ition” , w ho m oved  the 
definition o f ec o n o m ic s  from an objective to a  subjectivist basis with his ‘ch o ice’ d e l­
im itation. U nfortunately , this definition only succeeded in grafting A ustrian co n c ep ts  
into neo-classical ana lysis, resulting in bastardised versions o f  the A ustrian co n c ep ts . 
O f particular im portance to the present argum ent is  the notion o f costs. The p o in t o f  
the Austrian co n cep t o f  opportunity cost is that it is  entirely  subjective, and can  o n ly  
be known by the individuals concerned. It cannot be m easured in term s o f  m o n ey  
outlays, or by any  o th e r objective m easurem ent [BarTy 1984, p.37]. T he A u strian s  
w ould be con tem ptuous o f the assum ption o f  ‘perfect know ledge’ used by g en e ra l 
equilibrium  econom ists  as a condition for m arket equilibrium . The w hole p ro b lem  is 
understanding en trepreneurial behavior w ith im perfect knowledge [cf. B arry  
1984passim). Indeed , the A ustrians w ere also critical o f  the orthodox co n c ep t o f  
equilibrium . M ises m aintained that equilibrium  is a  stationary condition, an d  th a t 
“ T o  assum e sta tionary  econom ic conditions is a  theoretical expedient and  n o t an
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attem pt to  describe reality”  [1922 p.163].
T he Austrians w ere d ism issive o f  the entire welfare econom ics/general equili­
brium  structure precisely because they  view ed it as static and unreal. For the Austri­
ans. the central problem  for econom ics  was the analysis o f dynam ic activity through 
time —  the analysis o f econom ic change (Lavoie 1985 p.65]. M ises stated that “ the 
problem  o f econom ic ca lcu lation  is o f  econom ic dynam ics: it is no problem of 
econom ic statics” . T hat is ” T he problem  o f  econom ic calculation is a problem  which 
arises in an econom y w hich is perpetually  subject to change, an econom y which 
every day is confronted with new  problem s w hich have to  be so lved”  [1922 p. 139]. 
U nder perfect com petition there w ould  not be any econom ic problem, since the 
assum ption o f perfect know ledge assum es com plete efficiency [Bradley 1981 p.27]. 
In fact, for Hayek, the theory o f  perfec t 'com petition ' presumes that no competition 
as such can ensue
whai the theory o f  perfect competition discusses has little claim to be called "com petition'’ at all and 
...its conclusions are o f little use as guides to policy.
This occurs. Hayek believes, because the current theory begs the questions set by the 
o lder theories, as a  result o f  which
if the state of affairs assumed by the theory of perfect competition ever existed, it would not only 
deprive of their scope all the activities which the verb " to  com pete" describes but would make them 
virtually impossible. (Hayek 1946 p.92]
T he key concepts o f  the A ustrian  theory w ere com petition and entrepreneurship. 
The stationary equilibrium  canno t consider these concepts, because it is precisely 
entrepreneurship and com petition that cause econom ic change. The market is "n o t 
m erely an  allocative device, by w hich  factors are assigned to  their m ost important 
uses, it is a discovery procedure through w hich econom ic agents try out new tech­
niques, experim ent with d ifferen t uses o f resources and exploit new opportunities" 
[Barry 1984 p.42).
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So, fa r from accepting general equilibrium  as a  norm al condition, the Austrians 
believed such a situation to  be im possible [Lavoie 1985 p.65-108], W hat they were 
concerned with was the tendency tow ards equilibrium  —  the ‘equilibrating ' process 
[Bradly 1981 p.26]. W hile M arshall’s ‘m arket c le a rin g ’ price m ay be reached, the 
price set fo r general equilibrium  will not be attained [Lavoie 1985 p . 109],
The A ustrian critique was not that the m arket socialists em ploy general equili­
brium  theory incorrectly, but that this theory is  itse lf redundant [B any 1984 p.54]. 
Any m odel based on general equiiibrium /w elfare econom ics w ould be rejected by the 
A ustrians. A lthough M ises’ 1920 article dealt largely w ith  a  m oneyless econom y, his 
w ritings do  contain enough to  suggest a critical attitude.
M ises believed that a m oneyless econom y w ould  on ly  be possible under prim i­
tive exchange conditions [Lavoie 1985, p.60]. He though t that exchange and markets 
would soon begin to reappear for consum er goods, even  if  these were originally 
rationed:
The beer-tippler will gladly dispose o f non-alcoholic drinks allotted to him. if he can get more beer in 
exchange, whilst the teetotaller will be ready to give up his portion o f drink if he can get other goods
for it.
Furtherm ore m oney could even  re-appear:
The principle of exchange can thus operate freely in a socialist state within the narrow limits permit­
ted. It need not always develop in the form of direct exchanges. The same grounds which have always 
existed for the building-up of indirect exchange will continue in a socialist state, to place advantages in 
the way of those who indulge in it. It follows that the socialist state will thus also afford room for the 
use o f a universal medium o f exchange — that is. o f money [Mises 1920 p.91-92).
M ises did not view this developm ent as a particu lar problem  for consum er 
goods. T he real problem w as in capital goods. M ises c la im ed that these w ould there­
fore be im possible to value, since they are not subject to  exchange. T hat is to say, 
since the value o f  factors is unknown, costs cannot be ca lcu lated  —  at least not in any 
com m on un it o f m oney. [V aughn 1980 p.539]. T h is w ould  mean that “ any econom ic
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system  o f  calculation w ould  becom e absolutely im possib le”  [M ises 1920 p.109].
T he whole problem  for M ises is that equilibrium  values are unknow n. This 
resu lts  in a  constant flux o f  econom ic action, and  in the necessity  to  anticipate events 
in an  uncertain future. T his interpretation o f present data, and the anticipation  o f 
future events, is a function perform ed by the en trepreneur in M ises ' theory. He 
believed  that this function m ust be perform ed in all econom ies [M urrell 1983 p.95]. 
O f course, the static equilibrium  model rem oves th is function.
T he entrepreneur “ anticipates w hat future conditions hold and is penalised or 
rew arded  in his quest fo r pro fits” . It is the rew ard  for " a le r tn e ss”  to  consum er 
requirem ents that is the re levant function fo r the A ustrians and  is the dynam ic 
equivalen t o f  the ‘trial and e rro r ' process. It is th is constan t need to  change and  adjust 
p roduction decisions that is a t the heart o f the A ustrian  dynam ic theory . [Bradley 
1981 p.30]. It was from  this that M ises' d istribu tional theory is derived . M ises' 
believed  that the entrepreneurial ability that was such a vital function o f  the econom y 
was unevenly distributed am ong the population. W hat is im portant fo r M ises is that 
the best anticipators are brought to  the fore. T he m arket perform s th is task  by the 
profit o r  loss obtained in production and exchange. T here w ere tw o aspects to  this. 
The first was that the selec tion  process required an incentive, since the production 
process involved risk. B ut ju s t as im portant w as the fact that the incentives —  the 
process o f  rew ard —  placed capital resources w ith  those w ho w ere best ab le to  m ake 
use o f  them . The m arket ac ts as a  filter for processing  entrepreneurial ab ility , only 
allow ing  those with proven ab ility  to retain access to capital funds. T he poin t o f  the 
m arket m echanism  is not to obtain the objective equilibrium  conditions, for such 
objec tive knowledge is im possible, but rather to  selec t those w hose specula tive ab ili­
ties are  m ost developed, and  to  provide incentive and  resources to  encourage their 
specula tion  [M urrell 1983 pp.95-96].
M ises maintains that this lack o f  an incentive schem e under socialism  is detri­
m ental
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In an economic system based upon private ownership o f the means of production, the speculator is 
interested in the result o f h is speculauons in the highest possible degree. If it succeeds ... it is h is  gain. 
If it fails, then. He is the first to feel the loss. The speculator works for the community, but he himself 
feels the success or failure of his action proportionately m ore than the community. As profit o r loss, 
they appear much greater in proportion to his means than to  the total resources o f society
whereas
under socialism it is quite different. Here the leader of industry is interested in profit and loss only so 
far as he participates in them  as a  citizen —  one among m illions. On his actions depends the fate o f all. 
He can lead the nation to riches. He can just as well lead it to  poverty and want (Mises 1922 p.206).
There are tw o elem en ts to  this argum ent. The first is that the m arket system  gives an 
incentive to follow th e  society’s wishes. The second  is that the risk —  although 
magnified —  is also  localised. O nly the en trep reneur's  speculation stake is at risk. 
Under Socialism. M ises  believed, neither aspects  held. The m anagers o f the state 
enterprises had no incentive to  follow  the dem ands o f the m arket, w hile at the same 
time the effects o f  th e ir decision w ere universal.
There is another, subtler, argum ent raised by  the A ustrians concerning the state 
ownership o f production. T his concerns a possible socialist defence against the A us­
trian charge that the businessm an m ust obtain an  incentive to  fo llow  the m arket, and 
that this would necessarily  involve personal r isk . It could be suggested that the 
separation o f  ow nersh ip  from m anagem ent in m o s t m odem  corporations tends to  give 
this notion the lie —  few  o f  the decision m akers in m odem  com panies are risking 
their ow n capital. I f  th is  is the case, it is not c le a r  w hy the sam e m anagers could not 
simply be em ployed to  m anage state corporations. It is due to th is separation that the 
Austrians place great em phasis on capital m arkets “  ...it is the capita l m arkets which 
keep private m anagers in line ...the owners of p riva te  capital can sh ift resources from 
unprofitable to more profitable ventures and th u s  put poor m anagers out o f  a job. 
W here profit o r loss n o  longer serves as an ob jec tive test o f m anagerial success, as it 
likely would not u n d er socialism , it becomes exceedingly difficult to w eed out 
inefficient m anagers.”  [V aughn, 1980 p.548] H ayek  drew  on th is analysis later.7
7 Halm was also concerned that the ‘rate of accumulation' would be entirely arbitrary, since
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W e can see therefore that M ises w ou ld  certainly re ject any model based on 
static equilibrium , since this precludes the consideration o f  econom ic change. As 
Lavoie rem arks
Neoclassical equilibrium models, o f which the perfect competition model is one variety, are attempts 
to include all alternatives in a given framework — that is. they presuppose a world of Robbinsian 
opomisers who have preset adjustment ready to  meet any change that is anticipated under a given 
framework. There are no genuinely new ideas, no  alertness to urumagined alternatives — in short, no 
genuine changes, f Lavoie 1985 p. 107]
Yet th is is  precisely the model that L an g e et al are proposing [M urrell 1983 p.97]. 
There are  never any changes considered in  these models:
When Lange explains the " tria l and error" technique, one is immediately impressed with the banish­
ment o f change in his system. Such statements as "so  the process goes on until the objective equili­
brium is satisfied and equilibrium finally reached" remind one more of natural scientists in the labora­
tory than applied economists checking inventory. (Bradley 1981 p.28]
All these elem ents o f  A ustrian econom ics w ere m isin terpreted  in the 1930’s 
debate. T he interpretation o f the cla im  by M ises that socialism  w as " im p o ssib le”  
was m isunderstood by a m arket socialist school derived from a  general equilibrium  
tradition. In fact it seem ed to Lange that M ises was alm ost advocating  an institutional 
view o f  econom ic action [1938 p.62], presum ably since it appeared  that the general 
equilibrium  logic only applied under capita lism  and not under socialism . O f  course. 
M ises' claim  was that the logic o f genera l equilibrium  was inapplicable to any econ­
omy.
T he confusion was probably not he lped  by the inclusion in H ayek’s collection of 
critical artic les [H ayek 1935) o f the essa y  by Enrico Barone. The Ministry o f Produc­
tion in the Collectivist State [1908]. T h is essay , it will be recalled, w as in the Paretian 
m ould, an d  showed that a calculation o f  the coefficients o f  production in a  socialist
any interest rate would be arbitrary. There is no non-arbitrary method to determine the level o f in­
dustrial investments (Halm 1935 p. 161 ff. J. This affected the possibility of developing new pro­
duction techniques so as to lower costs. See the argument later.
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state w ould require the ca lcu lation  o f a  vast num ber o f  sim ultaneous equations. The 
poin t o f  its inclusion w as presum ably to substantiate the cla im  that the operation o f 
the D ickinson/Taylor m odels w as wildly im practical. T h e  decision to include the 
essay w as unfortunate in tw o  respects. Firstly, far from accepting  the im possibility  o f 
a  planned  econom y, the m arket socialists actually  cited  th e  B arone article as a  p roof 
o f the possibility o f the functioning  o f a  socialist econom y. Related to this, the article 
also caused attention to be diverted  into w hat Lavoie ca lls  the ‘com putation’ debate, 
a  debate over the possibility  o f  com puting the vast quantity  o f  data [p.90]. T his was 
only a m inor part o f the prob lem , Lavoie suggests. The m ain  poin t o f both M ises and 
H ayek w as the ‘ca lcu lation ’ argum ent —  that the data to  be input into the equations 
is not available (V aughn 1980 p.545]. That is
to at least Mises and Hayek. if  n o t also Robbins, the problem was fo rm u la tin g  the equations — not 
solving them. In a world of complexity and continuous change, the central planners would lack the 
knowledge of the coefficients that go into the equations (Lavoie 1985 p.91 ].
H ayek views the econom ic problem  as “ not merely a problem  o f  how to allocate 
‘g iv en ’ resources“  but though t that
It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of 
society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or. to put it briefly, it is a 
problem of the utilizanon o f knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality. (Hayek 1945 p.781
T he econom ic problem , fo r Hayek, was how  to co-ord inate the inform ation about 
econom ic variables w hich  w as dispersed am ong individuals. He regarded the price 
system  as “ a  m echanism  fo r com m unicating in fo rm ation”  between individuals, 
w hich therefore enables social co-ordination: “ in a system  in w hich the know ledge o f 
the relevant points is d ispersed  am ong many people, p rices can ac t to co- ordinate the 
separate actions o f d iffe ren t people in the sam e w ay as  subjective values help  the 
individual to co- ordinate th e  parts o f his p lan ”  [p.85].
T he reason that the socia lis t planners cannot draw  up  their equations is that the
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econom ic data available to  any individual is a lw ays incomplete. “ The p ecu lia r char­
ac ter o f  the problem o f  a  rational econom ic o rd e r ' ’ according to  Hayek
is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we m ust make 
use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits o f incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess (p. 77],
T his inform ation could  only be revealed through the market.
O f  particular relevance to an understanding o f  the assertion o f  decentra lised  and 
incom plete inform ation is H ayek’s  view  o f  the com m odity. For Hayek. ea ch  com m o­
dity  is only a 'ty p e ', and  variations in quality , tim e and location and a  m yriad  o f  other 
factors all contribute to d ifferen tiate the usefu lness o f  ostensibly identical co m m o d i­
ties. so that “ Tw o technically  sim ilar goods in different places o r in d iffe ren t pack­
ages cannot possibly be treated as  equal in usefulness for m ost purposes i f  even  a 
m inim um  o f efficient use is to  be sec u red ."  In fact we “ would have to  trea t the 
ex isting  body o f instrum ental goods as being constituted o f alm ost as m any d ifferen t 
types o f  goods as there are individual un its.”  [1935b p.209]
V aughn refers to this as the problem  o f  product specification [1980, p.546]. 
Each ‘product* is capable o f  an infinitely large num ber o f m inute variations in  availa­
bility and  quality. In a sense, each  object is a  d ifferen t ‘good’. The inform ation as to 
w hich ‘g oods’ are available and  w hich goods are required is therefore n ev e r com ­
plete, but is the subject o f continuous discovery  [op.cit. p.545].
It was for this reason that the en trepreneur w as required in a  rational econom ic 
system , and why Hayek believed that a p lanning  board could not act as a  rep lace­
m ent. It was the constant effort to  find out how  goods could be altered that fo r  Hayek 
was th e  relevant feature o f business. The p lanning  board could never d ifferen tiate  
goods in this way.
That the price-tixing process will be confined to establishing uniform prices for classes o f goods and 
that therefore distinctions based on the special circumstances of time, place and quality w ill find no 
expression in prices is probably obvious. Without some such simplification, the number o f  different 
commodities for which separate prices would have to be fixed would be practically infinite. This
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means, however, that the managers of production will have no inducement and even no real possibil­
ity, to make use of special opportunities, special bargains, and all the little advantages offered by their 
special local conditions, since all these things could not enter into their calculations |Hayek 1940 
p.1431.
It was this elem ent o f  differentiation that was crucial, because it  introduced changes 
in the econom y. T he reason there could be no equilibrium  in the m arket was because 
there could never be a  fully specified product. C onsequently, H ayek was not con­
cerned with studying econom ics in general equilibrium . His concern  was to study 
disequilibrium  and econom ic change. The static equilibrium  m odels were therefore 
inadequate.
In fact the m arket socialist m odels regarded the disequilibrium  o f  capitalism  as a 
disadvantage. It was this constant change that m ade the task o f  th e  Central Planning 
Board so difficult. A s each unit o f each com m odity was in a  sense unique, having d if­
ferent qualities, location, availability and o ther contingencies, the price o f each unit 
would need to be treated separately. Since the knowledge o f  the units constantly 
changes, these prices w ould  constantly alter. T he CPB would have to  constantly m on­
itor an infinite num ber o f  prices.
The other consequence o f  the em ploym ent o f  static equilibrium  m odels em ploy­
ing ‘g iven ' choices w as that it was unable to  consider the developm ent o f new pro­
ducts, and the other advantages o f econom ies o f  scale 8 [B radley 1981 p.28] In this 
respect the static equilibrium  econom y m ay w ell involve low er welfare and higher 
costs than the dynam ic disequilibrium  econom y, which could develop  new produc­
tion m ethods to low er costs
T he point w here these differences m aterialise in the m arket socialism  debate is 
precisely in the concept o f costs. The Austrian notion o f  cost w a s opportunity cost —  
the value o f  alternatives foregone. The point —  as was m entioned earlier —  was that 
these costs were subjective, and could be know n only to the individual w ho bears 
them. This is because evaluating the opportunity  cost involves knowledge o f  the
8 The reader will recall Marshall's extensive discussion on economies o f scale.
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value o f all possible alternatives, and  these alternatives, as we have ju st seen, are 
infinite. The knowledge o f  alternatives is therefore always incom plete, and is a lw ays 
diffused throughout the population, all the m em bers o f which have incom plete lo ca l­
ised information o f the different 'g o o d s ' w hich are available an d  w hich m ay be 
wanted. [H ayek 1945 p.88] O nly th e  individual know s the opportunity  cost o f  their 
choice, because only they can judge the value o f alternatives foregone. T his cost, 
moreover, will instantly change as the know ledge o f alternatives changes.
The concept o f  cost used in th e  equilibrium  m odels from  w hich  the m arket 
socialist m odels w ere drawn w as no t subjective, and in fact is on ly  nom inally o p p o r­
tunity cost. The general equilibrium  approach  uses "o b jec tiv e  opportunities d is ­
placed by a course o f  ac tio n "  rather than  a  subjective approach. T h e  costs are indeed 
often m easured in m oney term s, w hich  again  presum es an objective m easurem ent: it 
would be possible for any individual —  including the socialist state m anagers —  to  
objectively m easure alternatives foregone. T his, for the Austrians, is  an  error. C osts 
cannot be m easured objectively [Lavoie 1985 p. 16].
O f course, both welfare econom ics and  the general equilibrium  socialist m odels 
have as a central requirem ent the m easurem ent and know ledge o f  costs [Barry 1984 
p.36]. However, to the A ustrians, costs  are not m easurable, and  are know n on ly  to 
" th e  man on the sp o t”  [Bradley 1981 p.33]. T he use o f m arginal costs as a  p ricing  
rule would therefore be regarded by H ayek as im possible —  no p lanning o r m arket­
ing board could possibly know the m arginal costs, since only H ay ek ’s "m an  on the 
sp o t"  is aw are o f all the possible alternatives. Know ing the relative m oney price o f  
already existing alternatives is insufficient. It is also necessary to  know  other possib le 
alternatives (w hich maybe a change in a  pedantic detail, such as location o r packag­
ing) which do  not yet exist, but w h ich  could  be delivered [Lavoie 1985 p .102]. 
Although the socialist m anagers co u ld  m ake decisions between the ‘g iv en ’ a ltern a­
tives —  production is not im possible in th is sense —  there is no real way o f  know ing 
whether better alternatives exist. H ayek  s contention is that the m arket m echanism  
offers the chance to see if  this is so, since new  alternatives are constantly  generated.
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T his is w hat H a y ck  m eans when he c la im s tha t socialist m anagers would lack the 
necessary  in fo rm ation  to derive production decisions.
T he L an g e /T ay lo r trial-and-error m odel and especially  th e  L em er [and Durbin] 
m arginal co st ru le  w ere therefore re jected  by H ayek as inoperative. T he rule w ould 
sim ply  be unenfo rceab le. “ W hat is  fo rgotten  is  th a t the m ethod w hich under given 
cond itions  is th e  cheapest is the th ing  w h ich  has to  be discovered  anew, som etim es 
alm ost from  d a y  to  day, by the en trep reneur”  [H ayek 1940 p .l9 6 ,q v  Lavoie 1985 
p .142 ,170]. It w o u ld  be im possible to know  w he ther each decision  took advantage o f 
a  possib le ch a n g e  o r not. W hereas the socia lis t m odels assum e th at these costs can be 
o b jec tive ly  m ea su red , the Austrians re jec ted  objective costs. E ven  L em er’s ‘oppor­
tun ity  co s t’ w a s an  equilibrium  concept, and  therefore rem ains static [Bradley 1981 
p.26, qv .L avo ie 1985 p.140] in sp ite  o f  h is  criticism  o f L an g e’s  model as “ reaction­
ary and  s tatic”  [c f. H o ff 1938 p.218] F urtherm ore , all the m odels  deal with standar­
d ised  co m m o d itie s , w hereas in fac t alm ost a ll com m odities have infinite differentia­
tion . T h is  re su lts  in  the need fo r constan t p rice  changes, w hich  w ould be im possible 
fo r th e  m arket so c ia lis t m odels to  deal w ith.
If  in the real w orld w e  had to deal with approximately constant data, that is, i f  the problem were to find 
a price system w hich then could be left more o r less unchanged for long period, then the proposal 
under consideration would not be so entirely unreasonable. With given and constant data such a state 
o f equilibrium could indeed be approached by the m ethod o f trial and error. But this is far from being 
the situation in the real world, where constant change is the m le [Hayek 1940, p. 188).
H ayek  a lso  p o in ted  ou t that the trial and erro r m ethod w as ac tually  very sim ilar to  the 
m athem atica l m o d el. T he prices o f goods w ere a ll interconnected , and no one price 
co u ld  be c h a n g ed  in  isolation: ‘ ‘A lm ost ev ery  change o f  any  sing le price w ould m ake 
ch an g es o f  h u n d re d s  o f  other prices necessary”  [H ayek 1935b p.214].9 The m ethod 
o f  trial and  e r ro r , H ayek  believed, w ould  therefore soon  b reak  dow n. There w ould be 
an enorm ous n u m b e r o f  errors caused  by the sam e num ber o f  trials, and no w ay o f
9 Actually the problem  of interconnected utilities was noted by Roper in his 1931 book [see 
H off 1938 p.126]
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know ing which trial caused w h ich  error. The trial and error m ethod only  applies to 
prices individually —  it cannot be used to obtain the general equilibrium  10 Indeed, 
the entire process depends upon the assumption that no o ther change occurs whilst 
the trial is proceeding —  that ceteris remain paribus. T hat is, it involves a static 
econom y. As Barry pu ts it “ th e  socialist model was, in effect, an  experim ent in com ­
parative statics"  [1984 p.55].
There are also good m anagerial reasons for the m arket socialist system s to  break 
down. Lange especially  insisted  that the socialist m anagers m ust trea t the m arket 
clearing price as param etric: ea c h  producer m ust act as though they w ere unable to 
influence price [Lange 1938 p .7 0 ]. In practice, it is m ost unlikely that the m anagers 
would act in this w ay, particu larly  if  it runs contrary to their personal interests 
[V aughn 1980 p .548]. It is en tire ly  possible that the m anagers will use w hat am ounts 
to a monopoly position to ra ise prices and reduce output (and therefore, o f course, 
reduce costs), particularly  since L ange’s rules were to apply to  the m anagers o f  the 
entire industry as w ell as the ind iv idual producers. It w ould be possible for the state 
undertakings to sim ply exploit th e ir m onopoly position [H off 1938 p. 125]. In fact, the 
m arginal-cost/trial and  error m ethod  is less a model for socialism  than a  device for 
state marketing. Indeed. Lange w a s aw are o f the general nature o f  m arginal-cost pric­
ing, and accepts tha t the T ay lo r m odel is not specific to  socialism but can also  be 
used in a totally centralised  econom y [1938 p.90]. He m itigates this by asserting that 
“ such a  system w ould scarcely he tolerated by any civilised p eop le"  [ibid, p.45]. It is 
unclear w hether Lange is here re ly ing  on some M arxian analysis o f  the developm ent 
o f a socialist state, such that so m e correct political ‘form ’ is presumed to  com e into 
ex istence.11 Certainly, no an a ly sis  o f  political structures is given, and without this, 
toleration seems ra the r beside th e  point. It is unclear how  effective political ac tion  is 
supposed to be taken. H um phreys describes L ange 's  model as som ewhat “ politically
10 We can see that this is actually a partial equilibrium approach to a  general equilibrium prob­
lem.
11 It is worth remembering that Lange is the only participant in the 1930’s ‘London debate' to 
explicitly endorse the Marxist theory o f  history.
Mulberg: Social Limits to Economic Theory 105
innocent” , and points out that the political s tru c tu re s  m ay be undesirable o r unrealis­
tic [1977 p. 109].
Furtherm ore, it  is far from  clear how  the m an a g eria l decisions could  be chal­
lenged. There is  no real m ethod o f  obtaining in fo rm a tio n  about the responsiveness of 
m anagers to m arket demand. B ergson  poin ts ou t th a t
...Lange nowhere provided any criterion for judging and rew arding managerial success. The rules 
themselves, it is true, might be viewed as such a criterion, b u t in  order to gauge and reward success on 
this basis the Central Planning Board would have to  probe deeply  into the cost and other internal 
records o f individual production units. This would vastly increase the CPB’s responsibilities, which it 
is a  cardinal concern o f the competitive solution to limit. T he failu re  to establish any practical success 
criterion for managers, it was held previously [Bergson 1948 p.220] represents a  major deficiency of 
the competitive solution and one not easily repaired [Bergson 1967 p.657].
T here is  no real m ethod o f ensuring  that the p ro d u c tio n  ru les have been applied. In 
addition, the industrial m anagers w ill have less p ro f it incentive, and  even greater 
m onopoly pow er than m ost o f  th e ir cap italist co u n te rp a r ts  [ibid, p.658].
T h is m anagerial critique is  also ra ised  b y  K om ai. H e suggests that the 
L ange/L em er general equilibrium -based m odels a b s tra c t  from  the institutional set­
ting.
The people at his Central Planning Board are reincarnations o f  Plato’s philosophers, embodiments of 
unity, unselfishness and wisdom. They are satisfied with doing nothing else but strictly enforcing the 
‘rule’, adjusting prices to  excess demand.
K om ai, w ith his experience o f  the H ungarian e c o n o m y , believes that th is conception 
is desperately w ide o f the mark
Such an unworldly bureaucracy never existed in the past and n e v e r  will in the future. Political bureau­
cracies have inner conflicts reflecting the divisions o f society an& the diverse pressures o f various 
social groups. They pursue their own individual and group interests, including the interests o f the par­
ticular specialised agency to which they belong. Power creates an  irresistible temptation to m ake use 
o f it [Komai 1986 p. 1726]
It w ill be recalled that it w as precisely because o f  the need fo r judgem ents on
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m anagerial decisions that M ises em phasised capita l m arkets. F u rth e r to this, Hayek 
points ou t that since it is near im possible to ju d g e  the p erfo rm ance o f m anagers, a 
central bank, which Hayek regarded as the m inim um  requirem ent fo r any sem blance 
o f a socialist econom y, would have very little know ledge as to  w h ich  industries and 
enterprises to  com m it funds to. There is no au tom atic a llocation  m echanism , which 
was the function that the Austrian believed the profit and  loss o f  the m arket per­
formed, nor was there any ‘track record’ to ju d g e  the success o f  th e  present going 
concerns [H ayek 1935a p.20  cf.p.232 ff.].
III. N O R M A TIV E TH E O R Y
The 1930’s market socialist m odels were the first system atic attem pts  to  directly 
apply the pure econom ic theory o f the w elfare econom ists to  a  hypo thetica l econom y. 
The attem pt failed because the welfare econom ics theory is an  inadequate approach 
to the analysis o f real-w orld econom ies. The A ustrian  critique w a s a  critique o f the 
unrealistic approach o f the orthodox theory from  w hich the m ark e t so cialist m odels 
w ere derived [Barry 1984 p.54 cf. M urrell 1983 p.102]. T h e  m odels  o f  welfare 
econom ics —  o f  an unchanging world in w h ich  rational o p tim isers  act instantane­
ously with perfect knowledge —  was regarded a s  o f  no p ractical consequence  by the 
Austrians. It was the orthodox theory itself, no t the m arket socia lis t applica tion  o f  it, 
that was the m ain point o f  the 1930s debate.
T he Austrian critique was in essence a  critique  o f  the ap p lica tio n  o f  orthodox 
econom ic theory. The debate outlined in the p rev ious chapter w as m ethodological in 
nature, and concerned the validity and scope o f  the orthodox th eo ry . W e saw  that in 
order to rem ain logically valid w hilst satisfying various m ethodological imperatives 
—  that the theory should be positive and yield a  social conclusion  from  the analysis 
o f individuals —  the scope o f  the theory had to  be draw n so  narrow  that in the end it 
was rendered virtually analytic. T he m arket socialist b lueprin ts o f  the 1930’s lay
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firm ly  within the scope o f  this orthodoxy, and represented an attem pt to  apply the 
m o d e ls  o f  the w elfare econom ists to achieve a  particular politically  inspired outcom e. 
T he A ustrian claim  was that this market socialist scheme was inoperative because it 
w a s derived from a  largely analytic or unrealistic theory.
In  fact, the Austrian econom ists readily  conceded that once one accepted the 
w e lfa re  econom ics/general equilibrium  theory, the m arket socialist position is  not 
re ad ily  assailable. It was this that M ises m eant when he said that there w as no 
ec o n o m ic  calculation in the static state. U nder the static conditions presumed in the 
o rthodox  theory, the calculation problem posed by M ises and H ayek would sim ply 
no t ex is t [Bradley 1981 p.28]. Indeed, one m ay well hold the view that Lange has 
adequate ly  refuted the sceptical conclusions o f  Barone
it cannot be denied that as an answer to the computation argument. Lange's demonstration is an 
impressive accomplishment, and indeed it would seem that neoclassical economists who doubt the 
workability of socialism face a difficult task in responding to this demonstration. If the equilibrating 
process of real-world capitalism is explained by recourse to a Walrasian auctioneer, it is not clear why 
a p lanning bureau could not similarly function as a coordinating agent (Lavoie 1985 p. 122).
In d e ed , criticising the Lange/Lem er socialist m odels on the basis o f  the com putation 
d ifficu lties alone is insufficient. As Lavoie goes on to  point out, the computation 
arg u m e n t is dependent upon the calculation argument, which necessarily involves a  
re je c tio n  o f  general equilibrium  theory:
Some might argue here ... that Hayek is showing that Lange's answer was ineffective not only against 
the calculation argument but also against the computation argument. However. Hayek's objection 
holds only if one rejects [as I believe Hayek did. at least implicitly) the Walrasian explanation o f how 
capitalism  works. For any neoclassical theorist who takes his Walrasian auctioneer seriously. Lange's 
formal analogy argument shows quite plausibly that his central planning board can do as well at 
finding a general equilibrium configuration o f prices as the auctioneer could. Thus no doubt Lange 
would have responded to Hayek that i f  the planning board could not find the right prices, then neither 
could capitalists. Within what I have called the 'neoclassical' perspective, this response would be 
unanswerable (Lavoie 1985 p. 168 n. 12).
T his general equilibrium  function perform ed a m ethodological function in 
ec o n o m ic  science though, as outlined in the previous chapter. T he pure theory o f
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choice enabled the orthodox  econom ists to m aintain a positivist, neutral science o f  
society. The econom ic science was to show  how  the society was to be organised in 
order to  accrue m axim um  benefit. The positive science was required in order to  show  
how  m uch (o r how  little) control over social affairs was necessary. The science was 
to be individualistic to  show  how centralised control was undesirable, and a  ‘rational 
econom ic hum an ' was posited  to show how  econom ic value was subjective.
This entire schem e can now be seen to  have fallen through. T he essential 
insight from the 1930’s deba te was the need for an  evaluation o f costs: that the m eas­
urem ent o f costs m ust be imputed from values. I f  value is subjective, then costs are 
also  subjective [B radley 1981 p.33], and neither are capable o f pecuniary objective 
m easurem ent.12 T he ch o ices  facing the ‘rational econom ic hum an' w ere infinite in 
num ber, and any talk o f  preference sets should be dismissed. The theory therefore 
does not show how  social value could be derived . T he orthodox theory was accord­
ingly not able to m ake an y  com m ent upon how a society should obtain m axim um  
benefit. The raison d 'etre  for positive econom ic science has disappeared. It no longer 
provided instrum ental know ledge o f how to im prove our lot.
M oreover, as we no ted  in chapter one. the very  notion o f  a policy science is not 
politically neutral. T he resultant theory will inevitably result in a particular view o f  
the political process. It w as this dilem m a o f  positivist policy that the orthodox 
econom ists w ere unable to  solve. Indeed, the entire thrust o f  the Austrian m ethodol­
ogy  is that the sort o f  ob jec tive econom ic science w hich the marginalists w ere hoping 
to achieve was im possible. They rejected the idea o f  prediction in the social sciences, 
claim ing that the sort o f  regulations and law s w hich characterised positivist scientific 
activity did not ex ist in the social world [Barry 1984 p.35]. Hayek in particular 
denounced ‘scien tism ’: th e  use o f  physical science m ethods in social science. 
[cf.1955 pt. one], p recisely  because he believed that it inevitably denied the social 
scientist the sort o f  individualist basis that he view ed as an essential elem ent o f  politi-
12 It is worth noting that M arshall’s scheme was different: he was looking at “ well-being” . He 
believed this was capable of some measure o f objectivity.
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cal econom y.
W ith the denial o f  positiv ist social science, th e  so n  o f  hedonistic psychology 
which form ed the basis o f orthodox theory becom es redundant. The Austrian 
econom ic psychology —  as put forw ard by M ises  above —  m oved tow ards a 
Darwinian explanation o f  social structure. T he ca p ac ities  o f individuals are deem ed 
to be unequal: those ‘b est fitted ' to handle ec o n o m ic  decision-m aking would eventu­
ally obtain the necessary econom ic pow er to  d o  so . N ote that the evolutionary mode 
o f  explanation is d iffe ren t to its positivist p redecessors. There is no longer an 
equivalence o f prediction and  explanation. T he explanation  o f evolutionary theories 
is alw ays retrospective. Furtherm ore, the denia l o f  objective econom ic theory m eans 
that the boundary betw een econom ic and socia l/po iitica l action disappears —  indeed 
the Austrian econom ists a re  renow ned for their fo ray s  into the disciplines o f political 
theory and philosophy.
This is not to say th a t we need accept the substan tive theory o f the A ustrians. 
W e m ay well m aintain th a t this school is no m ore rea lis tic  than the orthodoxy. Again, 
we can derive our critique from the m ethodological roots, as we did with orthodox 
econom ics. A lthough th e  Austrians rejected m an y  o f the positivist tenets, they 
nontheless retain a  m ethodological individualist app ro ach , and w ith it the concept of 
the ‘invisible-hand’ explanation  o f the derivation o f  the optimal social outcom e from 
the individual actions. T h is  leads the A ustrians to  retain a psychology based on 
rationality, and also to  re ta in  the notion o f  causal explanation . W e will see that these 
prove to be incom patible under A ustrian theory.
The poin t o f departu re for the A ustrians, it w ill be recalled, was their conception 
o f entrepreneurial ac tiv ity . This broadly speak ing  consisted o f  speculative action 
based on localised know ledge. Because the kno w led g e o f production possibilities and 
opportunity cost was unavoidably localised, it w a s necessary to encourage and 
reward entrepreneurial ac tiv ity . It will also be recalled  that the Austrians placed 
great em phasis on capital m arkets. It w as these th a t enabled  entrepreneurs to  run  very 
large corporations ‘by p ro x y ’ as it were: by e m p lo y in g  managers.
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F urther to  this, we also noted the accom panying  psychologica l assum ption m ade 
by the A ustrians. In order to derive a  distribu tional theory  from  th is  analysis, it  is 
necessary to  assum e both that business su ccess  is largely a  resu lt o f  som e so rt o f 
undefined en trepreneurial ‘capacity’, and th a t  this capacity  is  inheren t, and unequally 
distributed am ong  the population. O nly  then  is  it possib le to  show , as M ises 
attem pted to  do , tha t distribution will settle  into an optim al pattern . M ises’ analysis 
w as that g iv en  th is  unequal entrepreneurial talent, it  w as indeed  functional fo r assets 
to be channeled  to  those who w ere best ab le  to  em ploy them .
U nfortunately , no causal link is  estab lished  betw een the cited  cause —  
entrepreneurial talen t —  and the cited  e f fe c t —  business success. It is necessary for 
the theory to  dem onstrate that success in  th e  m arket is due prim arily  to entrepreneu­
rial talent, ra th e r than m arket pow er o r s im p ly  luck. T h is dem onstra tion  is  m arkedly 
absent from  th e  analysis and rem ains a  presum ption. W ithou t th is dem onstration the 
theory m oves aw ay  from  an Adam  Sm ith -type ‘inv isible-hand th eo ry ’ and tow ards a 
D arw inian s ty le o f  evolutionary theory w h ich  neither expla ins n o r predicts. T his can 
be seen  m ost c learly  in M ises’ treatm ent o f  distribution. In essence, this is an evolu­
tionary theo ry , w hich states that the m ark e t acts as a  filter m echanism  to m ove 
resources aw ay from  bad entrepreneurs tow ards good ones. T he actual m anner in 
which the m ark e t does this is not specified, as a  resu lt o f  w h ich  w e are unable to 
show  that d is tribu tion  is indeed optim al. T h ere  rem ains sim ply  an  assum ption that 
those in  so m e w ay  ‘best fitted’ to receive w ealth  did indeed  receiv e  i t  In  order to 
explain tha t th e  distribution is optim al, i t  h as  to  be show n that m arkets do indeed 
respond m ain ly  to  entrepreneurial activity.
In fact, it  is  fa r from clear that th is is  th e  case. T he possib ility  tha t m arket pow er 
m ay affec t the optim al outcom e is no t considered  by the A ustrians —  they sim ply 
presum e that th e  m arket will filter out ‘inefficien t’ m onopolists. B u t their evolution­
ary system  m u st have some sort o f starting-point. G iven  the so rt o f  vast inequality o f 
w ealth w hich  h as  been in existence fo r hundreds o f  years, i t  is hard  to  see how the 
pecuniary evo lu tionary  process envisaged by  the A ustrians is  to  be go t go ing .13 It
•3 Even Hayek distances himself from uncritical support o f the present institutional set [1935a
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w ould no t be a t a ll fanciful to sug g est that the m arket is m anipulated  by the already 
pow erful ra the r than the m arket be ing  a m echanism  to re -a llo ca te  w ealth in a  func­
tional m anner.
M uch o f  the theory rests on  the vaunted capital m arkets. T he theory presum es 
free en try  and ex it o f firms, and  tha t entrepreneurs are ab le  to obtain capital fo r 
speculation: the capital m arkets are  ‘open-ended’. It also p resum es capital is m obile , 
and w ill pursue whichever areas w ill lead to  greatest p ro f it In  point o f  fact, p resen t 
capital m arkets clearly reinforce m arket power, and access to  funds fo r specula tion  
will be denied to those w ho do n o t already have collateral. In d e ed , the instability  and 
constan t crises o f  financial and ca p ita l m arkets g ives an a ir o f  unreality  to the A us­
trian theory.
A part from  the evolutionary aspect o f  the Austrian psycho logy , we can see tha t 
it  also retains a notion o f ra tionality . All institutional in fluences are ignored. T his, 
com bined w ith the evolutionary/D arw inian psychology, re su lts  in the A ustrian  
‘explanations’ being  post hoc in  nature. T he theory has ceased  to  explain why even ts 
have occurred, and as a result can  n ev er be proven w rong —  th e  econom ist is a lw ays 
w ise, bu t on ly  after the event. T h e  theory has, ju s t like th e  orthodox econom ics, 
becom e closed. Should m arkets n o t w ork in the required m anner, the A ustrians 
assum e it is due to  institutional barriers, o r because ind iv idua ls are not being  
entrepreneurial o r  som e such. T h e  A ustrian theory is  th ere fo re  no m ore capable o f  
application than  the orthodox th eo ry  was.
W e m ust abandon the attem p t a t deriving our social econom ic  theory from  a 
m ethodological individualism , and  w e m ust abandon our psycho logy  based on ind iv i­
dual rationality. Later we w ill consider the Austrian political theory, and w ill also  
consider particu lar problem s, such  as the environm ent and th e  legal fram ew ork, on 
w hich the m ainstream  econom ists are unable to  shed any l ig h t  In  the next chapter w e 
will look a t the institutionalist critique  o f positivism  and ra tiona lis t psychology, and
p.22-23], but offers no re-allocational scheme to remedy the faults. Indeed, none would be possi­
ble under the Austrian theory —  presumably the ‘evolutionary' type distributional theory is 
presumed to cover this.
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consider the em ploym ent o f  social psychology and  the pragm atist conception o f  sc i­
ence in econom ic theory.
Mul berg: Social Limits to Economic Theory 113
CHAPTER 4
American Institutionalism
IN THE previous chapter w e saw that orthodox econom ics could not derive the sort o f 
social policy conclusions that w ere necessary in order to ju s tify  the positivist 
m etatheorv. The use o f  orthodox theory by the 1930’s m arket socialists, while legiti­
m ate. failed because the orthodox theory itse lf could not be sustained. In particular, 
the concept o f  rationality  em ployed by the orthodox econom ists w as static, and was 
therefore not able to consider questions o f  dynam ic econom y. T he A ustrian critique 
w as that econom ic values —  and therefore im puted costs —  w ere totally  subjective 
in nature and cannot be known to any planner. Furtherm ore, they  believed, the 
interaction o f rational individuals led to a d istinc t o rder w hich it w ou ld  be unwise to 
attem pt to alter.
W e suggested that in fact it was near im possible for such an  aggregate social 
o rder to evolve. In addition , the A ustrians retained the concept o f  rationality . Both o f 
these elem ents —  ra tionality  and aggregation —  w ere attacked by the American 
Institutionalists. They m aintained that hum an ac tion  was not determ inately  rational, 
but w as influenced by social cu lture and habit, and that individual action was 
insufficient to derive an optim um  social order. They also attem pted to  revive the idea 
o f  econom ic planning by trying to base their value theory on objective 
technological/scientific crite ria. W e shall see in this chapter that although the critique 
o f  individualism  and rationality  is correct, the renew ed calls for p lanning solutions 
cannot be sustained.
T he A m erican institutionalists, in so far as they can be ca lled  a  distinctive 
school o f  thought, are certain ly  a m uch ‘looser' school than any o f  the others we have 
looked at. In so far as the authors have a com m on thread, it is that they view the 
econom y as a  sub-system  o f an evolv ing  socio-cultural system , an d  also  that they 
believe that scientilic and  technological advance is a prim ary force in  this evolution. 
T hey  w ould not accept th e  rational self-seeking model o f  conventional economics.
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Instead, they would claim  that the behaviour o f  hum ans in society is specific to each 
epoch fGruchy 1987 pp. 2-31.
W e can identify tw o main stream s of thought in the disparate school o f institu­
tionalist thought, representing tw o different interpretations o f  social institutions. We 
shall consider first o f  all the more determ inistic wing of V eblen, M itchell and Ayres, 
who invoke the pragmatist philosopher's conception o f institutions as habits of 
thought, follow ed by the ‘purposive' theories o f  Comm ons, w ho interprets institu­
tions as deliberate social control o ver individual actions while em ploying  to a greater 
or lesser extent a sim ilar rationalist conception o f  human action as  the conventional 
econom ists. W e shall argue that both interpretations are necessary. Both in this 
chapter and in the chapter following, w e will suggest that while the rational economic- 
conception o f behaviour is inadequate, we m ust hold, and w ork towards, a non- 
determ inistic model o f self-expression. This m odel, we will suggest, will invariably 
involve non-m arket, deliberate social action.
I. D ETERM IN IST TH EO RIES
V eblen
W e saw earlier how the utilitarian formulation o f  individual and social action had 
metam orphosed into rational-choice explanation by the 1930’s. T his theory was also 
used by the m arket socialists as the basis o f th e ir models. M eanw hile in America, 
contem porary with M arshall and just preceding th e  English market socialism  debate. 
Thorstein V eblen was developing a  social psychological critique o f orthodox 
econom ic theory. His critique led to many theoretical revisions w hich now form part 
o f the orthodoxy, but his work w as in itself heterodox and radical, and  led to a d is­
tinct socio-econom ic theory.
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T he u tilitarian  hedonist psychology was individualist and transcendental. The 
utilitarians conceived  hum an nature as given, and derived econom ic law s w hich they 
considered  im m utable. Veblen, by contrast, insisted on the h istorical relativity o f all 
social science generalisations, because o f  the m alleability  o f  hum an  nature. Further­
m ore. hum an natu re was an endogenous variable, not a ‘g iven’. It changed  as a result 
o f the norm al functioning o f the social system.
T he basis o f  V eblen’s critique was the em ploym ent o f  hedonistic psychology. 
Veblen jo in s  together the classics and m arginalists in this: he regarded  the marginal 
utility school a s  a  “specialized variant’’ o f  the classics [V eblen 1909 p .155].1 They 
m ay have p ro v id ed  a “ sufficient reaso n " for hum an behaviour, but not an  "efficient 
ca u se” :“ they  hav e  not postulated a causal explanation. Econom ic explanations were 
given in te leo log ica l terms, not cause and effect [op.cit p. 158]. T he fact w as that, for 
V eblen. " e a c h  generation o f  econom ists had taken for granted the very things that 
m ost needed  prov ing  —  the 'p reconceptions ' they took o ver from  th e  prevalent world 
outlook and  the accepted in stitu tions" [L em er 1948 p.20]. T he C lassics and margi­
nalists ignored  the social and cultural effects o f  society upon th e  hum ans which 
create that society .
A gang o f Aleutian Islanders slushing about in the wrack and surf with rakes and magical mcantauons 
for the capture of shell- fish are held in point o f taxonomic reality, to be engaged on a  feast o f hedonis­
tic equilibration in rent, wages and interest | Veblen. cued Lemer 1948 p.20).
Since hu m an  behaviour is regarded as an universal datum , all tha t is left for the 
social scien tis t to  do is to  classify this behaviour —  taxonom y. All econom ic 
behaviour is "h ed o n is tic  equ ilibration" in one form or another. E conom ics m akes no 
allow ance for the possibility o f  changing hum an nature. In the “ received  formula­
tions o f  econom ic  th eo ry " , according to V eblen 12
1 Nabers points out that both the classics and the neo-classics supported the status quo for the 
most part. Certainly not much in the way of new policies were derived for business or for the 
state, and the analysis o f the relation of the individual to the economy was similar |Nabers 1958 
p.78|. See also chapter 2 above.
2 i.e. propelling cause.
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the human material with which the inquiry ls concerned is conceived in hedonistic terms; that is to say. 
in terms of a passive and substannally inert and immutably given human nature. The psychological and 
anthropological preconceptions o f the economists have been those which were accepted by the 
psychological and social sciences some generanons ago. The hedonistic c once pa on of man is that o f a  
lightning calculator of pleasure and pains, who oscillates like a  homogeneous globule of desire of hap­
piness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither 
antecedent nor consequent. He is an isolated detinitive human datum ... (Veblen 1898 p.73).
For V eblen. the psycho log ica l theory o f  the hedonists was outdated, as indeed 
was their conception o f  science. H e rejected the scientific basis o f teleological exp la­
nation. M odem  science in V e b le n ’s tim e was D arw inian. V eblen criticised  the C la s­
sics and M arginalists fo r not positing  a  theory o f  the evolution o f  hum an nature. T his 
would provide a  causal e x p la n a tio n  o f  hum an action. T he acceptance o f the present 
social norm s by econom ists as “ intrinsic to the nature o f th in g s" , V eblen suggests, 
“ lim its their inquiry in a  p a rtic u la r and decisive way. It shuts o ff the inquiry at the 
point w here the m odem  scien tific  interest sets in "  [V eblen 1909 p. 161 ]. If Bentham  
w anted to  be the ‘N ew ton o f  the m oral w orld’, then V eblen wanted to be the D arw in 
o f econom ics. A nthropology w as to  be replace physics, and the concepts of equili­
brium  and calculus had no  part in V eblen s schem e. Instead, he w anted to search fo r 
the reasons behind the p resently  ex isting  social norm s to explain w hat the orthodox 
econom ists took for granted.
Veblen believed that hum an  nature underw ent an evolutionary change along  
D arw inian lines (C opeland 1958 p.50]. In place o f a  hum an nature modelled on 
rational thought, V eblen posited  thought as conditioned by habit, social conventions 
and social experience. V eblen  rep laced  the hedonism  o f  the utilitarians with the 
social psychology o f  the pragm atists . The term used by the pragm atists to describe 
habits o f  thought and social conven tions was institutions. It w as with institutions that 
V eblen w as prim arily concerned . H e was interested in cultural evolution rather than 
biology, and  unlike the " so c ia l D arw in is ts" , he w as unconcerned w ith biological 
attributes o f  individuals. H e regarded  biological traits as universal [M cFarland 1985 
p.97, L em er 1948 p.210J. T he im portan t elem ent for V eblen were the effect o f the 
institutions upon basic hum an nature .
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V eblen held that although prim ary instincts w e re  o f  importance as a determ inant 
o f  hum an nature in the early  stages o f  cultural evo lu tion , by the later stages these 
w ere dom inated by the institutional structures 1 R utherfo rd  1984 p.332]. T he instincts 
w ere the fixed ‘"prime m overs”  o f  hum an ac tion . Veblen mentions three such 
instincts: the drive towards the provision o f  w e lfa re  for both family and society 
(Parental B ent), a drive towards explanation o f  the w orld  (Idle Curiosity), and a  drive 
tow ards technological improvem ent (Instinct o f  W orkmanship).3 In V eblen 's 
schemes, the social institutions acted and  (to  an ex te n t) reacted upon these instincts.
The heart o f  V eblen 's  social theory is the " b i t te r  and unending struggles that go 
on in the cultural arena” . One such struggle is th e  conflict between anim istic and 
m atter-of-fact explanations, between superstition an d  science. Science weakens the 
cultural institutions, which will attem pt to overcom e o r divert the results o f  inquiry. 
[L em er 1948 p.24). Since the institutions are the re su lt o f  habits o f thought, they are 
antipathetical to m atter-of-fact inquiries. And the m em bers of the social order who 
gain from the institutional system w ould  obviously hav e  a vested interest in conserv­
ing the order: their class was called the “ Vested In te re s ts” .
The conflict between superstition and  science em erges in other forms. O f partic­
ular interest to Veblen. and the link betw een his social and econom ic theory, is the 
clash  betw een the workmanship instinct and the pecuniary institutions. The em er­
gence o f m odem  civilisation had altered  an instinct fo r well-being to one o f  a preda­
tory culture [V eblen 1899 passim]. W hen this lea d s  to individual esteem  being 
judged  by rew ard, property is no longer possessed fo r use. but as a  m ark o f status. 
G oods take on  what later cam e to be ca lled  " p o s itio n a l”  attributes [cf. Hirsch 1977], 
G oods are only  o f  value in so far as they are no t possessed  by others. This m akes 1
1 S«e Veblen [1914b p.25, 1918 p.5|. Nabers [1958 p.84 | and  others pul the predation among 
the instincts, possibly because of the use o f the term in the T h e o ry  o f  the Leisure C lass  (Veblen 
also refers to the "instinct o f sportsmanship"). This was an early work however, and contains 
some loose terminology. Veblen makes several references to predatory culture  and predatory ha ­
b it (cf. Veblen [1899 p.7,14 and 36). see also chapter headings 'Dress as an expression of the 
Pecuniary Culture’, [op.cit. chap viij. T h e  Technology of the Predatory Culture’. [1914 chap ivj.
The concept o f a  predatory instinct would also contradict the non-predatory nature of savage so­
cieties mentioned in the Leisure  C lass  |p .24 | and the In s tin c t o f  W orkm anship  (p. 101 ] [Rutherford 
1979 p. 122).
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w ealth, by definition , socially scarce:
In the nature o f the case, the desire for wealth can scarcely be satiated in any individual instance, and 
evidently a  satiation o f  the average o r general desire for wealth is out o f the question. However widely, 
or equally, o r “ fairly”  it may be distributed, no general increase o f the community’s w ealth can make 
any approach to satiating this need, the ground of which is the desire o f every one to excel every one 
else in the accumulation o f goods [Veblen 1899 p.32].
B y changing hu m an  nature from  a concern  for w elfare to  positional w ealth  and 
predation, the v e s te d  interests can  leg itim ise their position in the social order. By 
creating social s ca rc ity  they can then legitim ise business activity . W hat is  actually 
fo r V eblen the c rea tio n  o f w aste is  seen to people under the pecuniary institu tions as 
a  vital social func tion .
T he creation o f  w aste enables business to draw  upon “ intangible asse ts” , assets 
w hich have no re la tio n sh ip  to m aterial productive sources. They rep resen t free 
incom e to the businessm an. Industry, on  the o ther hand, em ploys only  tang ib le assets: 
“ m echanically  p roduc tive  capacity”  [1919b p.69]. T his d ifference concerns  one o f 
the m ain areas o f  V e b le n ’s  fram ew ork.
T he conflict be tw een  w orkm anship and  the pecuniary institutions m anifests 
itse lf in a  conflict betw een business and industry. B usiness attem pts to  sabotage 
industry by p rov id ing  a check  upon the productive capacity o f  industry, and  by keep­
ing prices high. T h e  m ain w eapon o f  industry was technology. It w as progress in 
technology —  the “ industrial a rts”  —  that provided the challenge to  the o ld  institu­
tions. T he ow ning g ro u p s respond to  the challenge by reasserting  the ex isting  princi­
ples: the assertion o f  vested ideas by  the vested interests [L em er 1948 p.25]. T here is 
therefore a ‘lag ’ b e tw een  the state o f  the industrial arts and business. T he outcom e o f 
the cycle is uncerta in , there is no suggestion  o f  technological determ inism  [R uther­
ford 1984 p.331].
T he main aim  o f  business, then, is  to  take an ever expanding  and productive 
industrial com plex, a n d  ensure that nonetheless a  condition o f  scarcity  ex ists. This is 
achieved through n o n -m arket m eans. W e have mentioned one o f  these —  th e  instiga-
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non o f  positional wealth. F o llo w in g  from this is the production  o f conspicuous w aste. 
This is V eb len 's  concept o f  the 'L e isu re  C lass ': that conspicuous expenditure and le i­
sure are taken as signs o f  well b e in g . The Leisure C lass —  those w hose w ealth p re ­
cludes the necessity o f w ork —  dom inate  the cultural norm s o f  the society. Standards 
are judged against this norm : th e  's tandard  o f liv in g ' is judged  against th is cultural 
level which is set in relation to  the leisure class. Patterns o f consum ption o f  the 
"com m on m a n "  are em ulative o f  the leisure class —  dress, en tertainm ent, food, 
drink, housing and so on. T he v es ted  interests —  business —  utilise the productive 
capacity o f industry for profit by producing  articles o f  w aste.
Veblen stressed that this w aste fu lness m ay w ell be invisible to the participants. 
"O rd ina rily” , he believes " h is  m otive  is a  wish to  conform  to estab lished  usage, to 
avoid unfavourable notice and com m ent, to live up  to  the accepted cannons o f  
decency in the kind, am ount, a n d  grade o f  goods consum ed, as w ell a s  in the 
decorous em ploym ent o f his tim e an d  e ffo rt”  [1899 p. 155]. The tastes tha t the o rtho­
dox econom ists took for gran ted  w ere, for V eblen. created  by business and vested 
interests.
In contrast to  the position tak e n  by the A ustrians, w hich we outlined  in the p re­
vious chapter. Veblen believed th a t there was ac tually  a  drive in industry tow ards 
standardisation, which was advan tageous. It was business w hich created the desire for 
individualised goods, because th e  uncertainty w hich  th is created enabled  the busi­
nessm an to  ex tract profit [1904 p .2 8 , cf. Nabers 1958 p.88]. Veblen believed that the 
uncertainty w hich according to  th e  A ustrians form ed the entire problem  o f  econom ics 
was in fact deliberately crea ted  by the business class. This uncertainty was 
heightened by periodic cyclical c r ise s , caused by expansion  o f  credit [1923 p.91 ff.J. 
This led to a rapid expansion o f  industrial capacity , and  then to overproduction and  
glut [ibid.]. T he cyclical tendency  w as often curbed through the "business-like sabo­
tag e "  m easures o f restriction o f  o u tp u t, and unem ploym ent [op.cit p.97].
There w ere other m ethods o f  diverting  production  into waste. O ne m ethod that 
was to assum e considerable sign ificance in the com ing years (and has m aintained that
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significance up to the present) was the use o f patriotism  a n d  militarism to  serve busi­
ness ends. V eblen was concerned not only with the L e n in is t analysis o f im perialism . 
H e also believed that the use o f nationalism  was an in tr in s ic  part o f the operation of 
the vested interests [1917 passim). The use o f m ilita r isa tio n  was held to  be a  good 
illustration o f  the duality o f  business and industry. O n th e  o n e  hand the industrial arts 
w ere vital to the successful prosecution o f warfare
... modem warfare not only makes use of. and indeed depends on the modem industrial technology at 
every mm ... but it draws on the ordinary industnal resources o f the counm es at war in a degree and 
with an urgency never equalled. No nanon can hope to make a stand in modem warfare ... without the 
most thoroughgoing exploitation o f the modem industrial arts |op cit. p .310 |.
Yet the business interests which the state were to  re p rese n t were an tithetical to 
the m achine process o f  industry. There is a dilem m a. T h e  vested interests are reliant 
upon technological developm ent, but this very dev e lo p m en t works against the vested 
interests. H ow ever in the case of war. the change m ay so m etim e s be so sudden  as not 
to allow the developm ent o f  new institutions [ibid.].
Veblen seem ed to regard the actual production a n d  distribution o f  artefacts as 
unproblem atic. It was only the business interests that c re a te  the need for a  pecuniary 
valuation o f goods [1904 passim]. Sim ilarly, the “ law s o f  d istribu tion" posited  by 
the orthodox econom ists w ere simply reflections o f  the institutions o f p rivate pro­
perty . The orthodox theory served to legitimise these in stitu tions , indeed they formed 
part o f  the institutions them selves [see Nabers 1958 p .8 8 ]. T he orthodox econom ists 
confuse value with price. The medieval notion o f  the “ ju s t  p r ic e "  was rep laced  by a 
notion o f com petition. The “ natural o rd e r"  was re p la ce d  by the " in v is ib le  hand”  
w hich had the advantage o f making the benefit to the com m unity  an irrelevance to 
the individual. All that the orthodox theory has ac h ie v e d  is to explain pecuniary 
exchange. Progress is im plied, but cannot be shown. W a ste  is outside o f  the dom ain 
o f  the theory.
In sum mary, business exercised a  cultural control o v e r  the com m on m an which 
cam ouflaged the real nature o f the social system. O rth o d o x  econom ic theory  was a
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part o f  this cu ltura l control. V eblen 's  theory w as. in this respect, som ewhat s im ila r  to 
that o f  Marx. Indeed , in many w ays V eblen’s theory can be viewed as a  su pp lem en t 
to M arx (G ruchy 1972 p.27]. In this light, we will consider V eblen 's theory o f  the 
state and his class theory. Veblen was less concerned with the means o f  p roduc tion  
than with the ends o f production. His class cleavage was between those w ho 
benefited from the product set —  the “vested interests ", and those who had n o  stake 
in affecting this se t —  the "com m on m an " . V eblen turns the separation o f  o w n e rsh ip  
and  m anagem ent into a critique: it is the absentee owners w ho create the requ irem en t 
o f  pecuniary m easurem ents o f  production. B usiness controlled industry. T he d iv isio n  
w as
not between those who have something and those who have nothing — as many socialists w ould  be 
inclined to describe it —  but between those who own wealth enough to make it count, and those who 
do not. | Veblen 1919b p. 161)
T he key factor w as those w ho w ere o f  the ‘ “kept c la sse s" , who had a
legitimate right to get something for nothing, usually a  prescriptive right to an income which is secured 
by controlling the traffic at one point or another, (ibid. |
V eblen 's  concern w as not so much the M arxian concept o f “ one capitalist d riv ing  out 
m a n y " , but ra ther th e  idea o f  a dynastic class o f  vested interests, w ho m an ipu la ted  
cu lture and law to p ro tec t their vested interests.
Just outside o f  the vested interests are their " a g e n ts " , who will act for an d  p ro ­
tec t the vested in terests proper. Notable am ong these are the clergy, the state a n d  the 
m ilitary. A lso o f  interest is that V eblen puts the labour unions am ong the a g e n ts  o f 
the vested interests [cf. Pluta and Leathers 1978 p.127].
It will be recalled  that one o f  the cultural controls that Veblen believed w a s 
exercised  upon the com m on man was that o f nationalism . This was possible b ecau se , 
for Veblen, the state w as one o f the agents o f  the vested interests. The go v ern m en t 
w as the institutionalised means o f physical coercion in any society, and w ould p ro te c t
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the existing social o rd e r (H unt 1979 p. 130]. It would act on behalf o f the business 
class, and w ould a lso  a ttem pt to  preserve itself, hence V eb len 's  term  dynastic state. 
T he state-run concerns w ou ld  also  invariably reflect the business interests, m ost not­
ably the education system  (hence his work The Higher Learning in America. subtided 
‘A M em orandum  on the C onduct o f Universities by B usiness M en- [Veblen 1918]). 
V eblen did not regard it as particularly desirable that the state should increase its 
intervention in the econom y, o r undertake public expenditure, he regarded the latter 
as ''ce rem o n ia l’*.
Let us return briefly to  V eb len ’s view o f  orthodox econom ics. W e discussed 
earlier his cla im  that the scientific m ethodology o f orthodox econom ics was outdated. 
V eblen also claim ed that the theory itself w as outdated. It m ay have had em pirical 
reference in the eighteenth  century , but had no reference in the twentieth (1909 p. 151. 
cf. 1919b p. 162]. V eblen re jected  the classical and m arginalist concept o f  perfect 
com petition. T his w as no longer applicable to m odem  business. The econom ic world 
o f  Veblen w as one o f  m onopoly , oligopoly and large corporate groupings. It should 
be reasonably obvious that th is is a necessary pre-requisite for the level o f influence 
V eblen ascribes to  the " b u s in e ss  c la ss" . T he com pleteness o f V eblen 's  system may 
also  explain why he did not attem pt to formulate his own system  o f political econ­
om y. His outlook, unlike v irtually  all the other theorists we have considered, was one 
o f  pessimism. Even the hopes he did have were to be proven som ewhat false. Veblen 
placed great store in the m ach ine process, and in the engineers as a force for change. 
T h is has palpably failed to  occur.
In spite o f  the fact tha t V eblen did not system atise his socio-econom ic system, 
w e can gain som e idea o f  his thought through his critique. T he first step in analysing 
V eb len 's  theoretical schem e is probably to attem pt a separation o f  his psychology 
from  the social psychological theory. It has been noted that w hile V eblen attacks the 
psychology o f  the utilitarians, he tends to  replace this w ith his ow n assertions o f 
instincts. A far m ore consisten t approach w ould be to  re ject psychologism  altogether 
[Rutherford 1984 p .333]. T h e  use o f  instincts is an obvious target for critics, and is
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generally regarded as the w eakest elem en t o f  V eblen’s w ork [Pluta and Leathers 
1973 p .133. A yres 1958 p.25]. It can  also  lead to racism , which V eblen tended 
tow ards [op.cit. p.132. H unt 1979 p .l  18], The concept o f  instinct is not necessary to 
the social theory. “ O ne could  ab andon  the psychologism  in V eblen s work and still 
m aintain a  perfectly cogent non-psychological theory. Indeed, the social psychologi­
cal concept o f  institution leads exactly  to  this p o in t."  [Rutherford 1984 p.345] H ie 
reason for the instinct concept w as m ainly because o f V eblen’s fascination with 
Darwin [cf. op.cit. p .333]. D arw in  w as cautious about using evolutionary theory in 
the social sphere how ever. V e b le n 's  use o f  D arw in gives no significant insights [Hunt 
1979 p .l  18].
V eblen appeared to regard a theo ry  o f  value as unnecessary. Value was a ques­
tion o f scientific use, not o f  pecuniary  m easure. Pecuniary valuation was simply a 
business class institution, and w as not required for serviceable production for the 
com m unity. V eblen believed, to  use Z ing ler’s phrase, that there was a  contest o f 
"v en d ab ility  versus serviceability  “ [1974 p.227]. The value o f com m odities was 
m easured in technical term s by the serv ice to  society it perform ed —  by its contribu­
tion to  the continuity  o f the life process [op.cit. p.224]. T he econom ic value was 
socially determ ined:
Private utility may reflect only the whun or caprice o f the individual, whereas social serviceability 
reflects what is fundamental to human survival. Social or brute serviceability is a matter o f the 
'm echanical' and 'chem ical' qualities o f goods that make them useful for enhancing 'human life on 
the whole'. In other words social serviceability is a matter o f science and technology and the ultimate 
criterion of value is not subjective personal utility but science and technology. (Gruchy 1972 p.23|
V eblen appears to m aintain that if production  w as standardised then the industrial 
system w ould be able to produce adequate quantities o f goods. This is especially the 
case if  the em ulative expenditures w ere not in existence. Indeed, V eblen viewed most 
hum an w ants o ther than that for surv ival a s  largely social phenom ena [Zingler 1976 
p.223]. T he w hole concept o f  scarcity , central to the Robbins definition o f  econom y, 
was for V eblen created  by the vested  in terests [cf. N abers 1958 p.96-98].
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The en tire  question o f consum er sovereignty, w hich  w a s the key issue in the 
debate on m arket socialism, was regarded as non-existen t by V eblen. N abers's 
analysis is interesting. In reply to  Frank Knight’s objec tion  th a t a  rejection o f consu­
m ers sovereignty has dangerous political im plications fo r a  dem ocracy  [K night 1920 
pp. 518-20], N abers suggests that
Veblen would have replied (1) consumer sovereignty is a myth derived from an acceptance of the 
hedonistic calculus; (2) in any event the gains to be made from the application o f the canons of servi­
ceability for society as a whole would outweigh any other possible loss and (3) to the implied question 
of who is to make the decisions for individuals he would ask "W ho makes them now "? [Nabers 1958P-99J
On the production side, V eblen posited three sources o f  in p u ts  the availability o f 
w hich determ ined the lim its o f com m unity production: the size  o f  the population, the 
natural resources, and the state o f  the industrial arts. T h e  las t is o f  primary im por­
tance. Veblen believed that the capacity o f industry set th e  lim its for population 
[Veblen 1919b p.293 ff], and also  that "T h e  state o f  the industrial arts determines 
what natural m aterials will be useful as well as how they w ill b e  m ade use o f"  [1923 
P-63].
The m ajo r source o f  production was the industrial arts . T hese industrial arts 
w ere for V eblen a public domain factor: —  he referred to th em  as a * ‘jo in t stock o f 
know ledge" w hich belongs to  the com m unity. It was im possib le to factor out the 
level o f productive efficiency o f  an individual unit, as the m arginalists  had suggested. 
Veblen view ed the factors o f production as public goods [N abers 1958 p. 103].
W e w ould  add that V eblen w ould also have rejected K n ig h t’s notion o f a dem o­
cratic political system, since the political is dom inated by the business class. C onse­
quently, V eblen did not undertake extensive analysis o f  the state , o r o f  the political 
system . Since the cultural controls affected the behaviour o f  the com m on man. the 
vested interests would not be sim ply dem olished. B usiness w o u ld  continue to control 
industry, even though industry had no need for business. U n lik e  M arx, V eblen did not 
believe the state would w ither aw ay.
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Vcblen believed —  correctly  o r  otherw ise —  that M arx had used an  unscientific 
Hegelian philosophy in h is belief in  the inevitability o f  a socialist an tithesis to  capi­
talism. V eblen w anted to  change o r update M arxism  into a  “ neo-D arw ian ian" 
theory. A lthough V eblen saw  the econom ic as in a  state o f  constan t flux, th is  w a s not 
due to any " inner co n trad ic tions"  o f  the social system . N eithe r was th ere  an y  pre­
ordained goal for h istory [cf. P lu ta  and Leathers 1978 p .133, L em er 1948. p.35]. 
There was no inevitability concern ing  the Veblenian analysis, indeed he w a s consid­
erably pessim istic. In a  way, V eblen  was M arxism  sans m aterialism  and  d ete rm in ­
ism. The cleavage betw een w orkm anship and predation is sim ilar to  the M arxian 
class analysis [Hunt 1979 p. 122]. In  practice, m any radicals use a V eblenesque class 
scheme [Pluta and Leathers 1978 p.128].4 Furtherm ore, as ide  from the com m on 
belief in the centrality o f  the econom ic , we can see how  the "e x p lo it”  o f  V e b le n 's  
theory w ould only be possible in a  c la ss  society, a f te r technology and tools h ad  made 
production efficient [H unt 1979 p . 122]. Veblen re jected  the labour theory o f  value 
though; he considered it a  leftover from  the natural-rights philosophy o f th e  classics 
[Veblen 1906 p.278]. A nd a lthough the conflict betw een the com m on m an  an d  the 
vested interests is very sim ilar to th e  labour/capital clash , the tw o theorists d id  have 
different em phasis: V eblen  on the social-psychological. M arx on the econom ic-legal 
[Hunt 1979 p.126].5
V eblen 's  work g ives a  clear exam ple o f how  the cultural critique o f  in stitu tion ­
alism took it beyond the realm  o f  orthodox econom ics. By positing the m anipulation  
o f wants. V eblen underm ines the en tire  rationality approach o f  individualist eco n o m ­
ics. Even if  equilibrium  is attained a n d  markets cleared, and  even  if  m axim um  ‘satis­
faction’ is attained, th is need not be construed as a social optim um , since th ese  wants 
are created artificially.
At the level o f critique. V eb len ’s work is pow erful. It is when V eblen attem pts 
to construct his closed, D arw inian theory that the project w eakens. As we hav e seen.
4 In fact, many social scientists also use similar classifications.
5 For a discussion of Marxian critiques o f  Veblen see Simlich and Tilman (19821
Mulhery: Social Limits to Economic Theory 126
evo lu tionary  theories tend tow ards determ inism . D arw inian  theory rep laced  teleologi­
ca l explanation  with
a fully materialistic explanation in terms o f 'opaque cause and e ffect': evolution has no course, and no 
consciousness guides it —  or even affects it. Veblen clearly wants to translate this idea into econom­
ics. Taken to its logical conclusion, o f course, that would mean eliminating all consciousness from 
econom ic explanation, creating an economic analogue of Skinnerian behaviouralism. ILanglois 1989
P-2731
V eblen  is in effect positing a determ inistic theory, in w hich  all behaviour is socially 
determ ined . This m ay be the reason that Veblen reached  such pessim istic conclusion. 
H e h as  left no room in his theory for conscious ac tion . All behaviour is controlled —  
there is no way o f breaking ou t o f  the vicious circle. W e should reject such a  fatalistic 
theo ry , not least because V eblen does not consistently  em ploy a  strictly  m aterialist 
app roach  [op.cit. p.275]. H e frequently em ploys conscious actions on behalf o f the 
vested  interests —  such as the em ploym ent o f  nationalism  and war. for exam ple. His 
critique  is as much concerned with the conscious use o f  pow er as w ith the inevitable 
consequences of structure, w hich is in contrast to  a structura list, determ inistic theory 
a long  D arw inian lines.
W here m ethodological questions arise w ithin substan tive econom ic theory is in 
the theory  o f  value, w here they take on a  technical gu ise. V eblen v iew s value as 
en tire ly  a  technical problem : value consists in the technical uses to w hich  a com m o­
dity  can  be put. and is m easurable by physical science. U nfortunately this value 
theo ry  is inadequate. W ithout a com m on unit o f account, there is no w ay to  compare 
the values o f  different com m odities. W e cannot say  w hether, for exam ple, land 
shou ld  be used for industry o r agriculture, o r any o ther com parison o f  different com ­
m odities. Such com parisons require at least a unit o f  account to balance production 
ac ross  the board. This was the scheme put forward by C larence Ayres, w hom  we will 
d iscu ss  shortly. We will m aintain that som e notion o f  subjective valuation is still 
necessary  unless the accounting prices are to be arbitrary.
V e b le n 's  scheme replaces the m oney-based conception  o f  objective value used
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by the 1930's m arket socialists  w ith an objective value theory based on the material 
properties o f  com m odities. A s  such it is open to m any o f the criticism s o f the social­
ists we outlined in the p rev ious chapter: in particular that no change in circum stances 
could  be accounted for. V e b le n 's  value theory is actually as static as that o f  orthodox 
econom ics, and  the en g in eers  whom Veblen believed could plan the econom y would 
run into exactly  the sam e p roblem s as the socialist C entral Planning Board.
M itchell
If  Ayres can be considered  to  be attempting to develop  V eblen’s ob jec tive value 
theory. M itchell can be v iew ed as attem pting to  reconcile subjective and objective 
values. He thought that it w ould  be possible to objectively ‘understand ' the subjective 
basis of price. T he link betw een  V eblen and M itchell has often been m isunderstood, 
possibly since M itchell’s m ain  work was ostensibly on business cycles and h is books 
w ere highly quantitative in content —  indeed he was one o f the first econom ists to 
use statistical da ta  ex tensively . This has led to his work being dism issed as em piricist 
[cf. Starr 1983], especially  by  book reviewers [eg. Koopm ans 1947]. There is  a  struc­
ture to M itchell’s work, b u t it is im plicit and not codified. His acceptance o f  Veblen 
' * has been m ore com plete than  those are aware who have read his books but not his 
essays’’6 [Tugw ell 1937 p .234], Tugwell believes that the orientation o f  M itchell’s 
w ork was provided by V eblen; “ If  he has been an observer, he has alw ays known 
w hat to o b serv e"  [ibid.].7 T h e  criteria for deciding w hat to observe are seldom  stated 
though, and have to be p u lled  together from a variety o f  sources.
One such source, w h ich  although not directly concerned with m ethodology 
strongly suggests non-em piric ist sympathies, is M itchell’s Types o f Economic
6 See Gruchy 119721 p.45
7 cf. Gruchy 11972) p.45: “ Mitchell believed that detailed, quantitative studies of the business 
cycle would enable economists to have a better understanding o f the qualitative aspects o f the mo­
ney economy. He felt that in the early decades of this century there was more to be gained from 
quantitative than qualitative econom ic analysis. His inquiries might be ‘more intensive and tamer' 
than Veblen's broad speculative studies, but in Mitchell’s opinion this was the way to advance 
beyond Veblen on the path that the latter had staked out.”
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Theory, his seminal w ork on the history o f  econom ic thought. M itchell lectured at 
C olum bia in this subject for 24 years,8 w hich suggests more than a passing interest. It 
ra ther suggests a concern for questions o f  m ethodology. W e shall see that this is 
indeed the case.
M itchell did not reject all theory per se. Few  academ ics would spend 24 years 
analysing something they reject outright. W hat M itchell was concerned to attack was 
certain  types o f  theory. M itchell realised  tha t theory is necessary for the generation o f 
w orking hypotheses and for effec tive th inking  [W olfe 1939 p.212]. W hat w ere not 
useful, M itchell believed, w ere deductive system s based upon untested and unsound 
assum ptions, and ‘‘p u re "  theories w hich w ere com pletely synthetic. T he confusion 
arises because historically orthodox eco n o m ic  theory evolved as hedonistic, and 
M itchell implicitly associated deductive theory  with hedonism [ibid.j. It was hedon­
ism w hich Mitchell was opposed to, and it w a s this which led to  his interest in the 
history o f  thought. He was against the ‘‘conscious use o f assum ptions contrary to 
fac t” , especially when econom ists use them  “ not in the purely logical developm ent 
o f  their untrue assum ptions" but rather a ttem pt the “ use o f  these assum ptions to 
facilitate com prehension o f the com plex  cond itions o f  rea lity"  [M itchell 1910 p.109]. 
H edonism  was such a false assum ption, although  the hedonism  w as not to be always 
explicit: Mitchell believed F ish er's  w ork to  be "B en th am 's  ideas under new labe ls"  
[ibid, n.28], and he view ed M arsh all's  w ork  as an attem pt to m ove away from 
hedonistic concepts [1916 p .145]. For M itchell, the whole idea o f an econom ics 
based on " th e  m echanics o f se lf- in te rest"  is m isconceived.
Nonetheless, he believed that the developm ent o f  econom ic thought consisted 
precisely o f  theories o f  this nature. M arshall, M itchell believed, simply qualified his 
use o f  hedonism  in an  essentially  hedonistic theory , “reserving an air o f reality by 
sagacious qualifications o f  the c o n c lu sio n s"  [M itchell 1910 p.910]. M arshall’s theory 
rem ains based on the pleasure/ pain continuum , expressed as differentiable function.
8 The two-volume publication T ypes o f  E co n o m ic  T h eo ry  [Mitchell 1967) was edited from 
M itchell's lecture notes for this course.
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“ M arshall based h is w ho le system  upon a  theo ry  o f  v a lue . H e thought o f  econom ic 
conduct a s  governed  by tw o opposing sets o f  m o tiv es  the fo rce  o f  w hich can be m eas­
ured in m o n ey ”  [M itchell 1944 p .213].
For M itchell, th is fo rm  o f  unrealistic postu la te co u ld  n e v e r  lead to realistic con­
clusions. T h e  v iew s o f  M itchell and M arshall on  the re la tio n sh ip  betw een theory and 
data  differed . M arshall had  also ca lled  fo r quan tita tiv e  w ork , but he believed the 
k inds o f  m arke t fo rces w ere already m arked  o u t  Q uan tita tive  analysis w as supposed 
to  give an objec tive accoun t o f  these fo rces —  indeed  M itc h e ll thought they formed 
the entire scope o f  M arshall’s  econom ics. H o w e v er M itchell believed  that M arshall’s 
m odel o f  tw o  opposing  m otives w as obso le te , and  M itc h e ll d id  no t search for a sta­
tistical m easu rem en t o f  these  forces [H om an 1928 p .139]. R a th e r  he w anted econom ­
ics to  turn  to  psycho logy  fo r an explanation  o f  m otiva tion . H e  believed psychology 
w ould give no  credence to  hedonism . Indeed , th e  poin t o f  h is  1912 article ‘T he Back­
w ards A rt o f  Spending  M o n ey ’ w as p recisely  th a t o b served  consum er behaviour, and 
especially  econom ic behav iour w ithin th e  fa m ily  unit, w a s  clearly  no t governed by 
rational se lf-in te rest [M itchell 1912 passim ].
F o r h is analysis o f  hum an m otiva tion  M itchell tu rn ed  to  the institutional 
psychology o f  Jam es an d  —  especially  —  M cD ougall. I t  w a s  socialised habits w hich 
evolved from  repeated  usage w hich  M itchell b e lieved  lay  at back o f  social 
behaviour.9 I f  econom ic rationality  d id  ex is t, i t  w as th is  ra tiona lity  which had to be 
explained an d  th is by exp la in ing  hum an  n atu re . R ational ac tio n s  w ere only a  limited 
part o f  hu m an  ac tiv ity  [H om an 1928 p .182]. F o r M itchell “ hum an nature is con­
ceived, no t as a  ready-m ade som ething tak e n  o v er a t  th e  o u tse t, no t as a  postulate 
w hose consequences m u st be developed , bu t a s  itse lf th e  c h ie f  subject o f  investiga­
tion [M itchell 1910 p i l l ] .
T he m ajo r institu tion  w hich governed  econom ic  ra tio n a lity  w as m oney. It was 
“ the use o f  m o n ey ”  w hich  w as one o f  the m ain  ra tiona lis ing  institutions.
9 McDougall treats pain and pleasure as m odifying influences o n  instinctive behaviour 
[Mitchell 1910p.l03].
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It gives society the technical machinery o f exchange, the opportunity to combine personal freedom 
with orderly cooperation on a  grand scale, and the basis o f that system o f accountancy which Sombart 
appropriately calls “ economic rationalism” . I t  is the foundation of that complex system o f p rices to 
which the individual m ust adjust his behaviour in getting a living. Since it moulds his objective 
behaviour, it becomes part o f his subjective life ... Because it thus rationalises economic life itself, the 
use o f  m oney lays the foundation for a rational theory o f that life. Money may not be the root o f  a ll  
evil, but it is the root o f economic science [1916 p.157].
F ar from  the neo-classical no tion  o f  m oney being used to  m easure m otivation , 
m oney becomes the m otivation in M itc h ell’s view . It is p recisely  because the in d iv i­
dual is socialised  into the use o f  pecuniary  rationality that th is is  ap p licab le  to  
econom ic ac tiv ity . I t  is  no t the case th a t m oney g ives the econom ist a  gu ide to  sa tis ­
factions. I t  g ives Iitde guidance to  anyth ing  a t  all except curren t institutional p ractice. 
B y th e  sam e token, i f  w e w ish  to  study  th is institutional set, then the study  o f  the 
m oney econom y is he believed  the on ly  objective w ay o f so  doing, [cf. V in ing  1951 
P -1 1 4 ].
It w as the concep t o f  m oney w hich  is one o f  the links betw een the h is to ry  o f  
econom ic though t and  M itchell’s  w ork  o n  business cycles. A lthough the w o rk  
appears to  be positiv ist and  even  em piricist, there is a  definite fram ew ork  fo r  his 
investigations, w h ich  w as institutional an d  V eblenian in nature. W e have already  
seen  th a t M itchell had  criticised  the use o f  false assum ptions in  orthodox th eo ry . W e 
have a lso  seen  tha t h e  criticised  the avoidance o f  the institutional ro le  o f  m o n ey . O f 
course, the com bination  o f  these tw o  aspects  w as necessary fo r the equilib rium  m odel 
o f  orthodox  econom ics to  hold.
M itchell there fo re  considered data  pertinent to  cyclical fluctuations, a s  an 
an tithesis to  equilibrium . T he data  w ere part o f  a  quantitative study  w h ich  he 
believed  to  be objec tive , bu t he d id  have a  “ fram ew ork o f  prelim inary ideas”  w h ich  
he em ployed  to  gu ide his search fo r data . W e can view  th is as  his theory.
However objective we might wish to make such a study, it was nevertheless essential to have some 
framework of ideas into which to fit the data. In short, there must be some test o f relevancy. In setting 
up this test, Mitchell displays an implicit theoretical position. For he prefaces his investigation by a 
brief statement of his view of the operation of the economic system. And in this statement, negatively 
or by neglect, he may be said to discard adherence to any orthodox view of economic process, while, 
positively, his descriptive analysis rests upon the distinction, taken explicitly from Vebten, of the
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distinction between business and industry [Homan 1928 p. 166).
T h e  m ain aspect o f  this d ichotom y o f  industry and business w hich M itchell 
believed  w as the main institution o f  contem porary activity  w as the use o f  m oney, 
“ not th e  use o f  m oney as a m edium  o f  exchange, but the fac t that econom ic activity 
takes th e  form  o f  making and spending  m oney incom es" [M itchell 1913 p.21 ]. This 
m eant th a t  there was no direct connection  betw een the w ell-being  o f the com m unity, 
w hich w a s determ ined by the production  o f  useful goods, and the pecuniary- 
m o tiv a ted  behaviour o f the individual units —  the fam ily and  the firm .10 U seful pro­
duction  functioned  according to  the d ictates o f  businesses w h ich  w ere connected by 
an “ e n d le ss  chain o f  interlocking indebtedness”  [H oman 1928], w hich determ ined 
business ac tion . It is the “ pecuniary  aspect o f  econom ic ac tiv ity”  w hich m ust be 
dealt w ith , and  fluctuations are p rob lem s o f  the fluctuating prospects o f  profits [ibid.).
T h e  p rice system is the m eans w hereby the pecuniary behaviour is coordinated. 
M itchell v iew ed it as an endless a n d  continuous chain, w ithou t any logical beginning 
or en d  [M itchell 1913 p.31]. B ecause o f  this interconnectedness o f business, the out­
lines o f  the system remained s tab le, even if  the individual units changed  [Vining 
1951 p . l  16]. But because each u n it w as only m otivated by profit, M itchell did not 
believe any  overall coordination w ould be achieved. “ In detail, then, econom ic 
ac tiv ity  is planned and directed w ith  skill, but in the large there is neither general 
plan n o r central direc tion .”  [M itchell 1913 p.38] The m oney  econom y gives no 
assu ran ce  o f  a desirable d istribu tion  nor o f  sm ooth functioning; this m ay be upset by 
uncertain ty .
T h is . then , is the theoretical fram ew ork  w hich M itchell m oved in. Having esta­
b lished  th a t the postulates o f  ra tionality  and m otivation used in orthodox econom ics 
w ere w ro n g , he then w ent on to  consider the question o f  equilibrium . “ T he whole 
bearing  o f  h is study, in fact, tended  to  discredit the notions o f  norm ality and o f  an
10 M itchell used the same units o f economic activity as the neo-classical authors [Vining
1951].
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equilibrium  o f  fo rces"  [H o m a n  1928 p. 174]. M itchell believed  that h is review  o f 
business behaviour belied a n y  notion o f  norm al or static conditions.
But a  review of business annals n ev e r discloses ... a static’ or 'norm al' state ... On the contrary, in the 
real world of business, affairs are  always undergoing a cumulative change, always passing through 
some phase of a  business cycle in to  some other phase ... In fact, if not in theory, a state of change in 
business conditions is the only 'n o rm a l' state |Mitchell 1913 p.86|.
Using his Veblenian fram ew o rk . M itchell d isproved the log ical consequents o f 
the orthodox model. This w a s  the re la tionship  betw een the m aster V eblen and his 
pupil M itchell.
Veblen s method of demolishing systematic theory is to cast doubt upon its postulates. Mitchell 
appeals to his mass o f facts and d is tils  them into a convincing picture o f economic process which lends 
no support to the conclusions o f system anc theory. He thus appears, not as a parrot o f Veblen. but 
rather as his complement, proceeding from a different angle and with a wholly different technique, to 
complete the discrediting of the schem e of thought in which economic theorists have framed their sys­
tems. | Homan 1928 p. 1761
V eblen 's  theoretical fram ew ork  could be ignored o r d ism issed  by orthodox 
econom ists. M itchell's fa c tu a l exam ination o f  the conclusions w as harder to  avoid. 
H ow ever the fact that the lin k  betw een the tw o  was often not m ade facilitated this 
avoidance as did the fact th a t  M itchell did no t o ffer any ultim ate " c a u s e "  o f  business 
fluctuations. They were s im p ly  a  function o f  the actions o f  business in the m oney 
econom y. His w as a " s ta t ic ”  study in the sense that his concern  w as no t to trace the 
evolution o f  institutions, bu t ra th e r to describe cyclical fluctuations w ith in  the dom ain 
o f  the present institutional se t. Institutions are  fixed ra ther than  variable [H oman 
1928 p. 173].
The o ther way in w h ic h  econom ic theory  could avoid  ana lysing  m oney as an 
institution was simply to tak e  preferences as data , and not to seek  to  instill any valua­
tion  theory into this data. T h is  was the line o f Pareto, and  la ter o f  Sam uelson. 
M itchell classifies this as p u re  theory. He w rote in 1916 that
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It is clear, at once, that this type of theory elim inates the problem o f valuation from economics. That is. 
it does not concern itself with the way in w hich m en find out what relative importance different goods 
have for their purpose. Instead, it assumes tha t th is process of valuation has been completed before 
they come to m arket... 11916 p. 1501.
Later. M itchell becam e more c r itica l o f  this pure theory. “ First and m ost o b v i­
ous. it m eant that econom ic theory m o v e s  on  a  more superficial level than in its m ore 
confident days. The theorist w orks w ith  data  he does no t p rofess to  expla in”  [1944 
p .215]. M itchell also believed that p rice  theory  was insufficient for an  explanation  o f  
econom ic behaviour. The B entham ite v a lu e  theories m ay have been incorrect. “ But 
the policy o f  dispensing with a  theory  o f  value seem s to  m e unhappy and un n eces­
sary. W hen econom ists deal realistically  w ith  hum an behaviour, they find them selves 
needing ... to  understand how people e v a lu a te  goods”  [ibid, p.216].
M itchell believed that econom ics sh o u ld  be able to  give guidance as to  fu ture 
conduct. Pure econom ics w as a futile in d o o r sport [W olfe 1939 p.214]. He w ou ld  not 
accept the notion o f the econom ist a s  'd isin te rested  o b serv er’. Econom ics h a s  the 
moral purpose o f  obtaining rational c o n tro l  fo r societal w elfare. T his was never ex p li­
citly discussed how ever [op.cit p .2 1 9 ].11 Defining w elfare is o f  course the central 
problem  o f  econom ics. M itchell leaves  w elfare undefined. Nonetheless, the task  o f 
considering social welfare, how ever h a z y  the concept m ay be, determ ines the nature 
o f econom ics.
The motive is now not idle curiosity but the " in s tin c t o f workmanship” . And from this point o f view, 
understanding is something more than hindsight o r knowing the genetic causation of things. It now 
takes on the complexion of foresight or a certain teleological character.
The issue, therefore, involves no questioning o f  our need of factual knowledge. It lies in the 
significance or meaning of the knowledge we have  or can get. And in this frame of reference meaning 
has an instrumental or value complexion. For a ll welfare economists ... the meaning of meaning must
lie in the sphere of values {op.cit p.225).
W olfe criticised M itchell for no t b rin g in g  out the significance o f the m eans/end
11 cf. Vining op.cit. passim . Vining suggests that this is in fact the main motive o f all economic 
theory.
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re la tion  [ibid.]. The criticism  is valid, but m uch o f  the relation is im plied in 
M itchell’s articles. M itchell also  believed that only fa c tu a l work could further the sci­
ence.
M uch o f  the critique o f  M itchell com es from th e  fa c t that he d id  not pro pose a 
system  to  replace the orthodoxy he criticised. He a p p e a re d  to favour econom ic plan­
n ing , which he saw  as an inevitability [ibid, p .210]. H is  m ain concern  w as to gain 
ob jec tive data from psychologists as to the actual m o tiv a tio n  o f hum ans. How ever, he 
is no t very clear as to w hat exactly we w ould do  w ith  this data. It is unclear how 
m otives would relate to  w elfare [ibid.]. M itchell s e e m s  to cling to the Veblenian 
no tion  o f  instincts and believes these could  be un co v e red . V eblen believed  that insti­
tu tio n s  functioned to raise the desire for consum ption  a n d  thereby artificially  create 
shortage . No econom ics would be necessary if in d u s try  could run unhindered. 
M itchell is am biguous as to  how far along  this road he is  willing to travel. W ithout a 
defin ition  o f  value o r w elfare, it is not possible, as we h a v e  seen throughout, to derive 
po licy  recom m endations.
... it is a little difficult to see how welfare economics, which assuredly is without frame o f reference 
unless it discovers or posits some human aims, can be much advanced by generalisations, no matter 
how illuminating otherwise, which have no reference to the purpose o f  the human behaviour on which 
they are made lop.cit p .217).
M itchell has provided us with an objective c r it iq u e  o f equilibrium  theory. He 
iso la ted  the question o f equilibrium  by reference to V eb len ian  social theory. How­
e v e r. he then w ished to derive an objective rep lacem en t theory which w ould  enable 
the econom ist to prescribe policy. As w e have seen throughou t, the search for an 
ob jec tive  basis for value rem ains doom ed to failure. E v e n  if  M itchell w ere to  uncover 
the institutional basis o f m arket dem and, it is far fro m  clear how w e are then to 
proceed . T o  say that m arket value is not objective m a y  be correct, but does not in 
i tse lf  give an objective account o f value w hich is re q u ired  for non-arbitrary econom ic 
planning .
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A y res
T h is objective foundation  for planning is precisely the basis fo r A yres’ th e o ry . Ayres 
believed  he co u ld  go ’beyond’ the values given by price to  som e n o tio n  o f  ‘rea l’ 
value given by science and technology. A yres scheme w as that p r ic e s  could  be 
ad justed  to  acco u n t for these real, social values.
A yres began  his system with a critique and rejection o f  c la ss ic a l and  neo­
classical price th eo ry . He drew a distinction between value, price, and  c a p ita l , which 
he believed w ere the essential com ponents o f the "classica l trad ition ’’ . A lthough 
these  three co n c ep ts  w ere irretrievably interconnected they were n o n e th e le ss  distinct. 
P rice  itself w as o n ly  the guise in w hich econom ic problem s em erge [R o s to w  1976 
p .76 ]. W hile p rice has no significance in itself, in the classical schem e it i s  used as a 
ca talyst " b y  the ac tio n  o f  which capital and  value were com bined”  [1944  p .37 ]. The 
key  elem ent o f  o rthodox  theory for A yres w as the way in w hich a co n c en tra tio n  on 
p rice theory en a b led  the neo-classics to derive a  value for capital (and  lab o u r) . The 
neo-classics co n fu sed  capital funds w ith capital goods [W alker 1980 p .6 5 1 ]. By 
equa ting  these tw o  distinct elements, neo-classical theory w as able to  e x p la in  the 
g ro w th  o f  capita l goods by the accum ulation o f  capital funds, w hich th e y  suggested 
occurred  through abstinence or saving [A yres 1944 p.50, cf. W alker 1 9 8 0  p.651]. 
T h is  also  prov ided  a  moral justification for " th e  great inequality o f  in c o m e  w hich is 
one o f  the m ost conspicuous features o f  cap ita lism " [A yres 1944 p .5 2 ] . (In fact 
A yers interprets th e  classics as justify ing  inequality on the grounds th a t i t  leads to 
capita l accum ulation  [op.cit. p.53]>. O nce w e understand the real role o f  technology 
th is justification  w ill be abandoned [A yres 1953 p.284].
T he confusion  o f  capital funds and capital equipm ent m ade it a p p e a r  that the 
g ro w th  o f  funds w as required before industrial growth could occur, w h e re a s  for 
A yres " in d u str ia l g row th  is a  consequence, not o f  non-consum ption, b u t o f  techno­
logical developm en t. N o com m unity has ev e r starved itse lf into p ro sp e ri ty ’’ [ibid.]. 
T h e  level o f  eco n o m ic  wealth is determ ined not by the accum ulation o f  fu n d s , but by 
the level o f techno logy  [1944 p.283, cf. W alker 1980 p.653]. It w as techno log ica l
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grow th  that, fo r A yres w as the m o st im portant force in civilization [W alker 1979 
p .521]. A n understanding  o f  eco n o m ic  grow th required  not an understand o f m arket 
m echanism s, but rather an  understand ing  o f  technological development.
Since A yres re jected  the neo -c lassic  notion o f  price as the focus o f  value, he 
m ust also  re ject the R obbins m eans/end  dichotom y. A yres follow s D ewey in this, and 
bases his theo ry  o f value upon th e  concept o f  ‘con tinuity’. Value is a synonym  for 
continuity  w hich  is  the hum an “ life p ro c ess" , the “ continuity  o f  civ ilization" 
[A yres 1944 p.221 cf. R utherford  1981 p.658]. T he continuity  o f experience is the 
basic scientific postulate o f  bo th  physical and social behaviour [A yres 1944 p.91], 
and  it is technology w hich  en ab les  the continuity  o f  civilization to  occur. Value is 
therefore instrum ental, and  located  in technological know ledge [Chung 1978 p .l 19]. 
W hatever causes technological developm ent is valuable [Rutherford 1981. p.659]. 
T he crite rion  o f  every  econom ic judgem ent is "k ee p in g  the m achines runn ing" 
[A yres 1944 p .223]. V alue is ob jec tified  w ithin technological instrum ents [Rutherford 
1981 p.658]. “ T rue values are n o t a  m atter o f individual taste or institutional condi­
tion ing , but a m atter o f dem onstrab le  efficiency in the m aintenance and production o f 
the technical continuum  and the life  process”  [op.cit. p .660]. Q uestions o f  value are 
sim ply technical questions o f  ch oosing  the right tools, as it were. Value is objective 
and  transcendental.
A yres is a  technological o p tim ist. W hereas for V eblen institutions can be either 
servicable o r d isserv icable, for A y res  all institutions are cerem onial in nature. They 
are form ed as  a  m ixture o f  conven tions, m yths and social m ores [Rutherford 1981 
p.660]. T hese institutions serve to  h id e  true value, and to  assign 'rank  through ritu a l’, 
thereby  m ain tain ing  the social o rd e r  [W alker 1979 p.524]. T he aim  o f  institutions is 
to  convey the social o rder o f  the p as t into the future. They are therefore in opposition 
to technology, w hich is concerned  w ith  future developm ent. Institutions constitute a 
cultural brake to  technological ch an g e [Rostow  1976 p.76]. The processes o f  techno­
logical and  econom ic deve lopm en t therefore required large changes to  the institutions 
o f  society [ibid.].
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Ayres dichotom ised human behaviour. T he m ain  force for progress was 
technological-based behaviour. This was held  back by institutional/cerem onial 
behaviour. T he price econom y was one o f  these ce rem onia l institutions, and Ayres 
held that price bore no relation to social value. A yres, fo llow ing  Veblen. believes that 
the industrial econom y is more fundamental than  th is p rice  econom y [G ruchy 1972 
p.97], in fact the price econom y is view ed as sim ply  a  p ow er system. ‘R ea l’ value is 
determ ined technologically  and. as fo r V eblen. is capab le  o f  measurem ent by physi­
cal science. Prices can then be adjusted to reflect these  ‘re a l’ values, and the econom y 
planned accordingly [G ruchy 1972 pp. 97-109].
It was for these reasons that A yres thought the level o f  finance capital to be an 
irrelevance. Progress occurred through technology, no t through investment. The 
developm ent o f western societies is due to the “ tr iu m p h ”  o f  technology and rational 
behaviour o ver cerem onial actions and institutions, A yres believed [1944 chap ix]. 
He considered that the key to progress was to cu t aw ay  the institutions w hich dragged 
back the progress o f  technology. A yres believed that “ the technological revolution is 
itse lf irresistible“  [A yres 1944 p.xxiv], and w ou ld  lead  to  an  improvem ent in the w el­
fare o f society.
In his interpretation o f technological deve lopm en t, and his interpretation o f  
value, A yres could possibly be said to be ex ten d in g  institutional theory along 
V eblenian lines. W ith h is analysis o f  institutions he beg ins a significant departure 
from  the Veblenian position. V eblen considered  tha t the vested interests held sway 
over scientific developm ent. The institutional se t w as dynam ic  and evolutionary. In 
A yres work all institutions are imbecile. He rep laces the V eblenian institutional lag 
w ith his concept o f institutional drag, im plying tha t technological progress is inexor­
able and drags all institutional behaviour behind it. T h is  raises the possibility —  o r 
even  probability —  o f  short-run trium ph o f techno logy  over institutions, thereby 
com pletely changing the conclusions o f  the theory . V eb len  believed only wholesale 
replacem ent o f  the institutional set could  achieve m axim um  social w elfare. A yres’ 
theory m akes it possible for reform  to achieve th is. In  contrast to radicalism  and
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pessim ism , Ayres h a rbours  liberalism  and optim ism  [M cFarland 1985 p .100].
Indeed, Ayres definition o f the concept o f  'in stitu tion ' borders o n  th e  tautologi­
ca l. V eb len  interpreted the concept som ewhat loosely, using the term  fo r cerem onial 
p rac tice , customs, w idespread  social habits, an d  culture am ong o thers . O f  these, the 
usual usage was so cia l habits, the first in the list is the least cen tral [ib id .]. Yet Ayres 
takes cerem onial p rac tices  as his exclusive m eaning. T he tec h n o lo g y / institution 
d icho tom y may th en  be tautological: all institutions are bad [ibid.].
Anything that hinders econom ic development is by definition an institution in A yres' w ort. If a habit 
of thought or behavioural pattern that we would call an institution contributes efficiently to the process 
of producuon. Ayres would call it a technological activity (Walker 1979 p.335].
A y res 's  use o f  tautology is typical o f  determ inistic theories. A y res  scheme is 
indeed  determ inistic. B y his use o f  the concept o f technological d ra g , h is view o f 
techno logy  as a seif-generating  process, and h is  view o f  in s titu tions as  cerem onial. 
A yres creates a technological over-determ inism  [op.cit. p .522]. T h e  tautological 
aspect o f  A yres’s defin ition  o f institutionalism  is necessary to  p ro tec t h im se lf against 
a  charge  that some institutions m ay be beneficial to technological g ro w th . If  they are 
beneficial, they ce ase  to be institutions.
T h ere  is ano the r charge w hich can be ra ised  against A yres, w h ich  is  harder to 
dodge. D eterm inistic theoretical systems m ust be functionalist in nature . I f  the deter­
m in ing  elem ent ca n  be show n to  be dysfunctional, then the dete rm in is t system  begins 
to break  down. A y res  w as not really able to co p e with the fact o f  th e  em ploym en t of 
techno logy  for unarguably  evil uses. Ayres argued  that these uses w e re  the result o f 
institutional forces. Y et if  this is the case, then  institutional va lue-judgem ents are 
apparen tly  of m ajor im portance in the developm ent o f particu lar techno log ies [Ruth­
erfo rd  1981 p.668].
Clearly, however, the recognition that the evil consequences of some uses o f technology result from 
institutions should entail the recognition that the machines are ethically and morally neutral in them­
selves with respect to a ll uses, and that what are considered to be their beneficial effects axe also deter­
mined by institutions. U ses o f technology that are judged harmful in some or all respects are the result
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of decision to employ technology in those ways. Beneficial consequences o f technology result from 
value judgements about what is beneficial ... The value judgements are the outcome o f the social insti­
tutions that operate to select objectives and to define problems. Science and technology enable the 
achievement o f the objectives, but do not select them, as can be inferred from the different uses to 
which science and technology are put in different societies. The conclusion must be that Ayres was not 
correct in supposing that there are universally true moral values which are objectively determined by 
technological operations, and that he was unable to demonstrate scientifically that culturally relative 
values are harmful. This rejection o f h is theory o f  value is a logical corollary o f the rejection o f  his 
theory o f the antithetical roles o f technology and institutions in the process of economic developm ent 
[Walker 1979 p.534]
T he technological dete rm in ism  o f  A yres’s theory is therefore in d o u b t  W e can  
also see that his value theory is o p en  to  doubt. T he essence o f  his value theory w as 
that value can be identified w ith  technological progress: the “ instrum ental”  theory o f  
value. T his w as to  rep lace the c lassical/neo-c lassical value theory [C hung 1978 
p .l  18]. S ince technology is  a  positive  determ inant o f  all hum an values, these values 
can be objec tive . A yres does no t a llo w  fo r d ifferences o ver values —  all choices are 
the sam e as  cho ices betw een to o ls  [A yres 1944 p .212-13]. Science can g ive us ob jec­
tive analysis o f  va lue  judgem en ts. T h is  is  “ an  exam ple o f  the naturalistic fallacy th a t 
statem ents o f  ob ligation  can  be deriv ed  from  statem ents o f  facts”  [R utherford 1981 
p.669]. W ithout show ing tha t sc ience  can  m ake values objective, A yres’s theory  
fa lls .12
W e arrive a t  th e  sam e p lace a s  w e departed  in  1789. Pre-determ ined theory  is 
held to be possib le because value ca n  be objectified. F o r Bentham  th is possibility  w as 
because values w e re  based  upon ca lcu lation . F o r th e  m arginalists values could  be 
m easured by  price . F o r A yres sc ien c e  equa tes w ith  ‘rea l’ value. B oth attem pt to  show  
how  w hat appear to  be sub jective valua tions are in  fac t objec tive ly  m easurable. N ei­
ther o f  them  can  be operationalised .
In fact A yres, fa r  m ore th an  V eblen , appears to  be heading  dow n a  parallel path  
to Bentham . T h is  m ovem en t is  accen tuated  by h is co n c ep tio n  o f  the “ unity  o f  
value” . H e m ain tains that all v a lu e s  —  no t on ly  com m odity  valuations —  form  part
12 The Knight/Ayres debate does indeed seem to be a confusion, as suggested by the titles o f 
the articles. If  morality becomes objective, then indeed no moral judgements need be made. The 
difference is over the content o f value theory, not over the inclusion o f ethics in economics.
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o f  value system s w hich can be com pared.
True values are trans-cultural ... because they are interrelated. All are manifestations o f the same pro­
cess. the life process o f mankind. All knowledge is related to and conditioned by all other knowledge, 
and all skills are mutually contributory. Good health, freedom from disease and famine, is contributory 
to the acquisition of skill and knowledge; and the acquisition of knowledge and development of skill 
are contributory to good health.
All true values define and fortify each other. | Ayres 1961 p.167)
A yres also  extends this analysis to  such values as  freedom  and equality, and even 
aesthe tic  “ excellence” . These w ere also  capable o f  technological expression [op.cit. 
p .34  and relevant chapters]. T he parallels w ith B entham  are clear —  everything is 
reducib le to scientific m easurem ent. U nfortunately , in actuality  these elem ents are 
not m easurable in this w ay, and to  cla im  th is is possib le remains faindy absurd. It 
seem s w orth pointing out that som e o f  the “ g row th  o f  know ledge" has been dis­
tinctly  unhealthy; although A yres w ould  no doubt claim  that this was due to  institu­
tions, no t technology. But such reasoning  sm acks o f  post-hoc rationalising. 'B ad ' 
technology is im bued with cerem onial p ractices, 'g o o d ' technology is not. By con­
trast. ex-ante judgem ents o f how  dispara te technologies are to be deployed is  required 
if p lanning  is to  succeed.
T he idea that technology is itse lf neutral should  be rejected. It is never possible 
to separate social from technological ch a n g e .13 T h ere  is no sense in w hich technol­
ogy  can  be objectively judged. A gain , the idea o f  ob jec tive value cannot be realised.
II. PURPOSIVE THEORIES
Commons
T he o ther wing o f  the institutional school concerned  itse lf less with the replacem ent
13 See references in Dickson 11974) and Rose 11976). Both Marxists and Greens would reject 
the idea o f neutral technology: see for example the works o f Habermas, Illich and others.
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o f  orthodox rationality  than w ith  analysing  the social ou tcom e and o ffering  policy 
proposals to  supplem ent and  reform  the resu lts  o f  orthodox analysis.
C om m ons14 responded to  the prospect o f  rad ical overhaul by  developing a 
reform ist theory. W e shall see  th a t C om m ons did no t a ttem pt a  reassertion  o f the 
neo-classica l approach, bu t ra the r tried to  a lter th is ana lysis to  accom m odate the 
boundary extensions th a t he believed  the discipline badly needed , and w hich  fitted in 
w ith  his early  20th  century  C hristian  eth ics [S tarr 1983 p . l  10].
C om m ons’s  avow ed purpose w as to  cure the inadequacies o f  econom ics, both in 
theo ry  and practice. H e w as “ trying to  save  capitalism  by m aking  i t  g o o d ”  [Com­
m o n s 1934 p.143 cf. D ugger 1979 p .369]. T h is w ould be ach ieved  n o t by  a rejection 
o f  orthodox analysis, bu t by providing an institutional “ supp lem en t”  [Rutherford 
1983 p.722]. “ T he problem  n o w ”  C om m ons believed, “ is  no t to  crea te  a  different 
k in d  o f econom ics —  ‘institu tional’ econom ics —  d ivorced  from  preced ing  schools, 
b u t how  to  g ive to  co llec tive ac tion , is  all its  varie ties, its  due p lace  throughout 
econom ic theory”  [C om m ons 1934 p.5]. In  C om m ons’s  v iew , o rthodox  econom ics 
w a s necessary but insufficien t to provide an  adequate ana lysis o f  b ehav iour [Com­
m o n s 1936 p.242 , S ta rr 1983 p . l  18].
C om m ons also d id  n o t d ichotom ise theory  and p ractice. R ather, h is approach 
w a s inductive: he attem pted  to  generalise from  h is experience. M uch  o f  h is writings 
are  taken up w ith  references to  ca se  studies and personal anecdo tes as  exam ples. He 
a lso  believed in  active reform , and  h is  w ork  should be v iew ed as b o rdered  by the pos­
s ib ilities o f  w hat he v iew ed  as  possib le reform  w ithin h is stated  e th ica l guidelines. 
C om m o n s’ reform  m ethod  “ transcended  the ra the r artific ial norm ative/positive 
d icho tom y” , instead o f  w hich  “ he w as alw ays practical, w h ich  m eans th a t he investi­
ga ted  w hat could be ra th e r than  w hat should b e”  [D ugger 1979 p .370]. T h is meant 
tak ing  existing p ractice as  h is starting  point, but he a lso  believed  th a t  the ethical 
in p u ts  to  his analysis w ere th a t o f  th e  society  under scru tiny . R eform  m u st be based 
on  the values o f  society  [ibid.].
14 and also J.K.Galbraith
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C om m ons’s  first m a jo r w ork w as his Legal Foundations o f  Capitalism, co m ­
pleted in  1923. M ost o f  h is m ain concepts w e re  developed  by  th is tim e. H ow ever, 
C o m m o n s’s  w riting sty le  is  by com m on co n sen su s th e  m o st un in tellig ib le o f  all 
w estern  econom ists. T he 1934 w ork  Institutional Economics w as a resta tem ent o f  this 
theo ry  [R am stad  1986 p .1090], the earlier ex p o sitio n  o f  w h ich  m any people had  c r iti­
cised  ‘ ‘to  the effec t that th ey  could not u nders tand  m y theories nor w h a t I w as d riv ing  
a t”  [C om m ons 1934 p . l ] .  Institutional Economics d id  little  to  so lve this prob lem , 
how ever, and  The Economics o f  Collective Action  w as an  “ attem pt to  expla in  in  sim ­
ple term s the essentials o f  a  com plex  system  o f  though t”  [Parsons, p reface to  C o m ­
m ons 1950 p. v]. T he references below  are taken  in  th e  m ain from  Institutional 
Economics, w hich w as h is  m ajor w ork  o f  exposition .
W e saw  previously how  the attem pt o f  o rthodox  econom ists to  arrive a t a  social 
value func tion  faltered w hen  they attem pted  to  aggregate the ind iv idual functions 
w hich th ey  posited. I f  C om m ons is  to  su cc essfu lly  supplem ent o rthodox theo ry , he 
m ust e ith e r  add a  supplem ent o r find an altern ativ e  to  th e  o rthodox m ethods o f  deriv ­
ing a  social value. C om m ons’s  response w as to  contend  th e  boundaries o f  econom ics 
to  em brace  the political an d  the legal. T hese b ec am e necessary  constra in ts upon in d i­
v idual ac tiv ity . C om m ons defined an  Institu tio n  as “ co llec tiv e  ac tio n  in  con tro l, 
libera tion  and  expansion o f  individual ac tio n ”  [1931 p .644]. Social value w a s no t 
derived  fro m  individual values, bu t ra ther fo rm e d  the constra in ts w ith in  w hich in d iv i­
duals m ay  a c t  T hese constra in ts w ere necessary , bu t w ere also  in teractive and  
dynam ic, and  the change in  institutions w as w h a t caused  th e  social evolution.
T h e  initial po in t o f  departure from  o rthodoxy  o f  C om m ons w as th e  necessity  fo r 
law  in  econom ic rela tions. In  the orthodoxy law  a n d  eth ics
*
were necessarily excluded, because the relations on w hich the units were constructed were relations 
between man and nature, not between man and m an .... Neither statute law, nor ethics, nor custom, nor 
judicial decision bad anything to do  with either o f these relationships; o r rather, all these m ight be 
eliminated by assuming that ownership was identical w ith the m aterials owned, in order to construct a  
theory o f pure economics based solely oo the physical exchange o f materials and services.
The latter was done. This identity o f ownership and materials was accepted as a matter o f custom, 
without investigation. It was assumed that all com m odities were owned, but the ownership was
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assumed to be identical with the physical thing owned, and therefore was overlooked as something to 
be taken for granted. The theories were worked out as physical materials, omitting anything of pro­
perty rights, because they were 'natural’ [Commons 1934 p.56-7).
For C om m ons the cru cia l om ission o f  orthodox econom ics w as the concept o f 
th e  transfer o f  rights. “ A lthough we speak o f  the price o f  c o m m o d itie s" . Commons 
believed  that “ w hat we ac tually  value in the m arket is the legal righ ts to  these uses or 
serv ices, nam ely property righ ts. Physical control follow s legal con tro l; legal control 
is strateg ic and valued”  [1950  p.151]. W hat was involved in  exchange was not the 
exchange o f  materials, but the exchange o f  property rights to  econom ic goods:
If the subject-matter of political economy is not only individuals and nature’s  forces, but is human 
beings getting their living out o f each other by mutual transfers of property rights, then it is to law and 
ethics that we look for the critical turning points o f this human activity [1934, p.57].
T he distinc tive feature o f  political econom y is the exchange o f  property rights. 
C om m ons m aintains that ownership is the relevant question, and  this involves human 
interaction. It a lso  involves social action, in the form o f leg islation  an d  judiciary. 
O w nersh ip  im plies, in the m odem  w orld, law. T his transfer o f  title is differen t to the 
ac t o f  physical delivery, w h ich  is part o f the labour process o f  transportation. Pro­
perty  righ ts requires the ex istence  o f  a  state. " T h e  individual does no t transfer ow ner­
sh ip . O nly the state ... by operation o f  law  as in terpreted  by the courts, transfers ow n­
ersh ip  by reading intentions into the m inds o f  participants in a  transaction .”  [1934
p.60].
C om m ons d istinguished  betw een institutional econom ics an d  engineering 
econom ics. T he form er w as concerned w ith the transfer o f  property  rights, and 
invo lved  hum an to hum an relations. E ngineering econom ics w as th e  relation o f 
hum an  to nature, and concerned  only the “ physical attribute o f  use-values”  [1934 
p .256]. T he engineer w ould go on producing indefinitely unless restrained , producing 
e v e n  to the poin t w here g oods w ere over-supplied. The production o f  use values —  
w ealth  —  is d istinguished from  value, w hich is the scarcity value o f  w ealth . Wealth
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had a double m eaning; the engineering m eaning o f  output (use-value) and the busi­
ness m eaning o f  incom e (scarcity-value). B usiness is necessary to  regulate the output, 
such regulation being  a feature o f  all societies [ibid.].
Orthodox econom ics confused  efficiency with scarcity. Technical efficiency 
must be supplem ented  by co llec tive action in order to m axim ise real value. Efficiency 
and scarcity are com plem entary , and. C om m ons m aintained, se t lim its to each other 
[op.cit. p.259].
Scarcity w as the factor w h ich  C om m ons (following Hum e) suggests requires the 
institution o f  property rights. A bundance w ould mean that there is  no  need for or 
possibility o f  title o r ow nership [op.cit. p .237, 1925 p.371]. C om m ons does not reject 
the R obbins' definition o f  Econom ics, but suggests it is insufficient. Scarcity was one 
o f the requirem ents o f econom ic analysis, since it explained the need  for ownership, 
but the analysis o f  the legal an d  ethical institutions w hich enabled  property rights to 
exist was also  necessary.
The classics and  neo-classics derived econom ic order from  the 'inv isib le-hand ' 
m echanism . C om m ons, how ever, is m aintaining that the scarcity m echanism s o f the 
m arket are only  partly  causal o f  the econom ic order: there are intervening  param eters 
o f institutions. T here is no presum ption  o f Adam S m ith’s "h a rm o n y  o f  in terests” , in 
fact, the opposite  is p resum ed. C om m ons believes that conflict w ould inevitably 
ensue, and that "h arm o n y  is no t a presum ption of econom ics, it is a  consequence o f 
collective ac tion  designed to  m aintain ru les that shall govern the conflic ts” . C om ­
mons expressly denied the concep t o f the ‘invisible-hand’: ind iv iduals’ self-seeking 
would not lead au tom atically  to  the best social outcom e. T he im position  o f collective 
order is required . Given tha t political econom y involves transfer o f  legal title, it 
becom es a  requirem ent for a  sovereign state to exist, to enforce the legally binding 
contracts. T he state m onopolises sovereignty; the "ex trac tio n  o f  violence from 
private transactions”  [1934 p.684,1950 p.74, cf. R utherford 1973 p.727]. O ther 
forms o f  pow er and other sovereign bodies also exist: bo th  econom ic and moral 
power m ay be em ployed  by o th e r “ governm ents”  than the state governm ent. There
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is a  h ie ra rc h y  o f governm ents in the po litical econom y [C om m ons 1950 p.75].
L a w , ethics and custom  also  prov ide, for C om m ons, a  necessary security o f  
expectations. Because exchange involves exchange o f title , th is requires a legal du ty  
c o n c e rn in g  future behaviour, a  concept C om m ons term s futurity. Because o f th is, it 
is p o s s ib le  for legal title to be negotiated: cred it, debt and  goodw ill becom e n ego ti­
ab le . P roperty  need not be lim ited to  tangib le objects; intangible goods are a lso  
tra d e a b le  [1950 p.30].
T o  sum marise. Com m ons designated  five broad princip les o f  econom ic action: 
e ffic ien c y , scarcity, sovereignty, futurity , and  one other not y e t discussed: w orking  
ru les o r  custom s [Parsons 1942 p .347]. T hese rules w ere the m ixture o f  ethics, cu s­
tom  a n d  collective action w hich has ev o lv ed  w hich defined the rights and  duties o f  
in d iv id u a ls. An organised form o f  co llec tive action C om m ons term ed a "g o in g  c o n ­
c e rn ”  [Rutherford p.723]. T he w orking  ru les o f  the going  concerns m ay involve 
m oral, a s  well as physical o r econom ic sanctions. Furtherm ore, the institutions w ere 
th e m se lv e s  changeable by individuals, although to  what ex ten t C om m ons believed 
this p o ss ib le  is a m atter for conjecture. W e w ill return to this.
E co n o m ic  activity for C om m ons took  the form o f  w hat he ca lled  Transactions. 
T his co n ta in e d  a bargain struck betw een parties o f  varying legal relationships co n ­
c e rn in g  ow nership rights. Com m ons identified three types o f  transaction . B argain ing  
tran sa c tio n s  w ere betw een legal equals. E ither party  has the ab ility  to  w ithhold from  
the b a rg a in . This form o f  transaction w as connected w ith scarcity . T he form c o n ­
nec ted  w ith  efficiency was the M anagerial Transaction: a  transaction betw een 
m an a g er and  managed. This was a  re la tion  betw een legal superior and  inferior: the 
w o rk er h a d  less right to  withhold. T here are no available alternatives to the bargain  
—  th e  “ lim its o f co e rc io n "  are less [op.cit. p .725]. R ationing transactions involve 
so v ere ig n ty : the im position o f transactions by superior au thorities, such as  taxation.
T h e  w orking rules o f  the society m ay constrain the negotiations w ithin the tran ­
saction . F o r Comm ons, the key rule upheld by the jud iciary  w as tha t o f  "reaso n ab le  
v a lu e” :
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The key word for Com m ons w as ‘reasonable’, reasonable value, cost, price, wage, profit and so on, 
and he always viewed expectations o f future economic activity (transactions) in terms o f prevailing 
notions o f equity and justice . T he ultimate criterion o f  reasonableness with respect to bargaining and 
division o f economic pow er, incom e and wealth was what the h ighest courts would accept in the final 
analysis. The specific m anifestations o f that social o r collective criterion could be altered smoothly and 
continuously as the system e vo lved  via a  continuing re-interpretation o f  the law by the courts. [Zingler 
1974 p335]
T he use o f  legal o r ec o n o m ic  coercion w hich  w as u n re aso n ab le  w ould be disallow ed. 
I t  should be noted  th a t  C om m o n s view ed h is  m ethod o f  an a ly sis  a s  un iversa l and 
applicable to any fo rm  o f  society . A  C om m unist o r Fascis t so c ie ty  w ould  sim p ly  have 
differen t proportions o f  th e  three types o f  transaction , d iffe re n t institu tions and  dif­
feren t w orking ru les [1 9 3 4  p.7].
C hange in  in stitu tio n s  also  w ould com e ab o u t th ro u g h  transactions o f  ind iv idu­
als w ith  going co n cern s . I n  particular, po litica l parties h e ld  a  key  part in  th e  control 
o f  the sovereign p ow er o f  th e  state in dem ocracies. C o m m o n s  d istinguished  betw een 
R outine T ransactions a n d  S trateg ic Transactions, w hich  es tab lish  custom s and  w ork­
ing ru les o f  fo r the ro u tin e  transactions. T h e  system  is th e re fo re  evo lu tionary  [1934 
p.656].
T h is  evolu tion  w a s  n o t, how ever, o f  th e  sam e natu re a s  tha t posed  by V eblen. 
C om m ons interpreted D a rw in  as  positing a  d ichotom y o f  n a tu ra l and  artific ial selec­
tion: o f  purposeless a n d  purpose fu l selec tion  [1950 p .9 1 , 1934 p .657]. C om m ons 
believed tha t i t  w as p o s s ib le  to  engender “ m o ra l se lec tio n ” , to  d irec t th e  trajectory  
o f  social evolution. T h is  h e  regarded  as the d istinc tive fe a tu re  vis à  vis V eblen  [ibid.]. 
T he evolu tionary  th eo ry  o f  V eblen  w as expressly  tha t o f  n a tu ra l selection.
W e saw  above, th o u g h , tha t this aspect o f  V eblen’s th e o ry  w as in  fac t its  w eak­
est part, and w as no t n e c e s sa ry  fo r his social psycho log ica l critique. C om m ons also 
believed th a t V eblen e f fe c tiv e ly  abandoned natu ra l selec tion , in  th a t his w orkm anship  
instinct introduced a  p u rp o se fu ln ess  into th e  theo ry  [1 9 3 4  p .661]. C om m ons m ain 
point o f  contention w a s th a t  V eblen ignored  scarcity  and  th e  need  to  reg u la te  the 
efficient production o f  in d u s try  [1934, p .673  ff]. V eblen a ls o  m isunderstood , C om ­
m ons believed , the c o n se q u e n t relationship betw een  m an ag eria l and bargain ing  tran ­
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sactions [ibid.]. There is also  a m ore triv ia l claim  that Veblen considered the ac tio n s  
o f  the wrong “ going concern” : C o m m o n s  claim ed that V eblen’s experience a t  the 
1901 Industrial Com m ission was to o  n arrow , and that his ow n perusal o f  S uprem e 
Court decisions since 1810 w ere su p erio r d a ta  [1934 p.660].
T o  an extent the debate on sc a rc ity , w hich is the m am  point o f con ten tion , is 
never joined. The question is w he ther th e  regulation o f  industry is a  serv ice to  the 
com m unity. V eblen believes that it  is  no t. Com m ons that it is. T he m atter o f  the 
power o f  the Suprem e C ourt relative to  business is an im portant but secondary issue. 
V eblen’s contention was that the b u s in ess  interests use cultural institutions to  m ou ld  
the “ needs”  o f socialised individuals: to  create scarcity. I f  it w ere not for these  in sti­
tutions. no scarcity would exist. T his a rg u m e n t was not m et by Com m ons.
In a  way, the question o f sovere ign ty  is  not contradictory to  V eblenian ana lysis . 
The concept is derived by C o m m o n s  in an alm ost gam es-theory m a n n e r.15 
Sovereignty is required to solve the inev itab le  conflicts occurring from bargain ing  
transactions, which them selves o cc u r because  o f  the transfer o f  legal title to  scarce 
com m odities. The sovereign state fu n c tio n s  by w orking rules w hich enab le it to 
decide upon reasonable behaviour. G iv e n  the institution as the fact o f  sca rc ity , the 
regulators o f  industry may well need regu la tion  them selves. It m ay well be im p o ss i­
ble o r im practical to practice un tram m elled  laissez-faire. B ut all this is to say th a t it is 
in the best interests o f  business to o rg a n ise  a  sovereign state. W hile the state m a y  be 
sovereign to an individual going co n c ern , it is far from clear that it is im m une from  
control by the collective vested in terests.
O n the face o f it, the idea o f ju d ic ia l control o f  the econom y as a cure-all fo r  the 
market m echanism  appears naive. R ais in g  a critique o f  C om m ons is qu ite  p ro b ­
lematic though, due to  his obscure s ty le . In  particular it is unclear w hether C om m ons 
is proposing an analytical technique o r  a  theory o f  political econom y. T he orthodox  
theory, at least in principle, purported to  show  how econom ic order is derived  from  
individual self-seeking. It is far from  c le a r  whether C om m ons is offering a  s im ila r
15 cf. chapter five
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theory, o r is  o ffering typologies a s  to  w hat to consider w hen investigating  any given 
society. Z in g ler suggests the latter:
Commons w as n o t the theorist that Veblen was. Rather he was a  conceptualise He developed ways of 
viewing economic phenomena, not theoretical constructs that had predictive value. [1974 p.336]
A t tim es he suggests tha t his ow n  concepts could  be su p p lem en ted  o r rep laced  by 
o thers [Parsons 1942 p .347]. It is also  hard to apply  the idea o f  po litical neutrality  to 
C om m ons’s theo ry  in  quite  the sam e w ay as to  orthodox ec o n o m ic s , since the legisla­
ture and ju d ic ia ry  are expressly endogeneous.
T h is is  indeed  the w eakness o f  the system  as a  theory. I t  i s  by no m eans clear 
e ither w hy th e  courts should  be prim ary nor w hy they sh o u ld  adopt “ reasonable 
value”  as a  crite rion  —  unless, th a t is, “ reasonable value”  is  iden tified  w ith jud icial 
decisions. T h is  w ould  then  am oun t sim ply to  a  revision o f  o rth o d o x  theory w hich 
poin ts ou t th e  need fo r legal institutions to enforce con tract o r  duty, w hich is  pre­
cisely  how  th e  theory has subsequently  been incorporated in to  conventional econom ­
ics. W e shall return to  this in the n ex t chapter.
T he im portance o f  the institu tional econom ists to the m a tte rs  w hich w e are con­
cerned w ith  h ere  is  no t so  m uch the answ ers they suggest as th e  questions w hich  they 
raised. T he question ing  o f  the en tire  conception o f  rational e c o n o m ic  hum an ra ises a 
pow erful critique  o f  bo th  the o rthodox and A ustrian  fo rm u la tio n s , and the id ea  that 
even  m arket transactions have a  social, political and legal b a s is  is a  m atter that 
laissez-faire econom ists could  n o t ignore since i t  suggests th a t ,  in  a  sense, ‘laissez- 
fa ire’ econom ics is  a  contrad iction  in  term s —  m arkets c o u ld  no t function i f  left 
alone. W e shall look  a t the response o f  ‘free-m arket’ ec o n o m is ts  to  this problem  in. 
the first p a rt o f  the next chapter, w here we w ill also  show  th e  shortcom ings o f  this 
reply. B ut g iven  that w e have re jected  the technological d e te rm in ism  o f V eblen and 
A yres, and th e  associated notions o f  planning, one could  w o n d e r  where w e can  go 
from  here. W e  w ill m aintain tha t ca lls  fo r planning sim ply p a ss  a ll the problem s on  to
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the polity , an d  in order to  show  h o w  the polity can  deal with them w e w ould h a v e  to 
deve lop  a  non-determ inistic po litical theory to  run  parallel with o u r theory o f  e c o n ­
om y. T he re jection  o f the concep t o f  rational hum an, we will suggest, is an  im portan t 
first step  in developing such a th eo ry . These m atters will occupy us in the second part 
o f  the nex t chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
NEW DIRECTIONS
IN METHODOLOGICAL te rm s  th e  A m e ric a n  in s t i tu tio n a lis ts  ra ise d  tw o  c h a lle n g e s  to  
o r th o d o x  e c o n o m ic  th e o ry . T h e  first, c o n n e c te d  m o re  w ith  V eb len . w as  a  p sy ch o lo g i­
c a l c r itiq u e  o f  h e d o n is m , i t  w as  a  d e n ia l  o f  th e  e n t i r e  n o tio n  th a t th e  o b je c tiv e  w e lfa re  
o f  in d iv id u a ls  c o r r e s p o n d s  to  th e ir  su b je c tiv e  w a n ts . T h e  q u e s tio n  o f  h o w  th e  su b je c ­
tiv e  u tility  f u n c t io n s  o f  in d iv id u a ls  c o u ld  be  m a x im is e d  w a s  th e re fo re  a n  ir re lev an ce , 
s in c e  th e se  f u n c t io n s  d id  n o t c o r re sp o n d  to  th e  o b je c tiv e  w e ll-b e in g  o f  th e  ind iv id u a l; 
w h o se  w an ts  w e re  n o t  e x o g e n e o u s . b u t w e re  m a n ip u la te d  b y  th e  m a jo r  p la y e rs  in  th e  
p o litic a l e c o n o m y .
In th is  c r i t iq u e ,  m a x im is in g  'u t i l i t i e s ' w o u ld  n o t c o r re s p o n d  to  a n  o p tim a l o u t­
c o m e  ev e n  a t  th e  in d iv id u a l level. T h e  o th e r  s tra n d  o f  c r it ic is m  c o n c e rn e d  its e lf  w ith  
sh o w in g  th a t e v e n  i f  in d iv id u a l u tility  fu n c tio n s  w e re  to  b e  ta k e n  a s  g iv e n , a n  o p tim a l 
so c ia l o u tc o m e  w o u ld  n o t re su lt f ro m  in d iv id u a ls  fo llo w in g  th e ir  o w n  se lf- in te re s t.  
M itch e ll b e l ie v e d  th a t  b u s in e ss  c y c le s  w e re  c a u s e d  by  th e  so c ia l  in s titu tio n  o f  m o n ey ; 
A y res  th a t t e c h n o lo g y  n eed ed  to  be  a c c o u n te d  fo r  in th e  ca lc u la tio n  o f  th e  social 
o p tim u m , a n d  C o m m o n s  su g g es ted  th a t so c ia l  in s ti tu tio n s  n e e d e d  to  b e  d e lib e ra te ly  
d e s ig n e d  so  a s  t o  re s t r a in  in d iv id u a l a c tio n , in  p a r tic u la r  b y  le g a l in s titu tio n s .
T h e re  w a s  a l s o  b y  th e  1960s a  g ro w in g  d o u b t a m o n g s t  o rth o d o x  eco n o m is ts  
th e m se lv e s  c o n c e r n in g  th e  s tru c tu re  a n d  m e th o d  o f  th e  d i s c ip l in e .1 A t a b o u t  th e  sam e 
tim e  a g ro w in g  b o d y  o f  lite ra tu re  a ro se  w h ich  a tte m p te d  to  reco n c ile  th e  o rth o d o x  
th eo ry  w ith  a n  a n a ly s i s  o f  in s titu tio n s , a n d  it is  th e s e  th e o r is ts ,  w h o m  w e  sh a ll  ca ll the 
‘new  in s ti tu tio n a l e c o n o m is ts ’,2 th a t w e  sh a ll lo o k  a t  h ere .
T h e  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  th e  co n c e p t o f  th e  in s ti tu tio n  m a rk s  th e  final a b a n d o n m e n t o f
1 "There is. w e are regularly told, a 'crisis’ in economic theory. Indeed, over the past 20 years 
this crisis has been alm ost permanently evident because it seems to have been the favourite theme 
for the Presidential Address to the Royal Economic Society and the American Economic Associa­
tion." [Whynes 1984 p.3) F o ra  listing see Nelson and W inter (1984 p.3],
2 The term was coined by Oliver Williamson. The NIE are not to be confused with modem 
'neo-insbtuhonalists', who are followers o f the American Institutional tradition: see Dugger (1983 
fn. 1) and the d iscussion below.
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the traditional o r ‘classic’ positive approach  to  econom ics. W e shall see that the idea 
o f  the congruency o f  explanation  an d  p red ic tion , which w as the hallm ark o f  positiv­
ism , has necessarily to  be abandoned  in  fa v o u r o f  a  functional o r evolutionary m ode 
o f  explanation. Furtherm ore th e  dem a rca tio n  o f  the econom ic and the political, the 
hallm ark o f  orthodox econom ics, m u s t a lso  b e  abandoned. I f  it  is  accepted that the 
institutional set can have a  non-neg lig ib le  effec t on econom ic behaviour, then the 
laissez-faire econom ists has to  es tab lish  th e  prim acy o f  the econom ic, and cannot 
sim ply  ignore the political. W ith o u t an  explanation  o f  the social and political, there 
can be no  explanation o f  the ec o n o m ic , g iv en  the ex istence  o f  institutions. The 
value-neutrality  o f  laissez fa ire  ec o n o m ic s , i t  w ill be recalled , rested upon the idea 
that w e could have a  science o f  ‘h u m an  n atu re’, and a lso  tha t individual actions 
w ould lead naturally to  a social o p tim um  w ithou t further in terference. W ith the adop­
tion o f  institutions, it  is  accepted  th a t th e  social and the po litical do influence the 
econom ic actions o f  hum ans, an d  th e re fo re  a  science o f ‘hu m an  nature’ m ust account 
fo r the political and  social in stitu tions also.
A  further consequence o f  th e  ab andonm en t o f class ic  positivism  is tha t the 
debate on  policy (the derivation o f  w h ich  w a s th e  w hole p o in t o f  a neutral social sci­
ence)3 has now  shifted to a  deba te o v e r  th e  b es t institutions. W e w ill divide the pro ta­
gonists into tw o m ain schools, w h ich  w e  co u ld  ca ll the N ew  Institutionalists and  the 
N ew  M arket Socialists, a lthough th e  la tte r w ould  also in c lu d e  many authors from  
w ithin the G reen m ov em en t T he n ew  m ark e t socialists attem p t to  com bine a m easure 
o f  liberal principles into socia lis t arg u m en ts  w hilst re jecting  the statism  and the 
em phasis on production that w a s th e  h allm ark  o f  the o lder socialism  and o f the 1930s 
m arket socialist m odels. W e w ill lo o k  a t  th is  school o f  th o u g h t in  the second h a lf  o f 
th is chapter. In the first half, w e  w ill lo o k  a t  the work o f  th e  new  institutionalists. 
T hese authors accept the need to  in c lu d e  institu tional ana lysis in to  the liberal fram e­
w ork. B ut w e shall see that in th e  final a n a ly sis  the original fram ew ork  is retained.
See chapter one.
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L N EW  IN ST IT U T IO N A L  E C O N O M IC S
T he new  institutionalists accept the need  fo r in s titu tio n al analysis, but the m ain  thrust 
o f  th e ir argum en t is  tha t these them selves tend  to  e v o lv e  from individual action. 
T hey  w ish  to  re ta in  m ethodological ind iv idualism , b u t fe e l  that the orthodox analysis 
is  inadequate.
M uch  o f  th e  w ork o f  the new institu tional ec o n o m is ts  w as derived from  w hat 
N elson  and W in ter ca ll “ a  sense o f  general m a la ise  afflicting contem porary 
m icroeconom ic theory” . T hey  wish to  m ove “ b e y o n d  the in tellectual territory 
c la im ed by m odem  general equilibrium  theory” , w h ich  w ill as they pu t it  “ require a 
theore tical accom m odation  w ith one o r m ore  o f  th e  m a jo r  aspects o f econom ic reality 
that a re  repressed  in general equilibrium  th eo ry ”  [1 9 8 2  p .5]. The school attem pts to 
deal w ith  w hat W illiam son calls the “ hu m an  fa c to r”  o f  econom ic organisation [1975 
p.2]. S cho tter v iew s his w ork  as “ a first s tep  in  an  a tte m p t to  liberate econom ics from 
its  fixation on com petitive m arkets as a n  all en c o m p ass in g  institutional fram ew ork”  
[1981 p .l ] .
In  th is  re sp ect the new  institutional econom ics  c a n  b e  seen  as a  response to the 
o ld  o r  A m erican  institutionalism , in th a t th e  the o rth o d o x  acco u n t o f  ra tionality  —  of 
homo oeconomicus —  w as now  perceived  as  in ad e q u ate . N e lson  and W in ter po in t to 
the assum ptions o f  perfect know ledge:
As theoretical representations o f  the problems faced by ecooom ic actors increase in realistic complex­
ity and recognition o f  uncertainty regarding values o f the variables, there is a  matching increase in the 
feats o f anticipation and calculation and in the clarity o f  the stakes imputed to  those actors. Never is 
such a  theoretical actor confused about the situation or distracted by  petty concerns; never is he 
trapped in a  system atically erroneous view o f the problem; never is  a  plain old mistake made. It is a 
central tenet o f orthodoxy that this is the o n ly  sound w ay to  proceed; recognition o f greater complexity 
in the problem o b lig a te s  the theorist to impute a  subtler rationality to  the actors. [Nelson and Winter 
1982 pp.8-9] •
w hereas Scho tter ra ises a neo- A ustrian cr itiq u e  o f  p e rfec t com petition
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The neoclassical agents are bores who merely calculate optimal activities at fixed parametric prices. 
They are limited to one and only one type of behaviour — that of acting as automata in response to the 
auctioneer" [1981 p.lSO].
or as L anglo is puts it
In this theory, the discipline o f the market consists entirely in limiting the discretion producers have in 
setting the prices they will charge. One competes not by taking action but. in a real sense, by being 
unable to take action" [1986 p.8).
T he new  institutionalists were a lso  influenced, as were the later A m erican  insti­
tutionalists. by the literature on im perfect com petition and on m onopoly . Firstly , as 
Langlois po in ts out, the reasons w hy a m onopoly should em erge (and by ex tension  an 
oligopoly) are never explained [op.cit. p.9]. Furtherm ore, the im perfect com petition 
m odels require an  understanding o f  the conduct o f  the tirms in order to  exam ine how 
close the m arket outcom e is to the social optim um  [ibid.].
If the new  institutionalists w ere influenced by their A m erican predecessors, they 
were influenced som ew hat selectively. The response largely ignored the V eblenian 
psychological critique and  instead took up his (in  our view discred ited) em ploym ent 
o f an evolu tionary  m ethodology. T he other aspect o f the old institutional critique 
which w as accep ted  into the new m odels was C om m ons' deflnition o f  institu tions as 
a deliberate restrain t on individual activity , and his attem pt to  incorporate legal insti­
tutions into th is concept. H ow ever the new institutionalists on the w hole d id  not fol­
low C om m ons in attem pting  to investigate deliberate, intentional restrain t. T heir con­
cern w as m ore to show  how  unintentional institutions could evolve. T hat is to say. 
although the new  institutionalism  acknow ledged the force o f the old institu tionalists ' 
argum ents, “ it is perhaps fair to say that this m odem  institutionalism  reflects less the 
ideas o f  the early  institutionalists then it does o f  their opponents." [op.cit. p .2] The 
new institutionalism  can best be viewed as com plem entary to  orthodox 
m icroeconom ics, ra ther than conflicting with it [see W illiam son 1975 p.xi], and  in 
this respect is  an tipathetic to  the original A m erican formulations.
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Game Theory
W e w ill not a ttem pt an exhaustive su rvey  o f  the w ide-ranging literature in this field, 
bu t w ill instead try  to  give a general o u tline  o f the school, and  w ill draw  on illustra­
tive  tex ts to  exam ine the inadequacy o f  th e  new  institutional response. T heir task  was 
to  reconcile  institu tions w ith orthodox m icroeconom ics. A s w e m entioned, th is con­
sisted  in essence o f  a  denial o f th e  need  fo r institutions o f  the sort Com m ons 
specified: a need fo r intentional im posed  restraints, fo r “ C o llec tive  action in control 
o f  Individual A c tio n ” . R ather, as illustra ted  by Schotter [1981] the new  institutional­
is ts  attem pted to  show  how  institu tions could  em erge unin ten tionally  o r spontane­
ously , ‘by hum an action  but not by hum an  design’. T h is fo rm  o f  institution M enger 
referred  to as ‘o rg an ic’. They were deriv ed  from  the sam e m axim ising  behaviour as 
o th e r econom ic ac tiv ity , and helped alloca te resources in  an  op tim al fashion. Organic 
institu tions arose from  “ the selfish in teraction  o f  a  m yriad o f  individual econom ic 
agen ts each pursu ing  his ow n se lf  in te re s t”  [Schotter 1981 p.4].4 In fact, while 
V eb len ’s  criticism s o f  orthodox ec o n o m ic s’ com plete o m ission  o f  institutional 
ana lysis had considerable force, M enger w as a  bad targe t fo r h im  to pick. M enger 
w as ac tually  grea tly  concerned w ith th e  questions o f  institu tions [Langlois 1986 p.4]. 
Indeed , M enger believed that the “ m o st no tew orthy  problem  o f  the social sciences”  
to  be how  “ institutions w hich serv e  the com m on w elfare and are extrem ely 
significant fo r its  developm ent cam e in to  being  w ithout a  common will directed 
tow ards estab lish ing  them ” , and that “ T h e  solution o f  th e  m o s t im portant problem s 
o f  the theoretical social sciences in general, and o f  theoretical econom ics in particular 
is  thus closely connected  w ith the q uestion  o f  theoretically  understanding  the origin 
and  change in  ‘organically’ created  so cia l institutions”  [M e n g er 1883 p.147 , cited 
S cho tter 1981 p .4].
It is  these ‘organ ic’ institutions, as opposed to  the ‘p ragm atic’ consciously 
designed  institutions, that the new  institu tional school, fo llow ing  M enger, are
4 Although Schotter and, o f course, Menger are  Austrian rather than neo-classic, we w ill show 
that the game theory approach actually collapses into an orthodox position. W e will consider the 
Austrian normative theory at greater length in the second part o f this chapter.
Mulberg: Social Limits to Economic Theory 155
attem pting  to  derive. T hus S cho tter, eschew ing R o b b in s’ definition o f  econom ics 
defines ec o n o m ic s  as
ti>e study o f  bow  individual agents pursuing tbeir own selfish ends evolve institutions as a  means to 
satisfy them. [op .c it p.5]
Schotter’s w o rk  attem pts to show  h o w  these organic in stitu tions could  evolve through 
the use o f  gam e theory. T he gam e theory tech n iq u e m odels the resu lts o f  social 
in teraction  d irec tly , by positive ‘pay o ffs’ fo r each com bination  o f  decisions m ade by 
the eco n o m ic  actors.5 O f  particu la r note are those g am e s w here the pu rsu it o f  self 
interest apparen tly  does no t lead to  th e  social optim al.
S ch o tter identifies tw o m ain ty p es  o f gam e. T h e  m o st w ell know n type o f  gam e 
is the ‘p riso n ers  dilem m a’.6 A lthough  neither ac to r h a s  an incentive to change from 
the sub -op tim al scenario in  equ ilibrium , since the p a y o f f  i f  the o ther pro tagonist does 
not change is  low ered, both w ould id ea lly  like the o th e r  to  change.
A  ‘coord ina tion  p roblem ’, on  th e  other hand, is  w here som e form  o f  coord ina­
tion w ill a lw a y s  increase both ac to rs’ payoffs, a lth o u g h  n o t alw ays equally .7
T he ac to rs h av e  preferences, bu t th ere  is  also an in ce n tiv e  to  forgo their preference.
5 The m odel is usually simplified Co a  2-player, 2  strategy m odel.
6 The following examples o f a  prisoner’s dilemma game are  taken from Rutherford [1989]: 
This matrix show s the basis o f the prisoner’s dilemma game.
A
Co-operate Don"t Co-operate
C o -  5 8
operate 5 °
Don't o
Co-operate 8 1
There is no possibility o f communicating o r contracting betw een the players. Each protagonist 
benefits m ost i f  she refuses to co-operate while the other does, so  that while the best jo in t strategy 
is to co-operate, the result o f each single round is that the w orst joint strategy — mutual non­
cooperation —  ensues.
7 This is an example o f a  co-ordination game:
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Both o f  these s itua tions appear to  lead to a so lu tion  w hich is sub-optim al. The 
prisoner 's  d ilem m a appears  to lead to a  sub-optim al equilibrium , w hereas the coord i­
nation problem  suggests th a t  no unique equilibrium  ex ists [op.cit. p .23 ].
W hat Schotter suggests is that econom ic actors repeatedly d ea lin g  with these 
problem s —  w hat he ca lls  ‘supergam es' —  w ill eventually  evo lve  ‘ru les’ which 
enable the optim al b ehav iour to  occur. T hese m ay take  the form o f  social conven­
tions, which are self-po lic ing , o r the econom ic ac tors m ay  agree to  the convention 
being policed externally  [p .l  1],
Schotter ca lls  the m ethod  o f  show ing how  institu tions can a r ise  the ‘state o f  
n a tu re ' approach. T his techn ique considers a pre-institu tional state o f  nature, and 
show s how institutions co u ld  have em erged w ithout being  imposed.® T he institutions 
w hich could subsequently  em erge  w ould then be endogenous to the m odel ra ther than 
given tp-21 ].
The institutions em e rg e  w ithout any form o f  external coord ination , or any 
agreed cooperation [p.28]. T h e  only inform ation required  fo r the econom ic actors is 
the alternative actions ava ilab le  and the possible payoffs. T hese are ca lled  the ‘ru les’ 
o f  the game, w hich also  d efine how m uch the p layer ‘k n o w s’ about p rev ious actions 
in the supergam e [p .l 10]. T h e  institutions arise as a solution to  the gam e problem . 
T hey  are not part o f  the behavioural rules o f  the gam e [p .29]9 The institu tions are not
A
Co-operate Don't Co-operate
Co-operate
Don't
Co-operate
Unlike the pnsoner's dilemma there is an incentive to find a co-ordinated soluoon: the problem 
here is simply to ensure that the protagonists co-ordinate their action. This is because both the 
pay-offs are equal pairs, but this need not be the case: in some situations a  43:34 p ayoff may oc­
cur. in which case considerable bargaining may ensue.
8 Schotter points out the sim ilarity of this approach to that o f Nozick [1975]. See also the 
analysis below.
9 Schotter differs in this from, for example. Martin Shubik (see Mirowski 1986 p.248].
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im posed, but are unplanned agreem ents [p.155]. T he institutions are needed to sup­
p lem ent the market.
Social and economic institutions are informational devices that supplement the informadonal content 
o f economic systems when competitive prices do not carry sufficient information to totally decentralise 
and coordinate economic activities.
T h at is. institutions help the coordination process as  per Hayek.
... social insututions convey information about the expected actions o f other agents when these actions 
are not perfectly coordinated by prices and consequently create incentives for such coordinated
activity [p .l09 |.
T he inequality w hich  persists under the p resent social institutions is not justified 
direc tly  by Schotter. as with the o ther Austrians. R ather he simply suggests that noth­
ing could  (o r should) be done about it, since red istribu tion  w ould  involve a  planned 
institutional change. His justification o f inequality  —  why we should  agree to 
inequality-preserving institutions —  is H obbesian. W e should agree because unequal 
social institutions are nonetheless preferable to  n o  institutions at all
The fact that the rights assignment may be arbitrary and preserving o f an unequal distribution of 
income merely reflects the fact that the equilibrium achieved with property rights is preferred by all 
agents to the state o f conflict that would result if all property rights were removed, but not necessarily 
preferred by all agents to the state that might result under another set o f property rights |p .44).10
Schotter is dism issive o f  the idea that institutions m ay be planned though. It would 
not be ‘a good th in g ' for these unequal social in s titu tions to be replaced by planned, 
equal ones since, follow ing Hayek, such institu tions only reflect the preferences o f 
the planner, [p .21 ] C onsequently, the only governm en tal intervention should occur 
when "em pirica l study shows that the equilibrium  institutions are sub-optim al, such 
as w ith  som e ex te rnalitie s"  [p. 156].
10 Schoner is here following Buchanan 119751-
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Schotter, follow ing the A ustrian  schoo l, attem pts to  show  how  so cia l and politi­
c a l  in s titu tions can  evolve through a  need  to supplem ent the in fo rm ation  system  o f  
th e  m ark e t when it is  insufficient. T he prob lem s (gam es) w hich o cc u r a re  the resu lt o f  
in su ffic ie n t inform ation being  availab le to  the actors to find an equilibrium  solution. 
T h is  is sim ilar to the position  tha t w e saw  H ayek  take earlier.
Transaction-Cost Analysis
T h e  problem  w hich W illiam son [1975] ra ise s  is that, in h is view , m arke t prices are 
v e ry  infrequently adequate inform ation  fo r  exchange, and he believes th a t institutions 
e v o lv e  less  as a  supplem ent than in o rd e r  to  by-pass the m arket. H e  is som ew hat 
m o re  orthodox than S chotter though, in  th a t the rationality  problem s w ith  w hich he is 
c o n c e rn e d  are no t so m uch  calculational a s  computational. R ecalling  the 1930s 
so c ia lism  debate w e looked  a t earlier, th e  p roblem  fo r W illiam son is  n o t so  m uch that 
th e  m ark e t does n o t conta in  sufficient in fo rm ation  (the ca lcu lational problem ) as that 
th e  ind iv idual canno t process the in fo rm ation  quickly enough. T h is  is  w hat H .A . 
S im o n  referred to  as  bounded rationality [S im on 1959]. Sim on suggested  that the 
co m p u ta tio n al ab ility  o f  hum an  ac tors w a s  lim ited and could n ev e r b e  sufficient to  
su cc essfu lly  com pute the op tim al stra tegy  in  o rd er to  constantly  m ax im ise utility  (or 
w e lfa re  o r whatever). S im on d istingu ished  in  his later w orks [S im on 1976] betw een 
substantive  ra tionality w h ich  is  precisely  th e  so rt o f  goal-oriented behaviour o f  the 
o r th o d o x y , and procedural ra tionality , w h ich  considers behaviour as  a  process o f  re a ­
so n in g . T he study o f  behaviour u nder procedura l rationality  is  co n cern ed  not w ith  the 
g o a ls  o f  action, bu t w ith  th e  process by  w hich decisions on the ac tio n  are taken. 
S im o n  had earlier suggested  that, g iv en  the im possibility  o f  m ax im ising  utility, a 
m o re  realistic analysis o f  hum an b ehav iour is  that
E conom ic man is a  sa tis fic ing  animal whose problem  solving is based on search activity to meet cer­
ta in  aspiration levels rather than a  m a x im iz in g  anim al whose problem solving involves finding the best 
alternatives in terms o f specified criteria [Simon 1959 p.277].
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H ow ever this ‘sa tisfic in g ’ aspect o f  bounded ra tiona lity  has been  largely ignored by 
the new  in s titu tio n alists ,11 w ho have instead  fo cu sed  on  the costs o f  acquiring infor­
m ation. It is in  th is  sense  tha t it  is  used by W illiam son  [1975]. F o r W illiam son, it is 
p roblem s o f  bo u n d ed  rationality  caused  through  uncertain ty  tha t are o f relevance, 
together w ith the b e l ie f  tha t transactions are costly .
W illiam son a ls o  d iffers from  S chotter in  tha t he explicitly  evokes J. R. Com ­
m ons and  his c o n c e p t o f  the transaction and attem pts to  use i t  to  explain the growth 
o f  large firm s th ro u g h  vertical in tegra tion  w hich  bypasses the m arket, thereby 
(accord ing  to W illiam so n ) econom ising  on bo th  bounded ra tionality  and transaction 
costs.
W illiam son, b u ild in g  on C oase’s  w ork  on  transaction  costs [C oase 1937] main­
tains tha t the tran sa ctio n  —  the passing o f  legal contro l —  w ould occur either in the 
m arket o r the firm  dep en d in g  on w hich  w as m o re  e f f ic ie n t T he contracts involved in 
specifying tran sactio n s , he held, w ere com plex  and therefore costly  to adm inister. 
T hese costs w ou ld  v a ry  both  w ithin the m ark e t and  w ith in  th e  firm. T he relative 
efficiency o f  the in te rn a l structure o f  the firm  w ou ld  e f fec t the outcom e o f  the inter­
nalisation  o f  the tran sactio n . T he m ain  th rust o f  th e  argum en t is  th a t the cost o f  draw ­
ing up and execu ting  com plex  con tingent con tracts is  h ig h , and as  a  resu lt firm s tends 
to  ad o p t the m o st effic ien t in ternal organ isa tion  —  w hich  W illiam son suggests is 
hierarch ical —  an d  to  in tegra te vertically  to  by -pass th e  m arket an d  cu t costs [pp.3-9, 
P-254].
T he reason  fo r  th e  h igh  costs is  n o t sim ply  a  function  o f  th e  m arket, W illiam son 
believes, but ra th e r d u e  to  the facto rs in  th e  business  env ironm en t w hich  are often left 
o u t o f  orthodox e c o n o m ic s  —  uncertain ty  an d  w h a t W illiam son calls “ small 
num bers exchange re la tio n s ’’ (i.e. o ligopsony an d  o ligopoly). H ow ever, it is not 
these  m arket co n d itio n s  alone w hich  cause th e  com petition  and enforcem ent o f  con­
trac ts to  be costly , b u t  ra th e r their com bination  w ith  the aspects o f  rationality that the 
orthodoxy ignores w h ich  explain the high  co s t o f  com plex, contingent contracts.
11 See the argument below.
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T hese aspects w ere bounded ra tio n a lity  and w hat W illiam son ca lls  'opportun ism ' 
[p.9], which he dehnes as " s e l f  in te re s t with guile”  (i.e. lying) [p .26]. It is the com bi­
nation o f these which caused p ro b lem s within market transactions. Lying during  a 
m arket transaction would be self-defeating  if  there w ere a large num ber o f b idders in 
the market [p.27]. By the sam e to k e n  bounded rationality w ould no t be problem atic 
unless there was uncertainty [p.22].
W illiamson, then, is attem pting  to  explain market structure by  reference to the 
very areas which orthodox an a ly sis  leaves out. Furtherm ore, W illiam son does not 
even  assume hom ogeneity o f  p ro d u c t, and he also points out that even  if com petitive 
m arkets for hom ogeneous p ro d u c ts  m ay have ensued at the initial contracts the 
renewal o f  contracts may be fo r an  heterogeneous product supp lied  by a m onopolist 
o r oligopoly [pp.27-28]. But w hile th ese  elements m ay show w hy m arkets fail, W illi­
am son has also to  show why in ternalising  the transactions should  be superior, and 
w hy such internalisation should necessarily  involve hierarchy.
These factors occur because o f  w hat W illiamson calls information impactness. 
Because o f the existence o f o p p ortun ism , often the inform ation required  for a  transac­
tion is. according to W illiam son, d is tribu ted  unevenly between th e  parties, o r alterna­
tively the cost o f  acquiring the necessary  information for a con tingent contract is 
prohibitive [p.32]. The costs o f  su ch  a  transaction m ay then be low ered  through verti­
cal integration [p.255]. In addition , W illiam son believes that bounded rationality can 
contain both com putational and  linguistic  elem ents [p.254]: know ledge m ay be 
difficult to fully com m unicate. B o th  these elem ents, W illiam son im plies, are d istri­
buted unevenly am ong the popu la tion . It is for this reason that hierarchies em erge, 
since "those whose rationality lim its  are less severely constra ined  than o thers are 
natural candidates to assum e tec h n ic a l, adm inistrative, o r political leadership posi­
tions ... “  [p.24].
The analysis o f hierarchies is therefore taking on a distinct evolutionary aspect. 
T he relevant abilities for leadersh ip  and  m anagem ent are unevenly distributed, and 
the m ost cost-efficient organisa tion  is  where these people ‘rise to  the top’. Indeed,
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this aspect is actually  sim ilar to the M ises account o f  en trep reneurial talent that w e 
m entioned earlier. W illiam son believes that ega lita rian  o r  dem ocratic decision m ak ­
ing structures —  w hat he calls ‘peer-groups' —are in eff ic ien t com pared to  hierarchies. 
He first o f  all points to  the inefficiency o f  a  fully  d em o c ra tic  decision-m aking struc­
ture w here everyone is  consulted abou t all decisions. O b v iously , th is process w ould  
be far too  slow  for use in business. B ut even  i f  a  ‘centralised*  decision-m aking struc­
ture w as agreed (perhaps by rota), this w ould com e u n d e r  increasing strain through 
“ differentials o f  bounded rationality’’, that is, d iffe re n t ability  levels [pp.45-47]. 
G iven self-interest, it  can  be seen that a  hierarchy w ill ev en tu ally  evolve 12
W illiam son is therefore critical o f  attem pts by g o v ern m e n t to  intentionally in ter­
vene in  th e  functioning o f  the resulting integrated firm s  and large conglom erates 
since these represent the m ost efficient m ethod o f  lo w erin g  transaction costs and  
ensuring sufficient m anagem ent [o p .c itp .159-60, c f . D ugger 1983 p .106]. 
W illiam son 's concern  is  to  show, like Schotter, how  a  socially  optim al solution can  
em erge even  when m arkets fail to  supply th is, an d  h o w  institutions are evolved to  
supplem ent the m arket m echanism. W illiam son’s  m o d e l is  a lso  evolutionary, since i t  
outlines the em ergence o f  institutions, and p ro p o se s  a  selection process (cost- 
efficiency) w hereby the ‘best-fitted’ institutions are  s if te d  o u t  In fact, generalising 
from these  authors, w e can  see how  the explanations o f  th e  new  institutionalists m u st 
tend tow ards functional-evolutionary m odes o f  ex p la n a tio n , precisely  because w ith  
their re jection  o f  the orthodox ‘rational econom ic h u m a n ’, and w ith  their insistence 
on explanations o f  social end- states w hich are  un in ten tio n al (th is being ju stified  
because insufficient inform ation em erges fo r ra tio n a l cho ices to  be relevant), no  
predictive elem ent is  left in the theory. T here is n o  hedon ist-sty le  ‘theory o f  hum an
nature’ w hich can be em ployed as a  predictable e le m e n t w ithin the theory. T he m ar-
«
ginalist theory cou ld  predict social op tim a because ‘h u m a n  nature’ w as know n an d  
hum an behaviour w as know n. T his enabled  the c o n g ru en ce  o f  explanation and p re d ­
12 Williamson does suggest that some peer groups may be d esired  ‘for themselves’, presuming 
the loss o f  efficiency is not too great (p.55J.
M ulberg: Social Limils to Economic Theory 162
ic t io n , w hich  we saw  in ch a p ter one to  be the hallm ark o f  positiv ism , to  be m ain­
ta in e d . H ere prediction is denied  —  all explanations are post hoc.
B y  rem oving the p red ic tive elem ents in econom ic theory , and  thereby  positing 
e x p la n a to ry  theories w hich  have no  p redic tive e lem ent (and  therefore n o  possibility 
o f  en a b lin g  social contro l), the new  institu tionalists  en su re  post hoc, 
ev o lu tionaiy /functional explanations.
Evolutionary Theories of the Firm
W e  c a n  see  th is in  the w ork  o f  N elson  and W in ter [1982]. T hese  au tho rs explicitly 
a d o p t  an  evolutionary m odel in  their w ork .13 T h e ir theory “ em p h asises  the tendency 
fo r  th e  m o st profitable firm s to  drive the less profitable ones o u t o f  business” . Their 
q u ib b le  is  no t w ith the co n cep t o f  self-seeking, b u t ra th e r w ith  its applica tion  to indi­
v id u a ls  [p .51], and w ith th e  idea o f  perfec t know ledge an d  o f  au tom atic profit- 
m a x im isin g . T heir operative concept is  tha t o f  organisa tional profit-seeking [p.31]. 
T h e y  hav e  a  “ partial acco rd”  w ith  the ideas o f  com petition  and  equilibrium  [p.32], 
b u t  b e lie v e  by focusing narrow ly  on the concep t o f  perfec t com petition  and equili­
b r iu m  m odels the orthodoxy goes too far. W hat N elson  and  W in te r w ish  to  look a t is 
th e  c o m p e titiv e  process [ibid.].
T h e  basis o f  their evo lu tionary  theory  is  th a t m ost business behav iour follows 
re g u la r  and  predictable patterns. T hese patterns o f  behaviour they  ca ll routines. It is 
th e s e  ro u tin es  that play the sam e part in  the econom ic evolu tionary  process that genes 
p la y  in  th e  biological theories o f  natural selec tion . I t  is  the ro u tin es  th a t  enable firms 
to  a d ju s t  to  changes in  the environm ent [p .134  ff]. T hese ro u tin es  arc classified into 
th re e  types.
1. D ecisions concern ing  fixed quan tities o f  facto rs (s im ila r to  M arshall’s 
‘short-run’)
2 . D ecisions on  periodical change in  capita l —  investm ent.
13 N elson and W inter's methodology is not Darwinian but Lamaikian, stressing adaptation and 
'inheritance of acquired characteristics’ [p .l 1].
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3. Routines which modify decisions in class (1) over time.
T he first cla ss o f  ro u tin e s  are the day to day “ operating characteristics”  o f  th e  firm. 
T he second group  p ro v id es  the stochastic elem ents in the model, since investm en t is 
linked  to  profitab ility . P rofitable firms will therefore expand, a t the e x p e n se  o f 
unprofitable firm s. T h e  th ird  category o f  routine N elson and W inter ca ll “ sea rch e s” . 
T hese are charac terised  by a “ routine-guided, routine-changing p rocess” . The 
changing  o f  rou tines en a b les  firms to  ‘m utate’, to  use a  biological analogy. The 
au thors believe th a t th is  m odel o f decision-m aking is  sufficient to  ex p la in  the 
dynam ic evo lu tionary  ou tcom e o f a com petitive m arket. As they exp la in  it, the 
curren t operating ch arac teris tics  determ ine factor inputs and outputs. T hese decisions 
determ ine facto r and  p ro d u c t prices on the (given) m arket, which therefore determ ine 
profitability, w hich  in  tu rn  affec t investm en t A  new  se t o f  input and output lev e ls  are 
thereby generated  fro m  the new  level o f  cap ita l stock. All the w hile the operating  
characteristics are  b e in g  slow ly  changed by the firms’ search routines [pp.14-19].
T he organ isa tiona l rou tines are sim ilar to  individual skills, according to  N elson  
and  W inter. T h ey  b e liev e  tha t m uch o f  th is sk ill is personal and ta c it  and  is  not 
transferable, and  ca n n o t be w idespread [p.76 ff). I t  is  fo r this reason tha t firm s’ reac­
tions to  a  dynam ically  ch an g in g  environm ent differ.
Critique
While much o f Nelson and Winter’s book is concerned with specific descriptions of  
the development o f  these routines, these need not detain us here. Our criticism o f  the 
evolutionary methodology will be at a more fundamental level. We can see how even 
Nelson and Winter —  who are closest to the orthodox views o f rationality —  are 
relying upon post hoc explanation. There is no attempt* at explanation of which rou­
tines are likely to be profitable, but merely something of an assumption that these 
exist. Similarly, in game theory there is no mention of just how organic institutions 
emerge through supergames, but only that such a process would be socially
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o p tim a l.14 Exactly what abilities are to be fo u n d  in the leaders o f  hierarchies is not 
d iscussed  by W illiam son. T he new  in stitu tio n alist attem pt a t post hoc explanation is 
ac tually  a post hoc ergo propter hoc fa llacy , a n d  by offering such a  fallacy as a cause 
for even ts, they tend to  offer undue ju s tif ic a tio n  for the status quo.
In  fact, the new  institutional ec o n o m is ts  use a very particular form  o f causal 
explanation . They explain not so m uch the h is to rica l em ergence o f  institutions as the 
'raison d'etre' for these institutions to ex is t [L anglo is 1986 p.21]. T hey  offer a  func­
tional explanation o f  institutional d ev e lo p m e n t —  W illiam son, in fact, often ‘re­
in terp re ts’ historical institutions in logical te rm s  [D ugger 1983 p.102]. B ut functional 
explanations have to  be couched  in term s o f  social benefit. T he problem  faced here 
—  as  w ith the positivism  o f  the orthodox eco n o m is ts  —  is to  show how  this social 
op tim um  can be derived through m eth o d o lo g ica l individualism . E ither the historical 
institu tions m ust be show n to be irrelevant fo r  present choices, o r the functional insti­
tu tio n s  m ust be traced from  som e sort o f  p re-institu tional ‘state o f na tu re ' [Rutherford 
1989 p .302], as Schotter sets out to d o .15
U nfortunately the presum ed ‘state o f  n a tu re ’ is no m ore natural than the post- 
institutional world, w hich w e can see v e ry  clearly  when exam ining gam e theory. 
R eca ll that Schotter’s neo-A ustrian fo rm u la tio n  was that the rules them selves were 
not regarded  as institutional; the in stitu tions em erged as the solution to  the game 
prob lem . Nonetheless, gam e theory does ta k e  som e rules or institutions as given. The 
no tion  o f  the supergam e, for exam ple, i tse lf  presum es that the gam e is capable o f 
repetition  [op.cit p .305]. The supergam e c o n c ep t is inoperable if  a  non-optimal 
response  is catastrophic [p.308]. F u rth erm o re  the entire structure is not so much 
ab strac t as artificial:
Game theorists sometimes become so enamoured o f the mechanics of the theory and the single-minded 
determination of their players to win that they lose sigh t o f what any game-theoretic problem presup­
poses; the arena in which the players are to compete o r  cooperate ... although one can investigate with
14 See below on ‘learning’.
15 Nelson and Winter actually seem closer to the marginalist position of simply abstracting
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game theory the dilemmas possibly faced by two prisoners, one should not expect from such a theory 
an explanation for why escape or insurrection is not pan  of the strategic space ... the arena o f any 
interactive game is partly determined by resources and technologies, but the social norms that pervade 
the atmosphere are an equally important characteristic o f that arena | Field 1984 p.703).
Furtherm ore, the supergam e m ust posit a constancy  am o n g  the econom ic ac tors 
[M irow ski 1986 p .252]. Indeed, the 'ru le s ’ o f  the g am e, as w e noted, posit very 
stringent restrictions on  the inform ation the p layers are presum ed  to  obtain.
Players are assumed to 'lea rn ' from past players of the game but this learning is constrained to a very 
small sub-set o f experience: they are allowed neither threat strategies nor to be different from other 
players and cannot remember past the last immediate play o f the game (op.cit. p .251 ]
In  fact, no real 'le a rn in g ' is ever done. "S c h o tte r, like m an y  o ther latter-day A ustri­
ans, shies aw ay from  explicitly  discussing learning, as opposed  to the transm ission o f 
a  discrete and seem ingly  prepackaged com m odity ca lled  knowledge, because the 
form er suggests a social process, w hereas the latter co n ju re s  up the g rocer’s dairy 
c a se ”  [M irow ski 1986 p.252. cf. F ield 1984] G am e theory  abstracts from the entire 
social and cultural elem ents o f individuals, com plete w ith  custom s, language and 
rules [F ield 1984 p .6 8 8  and passim ]. In fact, if gam e theo ry  is to  be consistent, these 
elem ents should a lso  be explained in term s o f  efficiency. T hese ‘b asic ’ rules m ust be 
endogenised into the m odel. This it does not do  [Field 1984 pp.695-96]. In fact, the 
individuals in the gam e theory m odels are ju s t as ab strac t as the orthodox homo 
oeconomicus.
In effect. Schotter delines the problem’ to be so straight forward and unambiguous that only one 
choice can be made: it is not so much learning as it is mechanism ... It is difficult to maintain that this 
model transcends the passive cooperation of the zombies found in conventional neo-classical general 
equilibrium |M irowski 1986 p.232].
S o in fact the econom ic actors never change throughout th e  supergam e. In addition 
the objectives and th e  environm ent are also  given  in the ru les, and held to be con­
stant. Actually no  econom ic gam e is played a t all and no  problem  solved: the rules.
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as fo r the o rthodox theory, determ ine the outcom e in  advance.
Given the fixed actors with their fixed objectives and fixed rules, the analyst (and n o t  th e  acto rs) pre­
reconciles the various sets, insists the pre-reconciled outcome is the one that w ill actually obtain and 
calls this a solution ... The process in w hich the actors take part is irrelevant, because the deck has 
been stacked in a  teleological manner, [op.cit p.253 original emphasis]
A nd w hat is  m ore, since the m odels assum e this constancy , they  ca n n o t consider his­
torical change [M irow ski 1986 p .2 5 5 ], which is  precisely  to say  th a t th ey  are unable 
to  show  the evo lu tionary  adaptation to  a  changing environm ent w h ich  Scho tter began 
by claim ing is  a  necessary requisite o f  econom ics. In  fact, th e  n ew  institutionalist 
school relies upon essentially  the sa m e  fundam entals a s  the o rth o d o x y  it hoped to 
supplem ent [H odgson 1989 p.249]. I t  still holds th e  sam e hedonistic  approach , using 
a  self-seeking an d  abstract ind iv idual, and m ay be no m ore d y n am ic  th an  general 
equilibrium  analysis. W e have ju s t se e n  how gam e theory, lik e  g en e ra l equilibrium , 
m odels an unchanging  world. S im ilarly , W illiam son ac tually  h as  a  notion o f 
rationality  no t to o  d issim ilar from  th a t  o f the orthodoxy, particu la rly  because he 
m isunderstands S im on’s concept o f  th e  bounded rationality  [H odgson  1989 p.254]. 
S im o n ’s poin t w as th a t because h u m an  com putational ability  is  lim ited , ag e n ts  cannot 
m axim ise, and  therefore strive for accep tab le m in im a. T he prob lem  fo r S im on  is not 
scarcity  o f  in form ation bu t o f  the com plexity  an d  quantity  o f  in fo rm ation  [Hodgson 
1988 p .8 1 ]. T he problem  o f  in form ation  is  not therefore sim ply th a t o f  its  c o s t
... ‘satisficing' does n o t amount to cost-minimising behaviour. Clearty, the latter is  ju st the dual o f the 
standard assumptions o f  maximisation; if ‘satisficing’ was essentially a m atter o f  minimising costs tha t 
it would amount to maximising behaviour o f  th e  orthodox type.
B ut this is clearly  W illiam son’s interpretation:
... Williamson adopts the orthodox, cost-minimising interpretation o f Simon and not the one which 
clearly prevails in Sim on’s work. In W illiam son's work ‘economizing on the transaction costs’ is pan 
o f global, cost-minimizing behaviour, and th is is  inconsistent with Simon’s idea o f  bounded rationality. 
Whilst Williamson recognises some o f the informational problems, the fact that the cost calculus 
remains supreme in his theory means he h as  not broken entirely from the orthodox assumption of
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maximisation [o p .d t p.254],
W illiam son there fo re  holds a  sim ilar notion o f  ra tionality  to that found in  orthodox 
m odels. H e  a lso  em ploys the general equilibrium  static  co n cep t o f  co st w hen he co n ­
siders tran sa c tio n  costs. As w e saw  in  chapter three, th e  en tire  problem  o f  costs  w a s 
that th ese  w e re  subjective. Y et in  W illiam son’s  trea tm ent, they appear to  be objec tive 
—  in fa c t, th e y  have been g iven prim acy. It is  unclear w h y  th is should be so.
Following the lead  o f George Stigler’s classic article [1961], search and information costs could be 
accommodated alongside, and treated similarly to, other costs in  a probabilistic framework. In this 
approach inform ation is treated just like any other commodity, and  subject to the marginalist rule that 
its com position is optimal when the marginal cost o f information and acquisition is equal to its 
expected m arginal return [Hodgson 1988 p.201].
T he 1930s ‘L on d o n  debate’, it  w ill be recalled, identified th is question o f  costs a s  a  
p ivotal is su e . T h e  w hole argum en t stem m ed from  th e  A ustrian  critique th a t the 
m inim al c o s t  o f  production w as unknow n; it  w as there fo re  im possible to  ju d g e  a 
priori h o w  eco n o m ic  actors w ou ld  behave. If  the co s ts  o f  production  w ere objective, 
it w as th e n  conceded  that production  could  in  fact be cen trally  planned [cf. H odgson 
1989 p .8 0 ]. A  s im ilar criticism  is  ra ised  by D ugger, w h o  poin ts o u t that in  the W illi­
am son m o d e l i t  w ould be possib le to  ex tend  the ana lysis to  the state.
Although n o t emphasised by W illiamson this advantage of internalisation over contracting out could 
be applied to  numerous government purchases ... The state should not contract out to the private sector 
for goods a nd  services so readily ... Yet, it must be noted, W illiamson does not emphasise these public 
policy im plications, though they are o f  immense practical im p o rt This monumental omission in his 
transaction co st analysis yields a  glimpse into his philosophical orientation. Although he views the firm 
as an efficient transaction-cost economiser be does not extend h is vision to include the state. [Dugger 
1983 p p .99-100]16
16 I t  could  presumably be suggested that the argument concerning hierarchies could be extend­
ed to the political sphere, whereby competing governments attem pt to economise on 'bounded ra­
tionality’ by  instigating hierarchies. Williamson mentions that h is approach is well suited to the 
analysis o f  non-m arket organisations: this ‘social Darwinism’ would b e an extension o f th a t Cer­
tainly, the dom ain o f the transaction-cost model has not been specified. See also Olson [1965] for 
an extension o f  economic concepts into the polity.
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Returning fo r a  m om ent to  the Austrian critique, it will be recalled that the value 
o f  m arkets in capita l was to ensu re  control over m anagem ent. Yet W illiam son neces­
sarily maintains tha t this con tro l is inadequate due to "in fo rm ation  co m p actn ess"  
[p. 142]. Yet w ithou t even the m arket or the state as a  regulator, it is far from  clear 
w hat is to stop corporate p ow er running amok.
If not ano-trust and the market, if not the public purpose and planning, th en  what'! Is any kind o f social 
control over corporate power needed... (Dugger 1983 p.107).
Indeed, any notion o f  pow er is  non-existent in both W illiam son 's form ulation and the 
new  institutionalists in general [op.cit. p. 108]. A t no  tim e do the m arket institutions 
coerce or influence e ither individual actors o r the social o r political institutions. The 
new  institutional econom ics a ttem pts to entirely  rem ove the possibility o f  pow er —  
all m ulti-national conglom erates are serving the public interest by m inim ising costs, 
legal institutions em erge because they are the m ost efficien t a t distributing property 
rights, and optim um  governm ent will necessarily em erge by rational choice. The 
en tire  program m e takes on an  a ir  o f  unreality —  try telling 'em  about ‘efficien t pro­
perty  rights’ in Sow eto. W hat the new  institutional program m e am ounts to  is an 
attem pt to endogenise institu tions [Rutherford 1989 pp.301-02, H odgson 1989 
p.252],*7 thereby elim inating  a ll possibility o f  pow er. All decisions are deem ed to  be 
the result o f rational action. N onetheless, the new  institutionalists only consider J. R. 
C om m ons treatm ent o f  institu tions —  collective ac tion  as  a  restraint. T hey  do  not 
look at the V ebienian psychologica l critique o f  rationality , but rather take the view 
that
..th e  individual can be 'taken for granted'. To put it another way. the individual, along with his or her 
assumed behavioural charactenstics. is taken as the elemental building block in the theory o f the social 
or economic system (Hodgson 1989 p.250). 17
17 Langlois points out that Coase and Williamson come from a more neo-classic (sic) position, 
and as such do not attempt this endogemsation of all institutions (1989 p.292). We would view 
this as a weakness rather than a strength though. The question o f legal and political institutions 
and the lack of conceptualisation o f power are glaring omissions in the transaction-cost analysis.
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T he possib ility  that the individual behaviour m ay be m alleable is n ev er m et by the 
new institutionalists, an d  in this sense 'th e  assu m p tio n  o f  the abstract individual 
w hich is fundam ental to  classic liberalism  is fundam en tal to  the ‘new  institutional 
econom ics’ as w ell”  [op.cit p .252], a s  it is for the A u strian s  [op.cit. p .253]. They are 
not therefore able to consider conspicuous e x p e n d itu re , cultural m anipulation, the 
production  o f  w aste an d  the other m achinations o f  th e  business class that V eblen 
discusses. D ouglas N orth, fo r exam ple, recognises an d  attem pts to accom m odate the 
need to  include ‘ideology’ in econom ic analysis. B u t N o rth ’s concept o f  ideology is 
not that o f  M arx o r V eblen. His concept is endogenous an d  evolutionary. Ideology is 
“derived  from  the experiences people have. If  a ll th e  people had the sam e experi­
ences. w e cou ld  expect that their perspectives abou t th e  w orld around them  w ould be 
the s a m e "  [1984 p.35]. T he sole role o f ideology w a s a s  a  m ethod o f  dec id ing  on the 
fairness o f  institutions [ib id .].18 N o exogenous m an ipu lation  o f ideology is co n ­
sidered.
In effec t, the new  institutionalism  is more d ete rm in is tic  than the old institution­
alism  it seeks to replace. If  the new institutionalism  is indeed attem pting to  offer a 
supplem ent to  the orthodox analysis it has to  ex p la in  how  a social optim um  is 
ob tained  from  the individuals acting selfishly. In evo lu tionary  theories, w hich w e 
have seen the school invariably adopts, this necessarily  takes the form  o f an 
efficiency argum ent [Langlois 1986 p.21 ]. But a s  n o ted  before, this is no t an  explana­
tion o f  the origin o f  an institution but ‘‘at best an  e x p la n a tio n  o f  the persistence o f the 
institution and  only then if  the feedback m echanism  is specified”  [L anglo is 1989 
p .293-94]. O u r critique earlier was precisely that the feedback  m echanism  is indeed 
unspecified. T heir theory is D arw inian in nature; the exp lanations alw ays fall short o f  
a com plete specification o f  the reason o f m aintenance o f  an  institution. A s a  result the 
school becom es simply apologists for the status quo.
18 North is also happy to extend the subsequent 'fa ir ' contracting to an analysis o f political in­
stitutions. Since no other influences on decisions are brooked, this appears legitimate. A more rad­
ical approach would suggest that it is ideology that affects our experiences, rather than vice versa.
The contracting approach then looks far more sinister.
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T he o rthodox analysis purported to show  how  a  social optim al cou ld  b e  derived 
from  indiv idual actions —  this w a s the idea o f  the ‘inv isib le h an d ’. T he n ew  institu ­
tionalists have replaced the ‘positive’ econom ics o f  the orthodoxy with an  ‘evo lu tion ­
a ry ’ functional explanation w hich is  derived from  post hoc observation. A s w e  m en­
tioned above, m ethodologically th is involves m oving to  theories w hich are  exp lana­
tory  but n o t predictive. But as w e saw  in chap ter one, the justification  fo r a  science o f 
society w a s precisely this pred ic tive nature o f  scientific th o u g h t I t  w as the ab ility  to 
control and  m anipulate the social a rena  to advantage tha t w as the raison d ’être  fo r the 
en tire  en terprise. T he basis o f  the orthodoxy w as tha t it  w as ab le to sh o w  h o w  the 
‘best’ po licy  cou ld  be determ ined; i t  w as a  tool fo r the policy  sc ien tist to  u se . Now 
th at prediction has been rejected, and only post hoc explanations are being  m ooted , 
there is no  possibility  o f  policy being  derived a t a ll —  even  a  policy o f  laissez faire, 
since no explanation  o f  the origin o f  present-day  institu tions is given.
W hat is  lacking is  what L anglo is ca lls  a  ‘com positional’ principle. W e  n ee d  to 
show  how  individual behaviour links together to form  an  aggregate re su lt  [1989 
p.281]. H e  believed it was carelessness concern ing  th is princip le that caused  e rro rs  in 
the w ork o f  the new  institutionalists [p.293]. O ur critique  w ould grow  fu r th e r  since 
w e  saw ea rlie r that the econom ic com position  principle —  the derivation o f  th e  social 
optim um  from  the individual ac tion  —  consisted  in  the theory o f  value. W h a t is  lack­
ing  in the new  institutional econom ics is  a  value th eo ry .19 A lthough the an a ly sis  may 
show  how  institutions could be o rganic , it  can no  longer show  that these o rg a n ic  insti­
tu tions w ould  be optim al nor th a t th e  m arket com plete w ith  organic in stitu tional sup­
p lem ent w ould  be optimal.
W hen push  com es to shove, th e  new  institu tionalists sim ply  g ive us th e  flip  side 
o f  the sam e m ethodological ind iv idualist co in  as the orthodox econom ists. T h e  ortho­
do x  analysis tried  to  ignore the social and the political by  abstracting i t  fro m  their 
purely econom ic theory. T his resu lted  in an unrealistic an d  virtually  u se less  theory.
19 This is Dugger’s criticism o f W illiamson [1983 p .l 10], but we would suggest it is geoeralis- 
able.
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The reason that value theory is essential to th is schem e is that it enables them to 
arrive a t a social op tim um  from their indiv idualist analysis. T he new  institutional 
econom ists accep t that the exclusion o f the political and social is not sustainable but 
they attem pt to  reduce them  to econom ic activity . A gain, this will manifest itse lf in 
value theory, w hich is e ith er ignored (W illiam son, N elson and W inter) or the values 
are given  (Schotter). N one actually m eet the problem s raised by the theories o f 
m arket failure w hich m otivated  the new  theories. T he orthodox econom ists gave us 
an  unrealistic theory w hich  show ed how  a social op tim um  could  be derived. The new 
institutionalists have chosen the other path, and  attem pted  to  give a  realistic theory, 
but in so doing  they canno t show  that the ou tcom e will be socially  optimal. W hen 
they attem pt to  do so. their theory loses touch w ith  reality, and  often  becom es o rtho­
dox in nature.
II. N EW  M A RK ET SO C IA LISM
T he quest fo r a positive science o f  econom ics has ended in failure. W e showed in 
chapter tw o that the utilitarian philosophy o f science was im possib le to  put into prac­
tice. T he a lternative positiv ist econom ic theory —  the idea o f  a planned  econom y —  
was show n in chapter three to also  be inoperable. Furtherm ore, in chapter four we 
have show n how  the econom ic cannot be separated from the political and the social. 
H ie  V eblenian critique w as that individual w ants are socially m anipulated, and it is 
therefore fu tile  to  dem onstrate how aggregate satisfac tion  can be m axim ised by the 
m arket: both are created  by the vested interests. In G a lb ra ith 's  phrase " . . .  it is the 
process o f  satisfy ing  w ants that creates the w ants ... the individual w ho urges the 
im portance o f  production to satisfy these w ants is precisely in the position o f  the 
onlooker w h o  applauds the efforts o f  the squirrel to  keep abreast o f  the wheel that is 
propelled by its ow n e ffo rts”  [G albraith 1958 p . 149]. Furtherm ore M itchell and 
C om m ons show ed how  the market was itself dependent on the social institutions o f
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m oney and also  o f  law  and  property rights. It is therefore no t the case that the prob­
lem s o f  econom y are indeed  universal fo r all societies, a s  w as claim ed by Robbins 
and others. The econom ic is  itse lf defined by the society , and to  cla im  that the 
'econom ic problem ' is un iversa l is in fact reification.
W ith the inability to  separate the econom ic from  the social and  the polity , the 
possibility o f  econom ics providing a  policy science is a lso  rem oved. It is not the case 
that the econom ic scien tist can  inform  us w hich policies w ill best prom ote o u r politi­
cal ends, since the operation  o f  ‘the ec onom y ' will vary acco rd ing  to  the institutional 
set. O ur interest should cen tre on this institutional set, no t on ly  upon the econom y. 
W hat the optim um  institu tional set w ould  consist o f  w ill be the question considered 
in the rem ainder o f this chapter.
It is w orth recalling from  chapter one that the ju stification  o f  positive social sci­
ence was precisely that it d id  o ffer the possibility o f  po licy  science, the ability  to con­
trol social life. This w as possib le because o f two facets o f  positive science; the ability 
to predict and the provision  o f  objective know ledge. W e have show n that the pred ic­
tive ability o f  econom ic sc ience  is so  lim ited as to  be useless. It is then unclear if  the 
gaining o f objective know ledge by itse lf —  w hich w ould  am oun t to  sim ple descrip­
tion —  is o f  consequence, since we cannot use this know ledge for policy. O u r inves­
tigation has gone beyond positiv ism , and  m ust be conducted  in norm ative term s. W e 
have to reintroduce the possib ility  o f  norm ative political debate, w hich  w as rem oved 
w ith the acceptance o f positive social science, back into the po licy  discussion.
F reedom
It should be noted at th is stage that this im perative fo r political, subjective analysis 
does not in itse lf preclude a  policy o f  laissez-faire. It sim ply requires a  political 
justification o f  the policy. Indeed, the m ost successful defence o f  laissez-faire has 
been conducted in p recisely  these term s. T he point o f  departure for the ‘N ew  R ight’, 
derived from  A ustrian theo ry , is precisely that the m arket w ill m axim ise the freedom  
o f  individuals. In this v iew  it is precisely the fact that the m arket allow s the indivi­
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dual ‘free  c h o ic e ’ that m akes the m arket allocation  preferab le to  any collective a llo ­
cation [H o d g so n  1984 chap.3]. The inform ation concern ing  the w ants and desires o f  
ind iv iduals is  necessarily dispersed throughout th e  econom y, and  any interference 
w ith the fre e d o m  o f  individuals to  exchange w ill, they  suggest, lead to a  sub-optim al 
allocation o f  resources. C entral planning, red istribu tive taxes and  fo r som e even legal 
tender are  a l l  unw arranted infringem ents on ind iv idual liberty.
T he s o c ia l  institution o f  the m arket is  there fo re  ju stified  not only in term s o f  
efficiency, b u t  because only  through m arkets ca n  ind iv iduals obtain ‘freedom ’.20 
T hat is, th e  free  m arket ob tains a m oral justification  [ibid.]. W e would note though, 
that a p a r tic u la r  conception o f  freedom  is being m ooted  here. T h is  conception o f  free ­
dom  is o f te n  know n, follow ing B eilin  [1969] a s  negative freedom . A  person is free  
when she o r  h e  is “ no t subject to  coercion by th e  arb itrary  w ill o f  another o r o thers’’. 
[H ayek 1 9 6 0  p . l l ] .  Freedom  is sim ply the ab ility  to  ac t “ accord ing  to our ow n dec i­
sions”  [ o p .c i t  p.12]. Only deliberate in fringem ents on  th e  rig h t to  m ake o u r ow n  
decisions is  re le v an t in the denia l o f  freedom ; th e  ab ility  to  p rocure  the desired resu lts 
o f  our d e c is io n s  is  no t pertinent to  th is view  o f  freedom .
In this sense ‘freedom ' refers solely to a  relation of men to  other m en, and  the only infringement on it 
is coercion b y  m en. This means, in particular, that the range o f physical possibilities from which a  per­
son can choose a t a  given moment has no direct relevance to freedom [ibid.].
T he poin t o f  th is  conception o f  freedom  is to  a ttem pt an  e th ica l justification o f  distri­
bution. T h e  inab ility  to  consider distribution adequately  w as o n e  o f  the m ain fa ilings 
o f  orthodox  econom ics. H ere laissez faire  d istribu tion  is ju s tified  on the grounds o f  
individual lib e rty . W hat is  im portant fo r the libertarians is  n o t w hether I am  ab le  to  
give effec t to  m y  desires, bu t that I am  able to  m ake m y ow n choices: “ T he question  
o f  how  m a n y  courses o f  action are open to a  person  is , o f  course , very im p o rtan t B ut 
it  is  a  d iffe re n t question from  that o f  how fa r in  ac ting  he ca n  follow  his ow n plans
20 Although the freedom argument invariably conflates into arguments concerning efficiency.
As we w ill se e  below, both negative and positive freedom are  required in any realistic conception 
o f ‘the good l ife ’.
Mulberg: Social Limits to  Economic Theory 174
and intentions ...”  [op.cit. p . 13].
T he New Right o fte n  ca ll upon a difference betw een freedom  an d  ability. S im ­
ply because I am unable to  clim b M ount Everest does not reflect o n  m y freedom  to 
try. Conversely I am n o t f re e  (a t present) to w alk in D ow ning S treet, even though 1 
am  able. Ability is re g a rd e d  as a  natural obstacle, and  there is no  obligation to 
rem ove such a  natural o b s ta c le . The only relevant denial o f  freedom  occurs w hen 1 
am  intentionally stopped  fro m  doing som ething I am  able to  do  [see M iller 1989 
p.33]. The results o f  m a rk e t  exchanges are viewed as precisely su ch  a  natural e le ­
m ent. and are claim ed to  b e  the unintentional result o f  action, and there fo re  not a  res­
traint on liberty. The o u tc o m e s  o f m arket exchange can be view ed as  no  more unjust 
than the consequences o f  th e  w eather [Plant 1984 p.54].
T he ‘New R igh t’ w o u ld  also deny that m oral questions can be g iven  an ob jec­
tive basis. The point a b o u t m arke t exchange, they w ould claim , is th a t it requires only 
a subjective view. T he o n ly  com m itm ent is to the exchange p ro ced u re  —  no end- 
state. such as equality, is b e in g  m orally justified. Individuals are fo llow ing  their ow n 
values in the market [o p .c it. p.58]. It is for this reason that equality  is  cla im ed to  be a 
denial o f liberty [H eld 1 9 8 9  p.26].
The Am erican in s titu tio n a l school posed a  significant cha llenge to  this liber­
tarian position, for it s u g g e s te d  that m arkets w ere them selves coercive , and  that social 
institutions could be fo rm a tiv e  o f  individual liberty. In particular. J. R. C om m ons' 
use o f  institutions as ‘‘c o lle c tiv e  action in control, liberation and expansion  o f ind iv i­
dual ac tio n "  [Com m ons 1931 p.644] would be o f special concern fo r the libertarians, 
since it destroys the nea t c a u sa l  link between individual freedom  an d  the absence o f 
coercion. Com m m ons w a s  suggesting that som e level o f  coercion m ay  be necessary 
for individual liberty to  e x is t .
T he reason for the em p h a sis  o f the ‘New R ight’ on organic institutions is p re ­
cisely that they wish to  s h o w  that such institutions can occur through choice: no coer­
cion need be involved. O u r  previous analysis show ed that the developm ent o f these 
organic institutions w as un lik e ly . W e need not therefore reject intervention in the
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m arket, nor deliberate restraint on  in d iv id u a l ac tion . T he question  is  w hat interven­
tion and w hat restraints would be b e s t
W e m ay also  wish to query  th e  e x c lu siv e  re liance on nega tive freedom  o f  the 
N ew  R ight. Indeed , w e m ay w ell a sk  w h y  w e  should have an y  in terest in  negative 
freedom  a t all. W hat is it about co e rc io n  w h ic h  is  so  repugnant to  us?
The answer must surely be that, if  w e are free from  coercion, we are then able to live a  life shaped by 
our own desires and preferences and not those o f another, and that is part o f  what the distinctively 
valuable features o f human life consist in. However, in  order to  realize what is valuable about liberty, 
we have to  be able to pursue values o f  ou r own, and to  d o  this we have to have abilities resources and 
opportunities —  that is to say, some command over resources so that we can live life in our own way 
[Plant 1989 p.65].
W e w ould be hard  pu t to m ain tain  th a t, fo r  ex a m p le , an  unem ployed  m iner in  South 
A frica has ob tained  a superior s ta te  o f  a f fa irs  than, say, a  conscrip t in  a  well- 
m aintained arm y, sim ply because th e  so ld ie r m u s t obey orders and  the m iner is  not 
g iven orders (although there m ay be o th e r  considerations). In  fact, very  few  libertari­
ans w ould hold  rig id ly  to a  no tion  o f  e x c lu siv e  negative freedom , and m ost would 
accept a  righ t to  positive freedom s in  e x tre m e  ca ses . It w ould be perverse to  regard 
m axim um  liberty  to  be the so le cr ite rio n  fo r  ju d g in g  the p light o f  the starving ch il­
dren  o f  A frica o r o f  the hom eless o f  N e w  Y o rk  and  few  o f  the N ew  R ight w ould do 
so. M ost w ould  concede that th ere  is  so m e  o b lig a tio n  to interfere w ith  property rights 
in  cases o f  catastrophes.21 Y e t a s  M ille r  p o in ts  out, lim iting  th is  obligation to 
extrem e cases is  arbitrary. It is  n o t m ad e  c le a r  w h y  a  righ t to  a  m inim um  com m and 
over these  resources should be confined  to  life-and-death  situa tions [1989a p.44]. T o  
lim it th e  righ t to  resources to  ex trem e ca ses , o r  on ly  to basic resources is  arbitrary. 
W e cannot say  w h ich  resources are  b asic  and  w h ic h  are n o t22 W e hav e to  accept that 
all resources can  contribute to  the e ffec tiv e  freed o m  o f  individuals [A bell 1989 p.84].
21 If  a  protagonist does insist on m aintaining an  ethical argument regardless, then as Miller and 
others have pointed out it is impossible to  p r o v e  this argum ent wrong. All we can simply say is 
that it is ludicrous o r perverse.
22 Some formulations of the Austrian theory stress the notion that ownership o f resources is ir­
relevant, since a c c e s s  is the relevant aspect. This p resum es in particular completely free access to 
credit markets, which is simply ludicrous.
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A lth o u g h  w e should accept the need fo r negative freed o m , w e should not rely 
e x c lu siv e ly  upon it [o p .c it p.83]. T he choice is  not b e tw een  m ark e t o r state. Rather 
w e sh o u ld  view  the tw o types o f  freedom  —  negative and  positive  —  as com plem en­
tary , an d  attem pt to derive the optim al balance [M iller 1989 p .25]. I t  is  this balance 
tha t w e  w ill look at now.
W e  saw  in chapter three that attem pts a t central p lan n in g  —  ev e n  using markets 
—  fo u n d e red  because they  d id  not recognise that goods w e re  produced  in order to 
s a tis fy  unknow n and inscrutable w ants. T h is aspect o f  th e  ex change m echanism is 
benefic ia l and should be defended. T he m arket m echanism  is  an  efficien t method o f 
c o o rd in a tin g  decentralised decision-m aking [Estrin and  L eG ran d  p .l ] .  M arkets are 
“ an  e ffic ien t way o f  producing and d istributing a very  la rg e  n u m b er o f  mundane 
item s, from  tomatoes to transistor rad ios ...”  [M iller an d  E strin  1986 p.3]. Further­
m o re , w e  should take seriously  the liberal em phasis on in d iv id u a l choice.
M arkets give their participants a  certain kind o f freedom. They tend to expand the range of choices 
that m ay  be made, and they g ive each person a  variety o f partners w ith whom  to d e a l ... [Furthermore] 
i f  I am  buying for cash, I have no need to explain or justify a  request for a  large consignment of 
salam i, and this freedom to arrange m y personal life in the way I happen to p refer is one whose value 
should n o t be under-estimated. [op.dL p.4]
w h ich  is  to  say that “ people on the w hole should be le ft to  de te rm in e  their own idea 
o f  th e  ‘g o o d ’ and indeed o f  the ‘good life’”  [LeG rand a n d  E s trin  p .7 ]. Furthermore, 
competitive m arkets tend to  disperse personal pow er o v e r  th e  positive freedom s 
w h ich  w e held to be im portant, so tha t w e do no t have to  d e a l w ith  petty  bureaucrats 
[M ille r and  Estrin 1986 p .4] o r  even  discrim inatory p ractices.
P u b lic  provision o f  positive freedom s should no t b e  re g ard e d  as  a  end  in itself, 
bu t ra th e r  justified e ither in  term s o f  com parative efficiency  [M iller 1989b p.31] o r on 
the g ro u n d s  that ‘the goo d ’ in  this particular instance g o e s  bey o n d  th e  limitations o f 
m on ey  m easurem ent W e should be especially  wary o f  c o n fu sin g  the allocative 
re su lts  o f  exchange w ith the distribution effec ts o f  inequa lities o f  w ealth  and income. 
A s w e  m entioned in our earlie r discussion, the exchange fu n c tio n  o f  m arkets already
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presum es a  given  d is tr ib u tio n ; it w as in  attem pting  to theorise d istribu tion  th a t bo th  
orthodox analysis a n d  A ustrian  theory failed as  com plete social theories. I t  sh o u ld  be 
realised  that ‘it  is  im p o rtan t to distinguish betw een the unjustifiable co n se q u en ce s  o f  
m arkets per se and th o s e  consequences w hich arise as  a  re su lt o f  the d iffe ren t en d o w ­
m ents w hich people b rin g  to production”  [A bell 1989 p.80J. T hat is  to  s a y  th a t  w e 
m ust bear in m ind th a t  the lack of distributional theory  in the conventional ec o n o m ic  
approach resu lts in  th e  need  for a po litical decision  concern ing  d istribu tion  as  a  p re l­
im inary  to  e s tab lish in g  a  socially optim al allocation  o f  goods and resources th ro u g h  
the m ark e t O nly a f te r  th e  question o f  distribution has been adequately d ec id ed  w ill 
the m arket alloca tion  system  deliver an  optim um  solution. B y the sam e  to k en , w e 
m ust be careful n o t t o  confuse problem s caused  by  an  inadequate d is tr ib u tio n  w ith  
those w hich are the consequences o f  m arket allocation.
M a r k e t  L im ita tio n s
M arket m echanism s c a n  have m any unjustifiable consequences though, an d  req u ire  
the existence o f  J. R . C om m ons —  sty le institu tions in  o rd e r fo r their effic ien t o p era ­
tion. W e should s tre s s  th e  idea that m arkets are in  no  sense natural o r ‘free ’ , a n d  th a t 
the concept o f  m a rk e ts  being som ehow  separate from  the polity  is re ifica tion . In  a 
sense referring to  ‘th e  M arket’ (using the definitive article) is  incorrect —  a ll m ark e ts  
are se t up by the s o c ie ty , and require a  large se t o f  law s and  decisions by  th e  po lity  
and society  fo r th e ir operation , all o f  w hich a lter the characteristics o f  th e  m ark e t 
exchange m echan ism . W e have a lready  m entioned  the need  fo r a  d is tr ib u tiv e  
m echanism  to  su p p lem en t the exchange m echanism  o f  th e  m arket, an d  w e  w ill be 
exam ining  this issu e  in  greater depth shortly. W e have a lso  touched upo n  th e  re la ­
tive ly  uncontentious d e s ire  to ensure a  m inim um  provision  o f  facilities fo r  th e  ab o li­
tion  o f  poverty and  to  provide m inim um  standards o f  health  and w elfare. T h a t is  to  
say , w e do  have so m e  notions of end-states w hich  w e w ish  to  achieve. A lth o u g h  it 
m ay be possible to  a c h ie v e  som e o f  the desired end-sta tes through th e  m ark e t, the 
en tire  argum ent fo r m ark e ts  becom es dubious w hen  the user o f the re so u rce s  h as
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insufficient in form ation to  m ake in fo rm ed  judgem ent on the good o r services pro­
v ided .23 H ealth  is  the usual ex a m p le  c ited , although there m ay be others. 24 A s M iller 
po in ts out, such  goods and serv ices w ill invariably require public m onitoring o r regu­
lation .25 A s the need fo r th is b e c o m e s  greater, the d ifference betw een public and 
m arke t provision  becom es sm aller, a n d  in the end there m ay p rove to  be very  little 
d ifference betw een a  good public  sy stem , and a  constra ined  private system  [M iller 
1989a p.317].
W e have seen  o ther aspects o f  th e  m arket w hich m ay be undesirable. W e have 
a lready  m entioned the problem  o f  in d u ced  wants and  the conspicuous expenditure 
ra ised  by V eblen . W e w ould  re je c t th e  strict determ inism  o f  V eblen  though. Veblen 
appeared  to  regard  ind iv iduals a s  c o m p le te ly  determ ined by  institutions w hich w ere 
con tro lled  by the vested in terests. I t  w a s this that enabled-h im  to  suggest an  evolu­
tionary  approach  to  econom ics, w h ic h  w e viewed as untenable. W e also  rejected his 
v iew  that it  w as only th is in s titu tional contro l w hich w as the cause o f  scarcity . Furth­
e rm ore , even  i f  overall scarcity  m a y  n o t ensue, the decision  o f  w h a t should be pro­
d uced  rem ains, a s  w e saw  in  ch a p te r th ree , problematic.
W hat w e can  gain  from  V eb len  i s  firstly that the econom y can  not be studied in 
iso la tion . W e w ill need to  w iden  o u r  ho rizo n s to  include both the cu ltura l and  the pol­
itica l, to  estab lish  to  w hat ex ten t ‘w a n ts ’ are form ulated, and  to  contro l p ow er over 
institutions. B u t although w e m ay  c o n s id e r  individuals a s  to  som e exten t m alleable, 
w e  should also  consider tha t b as ica lly  people are self-determ ining, and that subject to 
su itab le regula tion  w e shou ld  ta k e  their expressed w ants a s  achieving some 
co rrespondence w ith  w elfare. A f te r  a ll, w e cannot read  m inds. U nless w e arc to 
presum e know ledge o f  ind iv idual w a n ts  —  and then plan fo r these a la V eblen —  
th en  w e arc le ft w ith m arkets, p ro b lem a tic  though they m ay be [M iller 1989a p.146].
23 It m ay also be the case that the requisite information may need to be the subject o f regula­
tion to ensure adequate distribution.
24 The subject o f  health also raises the problem  of non-commodity conceptions of ‘the good’.
See the argument below.
25 Or even banning, as in the case of bard narcotics.
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W e have a lso  com e across the p roblem  o f  ex te rnalitie s, w hich will require regu­
lation o f  one form  o r another. It is not possible to  separate this regulation from  the 
question o f  d istribu tion  though. T he regula tion  o f  ex te rnalitie s through political con­
trol or th rough  taxation will have severe distribu tive effec ts, and  it is not possible to 
m ake m eaningfu l decisions concerning the level o f  regu la tion  without som e notion o f 
individual va luations o f  the externality , w hich will vary  according to  initial d istribu­
tions o f  incom e and  wealth. If. fo r exam ple , we are  considering  restricting the use o f 
pesticides in fa rm s through either taxation o r d irec t regulation (legislation o r some 
licensing schem e), we w ould suggest that in the sho rt-term  a t least, agricultural pro­
duce will rise in price.26 This will obviously  have a  fa r g reater effect on the poor than 
on  the rich, a n d  ou r view as to the level o f  re stric tion  m ay well be affected by our 
view  o f  the equitab ility  o f distribution. Recall th a t the question o f  allocation is 
separate and  subsequent to the political question o f  d istribu tion . U nless the d istribu­
tive status quo  is equitable, the consequences o f  m arke t allocation cannot be optimal. 
Indeed, adop ting  a piecem eal approach to  the op tim isation  o f  the environm ental sec­
tor in iso la tion  m ay well run into fairly  severe second-best difficulties, and  m ay be 
deem ed to lead  to a  sub-optim al strategy fo r m axim um  social value.
T his conclusion  is not affected by the d iscussion  on property rights. T he argu­
m ent o f C oase w as that externalities occurred  because o f  inadequate articulation o f 
property righ ts  —  individuals w ere unable to trade in the external ‘com m odities '. He 
suggested tha t the end result o f the ex istence o f  property  rights in externalities would 
be that the ex ternalities are consum ed at a  quantity  and  price given by the market, 
regardless o f  the initial distribution o f  property righ ts. I f  I have a  right to  clean air. 
then a producer w ho w ishes to pollute the air w ill need  to  offer ‘com pensation’ to  me 
for giving up  th is right: that is to say, my right is traded . A  breach o f contract (such as 
polluting w ithou t paym ent) w ould be ac tionable in the courts. T his trading will occur,
26 This is assuming that fanners are adept at maximising short-term profit, which seems a rea­
sonable assumption to make. There are those who would suggest that such a move as restricting 
pesocides would actually have no effect on shon-term profitability, but this author does not be­
lieve that we should be involved in telling farmers how to turn a  profit.
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and w ill produce an end  result, irre spective  o f  the initial d is tribu tion  o f  property 
righ ts, w hich  although im portant, is  nonethe less arbitrary [C oase I960]. All that the 
allocation o f  property righ ts w ill a f fe c t is  w hich  party has to  pay  fo r  the right to  co n ­
trol the com m on good.
A ll th is is  sim ply to  say that th e  g ran ting  o f  property r ig h ts  o v e r  externalities is  a 
question o f  distribution w hich as y e t w e have no adequate a c co u n t of. Furtherm ore, 
o u r v iew  o f  the final re su lt rem ains dep en d en t upon the eq u itab ility  o f all property 
righ ts, no t sim ply those in ex te rnalitie s  —  in  fact, this is  e v e n  m o re  obvious than 
before. T he discussion presum es th a t th e  resources brought to th e  bargaining are d is­
tributed fairly . It also m akes the lim ita tio n s  o f  the analysis m o re  obvious, in  tha t 
som e o f  the ‘trades’ th a t are supposed  to  o ccu r seem  ludicrous. I t  w ould  appear that 
people are supposed to  trade w ith  n u c le a r p ow er firms, fo r ex a m p le , their chance o f 
ca tch ing  leukaem ia, o r their portion o f  clean  a ir w ith a fac to ry  ow ner. It is fa r  from  
clear, in  any  case, exactly  how  the ind iv idua l righ ts are to  be aggregated  fo r trading. 
T he property  rights approach  to ex te rn alitie s  appears to  re ly  u pon  th e  conception o f  
organic institutions w hich  in  o u r v ie w  is  discredited. O therw ise, i t  appears th a t all 
contracts fo r  clean a ir a re  to be nego tia ted  separately, so th a t m y  a ir  can be polluted 
w hilst m y  neighbour’s  a ir m ust be k e p t clean . In  fact, w e have g o n e  around in  som e­
th ing  o f  a  circ le  in the a rg u m e n t R egard less  o f  the (arbitrary) d istribu tion  o f  property  
righ ts in externalities, i t  w ould still see m  im possible to  arrive a t  an  aggregate social 
pecuniary value o f the ex ternality .27
I t  should also be realised , fo llo w in g  from  th is invocation o f  property  rights, that 
there are m any aspects o f  righ ts o v er p roperty . W e m ay w ish  to  separate the righ t o f  
possession  from  the rig h t o f  use, o r  th e  rig h t o f  use from  the rig h t to  alienate (r ig h t to 
the capital). There is  no  a  priori reason  to  support full ow nersh ip  o f  righ ts as opposed 
to  o ther com binations [H o n o ri 1961, c ited  M iller 1989a]. T h is  m ea n s that the partic­
27 I presume it would be possible for the purposes o f our examples to imagine some sort o f  en ­
trepreneur who offers all the residents near W indscale (or Sellafield as it is now  known) a  contract 
to expose them to a risk o f radiation, and w ho then negotiates with British N uclear Fuels; I am 
sure the m odel could be m ade valid. N onetheless, the m odel remains bizarre.
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u la r form s o f  property righ ts m ust them selves be dec id ed  upon by the polity, e v e n  
before w e invoke the m arket exchange m echanism . R eca ll, as C om m ons pointed o u t, 
tha t it  is the legal transaction w hich w e are concerned  w ith, no t the physical ac t o f  
exchange. T h e  polity  has to m ake a  m eaningfu l d ec isio n  as to  w hat legal rights w ill 
be exchangeable, as w ell a s  who w ill have initial righ ts to  resources.
T h is  is  particu larly  significant w hen w e look  a t  th e  o ther lim itation o f  the m arke t 
w hich w as im plic it in o u r discussion. B oth  the o rth o d o x  ‘ex ternality ’ and the n eo - 
A ustrian  ‘property  r ig h ts’ treatm ent o f  ‘com m ons’ h in g ed  on the notion that ev e ry ­
th ing  has g o t a  price. T h is has not ac tually  been  dem onstra ted . There m ay w ell b e  
w hat M ille r re fers to  as non-com m odity elem ents o r  conceptions o f  ‘the goo d ’. W e  
m ay  w ell regard , say , cruelty  to an im als in  th is lig h t o r  the prom otion o f  the arts . 
H ealth  and  education  m ay also  be v iew ed as  bordering  o n  this. T hese non-com m odity  
e lem ents m ay  involve interference w ith  the m arket o r  w ith  property rights. W e m ay  
w ish  to lim it the righ t to  dispose o f  pets a s  the ow ners  w ish , o r the righ t to  bargain  
o v er health . T he som ew hat incongruous A ustrian  trea tm en t o f  ‘com m ons’ h a s  
obscured  th is d ifference betw een com m odity-based  an d  non-com m odity e lem ents o f  
‘the goo d ’, because it  b lurs the usual d is tinc tion  betw een  w hat is tradable and w hat is  
n o t  W e m ay sim ply  regard  it as b izarre th a t  fo r ex am p le , a  picturesque v iew  o r  
beautifu l arch itecture should be regarded as  com m odities,28 and  absurd that th ey  
should  require a  m onetary  value. W e m igh t w ell su g g est tha t clean a ir o r p ub lic  
health  con tribu te to  ‘the g ood’ in their ow n r ig h t  and  re je c t a s  perverse any sugges­
tion  that th ey  should be tradable in  the first place.
It is  im portan t to  no te the distinction betw een th ese  non-com m odity elem en ts 
and  our p rev ious conception  o f  end-states. W e are no t setting  out, say , the preserva­
tion  o f  picturesque v iew s as an  end in  itse lf. D ifferen t peop le  m ay have differen t c o n ­
ceptions o f  w h ich  non-com m odity elem en ts con tribu te to  ‘the good life’. W hat w e
28 Although, o f course, a  room with a view m ay be regarded as such. The point being m ade is 
no t that picturesque scenery may not be the subject o f rights, but that many people would regard 
the trading o f rights as perverse. This results in these rights being largely ignored by the market, as 
is argued below.
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are suggesting  is that the m arket exchange m echanism  will e ither no t take cognizance 
o f  non-com m odity  w ants, o r  m ore probably w ill price them  disproportionately  high, 
s in ce  these non-com m odity  elem ents w ould n o t be worth m uch in  the m a rk e t M iller 
po in ts  to  the m arke t fo r part-tim e labour as a  case in hand —  the ab ility  to work 
part-tim e is usually  bought a t a prem ium  [1989a p.94-5]. S im ilarly , a  h igh  premium  
m ay be charged  fo r jo b  satisfaction , o r even  fo r the low ering o f  health  risk s  a t work. 
W e m ay w ell need  to interfere w ith the m arket to  provide such e lem ents o f  ‘the good 
life ’; indeed , m any  people w ould suggest tha t th is is  the m ajor function  o f  th e  polity.
G iv en  th is  lack o f  provision o f  non-com m odity  elem ents, and  also  considering 
th e  prob lem  o f  induced  w ants, w e m ay w ell dec ide no t to  follow  the received  wisdom  
o f  orthodox  econom ics and attem pt to  m axim ise production (as m easured  b y  m oney). 
R a th e r w e w ill w ish  to  obtain a  m ix o f  com m odity  and non-com m odity elem ents. In 
particu la r, p o litical econom ists such as G orz w ould  stress the increase o f  leisure as a 
m ajo r p a rt o f  policy [G orz 1975, 1980]. O th ers  stress the need  fo r  individual 
‘d eve lopm en t’ [H odgson 1984 p .31], w hich  fo r  authors such a s  Ivan  D lich would 
n ecessarily  invo lve the re jection  o f  m ost o f  th e  consum er and cap ita l g o o d s presently  
produced . I t  a lso  re inforces the requirem ent to  base  distribution on som e o ther foot­
ing  than  the contribu tion  to  the production process.
I t  is  in  th e  sphere o f  distribution that th e  m ain  failing o f  laissezfaire  can  be said 
to  occur. W hat w e m ust concern  ourselves w ith  is  ensuring th a t ind iv iduals obtain 
suffic ien t re sources  “ in  o rd er to en te r m arkets in  an  effective m anner”  [P lan t 1989 
p .66]. W e m ust be concerned  w ith  “ the cond itions o f  freedom  fo r th e  individuals 
w ho en te r m arke ts and w ith  ensuring that th ese  conditions em body in  th e ir  institu­
tional fo rm  th e  h ighest degree o f  freedom  o f  ch o ic e”  [o p .c it p.68].
T h is  em phasis on freedom  o f  choice w as, o f  course, the o rig inal right-w ing 
justification  fo r laissez faire. O ne o f  our critiques o f  the libertarian em p h asis  o f  nega­
tive  freedom  w as th a t the ex istence o f  such a  social order required  the derivation  o f 
social in stitu tions —  m oney, legal righ ts in  p roperty , technical know ledge and inno­
vation  and so  on . W e then d iscussed  the possib ility  o f  these institutions b e in g  derived
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unintentionally o r ‘organ ically ’. W e will now  turn  to  another criticism  o f  the invoca­
tion o f  organic institutions w hich will lead us to  a  basis for distribution. This con­
cerns the em phasis p laced  on the spontaneity o f  o rgan ic institutions, on the fact that 
they lead to unintended consequences, which suggests that such institutions would 
not be coercive.
In the first place, it is far from clear w hy the intentions o f o thers should be 
relevant to  my freedom . If  m y freedom to  ac t is cu rta iled  then it rem ains curtailed 
whether or not this occurred  by accident or by design , indeed the distinction is not 
alw ays clear cu t. M uch depends on whether w e believe the outcom e, even  though 
unintentional could have been reasonably forseen. T he im plication o f  the libertarians 
is that because outcom es are unintended, no thing ca n  be done about the result, but if  
the outcom e o f the social order is predictable, then  w e can influence the conse­
quences and we m ay be regarded as being instrum ental “in the final outcom e, [see 
M iller 1989a p.35]. P lan t suggests that although w e m ay be unable to  forsee which 
individuals will be w orse -o ff from the m arket exchange m echanism , w e can forsee 
that the poorest group w ill derive least benefit [1989 p.65].
T he relevant questions are therefore not w hat outcom es are intentional, but 
w hich we should act upon. M iller suggests tha t w e m ust hold an idea o f  “ moral 
responsibility’’ to answ er th is question. W e m ust have som e notion o f “ w hat people 
can reasonably dem and o f  one another’’. Causal ana lysis is insufficient. W e also need 
some ethical judgem ent about behaviour [1989a p .35 ]. C onstraints on  ac tion  [or inac­
tion] can be justified m orally; the debate is really  o ver m oral responsibility  [op.cit. 
p.36].
Turning to  the d istribu tion  o f  wealth and incom e, we can conclude that the d is­
tributive consequences o f  laissez faire cannot be justified  on grounds o f  freedom, 
since the results are broadly predictable and can obviously  be influenced by govern­
m ent action. W e therefore require a m oral justification  o f  our d istribution set. As 
M iller term s it, we m ust defend distribution in term s o f  justice [1989a p.58ff]. 
Indeed, we need to do  th is even  to  defend laissez faire.
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Even complete la issez  fa i r e  is a  governmental economic policy; and capitalist governments escape 
ideological responsibility for its full consequences only by fostering a  naturalised or prescriptive con­
ception o f property rights
w hereas i f  w e conceive o f  property  righ ts in  an instrum ental fash ion , the state 
becom es th e  “ locus”  o f  questions o f  d istribu tion  [D unn 1986 p.37].
T h e  question  o f  distribution cannot be regarded as  a  technical question , a s  we 
saw  in ch a p te r tw o. W e m ust re g ard  the m atter as an  eth ica l question  o f  ju s tic e , 
which pervades all areas o f econom ic ac tiv ity . S ince the question  o f  d istribution is 
ethical, it  cannot be decided through  an  exchange m echanism  —  the m arket —  bu t 
m ust u ltim ate ly  be regarded as th e  responsib ility  o f  the polity.
Participation
W e m u st therefore re ject w hat in chap ter one Fay  term ed a  ‘p o licy  science’. W h a t is  
required to  answ er the ethical q uestions o f  d istribu tion , to  reso lve disputes o ver ex te r­
nalities, to  prom ote non-com m odity e lem ents o f  ‘the g o o d ’ and  to  regulate instances 
o f  m arke t fa ilure is  w hat he ca lled  a  partic ipa tory  theory. W e need  to  p u t forw ard  a 
theory o f  politics. W e should no t assum e as  C om m ons d id  tha t the legal and  political 
structures w ill au tom atically  d ispense an  appropriate ju s tic e  [see M ille r 1989a p .227], 
not least because th is ju stice is fa r  from  straightforw ard . W e ca n n o t separate d istri­
bution fro m  m arket, o r consider an  equitab le d istribu tion  (o r  even  an  equal d istribu ­
tion) w ith o u t an  effec tive exchange m echanism  [M iller 1989b p .32].29 A lthough the 
state m ay  b e  the locus o f distribu tion , and shou ld  accep t responsib ility  fo r  the d istri­
bution, i t  is  no t a  solution to distribu tion . [D unn  1986 p .38]. T h e  ta sk  o f  the s tate  is 
to set up  th e  fram ew ork o f  the m ark e t so a s  to  achieve the optim al balance betw een 
econom y an d  polity.
T h is  is  especially  relevant i f  w e  believe tha t the po lity  ex tends beyond the state 
apparatus. W e m ay w ell hold the v iew  such that
29 A sim ilar point was m ade by Little [1950].
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Politics is a phenomenon found in between all groups, institutions, (formal and informal) and societies, 
cutting across public and private iife. It is involved in all the relations, institutions and structures which 
are implicated in the activities o f production and reproduction in the life of societies. It is expressed in 
all the activities o f co-operation, negotiation, and struggle over the use and distribution of resources 
which this emails... Thus, politics is about power, about the forces which influence and reflect its dis­
tribution and use, and about the effect o f this on resource use and distribution...
T his m ean s tha t individual autonom y or independence can ac tually  only be achieved 
through  po litical participation.
If politics is understood in this way, then, the specification of the conditions o f enactment o f the princi­
ple o f autonomy amounts to the specification of the conditions for the participation of citizens about 
die use and distribution of resources in relation to affairs that are important to them (i.e. us) ... We 
should strive towards a  state of affairs in which political life — democratically organised, is an essen­
tial part o f all peoples lives [Held 1986 pp.25-26).
T h is  suggests participation in and dem ocratisatiori o f  bo th  state and m arket 
[Paine 1986 p.54]. Furtherm ore, since we m ust consider both com m odity and no n ­
com m o d ity  elem ents, or as Paine term s it, “ a  socially ju s t distribution o f  ‘life 
c h a n c e s’” , these being  “ not ju s t incom e and  assets, but also  non-m onetary com ­
pon en ts  o f  the quality o f  life” , w e cannot m ake a priori judgem ents on the re la tion­
ship b etw een  the polity  and the econom y, bu t this m ust be continually  re-assessed as 
part o f  th e  participatory process. W e need to  constantly  m onitor the political e c o n ­
om y to  e n su re  neutrality  betw een com m odity and non-com m odity elem ents o f  ‘the 
g o o d ’:
... a  neutral framework cannot be specified in advance o f knowing something about the conceptions of 
the good that people actually hold, and this is a contingent matter. Since the point o f the framework is 
to balance competing claims on social resources, broadly conceived, we cannot sensibly say anything 
about its shape until we know what claims it has to accommodate ... Furthermore, since conceptions o f 
the good change historically, the appropriate framework cannot be designed in a  once-and-for-all 
manner. W e need a political forum in which new demands can be heard, and the framework revised 
accordingly [M iller 1989a p.96].
W e w o u ld  therefore re ject any  idea o f  a ‘b luep rin t’ for the optim al political econom y. 
N o t on ly  w ill the conceptions (and realisations) o f ‘the g o o d ' constantly  alter, but 
“ th ere  is  n o  simple w ay o f  m easuring m ore equal righ ts n o r participatory decision­
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m aking , and more social ju s tic e ”  [Paine 1986 p.SS]. Nonetheless, we w ould  hope to 
be ab le  to  show that a partic ipa tory  political econom y would be feasib le, and the 
m ain  elem ents we w ould ex p e c t it to consist of.
M ost ‘com m unitarian’ (as opposed to libertarian) political econom ists, fo llow ­
ing N o v e  [1983], w ould  p lace an em phasis on individual and co-opera tive en te r­
prises. T hese would be supplem ented  by state utilities where needed and  by quasi- 
au tonom ous state en terprises. The m odels usually allow for some level o f  em ploy­
m ent, varying from sm all scale enterprises (N ove), through to  informal em ploym ent 
only [Breitenbach e t al., 1990].
B efo re we make a  b r ie f  exam ination o f  these m odels, we should note that the 
em phasis on sm all-scale production  is m ore than ju st an attem pt at b reaking  m arket 
pow er. W e should regard  it  a s  a necessary part o f  participation w ithin the econom ic 
p rocess. T he co-operative form at both ex tends dem ocracy to  the w orkplace, and 
g ives w orkers a d irec t re w ard  for the progress o f  their form. N ot on ly  does the 
em phasis on  cooperation a n d  sm all-scale production reduce as m uch as  possib le the 
a lienation  o f  the w orkers from  the production process caused by large production 
lines an d  a hierarchical m anagem en t structure, but it a lso  is likely to  increase produc­
tiv ity  through the w orkforce having a greater incentive for the profitability  o f  the 
firm. A lthough we w ill n o t have space here for a full investigation o f  co-opera tive 
econom ics, we will briefly m ention  several questions concerning the m odel o f  com ­
peting  sm all-scale co -opera tives which w ould require resolution .30 T he first w hich 
w e hav e already m entioned  is  the possibility o f  hiring labour. I f  the econom y is not to 
revert to  a  capitalist system , th is m ust be curta iled  or restricted in som e w ay —  som e 
w ou ld  even  abolish it a ltogether.
A  m ore aw kward organisa tional problem  concerns investm ent. W e ca n  identify 
tw o fo rm s o f  investm ent strategies; m utual investm ent o r external investm ent. The 
fo rm er is prevalent in th e  U .S  and U .K .; m em bers pool resources and  are the
30 For a  full investigation o f the economics o f co-operatives, see Vanek [1970] and [1975], and 
the references in Miller [1989a p.83].
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exc lusive ow ners o f  the firm ’s assets. The latter form  o f  investm ent is based on the 
Y ugoslav  model; all capital is  leased a t m arket prices. 31 in o ther w ords all firms have 
a hundred  per cent gearing  [E strin  1989 p. 172].
T he difference betw een  the tw o m odels is no t only one o f  finance. The real 
question  is o f  the property r ig h ts  in capital. In th e  high-geared  m odel the co-operative 
m em bers have rights o f  use o f  capital, but do  no t have the right to d ispose o f  it o r to 
deprecia te it. In the variab le g ea red  model, w h ich  historically  had to  com pete with 
lim ited  liabilities, the ca p ita l is  ow ned by the C o-op . T he C o-op  itse lf is not neces­
sarily ‘o w n e d ’ by anyone tho u g h . A lthough C o-ops are by definition m anaged dem o­
cratically  by the m em bers (o n e  m em ber one vo te), in som e m odels a variable share 
hold ing  is  allow ed, w hich g iv e s  m em bers ind iv idual rights to  the capital (finance by 
non-voting  shares, as it w ere. T hese are the C o-operative P roducer Federation rules). 
T he a lternative (Industrial C om m o n  O w nership M ovem ent rules) is to allow only a 
'm em bersh ip  fe e ’ to jo in  th e  C o -o p ; no additional equity  is allow ed and all assets are 
held co llec tive ly  [Estrin 1989 p . 173].
W e will consider the variab le  gearing m odel first. T his has the sam e full ow ner­
ship righ ts  as present p rivate lim ited  liability com pan ies since the C o-ops are in com ­
petition w ith  them . The fac t th a t profits are shared  equally  am ong all m em bers m ay 
well ac t as a  restraint on the ra is in g  o f  equity though, since raising equ ity  necessarily 
involves the dissolution o f  p ro fits  am ong a larger m em bersh ip , resulting in a  tendency 
to  under-capitalise. In ad d itio n , co-operative m em bers m ay be re luctan t to  risk both 
incom e and  capital should  th e  firm fail [M iller 1989a p.87]. T his places the co­
operatives at a d isadvantage com pared  to lim ited-liab ility  com panies, [ibid.] It may 
also  lead to  problem s ra ising  lo an  finance, as the com m ercial banks w ould be unw il­
ling to  lend to sm all p roducer co-operatives to the sam e exten t as private com panies 
[V anek p .455]. T his m ay w ell o cc u r through m ore  than  prejudice, since the higher the 
gea ring  the higher the risk  involved . 32 This m ay w ell m ake the establishm ent o f  a
31 One o f the main problems w ith the Yugoslav economy is thought to be that the interest rate 
was well below market price, so that capital was quickly swallowed up in inefficient ventures 
[Miller 1989a p. 14].
32 Although many large com panies presently have gearing well in excess o f 100%
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hundred p e r cent geared co m p an ies  near im possib le if  they have to  com pete with 
private com panies, particu larly  since the larger com pan ies would be b e tte r suited to 
risk spreading.
This suggests that a la rg e  co-operative sec to r ca n n o t em erge fro m  the present 
m arket m echanism  in com petition  w ith lim ited -liab ility  com panies. A  m o v e  towards 
a largely self-m anaged eco n o m y  w ill only com e in to  existence as  a  re su lt o f deli­
berate political intervention a n d  w ill invariably be h ig h ly  geared: the p o lity  will prob­
ably adopt a  one hundred p e r c e n t gearing m odel. T h is  m eans co n sid e rab le  changes 
in com pany law, to restrict th e  fo rm s o f  com panies a llo w e d  to se if-m anage firms, but 
more im portantly investm ent w ou ld  require som e m eth o d  o f  o rgan ising  th e  banking 
sector. O pin ions differ as to w h e th e r some form o f  state-run  en te rp rise  o r  oligopoly 
should be envisiged i f  the investm en t banking sec to r should be p riv a te  (o r substan­
tially private), o r precisely w h a t m ixture o f  these sh o u ld  ex is t.33
O ther areas for po litical dec ision  will arise o v e r  sectors w here econom ies of 
scale are likely to occur and in d ee d  judgem ents w ill b e  required as to  w h ich  these are. 
The technical question o f  the sca le  o f  production (a s  opposed  to th e  ec o n o m ic  ques­
tion o f risk) would probably n o t be a  problem  in g enera l. A s M iller p o in ts  out, it is 
feasible for co-operatives to  re ta in  the size o f  the ind iv idua l plants th a t  a t  p resent per­
tain under private firms. A nd w e  have already d ism issed  the transaction c o s t  approach 
o f  C oase and  W illiam son. T h ere  m ay be particu lar areas  which w ill requ ire  large- 
scale operation or investm en t though —  in particu la r, technological research  and 
developm ent m ay well requ ire large financial com m itm en ts . W e w o u ld  b e  w rong to 
rely exclusively on co -opera tives  fo r all p roduction, an d  a  variety o f  labour-m anaged  
organisations could be ex p e c ted  to  em erge (labour/cap ita l partnersh ips fo r exam ple, 
o r even co-operatives w ith  b o th  producers and  consum ers). It should a lso  be restated 
that m axim ising production is  no t necessarily the o b jec t being pursued . M axim ising 
investm ent m ay therefore not be o f  prim ary im portance: the level o f  production  will 
be a  political decision.
33 See Breitenbach et.al. [1990] p .50-51. Miller [1989a p .310], Estrin [1989 p .187-90].
Mulberg: Social Limits to Economic Theory 189
T he appropriate m arket structures are not lik e ly  to  em erge th ro u g h  the present 
market system , but w ill require a drastic a lte ra tion  o f  the legal founda tions o f the 
m arket by the state. The state will a lso  need to  a rriv e  at a decision as to  how  the inev­
itable inequalities w hich will em erge from a  m arke t-based  econom y w ill be handled: 
how m uch inequality should be tolerated, and  how  excess inequa lity  should be 
stopped. T he state w ould also be responsible fo r m eeting that e lem en t o f  positive 
freedom s that are to  be based on need, for the p rov ision  o f  public goods an d  the regu­
lation o f  externalities. There will, o f  course, be a  requirem ent for a ju d ic ia ry  and an 
executive —  the latter especially if  investm ent o r  even  K eynesian sty le  dem and 
m anagem ent is to be regulated.
H aving show n that polity and econom y are n ecessarily  in ter-linked, and having 
considered the form o f  econom ic organisation w h ich  w e believe to  be optim al, we 
can now  go on to look a t the polity. T his will n ecessarily  involve som e consideration  
o f our view  o f homo politicus . O ur critique o f libertarian  political eco n o m y  centred 
around the idea that the pursuit o f  rational self-in terest w as not su ffic ien t to  ensure 
the derivation o f  institutions. I f  w e are to suggest that the dem ocratic  polity  is to 
install such an  institutional set. w e have to m ain tain  that the individuals a re  guided by 
a different m otivation. As S chum peter am ongst o th ers  has pointed o u t. to  simply 
m ove rational self-interest into the political sphere so lves nothing —  in fact, the lack 
o f a budget constraint will m itigate against p roper political m anagem ent (see S chum ­
peter 1942].
M iller refers to this rationalist conception o f  political behav iour as interest 
aggregation. The participants are view ed as a ttem pting  to  prom ote th e ir  individual 
interest o r the interests o f  the group they represent,34 and  to guide necessary  co llec­
tive action tow ards this end. There will o f  course b e  m any such com p etin g  interests, 
and in this view politics is a process o f  aggregating  these interests in to  one [M iller 
1989a p .254]. In this respect politics is analogous to  econom ics, in th a t  it acts as a
34 This need not be rational self-interest in the narrow sense o f orthodox economics. They may, 
for instance, attempt to seek to further a religious cause.
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m ethod o f  deriv ing  an aggregate conclusion  from  individual w a n ts .35
M ille r  contrasts th is w ith w hat he calls dialogue. Ind iv iduals en te r the political 
process n o t  to  press their individual interests, but to  voice o p in io n  on “ m atters o f 
general c o n c e rn ” . They then en ter in to  dialogue in w hich they a ttem p t to persuade 
o thers, b u t  can  also be persuaded in turn. V iew points are co n stan tly  altered until a 
consensus em erges [op.ciL p.255].
A  fa ir ly  stock response to a d ialogue view  o f  politics is th a t i t  is  naive, but we 
could  a lso  venture a criticism  o f  th e  liability o f  the in terest-aggregation  view. W e 
m igh t a c tu a lly  w onder m ore about the concept o f  self-seeking: i t  w ould seem  m ost 
likely th a t  to tal self-seeking w ould destroy  virtually all m odem  so cie tie s  —  it w ould 
certain ly  d estro y  any dem ocracy (am ong o ther th ings, no one w o u ld  vote [D ownes 
1957]). In d e ed , the orthodox econom ists have to  indulge in stran g e contortions o f  the 
ra tio n a lity  co n cep t involving “ d irec t utility”  and such like to  ex p la in  the com m on­
place n o n -s e lf  actions such as parenthood, charity  and  so on .36 I t  w ould be hard to 
avoid th e  id e a  that som e level o f  altru ism  m ust ex ist a t  p re sen t
In terest-aggrega tion  politics w ill invariably conta in  all the sa m e  problem s o f  its 
eco n o m ic  s ib ling . U nless all in terests are equally  represented th e  process will no t be 
optim al. A lso , the prom otion and bargain ing  process m easures th e  cost o f  the failure 
o f  the lo b b y in g , rather than the quality  (value?) o f  the in terests. A t any event, the 
ag g reg a tio n  procedures w ill suffer from  all the social choice p ro b lem s w e outlined a t 
the en d  o f  ch ap ter 2: intransitivity  and  the o ther problem s o f  A rro w ’s im possibility 
theory  [ o p .c i t  p.257]. In  fact, such a  m ode o f po litics m ay w ell re q u ire  a  considerable 
am ount o f  coercion  to enforce the decisions reached  —  exactly  th e  opposite o f  the 
o rig inal N e w  R ight cla im  [M iller 1989a p.25].
T h e r e  are tw o aspects to the conception o f  po litics as d ia logue. T he first con­
cerns th e  ind iv idual as a  social being , w illing and able to  ta k e  part in com m unal
35 H ence Hodgson's term ‘economics o f  politics’. The process actually described by Miller is 
sometimes referred to as ‘log-rolling’, whereby the parties bargain until a compromise position is 
reached w h ich  commands a  majority.
36 For a  critique along these lines see Sen [1977].
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activity. T he second e le m e n t is  that the d ialogue process is  itse lf likely to re su lt in 
superior decisions being  m ade; “ The aim  o f  dialogue is no t sim ply to  allow p a r tic i­
pants to  air their v iew s, b u t  to reach the b est possible decision on m atters o f  gen e ra l 
concern”  [M iller 1989a p .285].
T he aim  o f  the ec o n o m y  could  be seen  as providing the necessary secu rity  to  
enable people to  develop  and  fo llow  altruistic aim s [see A bell 1989 p .88]. W e w o u ld  
also  suggest that a m ajo r concern  w ould be to  free resources to  enab le the eq u a lity  o f 
opportunity  fo r partic ipa tion  in the political process, in term s o f  tim e and hum an  
developm ent (education , train ing  and so forth). It should be noted here that the c o n ­
ception  o f  the altruistic ind iv idua l does not involve any notion o f  ‘sacrificing the in d i­
vidual w ants fo r the g re a te r  g ood’ o r som e such. O ur conception is  o f  community , 
w here “ each  person id en tifies  with the social group  in  the sense o f  seeing b o th  h is 
origins and h is destiny  a s  bound up w ith  those o f  the group as a  w hole”  [o p .c it  
p .229]. T he individual sh o u ld  also  no t be v iew ed as entirely  form ed by the co m m u n ­
ity: the com m unity a ttac h m en t is partial.
T h is conception g o e s  beyond die idea  o f  passive ‘trad itional’ ties, but is  a  p o s i­
tive notion tha t w e can  o rg an ise  and contro l th e  social w orld, [p.235].
T h is leaves us tw o  a re a s  fo r consideration. T he first is  w hat is  to  form the b a s is  
fo r th is com m unity  —  w h a t is  to  form  the group  cohesion, and w hy w ill ind iv id u a ls  
identify  w ith  the group? T h e  second consideration  is w hat th e  lim its should be o n  d ie 
com m unity  ties, and w h ic h  m atters should be regarded  as individual affairs.
I f  w e are to  su g g est th e  individual w ill be able to  identify  their w ell-being w ith  
th a t o f  the com m unity , th e n  th is com m unity  w ill require a  po in t o f  reference. “ I f  a 
com m unity  is  to  m ake a  c la im  on  m y alleg iance, it  m ust represent a  distinct w a y  o f  
life; there m ust be som eth ing  about the com m unity  and its m em bers tha t m akes i t  my 
com m unity”  [M iller 1 9 8 9 a p.231]. N onetheless, the d ifferen t com m unities w ill a lso  
require non-com m unitarian  links betw een each  o ther (otherw ise th e  com m unitie s  
w ould no t be d istinc tive ), and also be o f  a  size  sufficient to  exert contro l o ver th e ir 
environm ent. T his su g g ests  that there is a  p lay -o ff betw een sm all com m unities w ith  a
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greater participation and  tighter ties, o r la rg e r groups w ith m ore control and internal­
ised links, but a  w eaker sense o f  identity  [op.cit. pp.231-36]. The d ilem m a is to 
decide the balance.
M iller believes that the com m on identity  has to be based on nationality and 
citizenship. He poin ts ou t that only d is tribu tion  a t this level w ould be equitable given 
regional variations, and  that this d is tribu tion  will necessarily require an ideology 
based on the nation-state: he does not believe that the links between sm aller com ­
m unities w ould be strong enough to  invoke agreem ent to redistribute wealth [op.cit. 
p .237]. H e also  believes that, at any event, cu rren t identities are actually national —  
regardless o f  the lack o f  substance to  th is national identity —  and that we m ust start 
w ith the ex isting  identities [p.239].37 T h is  w ould  be a poin t o f contention between 
M iller and  m any in the Green m ovem ent, w hose vision o f com m unity is more 
federal.38 W e m ay in th is respect w onder i f  M iller woiild be able to lim it the sphere 
o f  national identity in quite the m anner he w ishes. R ecall that the com m unity was 
only  a part o f  the individual identity. W e w ould  be keen to  protect areas which need 
not be planned from  interference by the polity : we are not proposing a totalitarian 
state. B ut given  M ille r’s appeal to national citizenship as a  focus for com m unity, it 
m ay be difficult to  avoid  nationalistic tendencies em erging (that is. an  unswerving 
allegiance to the nation , together w ith an  hostility  towards o ther nations and tow ards 
m inorities, and so on). M iller recognises th is  problem , but does not show  how it can 
be avoided .39
Indeed, the m ain  problem  for a  com m unity-based  political econom y m ay well 
be w hat M iller calls the problem o f  to lera tion . W hile w ishing to  lim it the com m unity
37 In addition, the Green movement, because o f the environmental standpoint would place 
greater emphasis on the ' international', inter-community relationships.
38 Given this appeal to empirical evidence, we may wonder what idea of "nation"  Miller has 
in mind. Most o f the existing states have severe disputes over the question o f nationality. It could 
be suggested that this problematic question is as much an issue as the other questions we have 
dealt with.
39 He actually likens the connection between nationality and nationalism to that between a 
football fan and football hooligans. Reading this during the 1990 World Cup it seems an unfor­
tunate example — combating nationalist-based football hooliganism is very much a topical prob­
lem.
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identity, it m ay be d ifficu lt to cope w ith cu ltura l and  political be liefs w hich threaten 
the sense o f  com m unal identity. M iller po in ts ou t, for exam ple , tha t political parties 
may well act for sec tional interests, and w e m ay wish to d iscourage  political parties 
for this reason. [1989 p.288]40 M ore problem atic m ay be the existence o f  sub­
cultures, which in the ex trem e could rep lace the sense o f  com m unity  w hich the polity 
is based around. Such subcultural alleg iances w ould then tend to  shift the form  o f 
politics from dialogue back  to interest aggregation . T his m ay be a  particular problem  
regarding ethnic identities, which can lead to  a  dom inant cu ltu re [op.cit. p.280] R eli­
gion may also prove problem atic, as m ight som e aspects o f  personal culture. It is far 
from clear w hat o r indeed  w hether action should  be taken regard ing  such diversity o f 
culture.
The participatory political econom y should  be able to m ove beyond the present 
inequitable and iniquitous society by refusing to  base its ftistitutions around the con­
cept o f  rational econom ic hum an. In doing so, it m ay find th a t the calculation o f  the 
irrational will prove its sternest test.
40 Miller makes no m ention o f trade unions, but the analysis could be extended to them.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
WE HAVE dem onstra ted  how the supposedly technical questions o f  econom ics cannot 
be separated  from  norm ative questions o f  society and  polity. W e hav e show n how  all 
econom ic th eo ry , along w ith the positiv ist m etatheory , necessarily  has an im plied 
political th eo ry  w ithin it. It is not the case that econom ics can inform  us o f  the correct 
policy to  fo llow  in order to  achieve a  g iven  set o f  po litical and  social objectives, 
because eco n o m ic  theory itse lf m akes presum ptions concern ing  the legal, social and 
political in stitu tions which are regarded as  optim al. In particu lar, questions o f  d istri­
bution ca n n o t be separated from  questions concerning value.
T he p o in t o f  a neutral, value-free social science is that it enab les  us to  m an ipu­
late the social environm ent to  our advantage. U nless the positiv ist theories are ab le  to 
yield such p o licy  conclusions there does no t appear to  be any  justification  for adop t­
ing the po sitiv is t approach to  social science. It is th is argum ent tha t is a t the root o f 
P opper’s m ethodology o f  scientific explanation. It w ill be recalled  that Popper expli­
citly  stated  tha t the positivist approach to  science cou ld  no t be inferred from  an 
exam ination  o f  the subject-m atter, but w as a proposal fo r a  conven tion  to  dem arcate 
science from  non-science. T he question  is less  w he ther P opparian  positivism  is 
‘co rrec t’ th an  w hether his proposal w ould be useful. W e have suggested  that the p ro­
posed conven tion  m ay not be useful in social science because social science deals 
w ith q uestions o f  m otivations w hich m ay  not be susceptib le to  observation and 
falsification.
O ur specia l concern is, o f  course, w ith  econom ics. T he particu la r problem  w hich 
the orthodox , positiv ist econom ists had to  deal w ith, bo th  in the substan tive econom ic 
theory an d  in  the positivist m etatheory, is that the sort o f  teleo log ica l, m eans/end
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approach  w hich is  necessary to  exam ine m otivation o b jec tive ly  contains a tendency 
to  y ie ld  results favouring econom ic planning. T h is m eans th a t laissez-faire has to be 
ju stif ie d  objectively, and the task  o f  ju stify ing  bo th  positiv ism  and laissez-faire 
p roved  to  be im possible. T he basis o f  the problem  is tha t a  justification fo r laissez- 
fa ire  involves a  subjective theory based  on a m ethodological individualist approach, 
w hereas the justification fo r positivism  requires a social, ob jec tive policy  conclusion. 
O rth o d o x  econom ics has never m anaged  to  reconcile these  tw o.
In  th e  m eta-theoretica l sphere, the attem pts a t reconciliation  usually involved 
som e w eakening  o f  the strict observational aspects o f  positiv ism , such as  a  claim  to 
have in sig h t into ‘hum an nature’ a s  w ith  utilitarianism , o r  R obb ins’ claim  to  theorise 
‘eco n o m ic  hum an’. N either w as ab le  to  derive a  social con c lu sio n  from  their theories. 
T h e  u tilitarian  theory w as incapable o f  being  operationalised . T h e  R obbins ra tionality 
postu la te led  to  an  analytic theo ry , since econom ic ac tio n  w as identified w ith  
‘sc ien tific ’, m eans/end action. W e  ca n n o t draw  p o licy  conclusions from  such a  
theory .
N onetheless, the rationality  postu la te cannot be avo ided  i f  laissez-faire is to  be 
defended  on  positiv ist grounds. T h e  m ethodological in strum entalists  actually rem ain 
c lo se ly  tied  to the position o f  R obb ins. If, as fo r F riedm an , theo ry  is  an  irrelevance 
and  a ll th a t counts are the resu lts —  th e  accuracy o f  pred ic tions —  it is  no t c le a r why 
eco n o m ic  planners should no t be in  a  position  to  em p lo y  these  predictions directly  fo r 
p o licy  recom m endations. T he po in t o f  R obbins’ ra tiona lity  postu late is  to  focus on 
subjective valuations as  a  defense o f  laissez-faire. F ried m an ’s  m ethodology concerns 
an  objective testing o f  results, w h ich  cannot be u sed  to  defend  laissez-faire. N ot 
surp rising ly , the track record o f  ec o n o m ists1 on p red ic tion  is  n o t very  im pressive.
T h e  teleological, m eans/end approach  to social sc ience  also  presum es tha t the 
re la tionsh ip  betw een (objective) m eans and (subjec tive) en d s is fixed. In fac t this 
need n o t be the case —  ends can a lso  be a m eans fo r  a  subsequent end, and by the 
sam e to k en  m eans m ay be v iew ed a s  prev ious ends. T h is  resu lts  in  the possibility
1 A s opposed to statisticians
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tha t the m eans m ay not them selves be neutral, bu t can have values attached  to them 
independently . ^
T his was not a  problem  when the m eans/end  schem e was o rig inally  formulated 
by  M ill. The utilitarians believed all values w ere capable o f  m easurem ent. This 
schem e could not be im plem ented, for in order to  derive a  social u tility  from the indi­
v idual utilities a  un it o f  account was required, w hich  effec tive ly  m ean t that utilitari­
an ism  could only be operative in so far as utility  cou ld  be m easured  by m oney.
T his o f  course m eant that non-m onetary u tilities w ere ignored, and  that utilities 
tha t w ere directly  social (“ com m ons” ) cou ld  no t be com pared w ith  the utilities of 
individuals. W e cannot move from  the econom ic to  the w ider social framework. 
Furtherm ore the problem s in deriving an aggregate optim um  w ithin th e  sphere o f the 
econom ic itse lf are insurm ountable. In particu la r the utilitarian philosophy, and the 
m arginalist econom ics derived from it, con ta ins a particular theory  o f  distribution 
w hich  tends tow ards egalitarianism . In order to  defend  laissez-faire the philosophy 
had  to  be w eakened, initially by denying the in terpersonal com parisons o f  utility, and 
la ter by sw itching to  ordinal utility, ostensibly to  m ove to  m ore observable concepts. 
In  both  cases, the abandonm ent o f  the unit o f  accoun t resu lted  in an  inability  to derive 
a  social optim um  from  individual subjective ac tions.
T he only group  o f  econom ists to com e close  to  deriv ing  social conclusions from 
th e  individual analysis could be said to  be the neo-classics, but even  they  could not 
find a way out o f  th e  problem  o f  obtaining an objec tive , laissez-faire conclusion from 
subjective analysis. In effect, by concentrating on long-term  ob jec tive costs and 
d irec tly  on social value the neo-classics avoided  the problem  o f  subjective value alto­
gethe r, but having avoided the whirlpool they  are then im paled on  the rocks o f 
econom ic planning: i f  the social optim um  is m easurable objec tive ly  then  planning is 
justified.
T he use o f  ordinal utility appeared to  rescue  econom ics both from  charges o f 
using  non-observational, non-positivist concepts in their subjective theory , and from 2
2 See also the concept o f intermediate goods below.
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the need  to consider the egalitarian effects o f  interpersonal com parisons o f utility. 
U nfo rtunately  the theo ry  then becom es static in  nature, and no lo n g er allow s us to  
d ra w  policy conclusions. In addition, the social op tim um  becom es indeterm inate. A t 
a n y  even t it is fa r from  clear that the new  ord inal utility  is any m ore observable than 
th e  o ld  cardinal utility .
A gain, som e w elfare econom ists p roposed  that w e considered th e  idea o f  social 
u tility  directly , but could  not explain w hy som e form  o f  planning co u ld  no t then take 
p lac e . If  laissez-faire is  to  be defended, this canno t be done on the g ro u n d s o f  positive 
sc ien c e . T he 1930’s  ‘L ondon debate ' show ed th is up w ell. I f  we are to  posit social 
w e lfa re  functions, o r objective costs im puted from  objec tive values, th e n  it is indeed 
p o ssib le  to devise centralised  planned schem es to allocate resources correctly . The 
1 9 3 0 ’s m arket socialists  w ere simply taking the o rthodox econom ists a t  their word. If  
th e  m echanism  o f  the m arket did show up incorrec t p ricing  by shortages o r surpluses, 
th en  there is no real need  or function for the en trepreneur. S im ilarly, i f  the producer 
k n o w s  in advance tha t m axim um  revenue (and  the socially optim al strategy) will 
ac c ru e  when production is altered so that m arginal cost equals m arginal revenue, the 
p ro d u c er is acting sim ply  as a manager, and  can  equa lly  well be em ployed  by the 
sta te .
T his position is unassailable w ithin the o rthodox theory. In o rd e r  to  attack the 
id ea  o f  planning the idea  o f an objective social op tim um  has to  be je ttisoned . The 
A u strian  critique w as precisely that the static theory  w hich  the w e lfare  econom ists 
p u t forw ard  was o f  n o  use w hatever in considering  real-life ec o n o m ic  questions, 
w h ich  concerned reactions to change. N o change ever occurs in the o rthodox  theories 
—  all possibility o f  change has been e lim inated  from  the analysis. E a c h  econom ic 
a c to r  has a given set o f  alternatives, has perfec t know ledge, all m ark e t equilibria 
o c c u r  sim ultaneously and  so on. Indeed, fo r a d iscip line supposedly based  around 
ch o ic e , few  decisions seem  to be made.
O f  course, the m ove towards static ra tional-choice theory w as cau sed  by the 
n ee d  to  dem onstrate ob jec tive ly  how a  social op tim um  is derived, a n d  m uch o f  the
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w eakness o f  orthodox theo ry  occurred because o f  the attem pt to  avo id  ethical, d istri­
butional theories. T he A ustrians realised th is task  w as im possible, and  m et the ques­
tion o f  ob jec tive theory h ea d  on. T heir’s w as a  norm ative approach , and they w ere 
quite  prepared  to  deal w ith  questions o f  d istribu tion  and  the legal and  political struc­
ture. O u r criticism  o f  the A ustrians is not th a t d y n am ic  questions an d  norm ative ques­
tions o f  d istribu tion  and law  fall outside th e  purv iew  o f  econom ics, but that the 
answ ers tha t are pu t fo rw ard  are incorrect. W hile th e ir critique o f  static orthodox 
theory is  valid , their attem p t to  derive a  social theo ry  from  individual rationality lacks 
cogency, and  degenera tes in to  a  social D arw in ist defense o f the status quo.
F or the A ustrians, the real problem s o f  ec o n o m ic s  revolved around responses to 
change, in particu lar the developm ents o f  new  goods. T he o rthodox conception o f  a 
choice betw een given a lternatives w ould ap p e ar to  them  not to  address any questions 
o f  real-econom y w hatsoever. T he A ustrians w ou ld  refuse to accep t that the subjective 
u tilities o f  individuals co u ld  ev e r be know n at a ll. Each individual item o f  an 
econom ic good w ould, they  believe, have a  un ique com bination  o f  elem ents —  be it 
location, quality  o r even  packag ing  —  w hich  m ak es it desirable to  the individual. T he 
A ustrian  v iew  o f  the en trep reneur is therefore d iffe ren t to  the ‘m anagerial’ view  o f 
the o rthodoxy. The en trep ren eu r is v iew ed as  a  p rim e m over, a s  it w ere, an innovator 
o f  new  goods and a taker o f  risks.
T h is critique o f  the orthodoxy  seem s co g en t, particu larly  w hen  one considers the 
production  o f  capital g oods w here m inor varia tions  in  quality , delivery  o r location 
can be crucial. T he prob lem  is m oving from  th is  cr itique to  a  general social theory. 
T he A ustrian  theory seem s to  require an equa l access to capita l funds in order to  
explain inequality  in  te rm s o f  en trepreneurial ta len t. T his im p lies unlim ited cred it 
(c .f. the concept o f  perfec t know ledge o f  the orthodoxy), w hich is  clearly nonsensi­
cal. W ithout this elem ent, the A ustrians are u nab le  to  deal w ith  the possibility  o f  
m arket pow er, since the assum ption  o f  un lim ited  cred it had the function  o f  elim inat­
ing the possibility  o f  any  barriers  to  m arket en try .
O ne o f  the hallm arks o f  Social D arw inian  theo ry  is that it o n ly  gives post-hoc
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ra tionalisa tions o f  events. W e can see  this in  the A ustrian theo ry  w hen we ask w hat 
exactly th e  en trepreneur does to ju s tify  inequalities o f incom e —  especially  between 
different en trepreneurs, since one w ould  p resum e that the risks invo lved  would even 
ou t after tim e. T he Austrians —  especially  M ises  —  posit som e id ea  o f  entrepreneu­
rial “ ta len t” , bu t w ithout ever specify ing  w h a t th is talen t is  to  co n sis t of. It appears 
that the unequal rew ards are used to  show  th e  existence o f  en trepreneurial talent, 
ra ther than  the talen t justifying the inequality .
I f  w e are to  em brace norm ative theory  an d  deny the desirab ility  o f  an objective 
econom ics, th en  w e m ust also re jec t artificial boundaries to academ ic  disciplines and 
accept the no tion  o f  an  integrated social theo ry . T he A ustrians a re  unab le  to  success­
fully ob tain  such  a  social theory from  their ra tional ind iv idualism . A s the American 
Institutionalists pointed out, the ind iv idual ac tions were, th em selv es  determ ined 
socially, e ith e r  through the need fo r socially  constructed ru les o r  th rough social and 
culturally  dete rm ined  habits o f th o u g h t T h ey  cla im ed that the u se  o f  rationality  pos­
tulates and  the attem pt to  derive a ll social conclusions from  th e  individual actions 
rendered econom ic theories based on  m ethodological ind iv idualism  inoperative.
W hile th is  critique is  correct, w e w ou ld  again  criticise th e  substan tive theory 
derived from  i t  M any  institutionalists re v ert to  an  objective b as is  fo r  value, w hich is 
untenable. V eb len ’s  critique o f  ra tiona lity , fo r  exam ple, is  p lay e d  fa r  too strong. 
W hile w e w ou ld  accept that hum an natu re sh o u ld  be regarded as  m alleable , V eblen’s 
theory is som ew hat determ inistic. A t tim es h e  seem s to  suggest th a t  th e  w ants o f  indi­
viduals are a lm o st totally artificial. C erta in ly  th e  notion th a t w ith o u t the cultural 
m anipulation o f  the vested in terests no  shortage o f  goods and  serv ices  w ould ex ist 
seem s unjustified. W ithout such shortages th e re  w ould, o f  co u rse , be little need for 
econom ic theory .
V eblen  w a s o f  the view that th e  en tire  ec o n o m y  could  be ru n  by  engineers. The 
A ustrians show ed  clearly  that the p roblem s o f  econom y w ere n o t technical questions 
that could  b e  so lved  by engineers. M itchell w e n t a  differen t ro u te  to  try  to  obtain an 
objective basis  fo r value. He looked to  psychology to  give an  o b jec tiv e  account o f
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m a rk e t forces. T h is , again, seem s to  suggest an  unw arranted  b e lie f  in determ inism . 
O n c e  th is ob jec tive know ledge has been secured, M itchell seem s to  believe, w e 
w o u ld  be in a position  to undertake planning . O ur a rgum en t here is that su ch  
k n o w led g e  cannot be m ade objec tive , but is subjective and  inscru tab le .
T h is is the reason  w hy A yres ' scheme is also  doom ed to  fa ilure. Although m ore  
re a lis tic  than V e b le n ’s system , the valuations needed to  ad just m arket price w ou ld  
s im p ly  be non-existen t, since these values are  subjective. A yres  has underestim ated 
th e  p roblem s o f  such planning. A yres c la im ed tha t “ goo d  m ilk  m akes healthy  
b a b ie s ” , im plying tha t questions o f  the quality  of, fo r ex am p le , m ilk can be so lved  
o b jec tiv e ly . G ood m ilk  m ay indeed  m ake healthy  babies, but on ly  if  it can be tra n ­
s p o rte d  to  them , packaged and stored  correc tly  and so  on . T h is  is the ‘ca lcu lation  
p ro b le m ’ w hich w e considered in chapter three. Furtherm ore com m odities, as th e  
A u s trian s  so em phatically  m aintained, m ay be o f  identical quality  but still no t be 
hom ogeneous: any  variation in location  or availab ility  w ould be sufficient to  d iffe ren ­
tia te  betw een them . M ilk availab le a t noon is a  d ifferen t econom ic  good to one av a il­
a b le  in  the evening , particularly  for, say, w orking  parents. It is unclear how  th e  
m a rk e t is to be ‘a d ju sted ’ to take all these (unknow n) varia tions in to  account.3
A yres certain ly  oversteps th e  mark in ex tending  the idea  o f  objective value to  
p o litic a l and aesthetic  values. T h is  is  a  re-run o f  B entham , and  such a  system ca n n o t 
be operationalised . B ut nonetheless we should attem pt to  g ive som e account o f  th e  
non-econom ic  structures in our social theory. T his is the fa iling  o f  J.R .Com m ons. 
W h ile  he is correc t to  poin t out th e  legal backdrop  o f  m arket transactions (and indeed  
th is  contribu tion  is  o f  great im portance), he is sim ply naive in  im agin ing  that the ju d i­
c ia ry  —  or indeed the legislature w hich m akes the law s the ju d ic ia ry  are to  en fo rce 
—  is  a  com pletely neutral body. A s M iller po in ted  out, w e ca n n o t sim ply assum e th a t 
c o r re c t  law s will be enacted. If  w e are to  consider norm ative po litical econom y, w e 
m u s t attem pt an accoun t o f all areas o f  social theory.
3 I t  is also not always d e a r  what does make well babies. Ayres was w riting before the days of 
Thalidom ide etc.
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T he con tribu tions o f  the A m erican  Institu tionalists w ere nonetheless s ig n if ican t 
Firstly they  raised th e  en tire  question  o f  ra tionality  and the m alleability  o f  hum an  
nature. T hey  also b ro u g h t the question  o f  technology into the fram e. B ut possib ly  the 
m ost significant co n trib u tio n  w as to  sh o w  that even  a so-called  laissez-faire econom y 
was re lian t upon a  le g a l structure. G iv en  th is, it becom es fa r from  obvious w h y  one 
set o f  property righ ts ra th e r  than an o th e r should  be enacted. T he so-called  ‘la w s’ o f  
m arket forces w ere th em se lv es  the re su lts  o f  legislation.
It w as for this re a s o n  that the N e w  Institu tionalists tried  to  show  how  such  legal 
and political in s titu tio n s  cou ld  be deriv ed  from  the actions o f  rational ind iv iduals. 
W hile the theories p ro fessed  to  o ffe r a  m ore realistic approach  to econom ic th eo ry , 
they ac tually  deliver a  s im ilar analy tic  analysis and conclusions w hich are ju s t  a s  
vacuous as orthodox econom ics.
T he very  notion o f  a  ‘p o licy  sc ience’ has w ith in  it  an  im plied  political theory . F ay  
referred to  th is as th e  “ sublim ation  o f  po litic s” , in that the notion  o f  technical so lu ­
tions to  social p ro b lem s w ould e x c lu d e  non-technicians from  partic ipation  in  the 
decision-m aking p ro c ess . T h a t is  to  s a y  tha t th e  very concep t o f  positive social s c i­
ence is  politically  lo a d e d , and  m itiga tes aga inst partic ipa tory  dem ocracy . A  re jection  
o f  positiv ist social “ sc ie n c e ”  ap p e ars  to im p ly  an accoun t o f  such a  d em ocratic  
theory. W e w ould h o w e v e r re jec t th e  libertarian  political theory . W e noted  in  p a rtic u ­
lar how  H ayek a ttem p ted  to  provide a  m oral justification  fo r laissez-faire by sug g est­
ing a  lim ited m orality  w h ich  exc luded  involuntary  regulation. W e suggested  th is  lim ­
itation w a s unw arran ted  and  arb itrary , and  th a t it  led  to  perverse conclusions. W e 
w ould argue that bo th  th e  negative freedom  o f  H ayek and  a lso  the positive freedom  
o f access to  resources is  necessary fo r  th e  effec tive freedom  o f  individuals.
W e have seen th a t  the exchange m echanism  requires a  legal backdrop, and  w e 
have also noted the m alleab ility  o f  h u m an  nature. T he question  is  no t w he ther w e 
should ‘in terfere’ w ith  the m arket, s in ce  “ the m arket”  is a  social institu tion  in  the 
first place. T he th eo rie s  and p rogram m es w e should  w ork  on  w ould involve show ing
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how  individuals could  identify w ith  a  political structure w hich  w ill be ab le  to estab­
lish and adequately control an e x c h a n g e  m echanism  is possible. O f particu lar interest 
w ould be the areas w here pecun iary  m easurem ent o f  ‘the goo d  life’ o r  o f  ‘the good’ 
is no t possible, such as “ com m ons” , non-com m odity e lem en ts, com m odities and ser­
v ices w here the contracting partie s lac k  relevant in fo rm ation  and so  on . O f vital 
im portance w ould be political d e c is io n s  on  distribution. T h ese  are the so rt o f ques­
tions a  participatory dem ocratic p o litic a l econom y w ou ld  face, but w e w ould also 
w ish  to investigate the m anner in w h ic h  individuals w ould  iden tify  their ow n welfare 
w ith  tha t o f  the com m unity: we m u s t  attem pt a socio logical account o f  com m unity. 
T his o f  course also im plies that w e ex a m in e  the boundaries th a t could b e  placed on 
such a com m unity  both geograph ica lly  and  culturally  (w h a t should be tolerated), and 
also  th a t w e consider the links b e tw e e n  such com m unities. O ne m ajor link  will, o f 
course, occur through the exchange o f  goods and services.
T hese are the tasks w e face.
n
S om e o f  the conclusions w e have a r r iv e d  a t have been  b o rne  ou t by contem porary 
events. T he present au thor does n o t v ie w  it as co incidental th a t both th e  rise o f  the 
G reen  m ovem ent and the falling f r o m  favour o f  centra lly -p lanned  econom ies have 
occurred  a t the sam e tim e. B oth ca n  b e  v iew ed as a  reaction  to  the failure o f  positive 
econom ics to  offer solu tions to the p ro b le m  o f  finding th e  socially  optim al allocation 
o f  resources. T he problem  o f  en v iro n m e n t shows up  w e ll th e  shortcom ings o f ortho­
dox econom ics (and cannot be a d e q u a te ly  dealt w ith  b y  th e  A ustrian form ulation), 
and  also the trajectory o f  the m o v e m e n t has highlighted the perceived link  between 
the econom y and the political a n d  so cia l institutions. T h is  w as m irrored in the 
changes in  Eastern Europe, and the re a lisa tio n  that cen tral p lanning w as literally  not 
able to  deliver the goods reinforced th e  v iew  that the p o sitiv is t planning conclusions
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have failed. U nfortunately, the link betw een p la n n in g  and  positive science, and the 
link betw een orthodox econom ics and  p lanning h a v e  n o t y e t been m ade.
T he fa ilings o f  centrally  planned system s a re  leg io n , and have been  w ell docu­
m ented by A lec N ove and others.4 T he  U SSR  sy s te m  in particular w as doom ed to 
failure, as the centrally  controlled econom y w as p la n n e d  in  term s o f  physica l units. In 
m any w ays the system  resem bled th a t proposed b y  V eb len . W ithout th e  use o f  som e 
com m on denom inator o r unit o f  account, and w ith o u t ev e n  the sligh test h in t o f  defer­
ence to consum er sovereignty, the en tire  en te rp rise  w a s  doom ed from  the start:
Basically, the central plan gives exclusive emphasis to p roduction targets in terms o f single quantities. 
As a result, the individual enterprise is often ignorant o f  p rec ise  requirements. For example, plan- 
fulfillment targets in terms o f square meters in the textile sec to r can lead to the production o f  an exces­
sive amount o f thin, fragile cloth. The firm tries to achieve th e  target in quantitative terms, knowing or 
not knowing that the cloth is too thin. If the target is expressed in  terpis o f weight, the tendency will be 
to produce cloth that is too heavy. [Hodgson 1984 p.102]
T he central plan w as invariably overw helm ed by  th e  n ecessity  o f  such  detail:
Thus when window-glass was planned in tons it was too th ick  and  heavy; so they shifted the plan 
‘indicator’ to square m eters, whereupon it became too thin. C om m on sense tells us that glass should be 
thick o r thin according to the circumstances o f its use, but su ch  detail is not and can n o t b e  within the 
cognisance o f  the central planning organs. Aggregation is a  ‘m u st’ if  next year’s  plan is  to  be drafted 
before the end o f  the century. [Nove 1980 p.6, cited ibid.]
D em ocracy is not re levant to th is problem : “ S u ch  d is to r tio n s  could  o cc u r in  the m ost 
dem ocratic o f  centrally  planned system s.”  [ibid.]
A t no tim e do the producers in  the econom y ta k e  cognisance o f  the consum ers. 
Furtherm ore, a t no tim e are there any  cro ss -v a lu a tio n s  betw een d iffe ren t com m odi­
ties: each qu o ta  is  o f  necessity  given  in  isolation. N o  adjustm ent o f  p roduc tion  o r sup­
ply is possible. T his is, as we suggested earlier, o f  p a rtic u la r significance in  the pro­
duction o f  capital goods. Stories o f  sh ipm ents o f  m achine-parts w ith  incorrect 
threads, o r o f  goods being stranded in  the w ro n g  p a r t  o f  the country  are com raon-
see e.g. N ove [1980], and Nove [1984].
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place. B ecau se  th e re  is  no exchange m echanism , the planners requ ire  a n  im possibly 
vast array  o f  tec h n ic a l know ledge to m ake the p lan  workable.
In  a  sen se , th e  responses o f  the orthodox econom ists to  en v iro n m e n t consists of 
adding a  p lan n in g  supplem ent to their theory .5 B y assum ing e v e ry th in g  h a s  a price, 
the p roblem  o f  env ironm en t appears to  be a  technical question o f  so -c a lle d  ‘externali­
ties’. T h e  p ro b lem  is  reduced to that o f  allocating ‘ex te rnal’ costs and b e n e f its  to indi­
viduals.
T h e  tec h n ic a l solu tions usually revolve around treating n o n -trad ed  g o o d s as if  
they had  b een  tra d e d  and allocating a price to them  [Ball 1979 p.68], o r  a lternatively  
ad justing  the m a rk e t price to  a  ‘correct’ level by taxation. T his las t a p p ro a c h  espe­
cially  is re m in isc e n t o f  Ayres: the m arket is retained, but prices are a d ju s te d  to make 
the techn ical v a lu e  equa l the pecuniary value. #
A y res , th o u g h , w as proposing these adjustm ents throughout the e c o n o m y . The 
o rthodox ec o n o m is ts  are proposing such  alterations to  m arket p rices a s  a  supplem ent 
to  the m ark e t ec o n o m y . T his m akes the boundary betw een m arket and  p l a n  arbitrary: 
there ap p e ars  to  b e  no reason fo r incorporating environm ent and  e x c lu d in g  other 
non-com m odity  concep tions  o f  the good life. I t  is  also fa r  from  c le a r  h o w  the distri­
butive e ffec ts  o f  th e  price adjustm ents should be d ealt w ith , o r  even  w h y  th e  planners 
should s ta rt fro m  th e  distributive status quo. Indeed, if  trade is  no t n e c e s s a ry  fo r die 
va luation  o f  g o o d s , then it could be asked w hy the econom ist should  re q u ir e  market 
valuation  a t  a ll. W h y  stick to  the planning o f  externalities?
S ince th e  v alua tions  o f  the planners are actually  arbitrary, the f ig u re s  that have 
been p u t fo rw ard  b y  such m ethods as C ost-benefit A nalysis and sh ad o w  p ric in g  have 
frequently  been  so m ew h at strange. T he official price o f  life  in  B rita in  i n  th e  1970’s 
w as 9 000  p o u n d s , w hich m eant am ong o ther things tha t a  plane w a s ‘w o r th ’ more 
than th e  p a sse n g ers- a  p ilo t w ho is in difficulty should p re su m a b ly  ditch the 
passengers and  sa v e  the plane [see Ball 1979J. T he actual use o f  C B A  appears to
5 For a  more detailed analysis o f environmental issues in the light o f the analysis presented 
here see M ulberg [1990].
Mulberg: Social Limits to Economic Theory 205
reflect the values o f  the p lanners  r a th e r  than  any objective values, but its use does 
serve an ideological function , in  th a t  it  legitim ises these political values by giving 
them  the sheen  o f  ‘scien tific’ o b jec tiv ity .
T h is ideological func tion  h as  b e e n  recognised and re jected  by m any w ithin the 
G reen  m ovem ent. T he m ovem en t h a s  linked  the political structure and the need fo r 
partic ipa tory  dem ocracy  w ith  th e  n e e d  to account fo r non-traded  conceptions o f  ‘the 
g ood’ since its  ea rliest concep tion , a n d  m uch o f  its polem ic explicitly  links the d isre­
gard  o f  non-com m odity  e lem en ts  o f  th e  good life w ith  cultural m anipulation and 
econom ic and  political pow er.
T hese facto rs tend to  su g g est th a t  the days o f form alised  econom ic analysis 
based upon narrow  concep tions o f  ra tio n a lity  are num bered. It has long been recog­
n ised  that the w orld  o f  perfec t k n o w led g e  inhabited by th$ orthodox econom ists bore 
little  re la tion  to  reality , bu t w e h av e  se e n  above that the theory  is  incapable o f  re lax­
ing  the increasingly  s tringen t assu m p tio n s  that are necessary fo r social policy to be 
derived. T he orthodox theory  is  a n a ly tic  in  nature, and ca n n o t be used to  obtain pol­
icy  recom m endations- even  i f  th e  le g a l  and environm ental boundaries o f  the theory 
are ignored . Such a  science ca n n o t b e  justified. Indeed, it  is  very  notable how die 
‘righ t-w ing’ politic ians invariab ly  in v o k e  A ustrian theory in  preference to the ortho­
doxy w hen they  attem pt polem ica l ju s tif ica tio n  o f th e ir po litical policies, a  good 
exam ple o f  th is  being the fo rm er B rit ish  P rim e M inister’s invocation  o f negative free­
dom  as a  defence  o f  laissez-faire, a n d  h e r  denial o f the very  ex istence o f  such a  thing 
as “ society” . A part from  an y th ing  e ls e ,  there appears to  be a  clear perception o f  a 
po litical theo ry  behind the p o licy  recom m endations, and  a  be lie f tha t the econom ics 
involved  is  n o t neutral.
O u r cr itique also suggests the n e e d  to m ove aw ay from  the recen t trend tow ards 
q uan titative analysis. T he ex p lo sio n  in  quantitative w ork can  be said  to  have largely 
resu lted  through the influence o f  K e y n e s  and  to an  ex ten t M itchell. O ur criticism  
here - and also  it should be n o ted  in  th e  w orks o f the A ustrians - is  that such research 
is  o f  no in terest unless the po litica l q u e s tio n s  o f  valuations are d ealt w ith, and these,
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as we have said throughout, are not technical q u e s tio n s . Hayek, indeed, has been crit­
ical o f  the very idea  o f  m acroeconom ic ind ica to rs .6 A ga in , such m atters as obtaining 
a sing le indicator o f  inflation appear to  be tec h n ic a l questions, but are actually ques­
tions o f  the aggregation o f individual valua tions in to  a social value - tha t is, like 
value theory, they are political questions in  a  te c h n ic a l guise; and indeed the answ ers 
are frequently m anipulated by those w ith  po litica l p o w er.
I f  mainstream  econom ics and quantitative a n a ly s is  are to  be replaced, w hat is to 
rep lace them ? T he m ain thrust o f  o u r argum en t a b o v e  w as that the key  area is  the 
question o f  aggregation —  o f  m oving from  in d iv id u a l to social value. T his question 
o f  is  central to m odels o f  m arket socialism , and  a ls o  to  questions o f  environm ent, 
w hich is  why this dissertation has been titled  afte r th e  sem inal w ork  o f  H irsch [1977]. 
H irsch showed that, in  contrast to  the theories o f  b o th  the orthodox econom ists and 
the A ustrians, the process o f  aggregation o f  in d iv id u a l actions into a  social system  is 
far from  straightforw ard, and can lead to  u n d esira b le  results. Follow ing a Veblenian 
approach, Hirsch c la im s that m any g oods are  w h a t  he term s “ positional”  goods, 
w hich  obtain value on ly  in so fa r as they are n o t p o ssessed  by others. Such goods by 
definition cannot be w idely d istributed, and  can  in  fac t be regarded as having an 
absolute scarcity. T h ese  positional goods can  o n ly  b e  distributed by ration. T he pro­
duction o f  such g oods therefore involves d is tr ib u tio n a l questions, and m ust be 
decided upon by the polity: the use o f  a  pu re ly  e c o n o m ic  approach will be increas­
ingly insufficient to  analyse the production o f  th ese  go o d s. T he particular significance 
o f  the concept o f  positional goods lies in  its  ap p lica tio n  to  the en v iro n m e n t Else­
w here [M ulberg 1987] I have argued that th e  re v e rse  analysis also holds, and that all 
goods w hich are absolutely scarce are also  socia lly  sca rce . Environm ental resources 
fall u nder this heading. As the scarcity  o f  en v iro n m e n ta l resources grow s, they will 
increasingly take on  the character o f  positional g o o d s , and as such w ill no t be ade­
quate ly  allocated by th e  exchange m echanism . T h e  con c lu sio n  o f th is line o f
6 As a  consequence, we might expect to see increasing contradictions between the basis for 
policy and the polemical justifications by right-wing politicians.
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argum ent is tha t considering  how  m arket prices o f  en v iro n m en ta l resources should be 
adjusted is a  w holly inadequate approach , and that the ana lysis o f  positional environ­
m ental resources requires political and  social theory as w ell a s  th e o rie s  o f  economy.
Q uestions o f  aggregation also ar ise  in other gu ises. W e h a v e  looked a t applica­
tions o f gam e theory w here the theorists  have a ttem pted  to  sh o w  how  an optimum 
aggregate (socia l) solution can  be obtained , and saw  th at these  w e re  far from cogent. 
W hat is m ore cogent is H irsc h 's  cla im  that o ften  ind iv idual ac tio n s  are actually 
second-best decisions caused  by reactions to o ther ind iv iduals. H irsc h  develops this 
argum ent into a  concept o f  defensive, com pensatory ex p e n d itu res . T he defensive 
actions are no t valued in them selves, bu t are undertaken as a  c o s t  to  com pensate for 
other, undesirable actions. L eipert believes that ‘ ‘to  an  [ever] in c re as in g  extent, GN P 
contains transactions w hich  as such cannot be g iv en  a  p o s itiv e  value and whose 
activity lies on ly  in their function  o f  repairing  dam age b ro u g h t a b o u t by econom ic 
ac tiv ities.”  [Leipert 1986 original em phasis]
W e can see this w hen w e consider the concept o f  intermediate goods. This is a 
corollary o f  th e  problem  w e raised ea rlie r in the chap ter c o n c e rn in g  the relativity o f 
m eans and ends. W e consum e m any g oods not as en d s in th em se lv es , but as a m eans 
to obtain the final good. O n e  buys petro l to travel, bu t a rise in  th e  consum ption o f 
petrol caused by traffic queues does no t increase w elfare . T h e  p a y o ff to  H irsch’s 
analysis is firstly that the aggregate m easurem ent o f  w elfare is  n o t straightforward 
and m ay even  be im possible, and a lso  tha t econom ic po licy  m u s t b e  considered at the 
social level.
T his last m ay well p rove  to  be th e  m ore w ide-ranging  c h a n g e  in political econ­
om y. If  w e have necessarily  to  conduct analysis a t th e  level o f  th e  social and o f the 
polity, we m ust give an accoun t o f  these. T he need fo r a  n o rm ativ e  theory m eans that 
the econom ist m ust, as w e saw  in the p rev ious chapter, venture in to  the field o f politi­
cal theory. Furtherm ore, in  order to  accoun t both fo r the p o litic a l structure and also 
for the ac tiv ities w ithin th e  exchange m echanism  - such as  th e  manipulation o f 
dem and and the production o f  w aste - the political econom ist m u s t  also  venture into
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the arena o f  social theory.
W e m u st exp la in  both fo rm al and inform al structu res in o rd e r to  exam ine th e  
input o f  ind iv idua ls into the social processes w hich  w ill dete rm ine the allocation o f  
resources a n d  th e  ru les o f  exchange, decisions w hich can  on ly  be m ade at the a g g re ­
gate level. T h is  im plies a m ovem ent aw ay  from  quan titative, formal economic 
analysis a n d  tow ards traditional sociology, dea ling  w ith  such questions as fam ily , 
alienation a n d  com m unity.
W e h av e  show n in the p ag e s  above how  any attem p t a t considering  eco n o m ic  
theory w ill invariab ly  run up  ag a in st social lim its. W e w ould  a lso  suggest tha t in  
order to  ex a m in e  these  social lim itations, the econom ist m u st also  becom e a  so cio lo ­
g is t
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